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The questions that I pose in this dissertation stem from witnessing the gentrification of 
my childhood neighborhood, West Town, in Chicago. Without the language to make 
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came and went. It was not until I commenced a journey towards concientazion —from 
undergraduate to graduate school—that I was afforded the language to make sense of 
those changes. For teaching me that language, I am forever indebted to the mentors, 
educators, colleagues, friends, and family that follow.  
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by queer Chicano men. I attribute that research with providing me the skills necessary to 
confront the intellectual rigors of this dissertation.  
 
As an undergraduate, I was also fortunate enough to be the recipient of Lisa M. Cacho’s 
stellar mentorship. I doubt that I will be able to convey my appreciation fully, but I owe 
her my eternal gratitude. My awakening into a critical consciousness, one that provided 
me with the language to reflect upon my lived experiences, was spurred by the 
intellectual guidance of Lisa. By encouraging my intellectual curiosities, she validated 
me in ways that allowed me to trust my own voice as a scholar. This has had a profound 
life-affirming impact on me that I aspire to mirror in my own teaching. As the first person 
who spoke to me about graduate school, she made me believe that I was capable of far 
more than I dared thought possible. For this reason, I will always think of her as my 
mentor. I would also like to thank Richard T. Rodríguez for playing an instrumental role 
in my decision to pursue graduate school. While in undergraduate school, Richard 
affirmed, encouraged, and validated my research interests in queer of color critique. Also, 
at the University of Illinois, I was lucky enough to participate in the McNair Scholars 
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Program under the direction of Priscilla Henderson Fortier and Michael L. Jeffries Sr. My 
participation in this program provided me with ample opportunities at research and other 
scholarly activities that I attribute as sparking my interest in graduate school.  
 
My dissertation and I have also benefitted from the professional and personal 
relationships I have formed at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. I am indebted to 
Noro Andriamanalina from the Community of Scholars Program for working towards my 
academic and professional success as a graduate student. Jasmine Tang and Katie Levin 
from the Writing Center have also proven invaluable in helping me nurture a daily 
writing practice. I am thankful to Paul Ching from the Center for Educational Innovation 
for his resourcefulness and continued professional support. At the University of 
Minnesota, I have been fortunate enough to have learned from the following individuals, 
either through course work, directed study, teaching assistantship, or casual conversation: 
Elliott Powell, David Karjanen, Bianet Castellanos, Brenda Kayzar, Jennifer Pierce, Rose 
Brewer, Yuichiro Onishi, Erika Lee, Catherine Squires, Jigna Desai, Tracy Ann Deutsch, 
David Valentine, Karen Ho, Kale B. Fajardo, Jeffrey R. Crump, and Lisa Park. At other 
institutions throughout the country, the following individuals have also played a role in 
the development of this project, either through their gracious feedback or amicable 
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Melamed, Lori Rodriguez, Christina B. Hanhardt, and David Román.  
 
I am appreciative of the boundless collegiality I have witnessed as a graduate student. 
The solidarity of my comrades has proven instrumental in forging ahead, especially 
during times of self-doubt. For that, I am endlessly beholden to Reina Rodríguez. Her 
friendship has emotionally and intellectually shaped me in ways that I will forever 
treasure. Brittany Lewis and Daniel Topete also played a pivotal role in the completion of 
this project through their gracious feedback and emotional support. I look forward to 
teaching all their critical interventions in my classes. In addition, I am filled with 
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Pegues, Gabriela Spears-Rico, and the members of my dissertation writing support group. 
I am also much obliged to the participants of the Critical Race and Ethnic Studies 
interdisciplinary graduate writing group for their generous feedback throughout the 
writing process. Outside the University of Minnesota, I am particularly appreciative of 
the bond I maintain with Natalie Lira, whose accord from undergraduate to graduate 
school and beyond has made this experience the more worthwhile. There is no one else 
with whom I would have liked to have shared this experience. I look forward to the 
academic adventures that await us. I would also like to acknowledge the close 
relationships born out of my days in Urbana-Champaign: Miranda Jiménez, Jessie 
 
 iii 
Avilez, Rafael Hernandez, Jose Luis Benavides, Daisy Guzman, and the memory of 
Nicole Chavez.  
 
I am grateful for the financial support that has enabled me to complete this dissertation, 
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Were it not for the support of my friends outside the university, this would have been a 
more trying experience. Colin Peterson, David Otero, James Flowers, Thomas McClain, 
and Jason Yorek have generously bestowed upon me endless amounts of compassion, 
encouragement, and humor. I have been lucky enough to share with them some of the 
best moments I have had in the Twin Cities. Because of them, my recollections of my 
time here will always be framed by utmost fondness. I am also indebted to the yoga 
community in the Twin Cities for teaching me about the power of breath in cycling 
through the challenges the universe—or academia—may present.  
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends and my family back home in Chicago. 
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My dissertation, From Vice to Nice: Race, Sex, and the Gentrification of AIDS, tracks the 
agency of white gay leaders in shaping urban politics in the 1980s vis-à-vis the 
racialization of public health discourses and practices. In the context of state indifference 
spurred by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, these leaders embraced racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene to articulate their Americanness. Because early in the epidemic, the racially 
coded language of public health represented the gay community as a threat to white 
Americans, gay community activists learned that meeting institutionalized-defined 
standards of moral health and sexual hygiene was a precondition for their social 
membership. However, in testifying on behalf of the gay community’s moral cleanliness, 
these leaders sublimated fears of perverse spaces, atypical gender roles, and deviant 
sexualities onto communities of color. Under neoliberalism, I argue that these racialized 
norms of sexual hygiene stood as yardsticks for Americanization. I underscore that 
racialized norms of sexual hygiene provided for the anesthetization and co-optation of 
gay radical politics and, in turn, gave form to what Lisa Duggan calls 
“homonormativity,” the normalization of white, middle-class class gay and lesbian 
politics of sexual respectability. Specifically, through a case study of the Twin Cities of 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, I uncover how homonormativity converged with wider agendas 
and policies encompassing the “cleaning-up” of public urban spaces such as low-income 
neighborhoods and vice districts, and the policing of its racial denizens such as “crack-
addicted” single black mothers, Hmong refugees, and Native American sex workers. 
Using multiple methods, including archival research, ethnographic fieldwork, and 
discourse analysis, I illustrate that public health constructions of normative gender, 
sexuality, and domestic space became powerfully intertwined with private development 
so that both institutions worked in the service of promoting the economically prosperous 
potential of post-industrial inner-cities as centers of business, culture, and tourism. 
Gentrification, I conclude, does not simply denote the privatization of public urban 
spaces. It also reflects attempts at the privatization of non-normative sexuality in the 
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Introduction. 
“Diversity is Welcome. Crime is Not:” Homeless Queer and Trans Youth of Color, White 
Homonormativity, and the Neoliberal Spatial Fix of Racial and Sexual Difference 
Introduction.  
On July 3, 2011, a 25-year-old black man was reportedly attacked and stabbed in 
the “gay neighborhood” of Boystown in Chicago, by a group of other black men. The 
attack was caught on video by a white, same-sex couple that witnessed the act from their 
apartment. Soon after the video’s release and widespread circulation, racial tensions that 
had been barely simmering below the surface erupted into heated debates surrounding the 
influx of homeless queer and trans youth of color to Boystown.1 Although violent crime 
had actually decreased in the neighborhood, residents perceived a rise in crime due to the 
presence of young people—mostly black and Latinx and often homeless—who socialized 
in and around the neighborhood.2 Under the cover of communicating anxiety about their 
own safety, residents—mostly white, male, and affluent—echoed racist and derogatory 
remarks about the LGBT youth. 
                                                
1 Homelessness affects queer youth at disproportionate rates. According to a study conducted by the 
Williams Institute, the LGBT Homeless Youth Provider Survey, about 40 percent of all homeless youth are 
LGBT, although statistically they make up 10 percent of that population segment. The National Law Center 
for Homelessness and Poverty adds that each year about 110,000 LGBTQ youth experience homelessness 
in the United States. A lack of affordable housing, family rejection, on-going drug use, lack of educational 
attainment, and unemployment account for the major reasons homelessness persists. In addition, homeless 
queer youth report higher rates of unsafe sexual behavior and sexual violence. “America’s Shame: 40% of 
Homeless Youth are LGBT Kids,” San Diego Gay and Lesbian News, Jul. 13, 2012.; “LGBTQ Youth,” 
The National Alliance to End Homelessness. 2016. http://www.endhomelessness.org/pages/lgbtq-youth.  
2 The Chicago Police Department reported although crime in the 23rd district, which includes Boystown, 
had increased, crime in eight categories—robbery, aggravated assault, battery, burglary, and theft—rates 
had actually decreased from a decade prior. Sam Worley, “The Battle in Boys Town,” The Chicago 
Reader, Jul. 14, 2011. 
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Three days after the incident, over 800 people—residents, business owners, queer 
and trans youth—packed the auditorium of a nearby school to attend a highly-anticipated 
CAPS (Community Alternative Policing Strategy) meeting. Many in the audience, 
representing the interests of residents and business owners, held signs that read: 
“Diversity is Welcome. Crime is Not.” Residents, including some self-appointed gay 
leaders, called on the local alderman and the district police commander to adequately 
address crime while youth speakers warned of the racial profiling to emerge should more 
police patrols be added.3 Members of GenderJUST (Justice United for Societal 
Transformation), a LGBT youth group, claimed that Boystown residents unfairly 
scapegoated LGBT youth who looked to Boystown as a haven.4  
As the premier gay commercial and residential district in the Midwest, Boystown 
houses upscale real estate, chic boutiques, hip bars, specialty restaurants, and trendy 
coffeehouses, many of which are gay-owned and operated. But, Boystown is also home 
to the Broadway Youth Center and the Center on Halsted, non-profit organizations that 
provide social services to queer and trans youth including after-school drop-in programs, 
counseling services, and STD testing.5 LGBT youth who access the services of these non-
profits travel from far-flung corners of the city, including the west and south sides—
                                                
3 Kate Sosin, “Hundreds pack into Boystown violence forum,” Windy City Times, Jul. 13, 2011. 
4 GenderJUST described itself as “a multi-generational, inter-generational grassroots organization, 
committed to developing the leadership and power of diverse LGBTQ Chicagoans through a commitment 
to racial, economic, and gender justice, and the vibrant resistance cultures of our communities.” 
GenderJUST, “On Bullying and School Violence,” QED: A Journal in GLBTQ Worldmaking, Inaugural 
Issue (2013): 43-48.  
5 The Center on Halsted is a $20 million, 65,000-sq. foot environmentally-friendly facility that opened in 
2007.  
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economically impoverished areas that also house the bulk of the city’s black and Latinx 
population.  
In response to the stabbing and the widespread circulation of the video, the same-
sex couple that videotaped the attack created a Facebook page, “Take Back Boystown,” 
an online space to draw attention to community fear about crime and to air frustration 
about LGBT youth. On the Facebook page, which was flanked by a rainbow pride flag, 
residents expressed concern that “their” neighborhood was being overrun by criminal 
elements. According to GenderJUST, the rhetoric of “taking back” illustrates how 
residents perceived Latinx but, in particular, blacks as being “always-outsiders.” Indeed, 
the page was marred with overt expressions of racism that underscored the racially 
charged nature of the debate. Some commentators on the Facebook page had even 
proposed that the Night Ministry, a non-profit organization that administered services to 
homeless youth, be prohibited from providing services to deter youth from flocking to the 
neighborhood.6  
The call to curtail social services resonated with demands by Boystown residents 
that the city step up its policing and surveillance of black and Latinx youth. One 
commentator, in conveying his frustration at the perceived wave of violence and the 
supposed complicity of these non-profit organizations, wrote on the Facebook page: 
                                                
6 For over 20 years, the Night Ministry had provided homeless youth with “food, safer-sex supplies, 
personal hygiene products, bandages, socks and underwear.” And, for the past 10 years, it had offered its 
services in front of the MB Financial Bank building, located in the heart of Boystown, twice a week with 
the approval of the branch manager. Kate Sosin, “Lakeview residents want Night Ministry bus out,” Windy 
City Times, Jul. 7, 2011.  
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I’m just sick and tired of the thugs coming here into this neighborhood and being 
violent and intimidating good hard working people…They’ve destroy their own 
neighborhoods and now they want to come here and do the same in our beautiful 
neighborhood. I agree everyone is should be welcome, but don’t come here and 
act like a animal and expect us to welcome you with open arms. (sic; emphasis 
added)7 
In a now deleted post, one commentator voiced a similar viewpoint, though in more 
explicit language:  
Boystown was built and created by gay whites with hard earned money years 
back to make Boystown a great neighborhood that it is today…Boystown was 
meant to be a happy place with open arms full of hugs and love for all of us gays 
who wanted a place to feel safe and have w/o the bullshit and crime. Its sad that 
Boystown has been taken advantage by these fucking savage monkeys. (sic; 
emphasis added)8 
The racist and classist language in both statements is quite explicit. But, these statements 
also allude to something else: the intertwining of racism and political economy. What 
draws my attention here is unpacking the resentful tone that underpins these 
commentaries. In both statements, residents expressed anger for having built a “beautiful 
neighborhood” with “hard work,” only now to have that threatened by the uncivilized and 
                                                
7 AFY_Samantha, “Stabbing caught on video in Boystown: Reaction,” Amplify: A Project of Advocates for 
Youth, Aug. 6, 2011.  
8 “Third Boystown Stabbing in as Many Weeks Caught on Video,” Huffington Post, Jul. 5, 2011. 
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deviant behaviors of these homeless queer and trans youth of color.9 Their commentaries 
suggest the high stakes of protecting the gay neighborhood from outside intrusions. 
Residents perceived the youth as threats because they materially undermined the promise 
of full citizenship actively sought by residents through housing conditions and living 
arrangements, all anchored to a culture and politics of homonormativity.  
These commentaries do not merely reveal the limitations of a rights-based 
movement for citizenship, benefits, and protections propelled by single-issue sexual 
identity politics. They also point to the significance of domestic space in the articulation 
of those rights-based claims. Because many of the youth are homeless, their material 
realities run incommensurate to homonormativity with its emphasis on discourses and 
practices of domesticity, consumerism, privacy, and respectability. Given its emphasis on 
consumption as civic duty, homonormativity is unable to make sense of homelessness as 
a structural issue. As such, it renders illegible the lived experiences of the youth, whom 
residents come to frame as idle, recalcitrant, and vulgar to justify their policing, 
surveillance, and, ultimately, banishment. Since the youth are perceived as lacking in 
self-entrepreneurial value—a central tenet of neoliberalism—they imperil the normative 
project of gay and lesbian national incorporation. For that reason, their removal from 
Boystown is deemed necessary, not because residents are necessarily racist, though that is 
                                                
9 Boystown acquired its status as a gay neighborhood in the 1970s and 1980s with an influx of white gay 
men to the area after being pushed out by increasing real estate prices in neighborhoods directly to the 
south, such as Old Town. With the addition of gay residents into the area, Boystown witnessed the 
establishment of gay-owned bars, bookstores, and other such businesses. During this time of transition, 
Boystown had a larger population of African-American residents. The 1980 census reported that 16 percent 
of the area’s residents were black. As property values increased in the 1980s following the gentrification of 
the neighborhood, Boystown became wealthier and whiter. Recent census estimates put the area’s black 
population at a meager 5 percent, while the white population shot up to 83 percent. Sam Worley, “The 
Battle in Boys Town,” The Chicago Reader, Jul. 14, 2011. 
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certain in cases, but rather because residents subscribe to an understanding of space—in 
particular, domestic and private—that is crucial to their wider campaign for social 
membership.  
In this dissertation, my orienting questions, thus, become: how and why did space 
accrue such a significance for the gay community? And, generally speaking, of what 
political utility is domestic space in the articulation of normativity for marginalized 
communities? Understanding these questions provide us with greater insight into similar 
debates that have raged throughout the country in regards to the presence of homeless 
queer and trans youth of color, such as San Francisco’s Castro District and New York 
City’s Greenwich Village. Although the policing dynamics of gentrification are at play, 
what geographer Neil Smith terms “revanchist urbanism,” the added component of 
sexuality within these debates requires that we consider more than class as a motive 
behind the securitization of these spaces. What gentrification has offered gay men and, to 
a lesser extent, lesbians has been an ideological space rooted in consumer capitalism, 
middle-class respectability, and private property upon which they could stage their 
compliance to norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space—what I am calling 
“racialized norms of sexual hygiene”—and, by extension, confirm the validity of their 
rights-based claims on the state for citizenship, benefits, and protections. This particular 
treatment of space has not always been the standard for gay men, especially given gay 
liberation politics and its goal of free public sexual expression. What provoked this shift, 
I argue, was the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the larger neoliberal shifts in the political 
economy of central cities under which this public health crisis proliferated. I show that 
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gentrification, does not simply denote the privatization of public urban spaces—such as 
Boystown. It also reflects attempts at the privatization of non-normative sexuality in the 
service of consolidating what Cheryl I. Harris calls “whiteness as property.”10 
My spatial focus does not lie in New York City, San Francisco, or Chicago. 
Instead, I focus on the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. Located in the Upper-
Midwest, the Twin Cities is the largest urban hub between Chicago and Denver. In view 
of its location and population, it is appealing to a number of gay men and lesbians from 
the surrounding states of Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota. According 
to a study of the 2010 U.S. Census conducted by the Williams Institute at UCLA, among 
large cities in the country, Minneapolis ranked fourth in the number of same-sex couples 
residing within its borders. With 3,831 same-sex couples or a rate of 23.43 same-sex 
couples per 1,000 households, Minneapolis trailed behind only San Francisco, Seattle, 
and Oakland among cities with a population over 250,000.11 Minneapolis’s reputation as 
a liberal town with tolerant people was all but concretized in 2011 when The Advocate, a 
national gay news magazine, ordained it the “Gayest City in America.”12  
The case of the Twin Cities underscores that the American Midwest is both a 
geographic entity and a discursive formation that has been integral to the hegemony of 
neoliberalism. Conceived as a liberal, progressive, and tolerant region, Minnesota is 
lauded for its union cities and towns. Residents celebrate it for welcoming Hmong and 
                                                
10 Cheryl I. Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (1993): 1707-1791.   
11 “Minneapolis has fourth highest rate of same-sex couples among big cities,” The Washington 
Independent, Aug. 30, 2011. http://washingtonindependent.com/110981/minneapolis-has-fourth-highest-
rate-of-same-sex-couples-among-big-cities.  
12 Kim Palmer, “Gayest city? Magazine says it’s Minneapolis,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), Jan. 15, 
2011.  
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Somali refugees and Korean adoptees. They point out that anyone can be openly gay and 
lesbian in Minnesota, so much so that a gay neighborhood is unwarranted in Minneapolis. 
In spite of its popularity as a “gay friendly” city, Minneapolis does not have an official 
gay neighborhood. Residents argue Minneapolis does not have a gay neighborhood 
because the overall tolerance of the city renders such a space redundant and 
unnecessary.13 They insist that LGBT life is integrated in the Twin Cities—but integrated 
not as a racial category.14 This and other discourses like it of the “middleness” and 
“niceness” of the Twin Cities shore up and advance the political and economic structures 
                                                
13 State-sponsored practices of urban renewal have actually been at the forefront of eradicating gay spaces 
in the Twin Cities, including the Gateway District in the 1950s and Loring Park in the 1980s. See: Stewart 
Van Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves: A History of Queer Minnesota. (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2012).   
14 Despite not having a gay neighborhood, Minneapolis has also been privy to tense debates pertaining to 
the role of LGBT youth of color in supposedly undermining the struggle for full gay political 
enfranchisement. These debates between LGBT youth and white gay leaders were clearly explicit in the 
case of District 202. Founded in 1991, District 202 was one of the nation’s first non-profit organizations of 
its kind in the country. At the time of its opening, the Star Tribune described the organization as 
“something between a sanctuary and a social club, a place to meet and learn about each other without 
judgment or fear.” Designed with the intent of providing LGBT youth with alternative places to socialize 
that did not revolve around bars and public parks, the organization was opened late, especially on 
weekends. Yet, youth were not allowed to sleep there. However, by July of 2009, the GLBT youth center 
District 202 ended its day-to-day operations when it shut down its 7,000-sq. ft. physical drop-in center. At 
its height, two thousand youth stopped by the center in 1997, adding up to 12,000 visits. In the months 
leading up to its closure, few, if any, teenagers visited. Among some of the reasons for the organization’s 
dwindling popularity were the very same factors the organization was intended to address. With youth 
“coming out” earlier and schools in the Twin Cities offering gay-straight alliances or other support 
networks, the organization—according to some—had become obsolete. In addition, the internet—virtually 
non-existent at the time of the organization’s opening—now allowed LGBT youth with a platform to 
discuss their experiences with others, locate resources, and establish relationships. Still, others argued that 
District 202 was no longer necessary because of growing public and state acceptance and tolerance towards 
gay men and lesbians. But, more than anything, financial struggles also sealed the organization’s fate. In 
2008, the non-profit ran a quarter-million-dollar deficit. The organization’s financial troubles were partly 
the result of lessened funding for LGBT programs serving youth. A study of 2007 data found that 
Minnesota foundations gave nearly $1.3 million to organizations focused on LGBT issues; but only 22 
percent went to programs serving youth. Phillip Jares, the outgoing president of District 202’s board at the 
time of its closure, explained to the press that the lack of funds to LGBT youth programming was a result 
of competition with civil rights battles, including gay marriage and gays in the military. Jares elaborated, 
“Adults are very focused on issues that concern adults.” Madeline Baran, “Once-thriving Mpls. LGBT 
center faces identity crisis,” MPR News, Jan. 7, 2011.; Amber Schadewald, “PRIDE 2009: pride on our 
sleeves?” Star Tribune, Jun. 25, 2009: 18.; Kurt Chandler, “Center opens for gay, bisexual youth,” Star 
Tribune, Jan. 05, 1993: 03B. 
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of neoliberal corporate interests. A discourse of “Minnesota Nice” also obfuscates deep-
rooted differences of structural power and secures the upward redistribution of resources, 
all in a context of heightened racial policing. There is perhaps no better example of this 
set of dynamics at play than the gentrification of commercial sex establishments and the 
subsequent eradication of race- and class-based public sexual cultures in Minneapolis.  
Studies of homonormativity, gentrification, and HIV/AIDS tend to bolster the 
dominant coastal narrative of New York and San Francisco. And, when they do consider 
the Midwest, they largely focus on Chicago. That approach is problematic as we cannot 
know the collusions between white liberalism and neo-conservatism without first 
understanding the history of the Twin Cities and other self-described liberal and 
progressive locales. The case of the Twin Cities differs from the dominant coastal 
narrative to the extent that it provides us with a regional understanding of contemporary 
neoliberal formations. Because HIV/AIDS arrived later in the Upper Midwest, the social 
infrastructure in place to tackle the epidemic was not as developed as in other regions. 
Public awareness over the epidemic was also lacking. Therefore, to frame the epidemic as 
a pressing matter, local gay leaders renewed fears that the virus posed a significant threat 
to the general population of white Minnesotans. In Minnesota, HIV/AIDS was imagined 
as a disease that afflicted promiscuous gay men and heathen IV-drug users in 
predominantly black and Latinx urban centers, far removed from the idyllic countryside 
of the heartland. As such, gay community activists harnessed racial anxieties to make 
poor people of color the center of the epidemic. This strategy provided white gay leaders 
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with a platform to petition the state for their social membership vis-à-vis the perceived 
sexual otherness of the racialized poor.  
The case of the Twin Cities, thus, confirms that an investment in whiteness has 
proven influential in building a politics of homonormativity, and spearheading public 
health campaigns and public housing initiatives that radically reshaped the built 
environment in the image of neoliberalism. The domestication of white gay male 
sexuality and lesbian sexuality in the Twin Cities was the product of efforts undertaken 
by white gay and lesbian politicians and community activists, including the likes of Brian 
J. Coyle, Allan Spear, and Karen Clark. In bartering for the social value of some gay men 
and lesbians, these leaders promoted state interests that, in turn, facilitated a regional 
form of gentrification that undermined the interests of working-class queer constituencies 
and the racialized poor. The white gay liberalism at the root of these policies and 
practices in the Twin Cities became adapted and recognized at the national level through 
the Human Rights Campaign and other non-profit organizations. My spatial focus on the 
Twin Cities, hence, demonstrates that the contemporary neoliberal formations that we 
take for granted as new—homonormativity—were already in place in the Upper Midwest 
in the 1980s. Because a number of the policies and practices I discuss in the Twin Cities 
of Minneapolis and St. Paul occurred in relation to larger metropolitan areas, such as 
New York City and San Francisco, I move back and forth between a local urban frame 
and a larger national comparative. 
In the remainder to this introduction, I provide a brief overview of neoliberalism, 
homonormativity, public health, and their role in neighborhood change, especially in 
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relation to the gay community.” Next, in my discussion of the interconnections between 
the spatiality of homonormativity and the biopower imperatives of public health, I 
provide a critique of Marxian geography by offering a feminist and queer of color 
assessment of gentrification. I define what I am calling a “neoliberal spatial fix,” my 
corrective to Marxist geography. I elaborate how the case of the Twin Cities speaks to the 
ways in which locality can help nuance previous conversations on gentrification and 
homonormativity. I end by providing a description of the chapters and by reiterating the 
importance of analyzing white homonormative formations in relation to the devaluation 
of the racialized poor under neoliberalism.  
Historical Overview. 
Space is not only central to the accumulation and production of capital; it is also 
the medium through which historically marginalized groups stage their social value. This 
function of space has been bolstered by shifts in the political economy of American 
central cities beginning with the ascendancy of neoliberalism in the 1970s, following one 
of the deepest and longest economic recessions in the United States since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Arising in response to the Vietnam War and the oil crisis of the 
1970s, neoliberalism, according to geographer David Harvey, is “a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”15 
Harvey’s definition expresses that neoliberal discourses and practices are premised on the 
                                                
15 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2. 
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expansion of free markets and on the eradication of barriers to that free trade in a 
globally-integrated economy. Under neoliberalism, unfettered markets serve as the 
disseminators of democratic freedoms and as arbiters of economic and social disparities. 
To promote the deregulation of markets, neoliberalism endorses the privatization of 
government functions as it concomitantly embraces the retrenchment of social welfare 
services. This is not to suggest that neoliberalism does not impact the sociocultural 
domain. On the contrary, neoliberalism thrusts a discourse of personal responsibility and 
a practice of self-entrepreneurialism. These neoliberal ideologies and policies were 
spatially reflected in efforts to revitalize once economically divested inner-city 
neighborhoods.  
As American cities moved away from manufacturing-based economies to 
economies supported by financial, insurance, and real estate services, cities reorganized 
into sites of symbolic production. In the wake of these changes to profit-generating 
schemes, city officials came to rely upon place-making strategies that worked to 
differentiate their cities from others. Due to the incursion of this neoliberal market logic 
into urban governance, city officials transformed their cities into quasi-corporations, 
selling themselves to profit-generating industries and a professional-managerial class 
with global tastes. To attract residents, tourists, and private capital, city officials 
underscored their commitment to sexual tolerance and racial diversity, “recreating 
themselves as places of culture and consumption.”16 In so doing, city officials relied upon 
                                                
16 Dereka Rushbrook, “Cities, Queer Space, and the Cosmopolitan Tourist,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies 8.1-2, 2002: 188.  
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urban planning policies that vouched for the supposed economic benefits that come with 
the social tolerance associated with middle-class, same-sex households.  
 According to noted urban sociologist, Richard Florida, the social tolerance 
associated with a city’s concentration of same-sex households acts as a pull factor for the 
“creative class” of workers at the center of the (then) “new economy.” Florida’s oft-
critiqued creative class model posits that city officials must reach out to the creative class 
since cities can no longer compete economically simply by attracting or developing 
mega-projects like sports stadiums and downtown development districts. This mass of 
creatives, in turn, generates new ideas, technology, and creative content that, in theory, 
causes cities to thrive. But for a city to become a magnet of the creative class, it must first 
embody what Florida calls the three Ts: talent, technology, and tolerance. Here, Florida 
proposes a “gay index,” based on the proportion of same-sex households in a city as an 
effective determinant of the regional success of high-tech industries.17 Given this 
lucrative profit-generating opportunity, city officials now deliberately market their cities 
as “gay friendly.” Critics, however, have extensively challenged Florida’s claims. For 
one, Florida’s creative city model relies on data from the 2000 U.S. Census which only 
reports on the number of coupled, same-sex households.18 Therefore, what Florida 
accomplishes by mobilizing coupled, same-sex households as representative of 
(homo)sexual diversity is a model of sexuality in line with the neoliberal sexual politics 
of homonormativity. 
                                                
17 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, 
and Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 2002).  
18 David Bell and Jon Binnie, “Authenticating Queer Space: Citizenship, Urbanism and Governance,” 
Urban Studies 41 (2004): 1807-20.  
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Even though racial diversity and sexual tolerance may elevate a city’s desirability, 
city officials must ensure that the minority social difference they are promoting is one 
that adheres to the cultural and political tenets of neoliberalism. To that extent, city 
officials tend to highlight the safest and most fundable forms of minority social 
difference. In terms of sexuality, city officials, business owners, and community leaders 
favor a same-sex formation rooted in homonormativity. Emerging out of neoliberalism, 
homonormativity, according to historian Lisa Duggan, is a “politics that does not contest 
dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, 
while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, 
depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.”19 Rather than vying 
for the freedom to sexual difference—as was foundational to gay liberation politics—
homonormativity, cultural anthropologist Martin Manalansan explains, creates “a 
depoliticizing effect on queer communities as it rhetorically remaps and recodes freedom 
and liberation in terms of privacy, domesticity, and consumption.” 20 Duggan and 
Manalansan indicate that homonormativity re-situates freedom to the private domain, 
away from the public sphere. In the private domain, homonormativity then occupies and 
reproduces heteronormative norms. However, homonormativity also entails implications 
for the public sphere. As a biopolitical exercise of power, homonormativity necessitates 
the exclusion of certain queer bodies—those marked as deviant and unintelligible within 
                                                
19 Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2003), 50. 
20 Martin F. Manalansan, IV, “Race, Violence, and the Neoliberal Spatial Politics in the Global City,” 
Social Text 23 (2005): 142.  
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neoliberal rubrics of value, “who do not or cannot play by the rules, nor a system whose 
very existence depends upon exclusion.”21 
The spatiality of homonormativity is also the materialization of a revanchist 
urbanism. Geographer Neil Smith describes revanchist urbanism as middle- and upper-
class whites reclaiming central cities from poor, working-class and homeless populations, 
who are characterized as “underserving” of these spaces. Smith contends that stories of 
crime and violence, drugs and unemployment, immigration and moral depravity, all fuel 
a revanchism of the city. Under revanchist urbanism, the “rights to the city” by poor, 
working-class and homeless populations are symbolically withdrawn through policies of 
banishment, criminalization, displacement, and incarceration.22 Examples of the 
strategies of revanchist urbanism include the social cleansing of cities through heightened 
policing and regulation of “idle” (read: non-neoliberal) subjects, the demolition of high-
rise public housing, and the subsequent displacement of the racialized poor. Although 
cloaked under the veil of civic morality, family values, and neighborhood security, Smith 
argues that revanchist urbanism represents a defense against the unraveling of white 
supremacy. He elaborates that the revanchist city expresses a race, class, and gender 
terror felt by middle- and upper-class whites against exaggerated or imagined threats such 
as the curtailment in social welfare services, a decimated property market, the presence of 
                                                
21 Fatima El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 123.  
22 Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (New York: Routledge, 
1996). 
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minority and immigrant groups, and unemployment.23 This practice of regulation and 
surveillance is intrinsic to the production of gay neighborhoods. 
The commercialization of gay districts and ethnic enclaves as marketing 
opportunities by city officials highlights the state’s treatment of race and sexuality as 
opportunities for profit in a neoliberal creative economy. Cultural developments such as 
gay neighborhoods that highlight a city’s supposed diversity and tolerance further 
lubricate the process of gentrification. Not surprisingly, this strategy divests these very 
same spaces of their radical potential and sanitizes them in preparation for their 
consumption by consumer-citizens. Since homonormativity is tied to the neoliberalization 
of urban space and, by extension, the exclusionary nature of private property, the 
exclusions inherent to homonormativity are spatially articulated in the physical 
marginalization of those “deviant” bodies that do not advance the mandates of 
neoliberalism. These are the subjects deemed to be lacking in self-entrepreneurial 
value—those bodies allegedly poised to lower property values and tarnish the public 
relations campaigns of cities because their material reality proves that the freedom 
professed by neoliberalism is not universal or without violence. It is here where we can 
situate homeless queer and trans youth of color. In order to reap the highest returns on 
political and commercial investments, city officials and business owners, with the 
                                                
23 Smith offers the case of New York City in the mid-1990s as an example of revanchist urbanism. In 1994, 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani infamously enacted a particularly revanchist set of urban policies designed to 
criminalize a broad swath of activities deemed threatening to the “quality of life” in city neighborhoods. 
This included measures against sleeping and camping in public, pavement sitting, panhandling, and 
windshield washing. Smith determines that the paradigm of quality of life granted the NYPD with an 
unprecedented array of powers to remove homeless people from public, force them into unsafe shelters, or 
merely hide from view. Smith concludes that revanchist urbanism is conveyed in the legal, physical, and 
rhetorical efforts against scapegoats, constructed out of racial, class, gender, sexual, and national 
difference. See: Smith, The New Urban Frontier. 
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backing of gay leaders and residents, safely domesticate gay neighborhoods through the 
removal of these “undesirable forms of sexual expression,” what geographers David Bell 
and Jon Binnie call the “queer unwanted.” Under this process of purification, certain 
expressions of same-sex desire and the spaces in which those desires are enacted become 
labeled in need of regulation. The literal purification of “undesirable” forms of sexual 
expression, in turn, reduces the gay public sphere into mere gentrified spaces of 
consumption and domesticity, such as Chicago’s Boystown. 24 If spatiality is paramount 
to the expression of social value for historically marginalized groups, then it makes sense 
that white gay leaders would actively push for the removal of those physical 
manifestations that undermine the carefully orchestrated public image of the group as a 
whole.  
In an ostensibly colorblind moment, residents, business owners, and gay leaders 
mobilize narratives of safety to justify the removal of the queer unwanted. These 
discourses of safety function more as thinly-veiled attempts to safeguard the flows of 
capital and protect the racial category of “whiteness as property” than any such effort to 
protect against physical harm. The production of gay neighborhoods—as safe spaces—
has historically depended upon a practice of surveillance and regulation that confirms the 
imminent danger posed by people of color. In her study of gay urban politics, Safe Space, 
historian Christina B. Hanhardt shows that safe street patrols in the 1970s consolidated 
acts of street harassment and physical assault against gay men and lesbians as instances 
of what they deemed to be anti-gay hate violence. This bourgeoning legal category of 
                                                
24 David Bell and Jon Binnie, “Authenticating Queer Space: Citizenship, Urbanism and Governance,” 
Urban Studies 41 (2004): 1811. 
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crime facilitated the development of a shared consciousness among gay men and lesbians 
established around the collective need for “safe space.” Because gay neighborhoods, such 
as San Francisco’s Castro District and New York City’s Greenwich Village, nurtured a 
nascent gay subjectivity—one where gay men and lesbians could live openly without the 
fear of violence—these neighborhoods became the assets in need of highest protection.25 
Nonetheless, since safe street patrols made use of discourses of safety that were racialized 
to determine who was likely a victim and who was likely a perpetrator of that crime, safe 
street patrols organized in support of a very specific identity, one that matched the race 
and class demographics of the neighborhood: white, male, and middle-class. If safe street 
patrols suspected people of color of being violent threats, then it comes as no surprise that 
whiteness was conferred with “safe space,” at the expense of queers of color. These 
discourses of safety have persisted to contemporary instances of gay gentrification.  
Writing in regards to Greenwich Village in New York City after the World Trade 
Center attacks on September 11, 2001, Manalansan notes that gentrification there relies 
upon a racist order reproduced through neoliberal investments and structures. In an effort 
to ensure residential safety and national security, community stakeholders such as gay 
leaders, neighborhood watch groups, and business improvement districts altered the 
urban landscape frequented by homeless queer youth of color and migrants of color 
through punitive measures that criminalized the racialized poor.26 Manalansan’s analysis 
illustrates that homonormative discourses and practices extract their legitimacy vis-à-vis 
                                                
25 Christina Hanhardt, Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2013). 
26 Manalansan, “Race, Violence, and the Neoliberal Spatial Politics in the Global City,” 151. 
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the continued subjugation of devalued subjects. The narrative of safety also obfuscates 
the unlikely alliances between gay leaders and the state in the violent purification of 
commodified gay neighborhoods. Once the removal of the queer unwanted is achieved, 
gay neighborhoods are opened to the unfettered incursion of capital, including upscale 
condominiums and chic boutiques catering to the aestheticized lifestyles of a particular 
subset of gay men. The rightfully belonging gay subject within these commodified spaces 
becomes someone who complies with a mandate of domestic consumerism, middle-class 
respectability, and private property. Given the race- and class-based exclusions at the 
heart of gay commodified spaces, Bell and Binnie rightfully conclude that “gay public 
space effects marginalization even as it claims visibility.”27 Thus, the new vision of urban 
space conveyed by homonormativity is one framed by neoliberal forms of governance, 
maximizing profit while policing ideological and spatial borders against the intrusion of 
racialized and sexual aberrance. The narrative of safety in discourses and practices of 
homonormativity enables white gay leaders to reap the benefits of gentrification while 
passively accepting violent forms of regulation directed at economically disenfranchised 
populations.  
Since the mainstreaming of gay residential and commercial spaces disseminates a 
normative depiction of gay men as socially valuable, we can treat commodified gay 
spaces as crucial to the project of cultural belonging, political enfranchisement, and social 
membership enacted by white gay leaders. In other words, the spatiality of 
homonormativity operates in the service of state petitions for citizen rights, benefits, and 
                                                
27 Bell and Binnie, “Authenticating Queer Space: Citizenship, Urbanism and Governance,” 1817. 
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protections. I, thus, argue that homonormativity functions as a form of “empropertiment” 
in which white gay leaders make claims on the state for citizenship through the reification 
of gender, sexual, and domestic space norms—racialized norms of sexual hygiene. This 
effort to assert the civic fitness of domesticated gay men, nevertheless, is contingent on 
policing ideological and physical borders.28   
For that reason, the incorporation of white, middle-class same-sex households 
within the fold of the state conceals and perpetuates the state’s deployment of violent 
mechanisms against racially devalued subjects. Jasbir Puar argues that the national 
belonging of homonormative subjects— “homonationalism”—rests on the “segregation 
and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary.” Coinciding 
with “the coming out of the exceptionalism of American empire,” homonationalism 
functions as an “exceptional form of homonormativity” which “continue[s] or extend[s] 
the project of U.S. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror.” 
Under this formulation, the homonormative subject becomes a newly valued subject—a 
prong working in the service of American exceptionalism—while racial and sexual 
others, both domestic and abroad, are further devalued through processes of de-
nationalization. This ontological Othering—part of the state’s arsenal in the war on 
terror—enables the physical distancing of the racialized poor from the literal and 
                                                
28 The empropertying of white gay men during and after the HIV/AIDS epidemic transformed their social 
relation with the state. By the virtue of private property ownership or aspiration towards it, white gay men 
were now enjoined in a social contract with the state. The state alone could protect their rights as private 
property owners, a relationship which some white gay men surely thought could lead to their political 
enfranchisement, if not practically then symbolically. Through its technologies of policing and punishment, 
the state could protect their homes, neighborhoods against racial devaluation. In so doing, the state would 
be safeguarding the medium that white gay men used to petition the state for their social membership. This 
social contract between white gay men and the state did, in fact, result in the eventual admission of white 
gay men into United States citizenship.  
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figurative borders of the nation. Their “social death” is further ensconced through the 
denial of habeas corpus, the cutback in social welfare services, and the threat of 
banishment, deportation, and incarceration. If racialized violence is central to the 
production of homonormativity, then homonationalism makes use of processes of 
relational valuing. Here, Puar explains that “the deferred death of one population recedes 
as the securitization and valorization of the life of another population triumphs in its 
shadow.”29 Puar’s point is that the inclusion of white, middle-class same-sex households 
after 9/11 is contingent on the continued abjection, criminalization, torture, and outright 
death of “the terrorist,” the poor, and those of color.  
Elaborating upon Puar’s insight, Anna M. Aganthangelou, Daniel M. Bassichis, 
and Tamara L. Spira explain that the specter of equality, home, and safety within gay-
rights discourse redirects attention away from pressing forms of state-sanctioned 
violence. The state then exploits sentiments of happiness and safety, or “affective 
economies,” to lure individuals under its control. Aganthangelou, Bassichis, and Spira 
define affective economies as “the circulation and mobilization of feelings of desire, 
pleasure, fear, and repulsion utilized to seduce all of us into the fold of the state—the 
various ways in which we become invested emotionally, libidinally, and erotically in 
global capitalism’s mirages of safety and inclusion.”30 The narrative of safety and the 
promise of home are actively mobilized to rationalize the regulation of urban spaces and 
                                                
29 Bell and Binnie, “Authenticating Queer Space: Citizenship, Urbanism and Governance,” 8.; Jasbir K. 
Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 2007), 3.  
30 Anna M. Aganthangelou, Daniel M. Bassichis, and Tamara L. Spira, “Intimate Investments: 
Homonormativity, Global Lockdown, and the Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review 100 (2008): 
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discipline recalcitrant homeless queer and trans youth of color, such as those in Chicago’s 
Boystown. The attacks on September 11, 2001, although a watershed moment in world 
history with a series of long-lasting ramifications, alone cannot explain the 
homonormalization of white gay men. To truly understand homonormativity as a rights-
based shift towards domestic consumerism, middle-class respectability, private property, 
and reproductive futurism, we must look at the relationship between neoliberal urban 
policies, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the continued marginalization of the racialized 
poor.     
Theoretical Intervention.   
My dissertation, From Vice to Nice: Race, Sex, and the Gentrification of AIDS, 
asks how white gay men went from being reviled in the 1980s as a medical menace to 
being celebrated as a new model minority of citizens in the 21st century. The 
homonormative formation of white gay men into what Florida calls “canaries of the 
creative economy” is not an example of growing public and state acceptance and 
tolerance for racialized and sexual others, as The Advocate would have it in its 
designation of Minneapolis as the “Gayest City in America.” That would be an 
oversimplification, devoid of critical engagement with the spatial shifts in the political 
economy of the American central cities. At the same time, it is inaccurate to assume that 
the homonormalization of white gay men suddenly materialized overnight after 
September 11, 2001. Some LGBT studies scholarship mistakenly dates the rise of 
homonormative politics to the mid-1990s, when the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration authorized the sale of new life-sustaining AIDS medication. This moment 
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was perhaps best captured by white gay journalist Andrew Sullivan’s infamous assertion 
in the New York Times in 1996 that AIDS was over.31 Nonetheless, what these accounts 
of homonormativity and gay gentrification fail to take into account is that the 
homonormative turn in gay politics occurred much earlier than the mid-1990s. As a 
project of white gay racial formation, homonormativity, I show, arose in political 
mobilizations against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, in simultaneity with the state’s newfound 
logic of contingent belonging towards people of color, what literary critic Jodi Melamed 
calls “neoliberal multiculturalism.”32 By tracing the agency of white gay leaders in 
shaping urban politics in the 1980s vis-à-vis the racialization of public health discourses 
and practices, my dissertation proposes that the normalization of white gay men was not 
necessarily molded by growing public and state acceptance and tolerance; instead, it was 
mobilized by economic, political, and social conditions of neoliberalism.  
I use “white gay leaders” instead of “gay leaders” for various critical reasons. For 
one, it allows me to make the point that virtually all gay leadership at the time was white 
since the “gay community” was largely defined as white. I am not necessarily insinuating 
that gay men of color struggled with white gay men over leadership. Racial, class, and 
gender privilege afforded white gay men with opportunities for leadership in ways that 
were denied to gay men of color. And, second, I am making a case as to why we should 
attend to the ways in which homonormativity animated white racial formation. It is quite 
possible that even if granted with opportunities for leadership, gay men of color would 
                                                
31 Andrew Sullivan, “When Plagues End,” The New York Times Magazine, Nov. 10, 1996. 
32 Jodi Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).  
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have not taken those opportunities since they did not see their interests or needs reflected 
by the mainstream gay rights movement. I use “white gay leaders” interchangeably with 
“gay community activists” and “gay rights advocates” to denote the race and class-based 
privilege of gay leadership within the mainstream gay rights movement in the United 
States. When I note distinctions in political allegiances within the leadership, as noted in 
support for bathhouses and public sex, I make note of that distinction by referring to this 
latter group of leaders: “queer activists.”  
In the context of state indifference spurred by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, those in 
positions of power within the gay community embraced racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene to articulate their Americanness. Early in the epidemic, racially coded language 
of public health represented the gay community as a threat to white Americans. As long 
as the sexual habits of the gay community confirmed such demonized characterizations, 
the gay community as a whole would remain ineligible for legal recognition and social 
membership. Norms of sexual hygiene, which were thoroughly racialized, classed, and 
gendered, defined who was made to appear deserving and worthy of care and sympathy 
during the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Racialized norms of sexual hygiene determined upon 
whom Americanness was conferred and upon whom it was withheld. On those grounds, 
public health played a key role not only in bestowing social membership, but also in 
administering cultural meanings attached to race and sexuality.  
Because early in the epidemic racially coded language of public health 
represented the gay community as a threat to white Americans, gay community activists 
learned that meeting institutionalized-defined standards of moral health and sexual 
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hygiene was a precondition for their social membership. The institution of public health, 
in addition to promoting and shaping images of the gay community as sexually aberrant, 
also served as the medium through which gay leaders would invalidate such 
representations. However, in testifying on behalf of the gay community’s moral 
cleanliness, leaders sublimated white fears of perverse spaces, unorthodox gender roles, 
and deviant sexualities onto communities of color. As a result, they harnessed the 
existing racial order to recalibrate discourses and practices in their favor. I, therefore, 
argue that—under neoliberalism—racialized norms of sexual hygiene stood as 
“yardsticks for Americanization” that determined the validity of rights-based claims on 
the state by politically disenfranchised populations such as the racialized poor and sexual 
minorities.33 These racialized norms of sexual hygiene provided for the anesthetization 
and co-optation of gay liberation politics and, in turn, gave form to homonormativity, the 
normalization of white, middle-class gay and lesbian politics of sexual respectability.  
Specifically, through a case study of the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, 
I uncover how homonormativity converged with wider agendas and policies 
encompassing the “cleaning-up” of public urban spaces such as low-income 
neighborhoods and vice districts, and the policing of its racial denizens such as “crack-
addicted” black mothers, and Native American sex workers. Using multiple methods, 
including archival research, ethnographic fieldwork, and discourse analysis, I assert that 
public health constructions of normative gender, sexuality, and domestic space, became 
powerfully intertwined with private development so that both institutions worked in the 
                                                
33 Natalia Molina, Fit to be Citizens: Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2006), 45.  
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service of promoting the economically prosperous potential of post-industrial inner-cities 
as centers of commerce and tourism. The gentrification of AIDS, therefore, confirms that 
the infrastructural dismantling of public sexual cultures and commercial sex 
establishments—via the establishment of ordinances and racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene—cultivated the privatization of public urban spaces as an extension of efforts to 
reorganize white heteronormativity.  
By looking at the role of public health in the proliferation of racial discourses in 
the 1980s during the HIV/AIDS epidemic, I show the ways white gay leadership in the 
Twin Cities made use of such discourses to expand the racial category of whiteness 
through their exploitation of racialized norms of sexual hygiene. The revalorization of 
white gay men through a culture and politics of homonormativity helped restabilize a 
white racial order whose foundations were unstable due to the ascendancy of neoliberal 
multiculturalism. Moreover, investigating the linkages between the racialized poor and 
sexual minorities in the Twin Cities reveals that these populations were racialized in 
relation to one another, a process culminating in the institutionalization of a racial 
hierarchy. If homonormativity highlights the fluidity of whiteness and the ways through 
which racial categories evolve vis-à-vis norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space 
depending upon economic pressures and political factors, both regionally and nationally, 
then the history of whiteness in the United States requires that we consider 
homonormativity as a constitutive project of that racial category. I make use of this 
critical aperture to illuminate the ways through which the racialized reconstitution of 
white, middle-class same-sex households occurred in synchronicity to the sexual 
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devalorization of the racialized poor. These formations, in fact, were reciprocal onto one 
another.  
The Spatiality and Temporality of Homonormativity. 
Despite everyday attitudes that take spatiality for granted, space is central to the 
reproduction of society and capitalism. Space is the medium through which historically 
marginalized populations stage their compliance to norms of gender, sexuality, and 
domestic space. According to urban sociologist, Henri Lefebvre, space is the domain 
wherein the many elements and aspects of capitalism intersect. In The Production of 
Space, Lefebvre retheorizes space by arguing that understandings of geographical space, 
landscape, and property are, in fact, cultural and, thus, subject to shifting relationships 
and structures of power.34 Rather than operating as an empty reservoir where everyday 
life transpires, space—as the physical expression of modes of production—is inherent to 
any exercise of power. Nonetheless, once space is produced, Lefebvre argues, it is 
subsequently abstracted or divested from those social relations and processes inherent in 
                                                
34 In The Production of Space, Lefebvre re-characterizes space as an ever-evolving expression of the modes 
of capitalist production. Instead of reifying synchronic theories on space promulgated by disciplines such as 
planning and geography, Lefebvre examines the social underpinnings of space, arguing that meanings 
attached to geographical space, landscape, and property are culturally mediated. Critiquing social science 
theories on space, Lefebvre establishes the importance of lived experience in comprehending geographical 
space as an inherently social construct. By examining struggles over the meaning of space, Lefebvre 
challenges the denial of particular individuals and communities to “right of space,” or access and 
participation in the urban milieu so that individuals and communities not only enjoy the right of association 
but also exercise their own self-determination. According to Lefebvre, geographical space in capitalist-
driven societies is organized into privately-owned lots. Consequently, a privatized ethos of space 
circumscribes understandings of property in all capitalist societies. These taken-for-granted privatized 
assumptions of space, in turn, justify the violent exclusion, if not outright banishment, of those individuals 
and communities that violate this model of space. At the same time, Lefebvre proposes that clandestine and 
underground spatial practices—under which I would include public sex—that prompt sweeping 
reconfigurations of institutionalized discourses of space can unravel taken-for-granted privatized 
understandings and practices of space. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-
Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1991). See: Rob Shields, “Henri Lefebvre,” in Key 
Thinkers on Space and Place, ed. Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin, 279-85 (London: Sage, 2001).  
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its production.35 This abstraction operates in the service of a hegemonic class of 
administrators, developers, planners, residents that seeks to reproduce its own dominance.  
 Building upon Lefebvre’s insights, Marxist geographer, David Harvey insists that 
space is not absolute nor given. Space, Harvey maintains, is constructed and relative. By 
this, Harvey means that social practices and processes produce spatial forms which 
circumvent, facilitate, and modify those very same practices and processes.36 In The 
Limits to Capital, Harvey fashions a Marxian theory of geography—a historical-
geographical materialism of capitalism—that treats geography, or the material 
topography of towns, cities, and transport networks, as both a component and product of 
the capitalist economy. By incorporating space into Marx’s theory of capitalism, Harvey 
reveals that space matters to capitalism and is thus crucial in any attempt to critique, 
dismantle, or resignify capitalism.37  
 However, for all of Lefebvre and Harvey’s unprecedented insistence that space 
occasions social effects, they prioritize class as the social category of difference that fuels 
capitalism. In so doing, their theorizations of capitalist space remain wedded to a 
                                                
35 Here, Lefebvre underscores the dialectical nature of space between space that is concrete (localized via a 
physical expression) and space that is abstract (existing as a commodity in relation to other social processes 
including exchange and labor). Abstract space, or space produced by the conspiring forces of government 
and capitalism for commercial exploitation and social control, indexes an appearance of emptiness and 
homogeneity. Lefebvre argues that this illusion of cohesion is rendered possible through a visual 
epistemology of transparency. Transparency is the depiction of clarity that is articulated though the visual 
exercises of socially constitutive space. Ibid. 
36 In Social Justice and the City, Harvey argues that space is not “a container” into which “non-spatial” 
things are merely added. Instead, Harvey proposes that the question “What is space?” be replaced by the 
question, “[H]ow is it that distinctive human practices create and make use of distinctive space[s]?” For 
Harvey, social practices and processes engendered spaces in a circular fashion whereby those spaces would 
in turn impinge upon those very same practices and processes. David Harvey, Social Justice and the City 
(Atlanta, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1973), 14. See: Noel Castree, “David Harvey,” in Key Thinkers 
on Space and Place, ed. Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin, 234-41 (London: Sage, 2001).  
37 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1982).  
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patriarchal tradition that preserves a gender blindness and that naturalizes 
heterosexuality. Their uncritical division of bodies and spaces along normative gender 
and sexual metrics fails to take into account how these categories of difference 
themselves are implicated in the social production of space. This is a significant oversight 
since space is pivotal to the discursive and material consolidation of gender, sexual, and 
domestic space norms. 
 Central to the reproduction of society and capitalism is gender and sexuality. 
According to French philosopher Michel Foucault’s theoretical interventions into the 
mechanics of power, gender and sexuality are inherently spatial since their disciplinary 
technologies depend upon particular enclosures of space. In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 
1, Foucault examines how European social and institutional settings profoundly shaped 
understandings of sexuality. From ancient times through the present, Foucault discovers 
that these understandings of sexuality were not static. On the contrary, they were 
adaptable depending on the status, class, gender, age, and place of those individuals 
concerned. These understandings were subsequently combined into objects of 
“discourse,” or organized bodies of knowledge, that delimited the channels of particular 
sexual expression in some arenas while expanding them in others.38 Foucault’s analysis 
exposes the machinery through which the state effortlessly recruits the consent of citizens 
in their own self-disciplining. But, more than that, Foucault’s analysis suggests that 
spatialization has always been implicated in the production of “disciplined”—sexually 
normative— citizens.  
                                                
38 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (New York: Random House, 
1978).  
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 For Foucault, sexual dissidence along with criminality, madness, and sickness can 
be traced historically in their “Otherness” to European Victorian norms. According to 
Chris Philo’s reading of Foucault’s spatial interventions, these categories of exclusion 
(and inclusion) can be gleaned through spatial relationships. Philo explains that 
“Reason,” or sameness, has continuingly distinguished, labeled, and demonized and 
sought to exclude, either through banishment or incarceration, “Unreason,” or the Other. 
He adds that Foucault’s interest in the segregation and exclusion of the Other from the 
“Same” in the built environment enables Foucault to formulate madness and reason, 
sickness and health in spatial terms. Foucault’s spatialization of power is clearly 
articulated in his focus on “the bricks-and-mortar solutions of separate institutions,” such 
as asylums, hospitals, and prisons (i.e., the Panopticon) that were fashioned to enclose, 
rehabilitate, and, at times, restore to sanity those demonstrating the stigmata of 
difference.39 Space, simply put, functions as a medium that doles out not only discipline 
and punishment, but also normativity and social value.40 Thus, as Foucault succinctly 
puts it, in time, “the architectural means reproduce…the social hierarchies.”41 Foucault’s 
                                                
39 Chris Philo, “Michel Foucault,” in Key Thinkers on Space and Place, ed. Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin, 
162-70 (London: Sage, 2001).  
40 Michel Foucault’s varied conceptualizations of power have served as the basis for profound theorizations 
of space. In addition to arguing that power be comprehended through its microphysics, including its 
procedures, techniques, and targets, Foucault also analyzed a host of disciplinary mechanisms orchestrated 
in the nineteenth-century, all of which relied upon the detailed manipulation of space. One of these spatial 
innovations was the high-walled Panopticon. Its internal spatial structures were arranged in such a way that 
the constant threat of inspection loomed for the prisoner. Foucault argued that this invisible surveillance 
prompted prisoners to turn the inspection tower’s ever so-watchful gaze inwards. See: Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1976).  
41 Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: Vintage, 1984), 252 
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spatial sensitivity encourages us to consider the countless other sites which remain 
embedded in the production of “disciplined” subjects.42  
 Space is not the only medium that is organized around neoliberal logics of capital 
accumulation and heteronormativity. Situated within this structure is also time. In late 
capitalism, as cultural critic J. Jack Halberstam contends, life has become progressively 
arranged around spatial and temporal frames of “bourgeois reproduction and family, 
longevity, risk/safety, and inheritance.”43 This trajectory of universalized life 
experiences, revolving around consumer capitalism and reproductive labor, standardizes 
domestic consumption, private property, and wealth accumulation as arbiters of social 
value. When time and space are understood through capitalist and heteronormative 
rubrics, cultural theorist Lisa Cacho argues, social value is denied to those whose lives 
exist outside the “conventional logics of development, maturity, adulthood, and 
responsibility.”44 If social value is doled out in line with the spatial and temporal regimes 
of capital accumulation and bourgeois reproduction, then cultural belonging, political 
enfranchisement, and social membership for historically marginalized groups will also 
call upon that criterion. Thus, historian Nayan Shah argues that the “norms of gender, 
                                                
42 Space has been crucial to the articulation of same-sex desire in the West. Historian John D’Emilio 
attributes the rise of a homosexual identity and community to the rise of a free wage labor system in early-
20th century United States. Since young men and women were allowed to sell their labor for wages, they 
were no longer wedded to their biological family for economic survival. Young men and women, thus, 
migrated to large, urban centers to work in newly bourgeoning industries. There, they came into contact 
with others who shared their desires, facilitating the formation of a homosexuality. John D’Emilio, 
"Capitalism and Gay Identity," in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, eds. Ann Snitow, Christine 
Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 100-113. 
43 J. Jack Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: New 
York University Press, 2005).  
44 Lisa M. Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected (New 
York: New York University Press, 2012).  
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sexuality, and domestic space” are crucial for historically marginalized groups in 
corroborating their deservingness of citizen rights, benefits, and protections.45  
 In Contagious Divides, Shah traces the processes through which public health 
discourses and practices transformed representations of Chinese immigrants in San 
Francisco at the turn of the 20th century as a “filthy” and “diseased” race to a model 
minority in the mid-20th century. Notions of “citizenship, conduct, and health” 
underwrote that passage from “menace to model minority.”46 In the late-1800s, health 
authorities defined San Francisco’s Chinatown as “the material manifestation of the alien 
within the modern American city, emphasizing Chinese difference from, deviance from, 
and danger to white society and the American nation.”47 Health officials associated the 
physical condition of Chinatown with the characteristics of Chinese people: an allegedly 
dirty and unhealthy race that bred illnesses such as bubonic plague, smallpox, and 
syphilis that endangered white Americans. By the 1930s, however, Chinatown was no 
longer judged as a threat to the rest of San Francisco. Shah shows that the acculturation 
of Chinese immigrants, from a bachelor society of working-class men and female 
prostitutes to a society of independent nuclear family households, hinged on their 
subscription to norms of sexual hygiene and on the reform of their housing conditions. 
Central to this task were second-generation Chinese-Americans, who bridged the gap 
between the Chinese community and dominant white society. The second-generation 
recognized the value of monogamous morality and domesticity to the formation of 
                                                
45 Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001), 254.  
46 Ibid., 3.  
47 Ibid., 1.  
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citizen-subjects. Being as second-generation Chinese-Americans were educated and 
connected with American voluntary associations and government institutions, they were 
triumphant in framing their community and its needs appear “deserving” to the majority 
of white constituencies. Shah’s analysis makes clear that those petitioning the state for 
full political access and inclusion in American society must make their behavior appear 
intelligible within the heteronormative calculus of gender, sexuality, and domestic space.  
If racialized deviancy is refracted through the prisms of gender and sexual 
nonnormativity, efforts to be included within populations deemed deserving, valuable, 
and worthy require that marginalized groups conform to the norms of gender, sexuality, 
and domestic space commemorated as universally American and indicative of an 
imagined national family. Given this rationale, it makes sense that gay community 
activists prioritized a culture and politics of homonormativity in their mobilization for 
political enfranchisement and social membership. Since space acts as a medium that 
facilities the reconfiguration of social relations, it also makes sense that gay leaders relied 
on the spatiality and temporality of homonormativity to certify their rights-based claims 
on the state.  
As a result of the normalizing implications of gay residential and commercial 
spaces, white gay leaders are readily invested in the protection of said spaces. Like I 
discuss above in regards to homeless queer and trans youth of color, this spatial 
normalization, however, hinges on the sanitation of those queer identities and practices 
deemed to be menacing to the group’s overarching goals of state recognition. Another 
prime example of this literal and figurative purification is evident in the criminalization 
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of public sex cultures and commercial sex establishments. Speaking in regards to the 
privatization of same-sex desires through spatial fixes, geographer Dereka Rushbrook 
comments, “The state has an interest in shaping the forms of (nonthreatening) gay space 
that are legitimized; by offering tolerance, if not acceptance, the state can elicit 
appropriate behavior from queers who police themselves, assuaging the state’s moral 
anxieties.”48 Rushbrook alerts us to the centrality of homonormativity in the spatial 
legitimization of raced- and class-based iterations of same-sex desire in late capitalism. 
When the legal system continuously presents roadblocks to the cultural belonging and 
political enfranchisement of marginalized communities, leaders—at least those not barred 
from the private real estate market—take on the task of manipulating space in such a way 
that it showcases the social value of those groups.  
In the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, gay rights advocates sought 
to bypass the devaluing stigma attached to homosexuality by emphasizing other signifiers 
of value such as intimacy, morality, privacy, and respectability. But, in doing so, they 
engaged in a violent process of relational valuing. Gay leaders insisted on the moral 
cleanliness of white gay men in opposition to AIDS moral panic discourses that were 
racialized. They upheld racialized norms of sexual hygiene—gender, sexuality, and 
domestic space—as criteria by which to detect someone’s social value. Citing Lindon 
Barrett who claims that the “object” of value needs an “other” of value as its negative 
referent, Cacho argues, “The act of ascribing legible, intelligible, and normative value is 
                                                
48 Rushbrook, “Cities, Queer Spaces, and the Cosmopolitan Tourist,” 195. 
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inherently violent and relationally valuing.”49 The process of valuation, in other words, is 
contingent, differential, and intersecting. Gay leaders labored to distance white gay men 
from the racialized poor who were alleged to engage in non-normative gender and sexual 
habits. In media accounts, these leaders actively denied and explicitly refused any public 
sympathy towards sex workers of color. At the same time, they evoked public sympathy 
for those white gay men whose embodiment of domesticity and privacy harkened to pre-
existing cultural frameworks of social value. In the case of Minnesota, gay leaders 
insisted that some white gay men with HIV/AIDS deserved compassion and respect 
because these men adhered to Midwestern cultural and ideological formations of 
domesticity, morality, privacy, and responsibility. By choosing to become valuable 
members of society through the reification of gender, sexual, and domestic space norms, 
these gay rights advocates validated the exclusionary methods for assigning social value.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the racialized moral panic associated with the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, anti-gay hate violence, racialized poverty, and the war on drugs 
became a crucial site for securing the central and dominant position of white supremacy. 
This re-assertion happened in the context of a precarious and vulnerable cultural position 
for white heteropatriarchy. The HIV/AIDS epidemic, along with a number of related 
media-driven racialized moral panics, represented whiteness under siege. Single mothers 
of color and sex workers of color activated racial anxieties pertaining to the dwindling 
dominance of whiteness. These racial denizens mobilized white gay leaders into a 
nascent (homo)national collective over and against racialized subjects who undermined 
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the morality and respectability on which white gay leaders were rallying to secure access 
into the cultural, economic, and social order of white heteropatriarchy. The centrality of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the homonormalization of white gay men notifies us of the 
significance of engaging with the institution of public health to more accurately 
understand processes of gay relational valuing vis-à-vis race.  
My argument confirms that public health serves a key role in consolidating the 
racial and sexual metrics under which American citizenship is determined in the United 
States. In her account of public health in Los Angeles from the late-19th century through 
the mid-20th century, Fit to be Citizens, historian Natalia Molina argues that by 
approaching public health as a comparative site of racialization, we can assess the 
processes through which health officials at the local level contributed to the construction 
of racial categories and ascertained who had access to social membership. Backed with 
the language of scientific objectivity, public health authorities wielded tremendous 
amount of institutional power by disseminating discourses that explained the health 
problems plaguing Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican immigrants as deficiencies in their 
biological capacities and cultural practices. Health authorities were, therefore, paramount 
in deciding which populations were “fit” to comprise part of the body politic. In 
establishing racialized norms of sexual hygiene as the standards for American social 
membership, health authorities codified criteria that made some people appear capable, 
deserving, and worthy members of society, and others not quite so. Molina concludes that 
“cleanliness” functioned as a moral and patriotic medium that offered marginalized 
communities with a discursive space to vouch for their deservingness of American 
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citizenship.50 Molina’s analysis affirms how public health has historically contributed to 
the racialization of nonwhite groups as immoral, unassimilable, and unhygienic and, by 
extension, redefined citizenship in racialized and medicalized tropes.  
Molina and Shah’s analyses enable us to consider how public health also 
prescribed the terms of inclusion for white gay men. During the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
public health discourse treated racial and homosexual difference as the negative referents 
through which American moral cleanliness and nuclear-family domesticity could be 
established. Race and sexuality were the organizing principles in the containment of HIV. 
They served as the “interpretive framework” for making sense of the disease’s outbreak 
and mobilizing strategies for its containment.51 The HIV/AIDS epidemic, therefore, was 
understood as much by sociocultural beliefs about the perceived immorality of racial and 
sexual minorities. And yet, white gay leaders—given their racial and class access to 
dominant institutions—were able to downplay the public health emphasis placed on 
sexual difference as the root of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, while inflating that of racial 
difference. 
During the HIV/AIDS epidemic, racial ideologies and meanings pertaining to 
health and citizenship were recast to make way for the incorporation of some white gay 
men and lesbians. Gay leaders appropriated these discourses of public health to expand 
the racial category of whiteness to include themselves and some of their constituents. 
                                                
50 The representation of Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans in Los Angeles as threats to public health and 
civic well-being masked the structural factors that actually did cause communicable disease and illness to 
travel: inadequate medical care, exposure to raw sewage, and malnutrition. Molina, therefore, concludes 
that disease and illness were determined as much by “sociocultural beliefs in the inherent uncleanliness of 
immigrants and nonwhite as by biological explanations.” Natalia Molina, Fit to be Citizens: Public Health 
and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 2.  
51 Ibid., 68. 
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But, as a result, they embraced certain narratives that attributed the health problems 
facing those most at risk for HIV as a product of their own behavioral practices and 
cultural shortcomings. They also endorsed the social practices of modern disciplinary 
institutions such as law enforcement, media, public health, and public housing. Leaders 
accentuated their racial identity and class status similarities to dominant white society so 
as to authenticate the validity of their rights-based claims on the state for privacy. By 
engaging prevailing norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space, those in positions of 
power within the gay community aspired to convey the worthiness of other white gay 
men as a strategy to recoup the resources associated with American citizenship.  
Gay leaders reinterpreted their identity and their relationship to the nation-state 
through a racially coded language of hygiene and health, and through practices of 
relational valuing. Specifically, the public health narrative that treated homosexuals as a 
menace to the nation in the 1980s served as the basis of white normative recovery. The 
claim to citizenship and cultural belonging articulated by white gay leaders depended 
upon the performance of normative sexual hygiene and privatized spatial arrangements—
what I call racialized norms of sexual hygiene and I define to include domesticity, 
intimacy, privacy, and responsibility. Leaders embraced racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene as part of the proper biological and moral cultivation necessary for marginalized 
communities to achieve should they seek to certify the validity of their claims for state 
recognition. Racialized norms of sexual hygiene, temporally demarcated by reproductive 
futurism, are outlined by explicit gender roles and spatial manipulations of the private 
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and public sphere.52 Leaders understood that assimilation into modern nuclear families 
and middle-class habits and sensibilities would facilitate the integration of the gay 
community into American society. They did not question the use of this framework; they 
only insisted that white gay men were, in fact, quite normal.  
Gay community activists linked the practices of individual health and sexuality to 
the collective social well-being of the gay community. They believed that the sexual 
activity of gay individual men either bolstered or threatened the racial premise upon 
which they were petitioning the state. Sexual practices that violated this white, middle-
class, domestic ideal were considered detrimental to the homonormalization of white gay 
men as they confirmed that the gay community was in closer proximity to the sexual 
practices associated with poor, people of color. Hence, white gay leaders suggested that 
white gay men, as a series of middle-class, self-contained private households preserved 
the sexual normativity of whiteness and, thus, enriched the nation at a moment in time 
when the supremacy of whiteness and the ascendancy of the United States was 
threatened. 
Gay rights advocates knew that in order to marshal sympathy for the gay 
community, they had to reform mainstream representations of white gay men as 
promiscuous sex addicts to images of assimilating, Americanized nuclear households. 
The portrayal of white gay men as law-abiding and moral increased their standing as 
citizens that deserved rights, benefits, and protections from the state. To dislodge 
                                                
52 With my concept of racialized norms of sexual hygiene, I build upon Shah’s model of respectable 
domesticity. Writing in regards to Chinese bachelors and prostitutes in San Francisco’s Chinatown in the 
early 1900s, Shah defines respectable domesticity as the standard of gender, sexuality, and domestic space 
upon which social membership was prescribed in the United States. Shah, Contagious Divides.  
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portrayals of deviance and disease that proliferated in regards to the gay community 
during the HIV/AIDS epidemic, gay leaders highlighted those members who had 
successfully assimilated to middle-class norms of domestic consumerism, private 
property, and sexual hygiene. This approach entailed significant consequences for those 
who operated outside the rubric of respectable domesticity—namely, poor, queers of 
color, and sex workers of color. Leaders demonized queer and trans sex workers of color 
and promiscuous gay men as an immoral cadre that frequented bathhouses and that 
cruised around for public sex. These discursive strategies divided the gay community 
along a distinction of aberrant and normal. White, middle-class same-sex households 
garnered entry into the “normal” side of that binary unlike queer and trans sex workers of 
color who remained framed as “aberrant.” With the inclusion of white, middle-class 
same-sex households into the body politic, the binary of aberrant and normal persisted; 
the dividing line merely shifted.  
We can attribute the exclusion of such recalcitrant subjects to an instance of racial 
uplift by gay community activists. This strategy illustrates that the terms of legal 
recognition and social acceptance in the United States commend nuclear family 
domesticity while they conserve the state’s exclusionary practices. But because of their 
racial, class, and gender privilege in accessing dominant institutions and resources, gay 
leaders were able to contest and rewrite the terms of their cultural and political alienation. 
Preserving whiteness involved mobilizing racialized norms of sexual hygiene that 
demonized the racialized poor. Health authorities and civic officials used race as one of 
the organizing principles to understand HIV. This approach added a racialized dimension 
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to discussions over the disease’s transmission. In turn, public health discourses and 
practices played a key role in marking racialized populations outside the bounds of social 
membership. Through punitive ordinances and policies, health authorities singled out 
some people as capable, deserving, and worthy of citizenship and others incapable of 
such participation. Such ordinances and policies helped to circulate constructed 
categories of blacks, and Native Americans as unclean, ignorant of basic hygienic 
practices, and unwitting hosts for communicable sexually transmitted diseases. These 
representations were then reflected in medical and media narratives pertaining to the 
disease and public policy. Health authorities reinforced these accounts in the press by 
disseminating textual representations of people of color as immoral and promiscuous. 
The medical and social knowledge regarding transmission emerged in a neoliberal 
context shaped by deindustrialization, the withdrawal in social welfare services, intense 
anti-black and Latinx sentiment, and the “culture wars” of the 1980s. The influx of non-
white urban migrants to the Twin Cities helped restabilize the white racial order by 
opening citizenship to white gay men. Urban migrants of color to Minneapolis were 
regarded as disease-ridden, foreign, and subordinate. As the number of urban migrants of 
color increased, concerns over how their presence might impact the economic, physical, 
and social landscape of the city also intensified. There was a deep-rooted concern that the 
racialized poor would undermine the norms of white American society and would, 
therefore, endanger the prosperity and vitality of the nation-state.  The portrayal of urban 
migrants of color as threats to the public health and civic well-being rendered invisible 
the root causes of their socio-economic (dis)location: discrimination, injustice, and 
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poverty. Instead, health authorities, housing officials, law enforcement, and civic leaders 
crafted a narrative that traced their socio-economic location to a wide array of perceived 
cultural and social differences.  
Health authorities and civic leaders exploited the widespread perception that 
urban migrants threatened the health of the city in both a material and metaphorical sense 
to enact legislation that curtailed public sexual cultures while bolstering private 
development. Health authorities pursued sex workers of color as medical menaces that 
needed to be physically distanced from the general public. They endorsed ordinances and 
policies such as contact tracing, non-compliance, and quarantine. These ordinances and 
policies were not based on scientific objectivity. On the contrary, they were shaped by 
racially charged visions of the culturally intractable sex habits of people of color. Health 
authorities and civic leaders employed racially-biased public health standards as the basis 
for implementing legislation that delimited the activities of sex workers of color. In so 
doing, they reframed racial difference as a public health concern. This move legitimated 
practices that might have otherwise been challenged if their racist intent were more 
explicitly stated. Public health, thus, provided a shield to protect racist sentiment in a 
putatively colorblind social milieu. On the other hand, the programs directed at single 
mothers of color living in public housing made use of tropes of Americanization and 
citizenship to discipline these women for their perceived hyper-fertility. On their first 
step towards assimilation, single mothers of color were encouraged to embrace the 
benefits of a healthy lifestyle, including diet and sexual hygiene.  
 
  43 
The racialized poor served as the ideological boundary around where social value 
was anchored. The aberration of sex workers of color and the deviance of single mothers 
of color operated as an ontological foil in the articulation of white gay social worth. The 
establishment of racialized bodies, conduct, and space ushered significant consequences 
for white gay men. Health discourses and practices employed to define, contain, and 
regulate racial difference provided whiteness with a set of corresponding criteria upon 
which it could immunize itself. These public health-generated demarcations pertaining to 
racial identity and embodiment generated strict racial boundaries that were in turn 
transplanted onto the geography and social space of the Twin Cities. Authorities 
perceived poor, people of color as producing a sexual and social subjectivity that ran 
incommensurate to American sexual typologies of heterosexual married life and that 
threatened the image of the city. To protect white civilized behavior, health authorities 
commanded that the racialized poor embrace racialized norms of sexual hygiene, 
complete with domestic living quarters, marriage, moral cleanliness, and private nuclear 
households. But, in actuality, heterosexual marriage and respectable domesticity were 
meant to minimize the state’s role in doling out social welfare services to its citizenry, 
much like homonormativity was meant to obscure the state’s failure in curtailing rates of 
HIV and not providing its citizenry with basic health care.   
In the 1980s, just as Minneapolis was coming into its own as a post-industrial 
service-oriented city, city officials wanted to promote the image of the city as 
economically prosperous. However, reference to non-white urban migrants marred such 
an idyllic image of the city. The trope of public health became powerfully intertwined 
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with private development so that both institutions worked to advertise the economically 
prosperous potential of the city as the nucleus of business, culture, and tourism in the 
Upper Midwest. Under this formulation, urban migrants of color were perceived as 
carriers of disease and purveyors of vice. These perceptions were codified into punitive 
legislation—such as HIV-prevention and the deconcentration of poverty—that proceeded 
from an assumption in the sexual deviance of the racialized poor. These practices of 
urban public health reform, in turn, upheld economic and political trends towards 
gentrification. Eventually, the public health management apparatus merged with efforts to 
revitalize downtown Minneapolis and its surrounding neighborhoods. 
During the initial wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the public health portrayal of 
gay residential and commercial enclaves as the nexus of depravity, disease, and death 
spread throughout central cities in the United States, such as New York’s Greenwich 
Village and San Francisco’s Castro District. Health authorities, conservative politicians, 
and law enforcement officials warned that commercial sex establishments— bathhouses, 
bookstores, and theaters—and the public sexual cultures that emanated from such spaces 
fostered perverse intimate encounters between queer and trans sex workers of color and 
white, married men that subsequently bred contagion and fueled the transmission of the 
virus to white Americans. Owing to that fear, health authorities characterized commercial 
sex establishments, in particular bathhouses, as the physical manifestation of racial and 
sexual Otherness. For health authorities, bathhouses emphasized gay male sexuality’s 
difference from American sexual norms of hygiene and thus confirmed their threat to the 
health of the nation. Indeed, bathhouses and other commercial sex establishments 
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generated alternative social possibilities and knowledge of social relations that posed a 
formidable threat to the racialized norms of respectable domesticity. But, white gay 
leaders refused to acknowledge such queer alternatives to heteronormative domesticity 
and privacy; if they defended such establishments at all, they did so on the Constitutional 
basis of “privacy.” Bathhouses were deemed threatening not just because they facilitated 
the transmission of racial contagion into white suburban spaces. Bathhouses were also 
physical obstacles to the neoliberalization of urban space. On account of the roadblocks 
that such establishments posed for urban revitalization, public health discourses of 
racialized contagion were readily applied to commercial sex establishments and public 
sex cultures in hopes of affirming their physical and symbolic eradication. The 
stigmatization of commercial sex establishments and public sexual cultures makes clear 
that explanations for the transmission of HIV were as much rooted in theories of 
racialized sexual deviance as they were harnessed to promote private development. 
These punitive HIV and anti-poverty policies called for the spatial and social 
division of certain people, for instance, sex workers of color, and of certain practices, 
such as public sex, marked as hazards. This showcases how public health can sustain 
racial segregation and exclusion by mobilizing the interests of private capital in the 
promotion of central cities.53 Through their endorsement of a culture and politics of 
                                                
53 Molina writes that public health in Los Angeles from the late-19th century to the mid-20th century also 
came to exert a force that reached well beyond the realm of health. Public and private discussions in the 
late 1800s in regards to maintaining a high standard of public health were laced with references to the 
economic dangers posed by the city’s immigrant communities to the city. That is why, public health had a 
dual mission of promoting and preserving the biological health of citizens as well as promoting and 
preserving the cultural and economic well-being of the city. Sanitation and good health were central to the 
image of Los Angeles as a pristine, idyllic, and modern destination. Molina writes, “Safeguarding the city’s 
image and protecting its citizens’ health were two sides of a single coin.” Molina, Fit to be Citizens, 27. 
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homonormativity, white gay leaders prescribed specific spatial arrangements of the 
private and public sphere that lend themselves to the gentrification of central cities.  
Since public health had the legal authority to regulate people’s conduct and private 
property for the health and well-being of the citizenry, it regimented strategies of 
surveillance, documentation, and quarantine—all of which contributed to gentrification, 
either directly through the closing of commercial sex establishments, or indirectly 
through the revanchist policing of inner-city neighborhoods for sex workers and would-
be public sex cruisers. Similarly, anti-poverty policies, such as the deconcentration of 
poverty, called for the restructuring of public housing in such a manner that it encouraged 
heteronormativity among the racialized poor and primed these low-income, inner-city 
neighborhoods for a surge in private capital.   
Eventually, by the mid-1990s, gender and sexual norms were recalibrated for a 
bourgeoning neoliberal social order. With the introduction of new life-sustaining AIDS 
medications, white gay leaders and their constituents were able to offer an alternative 
representation of homosexual difference, one that openly embraced private property, 
respectable domesticity, and whiteness. From a difference that imperiled the moral order 
and the public health of the nation, homosexuality was remade into a formation in 
accordance with neoliberal ideologies for the purpose of revamping the urban landscape. 
Nonetheless, because their incorporation was contingent on racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene, white gay leaders augmented fears communicated in dominant white 
representations of the racialized poor as breeding anomalous gender roles, immoral 
sexual practices, and polluted urban spaces. Establishing their racial privilege required 
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that white gay leaders define themselves in contradistinction to the sexual otherness that 
underpinned racial difference. And, since they placed moral cleanliness, private property, 
and respectable domesticity at the center of entitlement claims, white gay leaders fortified 
the notion that only those with social value could be conferred with citizenship.  
Neoliberal Spatial Fix. 
 The reform of housing conditions—via gentrification—and the consolidation of 
gender and sexual norms—via homonormativity—contributed to the political 
enfranchisement of white gay men in the United States. This perspective, however, is 
difficult to gather from current studies of gentrification or studies of gay urban politics 
because these tend to focus on class as the overarching propeller of gay neighborhood 
change. As I have been arguing throughout this introduction, class does not tell the whole 
story. For that, we must employ a women of color feminist and queer of color critique 
lens that espouses intersectionality and that ties neighborhood change back to materiality. 
This lens enables us to observe that the management of race, gender, and sexual 
difference is intimately bound up within the neoliberal restructuring of space. In this 
section, I historicize Marxist theoretical interventions into the study of gentrification. I 
then propose a corrective to those theories. And I show how a white liberal discourse of 
“Minnesota Nice” abetted the neoliberal revamping of Minneapolis and masked its 
attendant racial violences.  
Following a period of sustained economic devalorization and physical 
deterioration after World War II, many larger and older cities in North America, Europe, 
and Australia experienced the early instances of gentrification. The early gentrification of 
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these central and inner-city blighted neighborhoods commenced as a relatively isolated 
phenomenon in the private housing market. By the 1970s, however, in the midst of a 
global economic recession, gentrification became a prevalent occurrence. As a process of 
neighborhood change marked by an improvement in the housing stock and the relocation 
of young, urban professionals, gentrification systematically transformed the physical 
terrain along with the cultural layout and economic geographies of central cities. By 
reconfiguring financial, producer, and professional employment in downtown office 
districts, gentrification also provoked commercial revitalization along with the increase in 
high-end cultural and recreational amenities.54  
Early theorists of gentrification described it as a process that emerged out of the 
shifts in the consumer patterns and lifestyles of young, urban professionals. For instance, 
geographer David Ley insisted that patterns of consumption determined patterns of 
production in post-industrial cities. According to this rationale, gentrification was the 
mere spatial consequence of an adjustment in consumer preferences, in which a 
disillusioned middle and elite class migrated back to the city from the suburbs. 
Geographer Neil Smith disagreed with this hypothesis, concluding that it placed an 
excessive amount of consideration on consumer preference. What Smith proposed, 
instead, was the notion that the search for a high return on productive investments was 
the primary reason fueling gentrification.55 
                                                
54 Smith, The New Urban Frontier.  
55 Smith questioned neoclassical economic theories that posited neighborhood change as the simple result 
of modified consumer patterns, economic barriers, and the return relocation of the middle-class from the 
suburbs. For Smith, the gentrifier as consumer was only one of many actors in the process that included 
builders, developers, government agencies, landlords, mortgage lenders, and real estate agents. Smith 
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To explain both the physical and social dimensions of gentrification, Smith 
revised Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism by centering space. This spatialized Marxism 
provided Smith with the framework to develop his famed concept of the “rent gap,” or a 
historical materialist explanation for gentrification. Smith deduced that since profit drove 
neighborhood change, then one needed a production theory of gentrification. He observed 
that central and inner-city blighted neighborhoods deteriorated to a certain point before 
experiencing physical and social revitalization from a surge in capital. Smith noted that 
the economic returns (rent) recovered from buildings in any one area of the city were tied 
to the physical properties and use value of those buildings. When a neighborhood, usually 
always located in the city center away from the suburbs, entered a downward economic 
spiral, the actual rent would also deviate from the “potential ground rent” that landlords 
could recoup if they put their properties to a different land use, “best use.” In due time, a 
valley of low rent would materialize between the city center and outer city areas. When 
that valley or “rent gap” was sizable, then banks, developers, and planners would be 
enticed by the potential rental income to be had and, as a result, would reinvest in the 
central and inner-city neighborhoods with new or refurbished residences and businesses 
for a new class of inhabitants. This private development would essentially close off the 
rent gap, resulting in higher rent, mortgage, and lease rents—in short, higher property 
values for a newly gentrified neighborhood.56  
                                                                                                                                            
clarified that when one considered the position of consumers and producers in gentrification then the need 
of production to earn a profit was a greater determining factor. Ibid.  
56 Ibid. 
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Smith’s rent gap theory is noteworthy in that it exemplifies that uneven 
development is not a random or accidental outcome of economic growth and 
industrialization. Rather, uneven development is a necessary and systematic component 
of capitalism.57 The economic devalorization and physical deterioration of central city 
and inner-city neighborhoods, triggered by suburbanization, made those same 
neighborhoods ripe for gentrification. As a manifestation of that uneven development, 
gentrification, therefore, is not a natural urban phenomenon denoting cultural progress or 
spatial evolution. On the contrary, gentrification is the result of “deliberate policies, tax 
credits, policing strategies, and moratoriums on low-income housing.”58 In short, it is a 
mechanical process, constructed and imposed by force. We can treat postwar redlining 
and gentrification in late capitalism as processes along a continuum in which private 
developers seek to recoup a profit in the state-subsidized private housing market.   
At the core of gentrification is the movement of capital in and out of the built 
environment, depending upon where the rate of return is highest. Lefebvre argues that 
                                                
57 Central to Smith’s economic explanation of gentrification is the claim that uneven development is made 
possible by devalorization. Smith insists, “A theory of gentrification must explain the historical process of 
capital devalorization in the inner city and the precise way in which this devalorization produces the 
possibility of profitable reinvestment.” Central cities, like Chicago, were adversely affected by the 
movement of capital to the suburbs where higher profits were viable. Given the low rates of return in the 
central city, investors and private developers applied a combination of concerted disinvestment and neglect 
that resulted in a long period of deterioration and that engendered the postwar ghettos and slums in 
American cities. One of the ways in which neighborhoods were disinvested was through a policy of 
undermaintenance. In a declining housing market, a landlord could have responded by undermaintaining 
his or her property. Undermaintenance, in turn, further disinvested the neighborhood as the landlord’s 
stakes diminished. This was followed by disinvestment from banks and vandalism which further 
accelerated the process. When landlords were unable to collect the sufficient amount of rent to cover basic 
costs, buildings were subsequently abandoned. These conditions exacerbated decline since ground rent had 
also been contingent on the economic and physical conditions of surrounding buildings. As the 
neighborhood declined, the rent gap widened. Eventually, reinvestment became profitable, and 
gentrification occurred. Ibid.  
58 Sarah Schulman, The Gentrification of the Mind: Witness to a Lost Imagination (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2013), 54. 
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capitalism has survived in the 20th century by one and only one means: by occupying 
space—that is, by producing space.59 Geographer David Harvey calls this process a 
“spatial fix.”60 After World War II, suburbanization functioned as a vehicle for capital 
accumulation. At the time, because profit rates in the central city were low, economic 
growth was not feasible. Therefore, industrial capitalism migrated to new American 
suburbs to meet the continued need for capital accumulation.61 Alterations in the built 
environment—suburbanization—through profitable investment came to be a mode of 
securing economic growth. What this example shows us is that capital literally pursues 
new spaces in an effort to recoup a profit, or to mitigate any economic crisis. Capital’s 
ability to travel to new spaces and new markets highlights its flexibility (i.e., the inherent 
malleability of the liberal public-private divide of space) and its capacity to work with 
previously stigmatized populations (i.e., ethnic whites after World War II, and same-sex 
households in late capitalism). In the context of a global economic recession in the 1970s, 
gentrification emerged as an opportunity for capital to reconsolidate its power in the new 
                                                
59 Lefebvre, The Production of Space.  
60 Writing in regards to crises of capital, Harvey argues that one of the solutions that capital undertakes to 
overaccumulation is a spatial fix. A spatial fix consists of moving capital or labor to a different territory and 
commencing production anew. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1990), 180.  
61 Smith writes that the exception to the suburban migration of capital for residential construction in 
American cities has laid in the central business district. Beginning in the 1920s, these districts experienced 
significant skyscraper office construction. However, due to the suburban migration of capital, land values 
in the inner-city dropped relative to the central business district and the suburbs. What emerged was a 
valley in land values between the downtown core of cities and the suburbs. Buildings in the valley were 
older, and residents paid less in rent. During the period of sustained postwar suburbanization, from the 
1940s to the 1960s, the valley in the land value intensified due to the persistent lack of new capital 
investment in the inner-city. Smith indicates that this concerted process of capital devalorization, which 
took place in most older American cities, gave rise to the ghettos and slums of the postwar era, 
neighborhoods that would eventually be gentrified once capital migrated back to the city. Smith, The New 
Urban Frontier. 
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uncharted terrain of the inner-city. But, unlike World War II and ethnic whites, this time 
capital recruited the purchasing power of white, middle-class same-sex households.  
 As a key theory in the study of gentrification, Smith’s concept of the rent gap 
posits that the urban renaissance of central city neighborhoods is a process that is 
provoked by economic rather than cultural forces. Smith argues that the movement of 
capital to the suburbs and the continued devalorization of inner-cities produced a rent 
gap; when that rent gap was wide enough, developers rehabilitated the built environment 
of the city to challenge the rates of return elsewhere. Smith concludes that gentrification 
is “a structural product of the land and housing markets.”62 His focus on class, however, 
has made certain that Marxism—at the expense of a critical race or feminist approach—
has dominated the study of neighborhood change. Even if profit is the primary factor 
fueling gentrification, it is not the sole determinant of urban revitalization. Smith and 
other theorists in the intellectual camp of spatialized Marxism such as Lefebvre and 
Harvey have failed to note the relevance of categories of social difference in propelling 
neighborhood change in late capitalism and, by extension, how those marginalized 
populations are normalized through gentrification schemes.    
 If gentrification is inherently bound up with the patterns and rhythms of capital 
investment and disinvestment in the built environment, then we can present gentrification 
as a solution, a “fix,” to the public social ills of the 1980s—the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
racialized poverty—events that were abetted by the state’s shift towards an ethic of 
neoliberalism. I build upon Harvey’s concept of spatial fix by defining a “neoliberal 
                                                
62 Ibid., 57.  
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spatial fix” as an attempt to implement organizational transformation, but entirely 
through spatial strategies. As an example of environmentalism, a neoliberal spatial fix 
proceeds from an understanding that changes in the built environment can result in 
changes to people’s behavior. Still, as a theory of neoliberalism, it also proceeds from a 
faulty assumption that people are responsible for their own social circumstances and the 
larger social ills from which these predicaments arise. For instance, through the public 
health policies that authorities implemented to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
racialized poverty, policymakers also readied urban spaces for privatization, out of a 
belief that alterations in the built environment—towards domestic space and moral 
cleanliness—would change people’s behaviors.  
 In the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and racialized poverty, policymakers 
believed that these matters were intensified by people’s sexually deviant behaviors and, 
by extension, inability to occupy public and private space in appropriate, respectable 
ways. To that extent, public health policies called for the criminalization of public sex, 
the closure of commercial sex establishments, and the reorganization of public housing—
all with a spatial emphasis on racialized norms of sexual hygiene. We can, hence, treat 
these policies as examples of neoliberal spatial fixes, in which the state sought to remedy 
the visible detritus of capital—AIDS and poverty—through the application of solutions 
designed to generate profit via the neoliberal restructuring of urban space. Under a 
neoliberal spatial fix, as I show in this dissertation, the linkages between individual 
circumstances and social processes are reversed. This means that a neoliberal spatial fix 
indexes the abstraction of neoliberalism; it obscures the ways in which the state and 
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capital create the conditions of possibility for AIDS and poverty to materialize, in the 
first place. In so doing, a neoliberal spatial fix promulgates narratives of personal 
responsibility that attribute people’s material realities to cultural deficiencies and 
individual shortcomings.  
Because policymakers believed that sexual deviance was at the crux of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and racialized poverty—not institutional neglect, political 
disenfranchisement, or socio-economic disparities—gentrification, as a fix to those 
conditions, operated much more than to simply generate profit. As an apparatus of the 
neoliberal state, gentrification in the Twin Cities also functioned in the service of 
restoring the racial order by disciplining and remedying perceived deviations in gender 
and sexuality. I, therefore, emphasize the racial and sexual politics underpinning 
gentrification in the United States to highlight the ways that the management of race and 
sex have been central to the restructuring of space under neoliberalism.  
My dissertation, From Vice to Nice: Race, Sex, and the Gentrification of AIDS, 
contributes to a nuanced definition of gentrification that anchors us forward in 
understanding contemporary neoliberal formations such as homonormativity. Although 
the theories of Lefebvre, Harvey, and Smith are crucial in making sense of neighborhood 
change in late capitalism, a one-sized model cannot account for the different species of 
gentrification nor the complexity of on-the-ground spatial formations. Classical urban 
theory—even its Marxist permutations—is not equipped to process the historical regional 
specificity to gentrification. The story of gentrification in Minneapolis carries with it the 
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potential to radically alter how we tell the story of gentrification in other parts of the 
country.  
As I mentioned above, there is no officially-designated gay neighborhood in 
Minneapolis because those spaces were eradicated and gentrified. Central to that 
gentrification was a discourse of white liberalism that posited that, in Minneapolis, there 
was no need for such a space because a gay man and lesbian could be safely visible 
anywhere in the metropolitan region. Gay and lesbian life in the Twin Cities was and 
remains imagined as integrated—seamless with white heteronormativity. Gay and lesbian 
politicians pushed this narrative of the “middleness” of the Twin Cities to make particular 
raced- and classed-iterations of same-sex desire appear non-threatening, at ease, and 
taken for granted. Since a gay neighborhood was deemed not necessary, the perceived 
integration of gay and lesbian life catalyzed widespread neighborhood change. The 
“middleness” of Minneapolis—illustrated in the discourse of “Minnesota Nice”—
underscores how a progressive ethos of white liberalism was crucial to the urban 
redevelopment of downtown Minneapolis and the eradication of the public sexual 
cultures that sought refuge there. The “middleness” of Minneapolis was not just a local 
formation; it helped tie the Twin Cities to a national movement of American 
exceptionalism, especially in light of the war on drugs, poverty, and more recently terror.  
Before New York and San Francisco, the Twin Cities served as a test case for 
white liberalism as a racist neoliberal project—that is, racism via “nice” people. By 
emphasizing the violence of normalization, my dissertation tells how the category of 
“Minnesota Nice” operates as a racial project that harnessed a culture and politics of 
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homonormativity to execute the mandates of neoliberalism. As I show in this dissertation, 
white gay and lesbian leaders positioned homonormativity as a defining attribute of a 
Midwestern ethics of liberalism, progress, and tolerance. Instead of being prescribed as a 
threat to middle-America, homonormativity was sutured onto a discourse of Minnesota 
Nice, a white liberal ethos that masks a myriad of exclusions and violences. Through a 
culture and politics of homonormativity, some gay men and lesbians were able to secure 
access to privilege and power. Their social membership, nevertheless, came largely at the 
expense of racialized and gender non-normative constituencies. Homonormativity also 
occasions privatizing imperatives and redistributes resources in an upward fashion—
hallmarks of neoliberalism. The interconnections between homonormativity and 
Midwestern values reveals Minnesota Nice to be a precursor to contemporary neoliberal 
formations of white liberalism. Inasmuch as the contradictions of neoliberalism were first 
exposed in the Twin Cities, an assessment of the Midwest as a liberal, progressive, and 
tolerant region must call attention to the ways in which this ethos actively colludes with 
racial violence. As I show in my dissertation, white liberalism capitalized on raced- and 
classed-iterations of gender and sexuality to reformulate the cityscape of Minneapolis in 
the service of codifying white heteronormativity and neoliberal capital.  
The metronormative impulse of studies of homonormativity, however, prevents us 
from seeing how regionality can dismantle coastal narratives. This LGBT studies 
emphasis on the urban inadvertently works to abstract the internal workings of 
neoliberalism by glazing over the significance of the Midwest in fomenting a white 
liberalism that was imported throughout the country. I decouple homonormativity from 
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New York and San Francisco by showing how this politics of gay and lesbian 
normalization was manifest in Minnesota vis-à-vis the racialization of the poor and the 
disciplining of the sexually licentious. This approach helps reorient our understanding of 
not only gay and lesbian history, politics, and culture, but that of white liberalism.  
Chapter Summaries.  
My dissertation, From Vice to Nice: Race, Sex, and the Gentrification of AIDS, 
consists of five chapters, tracking white gay leaders’ coming into being as agents of 
homonormativity. In chapter one, I explore how white gay leaders linked the legislative 
effort to decriminalize private homosexual behavior in Minnesota, after the 1986 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, to the creation of a new crime of public 
sex. Leaders designed this new crime of public sex to police dissident sexualities and to 
maintain a system of private property ownership, all the while channeling rewards to 
white, middle-class same-sex households that spatially embodied the tenets of a 
bourgeoning culture and politics of homonormativity (i.e., domesticity, morality, privacy, 
responsibility). Under these terms of inclusion, the new crime of public sex reinforced the 
state’s monopoly in determining where normative sexuality could be enacted and with 
whom. The inclusion of white, middle-class same-sex households within the fold of the 
state was not necessarily a result of progress inasmuch as it was a reflection of the 
inherent malleability of the public-private divide of space, shifting to bestow privacy 
upon previously marginalized populations so as to meet the particular ideological needs 
of capital. By conducting textual analysis of legal cases pertaining to convictions of 
sodomy, I note how white gay leaders defined privacy in relation to whiteness, anchored 
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in private property, and framed in terms of coupled monogamy. In other words, these 
demands for social membership via the private sphere of the home were racially 
restrictive, class contingent, and sexually delimiting.  
Chapter two elaborates how gay politicians and leaders, in collaboration with law 
enforcement, applied the spatial strategies discussed in chapter one to promote 
monogamy and privacy—racialized norms of sexual hygiene—as cures for anti-gay 
violence. Although violence often took the form of verbal harassment and physical 
assault, between 1984 and 1987, Minneapolis witnessed upwards of 15 murders against 
gay men or trans women. Due to the indifference and incompetence of law enforcement 
authorities, white gay leaders founded Community United Against Violence (CUAV) to 
document the rising wave of violence, to demand greater protection, and to provide 
support and service to survivors. However, CUAV, and the mainstream LGB anti-
violence movement from which it emerged, directed its actions both against and in 
support of state powers. By demanding the expansion of the criminal punishment system 
through the promotion of state-centered solutions, gay anti-violence activists mobilized 
moral panic discourses that were racialized to consolidate “hate crime” as a legal 
category. Eventually, the interests of CUAV’s leadership would come to neatly align with 
those of law enforcement. I analyze CUAV’s anti-violence campaign literature to 
underscore how gay community activists and law enforcement authorities mobilized race 
and private property to determine who counted as victim and who figured as criminal.  
Chapter three continues to unravel the ideological origins of homonormativity in 
discourses and practices of racialized criminality and deviance by showing how gay 
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rights advocates used the HIV/AIDS epidemic as the basis of white normative recovery 
vis-à-vis the discursive Othering of HIV-positive sex workers of color. In reframing the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as the fear of racial contagion, I illustrate how the moral panic 
surrounding HIV-positive sex workers of color masked deeper fears of white injury in the 
wake of neoliberalism’s advent (i.e., deindustrialization, market deregulation, 
privatization). At the height of the epidemic, mainstream media publicized erroneous 
accounts of the epidemic’s threat to white heterosexual families. By reporting on 
sensationalistic cases of HIV-positive sex workers of color who engaged in sexual 
activity with bisexual married white men, news sources exploited white public fears of 
AIDS to warn of the dangers of deviating from sexual monogamy and heterosexual 
marriage. For this chapter, I conduct textual analysis of a joint PBS and Minneapolis 
produced Frontline episode, “AIDS: A National Inquiry,” revolving around Fabian 
Bridges, a poor, black gay man with AIDS at the center of a national media frenzy. 
Bridges’ depiction, which characterized sex workers as socially irresponsible and 
pathological subjects unable to regulate their sexual impulses, urged public health 
departments and law enforcement agencies to abandon the civil liberties of sex workers 
in favor of protecting the public good via the implementation of social controls that 
circumscribed the freedom of movement and association of people with HIV/AIDS. In 
the wake of AIDS moral panic, urban policymakers pushed for these new technologies of 
social control to rid the public sphere of unwanted identities and practices, thus, priming 
central cities for the incursion of neoliberal capital and the restoration of white 
supremacy. Rather than challenging these racist depictions of HIV-positive sex workers 
 
  60 
of color, gay leaders pointed to them as foils in vouching for the “worthiness” of some 
white gay men with HIV/AIDS.  
For chapters four and five, I elucidate how public health officials and white gay 
leaders used morality-based policies established in chapter one to limit anonymous sex in 
commercials sex establishments and public sex venues, essentially shutting down these 
spaces and readying them for gentrification. During the height of AIDS moral panic, 
commercial sex establishments and public sex venues became the targets of urban 
renewal for a number of reasons. For one, anti-pornography feminists famously argued 
that adult bookstores and X-rated theaters promoted a culture of sexual violence against 
women. On the other hand, public health officials hypothesized that these establishments 
accommodated a sexual promiscuity among gay and bisexual men that facilitated the 
spread of the disease to white, suburban families. However, perhaps more than anything 
else, urban policymakers feared that the presence of commercial sex establishments and 
public sex venues deterred future economic investment in the downtown core of post-
industrial central cities. As such, city officials used the HIV/AIDS epidemic to limit, 
close, or evict businesses that sold sexually explicit material or that accommodated public 
sexual cultures. In chapter four, I discuss the processes through which racism, morality, 
and private real estate interests fueled the decision making of the more conservative 
contingent of gay leadership, along with public health officials and city officials, to close 
the last remaining bathhouse in the Twin Cities, the 315 Health Club. Whereas, in chapter 
five, I analyze how these same dynamics emboldened city officials—with the backing of 
some gay residents—to crack down on public sex at Loring Park. I explore how the 
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misleading claims articulated by white gay journalist Randy Shilts in his 1987 publication 
of And the Band Played On, in which he notoriously insisted that gay men’s sexual 
behaviors were partly to blame for the spread of the epidemic, influenced both an anti-
bathhouse ordinance and an anti-cruising ordinance. These ordinances were designed to 
fight AIDS by making it harder to engage in “high-risk” sexual conduct in the city’s 
commercial sex establishments through a policy requiring architectural changes, and the 
city’s public parks through heightened police surveillance. As I reveal in chapters four 
and five, this new gay moralism that called for closures and that advocated for 
monogamous marriage as responsible disease prevention strategies provided for a 
shrunken public sphere and laid the foundation for the infrastructure of homonormative 
domestic privacy in line with the neoliberal restructuring of central cities.  
In chapter six, I present how housing officials extended the spatial strategies 
applied to HIV/AIDS in the city’s vice district to treat poverty in the city’s skid row. In 
the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Urban Development (HUD) settled several meritorious 
lawsuits brought against the agency for racial segregation and spatial concentration of 
subsidized housing. The plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination on the part of HUD and 
local housing authorities for negligently and willfully segregating subsidized housing in 
minority- and poverty-concentrated neighborhoods. To settle these claims, HUD entered 
into consent decrees, or negotiated settlements, in more than a dozen of these cases 
nationwide. As I indicate, the settlement-negotiated process fit seamlessly with the 
neoliberal objectives of the “new” (read: neoliberal) HUD. Because housing officials 
characterized poverty as an urban disorder brought upon by deviant sexuality, they 
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attributed the failure of public housing not to institutional neglect, but to “broken 
families” manifested via black female-headed households and fatherless black gang 
members. A culture of poverty thesis, thus, fueled the gentrification of central cities, 
including north Minneapolis, by justifying the restructuring of public housing with a 
spatial emphasis on sexual hygiene. Housing officials tried to inculcate respectable 
domesticity among public housing residents by promoting single-family, privately-
maintained suburban homes. As one of the first cities to implement a policy of dispersed, 
inter-mixed public housing, Minneapolis’ re-engineering of family housing held lasting 
consequences for the national revamping of public housing. Even though HUD officials 
extolled the benefits of deconcentration-policy, I reveal that efforts to deconcentrate 
racialized urban poverty incurred greater economic violence on public housing families. 
A policy of deconcentration achieved minimal residential integration. Quite the opposite, 
it destroyed entire neighborhoods in central cities and merely relocated poverty elsewhere 
for the purpose of readying these urban spaces for gentrification. Additionally, I disclose 
that this policy of deconcentration pushed a number of public housing families into 
homelessness as it likewise severed their social safety support networks. And yet, 
because HUD employed a liberal discourse of multiculturalism to justify the destruction 
of entire communities of color under the guise of opening up suburban living to these 
very same people, local community and housing activists could not explicitly accuse 
these initiatives and policies of racial discrimination. If anything, the official antiracist 
nature of these policies foreclosed a critique of how these policies ultimately relied on 
racist tropes of sexual deviance. The conclusion briefly identifies the present-day 
 
  63 
consequences of this neoliberal spatial management of gay male sexuality and racialized 
poverty through a juxtaposed discussion on gay gentrification and gay tourism initiatives 
in the midst of increased economic divestment and political disenfranchisement among 
poor, people of color in Minneapolis.  
Underlying these state actions of privatization in the 1980s was the erroneous 
argument that AIDS and poverty were the result of sexual deviance, not institutional 
neglect. For that reason, some conservative policymakers, including white gay leaders, 
adopted sexual narratives that cast specific populations (such as “sexually licentious,” 
unmarried black women with children) as deviant and, thus, morally “unworthy” of aid. 
My dissertation identifies how the racialized and classed politics of sexual respectability 
that emerged in response to these moral panics reinforced the exclusionary strategies 
performed by the modern liberal state. These politics upheld the exclusionary nature of 
private property and extended the norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space upon 
which social membership for minority groups depends. By showing that racialized and 
queer strategies for integration into the middle-class depend upon private housing 
arrangements and patterns of respectable domesticity, I argue that the domestication of 
gay sexual identities and practices has, in turn, required a disavowal of public and 
marginalized sexual cultures, identities, and practices. These linkages between race, 
sexuality, and space in the management of AIDS and poverty provide us with insight into 
the dynamics of gentrification and public health in processes of inclusion and exclusion 
of marginal communities. 
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To showcase the ways in which racial logic evolved under neoliberalism, I 
compare the experiences of nonwhite groups in Minneapolis to those of gay 
communities, and to the dominant white population. By interrogating the role of public 
health as a key site of racialization, I emphasize the importance of approaching 
racialization from a comparative perspective by way of women of color feminism and 
queer of color critique. A comparative perspective showcases the ways in which racial 
logic assumes different forms during the same historical moment and how these are based 
on a particular set of gender and sexual norms.63 By juxtaposing homonormative politics 
with discourses of racialized criminality and deviance in the restructuring of central 
cities, my work forwards an important contribution to ethnic, queer, and urban studies by 
broadening our understanding of the intersections of race, sexuality, space, and power. 
This project, one of the first detailed studies of the relationship between AIDS, poverty, 
and gentrification, also offers a special contribution to the emerging scholarship in 
comparative and critical ethnic studies by underscoring the generative benefit of 
analyzing racialized formations in relation to sexual ones via feminist and queer 
theorizing.   
 
 
                                                
63 Molina, Fit to be Citizens.  
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Chapter One. 
The Moral Geographies of Sodomy Repeal in the Heartland: Legal Jurisprudence, Racial 
Suspicion, and the Illegality of Public Sex 
Introduction.   
 Prior to the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, gay and 
lesbian leaders argued on behalf of sodomy repeal on the grounds that courts could not 
allow public animosity or social intolerance to constitutionally deprive gay men and 
lesbians of their right to privacy. At the height of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, however, the 
Court in Bowers was unreceptive to such a position. That case involved Michael 
Hardwick, a white gay Atlanta resident who was arrested after a police officer serving a 
warrant discovered him engaging in mutual oral sex with another man in Hardwick’s 
private bedroom. Police charged Hardwick with sodomy, which the Georgia sodomy 
statute defined as “any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth 
or anus of another.”1 On June 30, 1986, the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 ruling, upheld 
Georgia’s sodomy law.2 The Court ruled that the Constitution did not protect homosexual 
relations between consenting adults—even in the privacy of their own homes.3 
                                                
1 Although the technical common-law definition of sodomy applies to anal sex, most sodomy laws referred 
to laws that prohibited oral and anal sex, with most of them equally applying to both heterosexuals and 
homosexuals. The State of Georgia insisted that homosexual sodomy did not fall within a constitutional 
right to privacy given the state’s historical tradition against it. Georgia’s Assistant Attorney General, 
Michael Hobbs, defended his state’s sodomy law to the press claiming, “Our legal history and our social 
traditions have condemned this conduct.” While Georgia state officials invoked “social traditions” to 
defend the sodomy law, Harvard law Professor Laurence Tribe, who represented Hardwick, countered that 
states, given the spatial boundaries of privacy, could not criminalize sodomy between consenting adult 
homosexuals merely with “an invocation of the majority’s morality.” Michael J. Bowers was Georgia’s 
Attorney General. “Supreme Court hears debate on adults’ right to practice sodomy,” Star Tribune, Apr. 1, 
1986. 
2 The Court did not rule whether the Constitution protected married heterosexual couples from prosecution 
under the law. In a notice at the bottom of Justice Byron White’s majority opinion, he wrote that the Court 
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In ruling that homosexual sodomy was not protected by a constitutional right to 
privacy, the Supreme Court determined that homosexual sodomy was not fundamental—
that is, traditional. Homosexual sodomy, the Court argued, was neither rooted in history 
nor valued by the majority of American citizens. Writing for the majority opinion, Justice 
Byron White labeled it “facetious” to insist that gay men and lesbians were protected by a 
fundamental right to privacy. The right to engage in homosexual sodomy, White 
declared, was not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” For that reason, 
the Court decided not to strike down Georgia’s sodomy law. By limiting the “zone of 
privacy” to the heterosexual bedroom, the Court essentially affirmed the notion that gay 
men and lesbians were incapable of family, marriage, and intimacy.4   
 After Bowers, gay and lesbian leaders altered their approach to sodomy repeal. 
Instead of arguing that a fundamental right to privacy should extend to all gay men and 
                                                                                                                                            
expressed “no opinion” on the constitutionality of heterosexual acts of sodomy. Writing for the four 
dissenters, Justice Harry Blackmun criticized the Court’s “almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity” 
and for ignoring both the heterosexual plaintiffs in the case and Hardwick’s privacy claim. A heterosexual 
married couple joined Hardwick’s case, insisting they had violated aspects of the Georgia law prohibiting 
oral and anal sex between both heterosexuals and homosexuals. However, the Court refused to consider the 
claims of these heterosexual plaintiffs. Blackmun, agreeing with Hardwick’s defense team, declared that 
regardless how uncomfortable a certain group could make the majority of the Court feel, the Court could 
not allow public intolerance or animosity to “constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical 
liberty.” Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy statute upheld, Mn. court challenge reviewed,” Equal Time, Jul. 9, 1986.; 
Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy vote almost went other way,” Equal Time, Jul. 23, 1986.; Jim Schroeder, 
“Sodomy law unconstitutional,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986.  
3 For some, the decision also reflected the government’s defense of the rights of individual states to 
establish moral codes. “The Supreme Court in the bedroom,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jul. 06, 1986; 
“Court upholds sodomy laws//Justices rule 5-4 that homosexual acts can be banned,” Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune, Jul. 1, 1986. 
4 The belief that the state should not interfere in the private sexual conduct of consenting adults became 
popularized in the 1960s. In 1965, the Supreme Court ruled in Griswold v. Connecticut that there existed a 
“zone of privacy” within which the government could not interfere. That case involved a state law 
preventing the purchase of birth control by a married heterosexual couple. The ruling, however, extended to 
unmarried couples out of a belief that all consenting adults, regardless of their marriage status, possessed a 
right to sexual privacy. But, the right to consensual sex did not necessarily correspond with a guarantee to a 
right to privacy. Griswold V. Connecticut. 1965. Print. 
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lesbians, by virtue of constitutional guarantees, they now sought to highlight the 
heteronormative compliance of some gay men and lesbians to the institution of privacy. 
With this goal, gay and lesbian leaders mobilized monolithic constructions of same-sex 
identities and practices that prioritized a culture and politics of homonormativity. 
Inasmuch as they imposed a modern, Eurocentric, and allegedly universal subjectivity on 
all gay men and lesbians, leaders assumed that all gay men and lesbians aspired, or even 
desired, privacy as a symbol of the state’s recognition of homosexuality.  
Alternatively, in highlighting homosexual conformity to gender and sexual norms, 
gay and lesbian leaders extended practices of racial exclusion and racial privilege. For 
queers who remained the most economically and socially marginalized, privacy alone 
could not remedy material inequalities and social injustices conditioned by AIDS, 
poverty, and structural racism. Had gay and lesbian leaders thoroughly considered racial 
exclusion and material inequality, they would have realized that queers of color violated 
the norms, rights, and privileges that homonormative formations claimed to embody. 
Instead, gay community activists merely perceived that those who engaged in public sex 
did so out of internalized homophobia or gay shame. They did not contemplate that for 
some, public sex was an economic necessity.  
In this chapter, I juxtapose the rhetoric of homonormative formations against the 
experiences of homeless queers of color to underscore how home and its attendant 
discourses and practices of privacy are not universal but rather shaped by racial and class 
exclusions. The Court’s decision in Bowers encouraged gay and lesbian leaders to 
prohibit sex from spilling out into public spaces. By restricting sex to the private sphere 
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of the home, nonetheless, gay and lesbian leaders rendered those poor and queers of color 
that had to have sex in public incredibly vulnerable to surveillance and punishment.   
In Minnesota, those in positions of gay and lesbian leadership organized to 
decriminalize private homosexual behavior after Bowers through a strategy that called for 
the criminalization of public sex. They wedded challenges to Minnesota’s sodomy law to 
a rejection of public sexual cultures. This approach empowered gay and lesbian leaders 
with determining which types of same-sex identities and practices to vouch for state 
protection and which ones to further criminalize. Those sexual arrangements that most 
closely matched the racial, class, and spatial idiosyncrasies of white heteropatriarchy 
were also the ones that leaders could more readily recuperate as “private.” On the other 
hand, those sexual arrangements that defied dominant raced and classed models of 
homosexuality were the prime targets of a newly proposed crime of public sex. In hopes 
of garnering support for the repeal of Minnesota’s sodomy law from conservative 
politicians and constituents, gay and lesbian leaders proposed the public sex law to 
increase the policing of dissident sexualities and to maintain a system of private property 
ownership, all the while channeling rewards to white gay men and lesbians who spatially 
embodied middle-class norms of respectable domesticity. The emphasis placed on 
privacy reflects how gay and lesbian rights activism veered towards a neoliberal project 
of racial exclusion and privilege.  
 Beginning in the 1980s, we witnessed the emergence of a gay and lesbian politics 
of morality organized around heteronormative compliance. Homonormativity illustrates a 
tradition in which minoritarian social formations appeal and strive for recognition by the 
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liberal capitalist state through the performance of American norms of gender, sexuality, 
and domestic space. Homonormativity, therefore, does not imply a deviation from 
heterosexual normativity, but instead signals its convergence. Sociologist Roderick A. 
Ferguson likens homonormativity to an ethnic white formation. The purpose of 
“ethnicity” as a category is to maintain and communicate difference by consigning it to 
the private sphere so that the subject can occupy the universal properties of citizenship in 
the public sphere. Ferguson cites Karl Marx’s “On the Jewish Question,” to show how 
the logic of the rights-based subject mediates difference in accordance to the exigencies 
of citizenship. According to Marx:  
Man emancipates himself politically from religion by expelling it from the sphere 
of public law to that of private law… [Religion] has been relegated among the 
numerous private interests and exiled from the life of the community as such. But 
one should have no illusions about the scope of political emancipation. The 
division of man into the public person and the private person, the displacement of 
religion from the state to civil society—all this is not a stage in political 
emancipation but its consummation.5 
Marx posits that the secularization of religion creates the conditions of possibility for the 
Jewish subject to participate in the public sphere and to benefit from the state’s 
recognition. In the same way, Ferguson describes that the normalization of 
                                                
5 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: 
Norton & Company, 1978): 26-46.  
 
  70 
homosexuality is contingent on confining homosexual difference to the private sphere.6 
Homosexual difference, as a secular element of the contemporary neoliberal state, is 
preserved as a private idiosyncrasy instead of being eradicated altogether. Under these 
circumstances, gay men and lesbians, like other marginalized populations, articulated 
their demands for state rights, benefits, and protections through private living 
arrangements.  
Because in American legal tradition property has historically operated as a means 
to attain privacy and autonomy, private property operates as the conduit through which 
marginalized populations perform their social worth and characterize their intimate 
relations as private. The private sphere of the home is the venue through which 
marginalized populations enact and legitimate citizen claims. Within Anglo-American 
legal tradition, private property is that shield, in theory, that protects the autonomous 
individual from both the public gaze and the watchful eye of the state.7 In practice, 
however, private property is not enough to deter the ever-curious gaze of the public and 
the ever so suspicious glare of the state. After all, the state holds a vested interest in 
sexually regulating the private bedroom. The private sphere of the home, as a result, 
necessitates an affiliation with the illusory and universal itineraries of white 
heteropatriarchy to lay claim to the rights and privileges of American citizenship.  
                                                
6 Roderick A. Ferguson, “Race-ing Homonormativity: Citizenship, Sociology and Gay Identity,” in Black 
Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology, ed. E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005): 52-67.  
7 Nicholas Blomley, “The Borrowed View: Privacy, Propriety, and the Entanglements of Property,” Law & 
Social Inquiry 30.4 (2005): 617- 661.  
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In the West, heteronormativity occupies the top-tier of the sexual hierarchy. To 
that extent, in attempting to garner constitutionally protected sexual privacy post-Bowers,  
gay and lesbian leaders appealed to heteronormative discourses and practices. In 
Contagious Divides, historian Nayan Shah traces the processes through which public 
health discourses and practices transformed representations of Chinese immigrants in San 
Francisco in the nineteenth century as a “filthy” and “diseased” race to a model minority 
in the mid-twentieth century. Shah observes that community claims for Chinese 
American citizenship and cultural belonging depended upon a strategy of assimilation 
that privileged the performance of American norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic 
space. He explains, “In order to be a candidate for inclusion, the previously unreformed 
have to prove that their conduct makes them worthy of participation in society and 
governance.”8 Shah argues that Chinese American activists, in a quest for welfare 
resources and housing entitlements, highlighted those members of the community who 
effectively modeled middle-class norms of respectable domesticity while simultaneously 
ignoring those unable (or unwilling) to adhere to such domestic arrangements, 
consumption patterns, and proper social conduct, including Chinese bachelors and female 
prostitutes. Given this paradox, Shah concludes that “the terms of assimilation that 
privilege nuclear family domesticity allow only limited inclusion and enable the 
resilience of exclusionary strategies in U.S. liberal democracy.”9 In reifying heterosexual 
family formations as natural, normal, and universal, this strategy of assimilation 
                                                
8 Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001), 253.  
9 Ibid.  
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strengthens the foundations of domestic space as a private consumer-oriented sphere of 
racial exclusion and gender insubordination. More expansively, Shah’s critical 
intervention reminds us that the formation of the citizen-subject in society hinges upon 
the performance of norms of conduct and nuclear family domesticity—what I call 
“racialized norms of sexual hygiene.” In a similar vein to Chinese Americans’ quest for 
citizenship and entitlement through the public performance of respectable domesticity 
and coupled, heterosexual intimacy, gay men and lesbians have had to contend with 
dominant representations that cast them as sexually aberrant. 
In the 1980s, at the height of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States, moral 
conservatives circulated mass messages that gay men were dying, not because of 
institutional neglect, but because of sexual promiscuity. This rhetoric of blame was 
particularly salient in discourses by both opponents and proponents of sodomy repeal. In 
Minnesota, while supporters of sodomy repeal warned of the law’s impact on the liberal 
reputation of the state, other more conservative interests embraced the statute, insisting 
that it elevated the state to a moral high ground. Both sides argued on behalf of a white 
liberal discourse of “Minnesota Nice” to assert the moral superiority of the region. The 
Berean League, a Christian public affairs group that advocated the use of public law to 
maintain society’s sexual health and morality, expanded its frame of reference beyond 
morality and tradition. The Christian group harnessed the scientific objectivity of public 
health to push for the enforcement of the sodomy law against gay men. Taking a cue 
from wider media and public policy discourse, the Berean League characterized gay male 
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sexuality as a public health hazard through the spread of HIV.10 The Berean League’s 
position on the issue was not unpopular. A large portion of the American population 
agreed with the Supreme Court’s Bowers decision that homosexual relations in private 
should not be constitutionally protected. According to a Gallup Poll, in 1986, the year 
Bowers was handed down, 54 percent of Americans said that homosexual relations 
between consenting adults should not be legal, and 51 percent of Americans said they 
approved of Bowers.11 Society and policymakers’ perception of gay male sexuality as 
chaotic, deviant, and pathological, during the AIDS crisis, helps explain why gay and 
lesbian leaders labored to portray gay male sexuality as “normal” through the institution 
of privacy. 
 During the AIDS crisis, gay and lesbian leaders characterized some gay men and 
lesbians as worthy of rights vis-à-vis performative norms of gender, sexuality, and 
domestic space. Put another way, homonormative formations achieved cultural 
normativity and state legitimacy by appealing to neoliberal capital’s investment in 
privacy. Such understandings of sexuality, including which ones are considered normal, 
vary over time and space as social representations of different sexual identities and 
practices circulate and are contested, and, as I argue, fluctuations in the private real estate 
market ebb and flow. Cultural anthropologist Gayle Rubin emphasizes that the “most 
acceptable excuses” for exempting particular erotic behavior from being considered 
                                                
10 Kate Parry, “ACLU offers help in challenge to sodomy law,” Star and Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), Jul. 
25, 1986. 
11 George Gallup Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1986, at 213-14 (1987). 
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negative is “marriage, reproduction, and love.12 If we apply Rubin’s logic to our 
discussion, we can see how gay men and lesbians who participate in the institution of 
privacy can more easily transition from being highly stigmatized to being considered 
(somewhat more) acceptable. Privileged by the state, media, and law as natural, normal, 
and healthy, heteronormativity is the arrangement that “bad” sexual subjects who are 
denied the right to privacy will attempt to emulate. As defined by Lauren Berlant and 
Michael Warner, heteronormativity consists of “the institutions, structures of 
understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality coherent, organized 
as a sexuality, but also privileged.”13 Heteronormativity is a particular form of 
heterosexuality that is made to appear natural and normal.  
Berlant and Warner rightfully distinguish between heteronormativity and 
heterosexuality. And yet, in describing the distinction between the two concepts, they 
claim that “one of the most conspicuous differences” between the two is that 
heteronormativity has “no parallel, unlike heterosexuality, which organizes 
homosexuality as its opposite.” They explain that “it would not be possible to speak of 
‘homonormativity’ in the same sense” as heteronormativity because homosexuality lacks 
“the invisible, tacit, society-founding rightness” that heterosexuality enjoys. Through a 
single-issue focus on sexuality, Berlant and Warner overlook how race and class 
circumscribe access to privacy, property, and propriety—systems that lay the social 
                                                
12 Gayle Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” in The Lesbian 
and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin (New York: 
Routledge, 1993): 11.   
13 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex in Public,” Critical Inquiry 24 (Winter 1998): 548.  
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infrastructure of homonormativity.14 Such an omission, I argue, was also at the center of 
sodomy repeal efforts by gay and lesbian leaders after Bowers. Since heteronormativity is 
organized around coupling, reproduction, consensual sex and love, it is ideologically 
fixated around the privacy of the home and, by extension, is spatially anchored to private 
property, institutions which are animated by both racial and class exclusions.  
 Private property, as conjugated through gender and sexual normativity, serves as 
the locus for negotiating inclusion into the body politic. In addition to being central to the 
maintenance and reproduction of social hierarchies, private property is essential to the 
economic wellbeing of a private real estate market. In postwar America, the single-family 
ranch-style bungalow became foundational to the expansion of an industrial economy of 
production. This idealized Western home, which coupled beliefs of love and intimacy 
with convictions of commitment and reproductive futurism, championed capital 
accumulation by encouraging an aspirational form of homeownership that proved 
profitable to banks, construction industries, and real estate firms. The nuclear family and 
its spatial-temporal anchor to the private home were, in turn, crucial to the geographic 
expansion of modern, Western cities, and to national projects of liberal citizen-subject 
development.15 We witness a similar feat beginning in the mid-1980s and culminating in 
the 1990s when homonormativity becomes essential to neoliberal capital in the 
gentrification of central U.S. cities—through the expansion of private property, the 
privatization of public space, the endorsement of privacy, and the curtailment of public 
                                                
14 Ibid.   
15 Phil Hubbard, “Domesticating Sex,” in Cities and Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 2012); Elaine Tyler 
May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988).  
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social services previously administered by the state. Homonormative formations, thus, 
materialize out of a historical setting in which the liberal capitalist state ushers in a new 
mode of governmentality. As the liberal capitalist state discarded its welfare provisions, 
homonormative formations emerged to justify said shifts in the political economy of 
American central cities. Since a culture and politics of homonormativity is synonymous 
with neoliberal capitalist expansion—where gay identities and practices coincide with 
privacy, private property, and propriety—the inclusion of (white) gay men and lesbians 
within the fold of the private sphere does not so much reflect society’s newfound 
tolerance. On the contrary, it confirms the inherent malleability of the liberal public-
private framework of space to shift depending upon the ideological and material needs of 
capital in times of crises.  
Distinctions between public and private space are incredibly flexible. This 
flexibility is a result of capital’s need to continuously move the dividing line to fulfill 
particular ideological mandates. Instead of being a priori, normal, or universal, the 
distinction between public and private is itself a social product that conforms to 
ideologies of the moment.16 The nature of capital helps explain why (white) gay men and 
                                                
16 Capital, in addition to the imperatives of the state, plays a central role in fashioning the social meanings 
attached to space. For instance, industrialization and urbanization in the West beginning in the mid-1850s 
radically reshaped people’s perception of space. In his seminal text, “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” John 
D’Emilio argues that the growth of American cities in the early twentieth century facilitated the 
development of a homosexual identity and community. Industrialization and urbanization impacted 
individual’s lives by altering gender roles and sexual behaviors. Prior to industrialization and urbanization, 
unmarried people of all ages resided and functioned economically within their biological families. 
However, as D’Emilio shows, with the rise of industrial capitalism, families no longer functioned as the 
primary economic unit. While the United States shifted from an agricultural economy to an industry-based 
economy, many young men and women abandoned the family unit and relocated from small towns and 
farms to urban centers to sell their labor for wages. Thus, D’Emilio concludes that the rise of the free wage 
labor system brought men and women who shared same-sex desires into contact with one another, 
facilitating sexuality’s shift from behavior to identity. Despite the groundbreaking nature of his claims, 
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lesbians went from being denied sexual privacy in 1986 via Bowers to being conferred 
with the right to same-sex marriage—the bedrock institution of society—in 2015 in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, all within the span of a few decades just as the neoliberal city came 
to fruition with its policies and practices of accumulation, dispossession, and 
privatization. Homonormativity, given these points, depends upon a public-private 
distinction of space to maintain its illusion of naturalness, alongside the institution of 
heteronormativity. As I show in this chapter, homeless queers of color and other 
manifestations of dissident sexuality, undermine the universality of that privacy by 
underscoring the racial and class exclusions of private property.  
 For gay men and lesbians, the spatial enactment of homonormativity is part and 
parcel of articulating social membership within the nation. In this chapter, I focus on how 
the strategies of assimilation that called for the repeal of Minnesota’s sodomy law by gay 
and lesbian leaders framed social membership in opposition to public sexual cultures, 
identities, and practices. These strategies upheld private property as the locus of 
                                                                                                                                            
D’Emilio overlooks the significance of space itself or rather the production of the liberal public-private 
framework of space in the social articulation of white homosexual identities and communities. With 
industrialization, people no longer worked from home. They were forced to physically relocate to the 
factory to sell their labor for wages. As a result, the home accrued particular social meanings around the 
sanctity of motherhood, family, and private. On the other hand, the public sphere became associated with 
the state and capital. This delineation of space generated the image of “the pious (white) woman” who 
cared for the home while the family patriarch worked. In a way, industrialization cemented the division of 
public and private through a patriarchal, not to mention white supremacist, logic that privileged the 
demands of capital. During the ascension of neoliberal capital and governmentality in the West beginning 
in the 1980s, we witness a similar feat with (white) gay men and lesbians who demand an arbitrary 
distinction of public and private that will accommodate them within the fold of the state and confer them 
with citizen benefits, rights, and protections. But, just as this growing shield of privacy was extended to 
previously marginalized populations, capital and the state stepped up their regimes of discipline against 
other less privileged subjects, those who failed to adhere to the norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic 
space upon which social membership in the private sphere was contingent. See: John D’Emilio, 
"Capitalism and Gay Identity," in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, eds. Ann Snitow, Christine 
Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983). 
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citizenship. The proposed public sex law in Minnesota, which repealed sodomy in 
exchange for the criminalization of sex occurring in public, was designed to legally 
protect some expressions of gay and lesbian sexuality by privatizing them.17 These terms 
of inclusion authorized the criminal punishment system with the right to watch, regulate, 
and crack down on dissident sexualities that failed to adhere to the bourgeoning dictates 
of homonormative codes of respectability and social worth, what I call racialized norms 
of sexual hygiene. More generally, it also reinforced the state’s power to point to where 
normative sexuality could be enacted and with whom. These demands for social 
membership via the private sphere of the home were racially and class restrictive. In this 
chapter, I introduce one of my dissertation’s theoretical interventions that 
homonormativity operates as a central organizing principle of neoliberal urban policies 
and practices.  
I begin by discussing the local response to the Bowers v. Hardwick decision in the 
Twin Cities. I then trace the history of Minnesota’s sodomy law. Next, I look at the case 
of Richard Gray Jr., a real estate agent arrested and charged with sodomy for engaging in 
oral sex with an underage male sex worker at the height of the AIDS crisis. I focus on 
how Gray’s defense used private property to vouch for the privacy of the sex acts in 
question. Gray’s case illuminates the shift among gay and lesbian leaders towards 
articulating their rebukes against sodomy statutes in terms of raced and classed iterations 
of privacy. I, then, turn my attention to the legislative attempt to repeal the sodomy 
                                                
17 Michael Warner, writing about the “zone of privacy” established by the courts in relation to sexual 
privacy, argues that the legal tradition “tends to protect sexual freedom by privatizing it.” Michael Warner, 
“Zoning Out Sex” in The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 174. 
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statute. In particular, I discuss how the legislative attempt to extend constitutionally 
protected privacy to gay men and lesbians involved the creation of a new crime of public 
sex and I consider the implications of said law on homeless queers of color who held a 
more tenuous relationship to private property. I end the chapter by looking at how both 
local gay and lesbian leaders and moral conservatives harnessed the AIDS crisis as 
reason to either decriminalize sodomy or to vouch for its permanence on the books.  
Bowers in the Context of the Heartland.   
 Gay community activists in the Twin Cities reacted to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick with great shock. They deplored the decision, calling it a 
further setback to the local gay and lesbian community which was already reeling from a 
perceived surge in anti-gay hate violence and experiencing the government’s willful 
negligence to AIDS. Brian Coyle, the first openly gay elected Minneapolis City Council 
Member, did not shy away from conveying his anger. In an interview with the press, 
Coyle objected that this was “an outrageous and very political decision” on the part of the 
court which had “invade[d] the bedroom.” Coyle hoped the decision would “fuel people’s 
anger” and force gay men and lesbians to push the federal government to move faster to 
finance programs whose aim was to find a cure for AIDS.18 That Coyle linked Bowers to 
                                                
18 Given the AIDS crisis, local gay and lesbian leaders worried the ruling could lead to heightened 
surveillance of gay male sexuality by law enforcement agencies and private citizens. However, 
Minneapolis Police Chief Tony Bouza did not foresee the Minneapolis Police Department beginning to 
enforce the state’s sodomy law. In an interview with the Star Tribune, Bouza reassured, “We don’t have 
any immediate plans to implement that decision.” He continued, “I’m not sure anybody would want to. It’s 
on the books. Obviously, it can be a source of mischief. It’s not a high priority on a police chief’s agenda.” 
Even if Bouza mitigated fears that the Minneapolis Police Department would not begin to enforce the 
sodomy statute, residents remained unsure about the implications of the Court’s decision in other facets of 
their lives. Ibid. 
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HIV-prevention suggests that Coyle might have interpreted sodomy repeal’s focus on 
privacy as providing a shield against the virus.  
Although the ruling solely pertained to sodomy, mainstream gay and lesbian 
rights organizations feared the negative consequences the ruling would wreak on all gay 
men and lesbians.19 The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, an American gay 
rights organization whose top priority into the early-1980s was overturning anti-sodomy 
laws, worried the ruling would hinder progress against gay discrimination in housing, 
employment, and child custody.20 For many, the decision represented the state 
                                                
19 According to American legal historian Michael Klarman, “Nobody thought the ruling would trigger more 
sodomy prosecutions; its principal effect was symbolic.” The symbolism behind the ruling, for gay men 
and lesbians, was twofold. First, the decision created a context in which discrimination against gay men and 
lesbians was legally justifiable. Second, the decision endorsed the notion that gay men and lesbians were 
incapable of family, marriage, and intimacy. Local gay and lesbian leaders and activists highlighted the 
negative consequences that sodomy statutes entailed for queer Minnesotans. According to Matthew Stark, 
MCLU executive director, sodomy laws not only made Minnesotans believe they were engaging in illegal 
behavior, but they invaded their privacy. Nan D. Hunter, director of the ACLU’s Lesbian/Gay Rights 
Project, believed that although most sodomy laws were not enforced, they nonetheless affected those who 
were charged in “very destructive ways” including denial of professional licensing and denial of 
employment. The danger that most advocates of repeal cited was the denial of custody or visitation rights to 
gay and lesbian parents. Hunter argued that if a gay or lesbian parent were characterized as “a habitual law 
breaker” then that would be reason enough to deny him or her “basic civil rights.” For this reason, the 
ACLU made it a top priority to repeal local sodomy laws as unconstitutional. Kate Parry, “ACLU offers 
help in challenge to sodomy law,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jul. 25, 1986; Michael Klarman, From 
the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
20 Lambda Legal had called anti-sodomy laws “the bedrock of discrimination against gay men and 
lesbians” in the United States. Lambda’s concerns might not have been far-fetched, according to Michael 
Klarman, as a number of courts cited Bowers to justify various acts of legal discrimination against gay men 
and lesbians. In 1987, a federal circuit court rejected the equal protection claim of a lesbian who was 
allegedly denied employment with the FBI because of her sexual orientation. In citing Bowers, the court 
ruled that the government discrimination against a class of persons could not be considered unjust if the 
Supreme Court had ruled that the behavior defining said class of persons could be criminally punished. 
That same year, the New Hampshire supreme court summoned Bowers to refuse a constitutional challenge 
to a law preventing gay men and lesbians from adopting or fostering children. Klarman shows that federal 
circuit courts invoked Bowers to similarly reject legal challenges to the military’s exclusion of gay men and 
lesbians, to uphold the Defense Department’s practice of applying greater scrutiny to security clearances 
sought by gay men and lesbians, and to discard a constitutional challenge to a Cincinnati charter 
amendment prohibiting the city council from establishing anti-discrimination protections for gay men and 
lesbians. See: Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar.  
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endorsement of second-class citizenship for homosexual men and women.21 That is why, 
following Bowers, white gay leaders actively invoked civil rights as the legal and 
political precedents for sodomy repeal. For instance, Thomas Stoddard, executive 
director of Lambda, compared Bowers to the Court’s 1857 Dred Scott decision, which 
ruled that there were no federal protections preserving the liberty of slaves who had 
found their way to free territories. Stoddard lamented that Bowers confirmed that there 
were no federal protections that states had to honor with regard to homosexuality.22 Like 
the Dred Scott decision marking black men, women, and children noncitizens, Stoddard 
reasoned that Bowers also heavily endorsed the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from 
the system of citizenship.  
In other comparisons with race-based exclusions, gay rights advocates sometimes 
referred to Bowers as the Plessy v. Ferguson of gay men and lesbians. That 1896 
Supreme Court decision legitimized “separate but equal” as a legal rationale for racial 
segregation.23 At other times, gay leaders compared the opposition to sodomy repeal to 
anti-miscegenation, most notably Loving v. Virginia. By comparing the state-sponsored 
homophobia in Bowers to the state-sponsored racism in Dred Scott, Plessy, and Loving, 
some gay rights advocates characterized racial violence as a remnant of the past. Because 
                                                
21 Gary Rankila at the time claimed to have been representing 26 clients who had been fired from jobs 
because of AIDS diagnoses. Jim Schroeder, “Rally protests Supreme Court, Justice Dept.” Equal Time, Jul. 
23, 1986. 
22 In the 1857 Dred Scott Supreme Court decision, Congress was barred from intervening against slavery in 
federal territories. In addition to ruling that black slaves were not citizens, the decision mandated that the 
rights under the U.S. Constitution did not apply to free blacks. Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy vote almost went 
other way,” Equal Time, Jul. 23, 1986.; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy statute upheld, Mn. court challenge 
reviewed,” Equal Time, Jul. 9, 1986.  
23 In the 1986 Plessy v. Ferguson decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state-imposed 
racial segregation on railroad passengers. Linda Greenhouse, “When Second Thoughts In Case Come Too 
Late,” New York Times, Nov. 5, 1990.  
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gay rights advocates only focused on sexuality as the nexus of oppression, their 
comparisons denied racism temporal coevalness to homophobia. Analogizing sodomy 
repeal to anti-miscegenation and other race-based legal exclusions minimizes what David 
L. Eng describes as “the constitutive history of racial and sexual regulation.” Eng 
describes that the temporal analogy of sodomy repeal to racial liberation configures the 
latter as a completed project of the past that has been achieved and settled.24 Treating 
racial violence and homophobia as one and the same prevents us from analyzing race in 
relation to homosexuality as intersectional and as politically and temporally coeval. 
Moreover, by consigning racial liberation to the past, we disregard the on-going violent 
machinations of the U.S. state in its consolidation and enforcement of white supremacy, 
most recently through a supposedly benign anti-racist white liberalism. The racial 
dynamics of the temporal analogy of sodomy repeal illuminates why gay and lesbian 
leaders, in subsequent attempts to repeal Minnesota’s sodomy statute, excluded the 
intersections of race and sexuality as analytical categories of power, privilege, and 
disenfranchisement.25   
                                                
24 David L. Eng, The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 38.  
25 As a result of the federal decision, Council Member Coyle’s office received numerous worried and 
confused phone calls from residents, some of whom believed it was now “illegal to be a homosexual.” 
Given the strong community reaction, Coyle devoted an entire community breakfast meeting to the subject. 
On 8 July 1986, Gary Rankila and Emma Hixson, members of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, 
joined Coyle to discuss the implications of the Court’s decision on sodomy. Rankila confirmed to the 
breakfast meeting crowd that the ruling did not render homosexuality illegal and that people arrested under 
state sodomy laws could still appeal to state courts. Hixson warned the crowd that the ruling would be used 
against gay men and lesbians when trying to pass new civil rights laws across the country. She explained 
the ruling would be used in “a psychological way against us. In that sense this is a devastating case.” 
Rankila echoed Hixson’s concerns. Although the sodomy decision did not affect the local civil rights 
protections of gay men and lesbians, Rankila feared the Bowers decision would negatively impact gay and 
lesbian parents when they attempted to prove their fitness as parents before a judge in child custody cases. 
Rankila predicted the decision “will be thrown in my face when I represent a lesbian mom or a gay dad” in 
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To protest the Court’s Bowers decision, the Ad-Hoc Committee on Liberty, a 
group of gay and lesbian rights activists and civil libertarians formed in response to the 
federal action, organized a rally and demonstration on July 9, 1986, outside the Federal 
Building in downtown Minneapolis. About 170 protesters, the largest turnout a Twin 
Cities gay and lesbian protest had garnered in years, marched in front of the Federal 
Building and listened to a number of prominent local gay community activists criticize 
the federal action.26 Coyle voiced his particular frustration that the decision equated 
homosexuality with a number of other activities to which the courts had also denied 
privacy. He decried, “On the question of privacy to heterosexuals but not to homosexuals, 
the Supreme Court equated incest, wife battering and other outrageous acts that might 
occur in the bedroom, with homosexual love.” Coyle distanced “homosexual love” from 
“incest, wife battering and other outrageous acts” to propose that sexual behavior 
committed in private by adult consenting homosexuals warranted constitutional 
protection because it more closely resembled heteronormativity than it did those other 
“outrageous acts.”27 Coyle also hoped that the decision would incite the public to political 
action in support of repealing the state’s sodomy statue.28  
                                                                                                                                            
custody, adoption or visitation cases. Rankila and Hixson were particularly concerned that the ruling would 
be used to stigmatize otherwise morally upstanding gay and lesbian parents by denying them visitation 
rights or child custody. Jim Schroeder, “Rally protests Supreme Court, Justice Dept.” Equal Time, Jul. 23, 
1986. 
26 In the hours and days following the Bowers decision, protests erupted in several cities throughout the 
country. The largest of the protests took place in New York where more than a thousand demonstrators 
marched from the federal courthouse. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar. 
27 Chief Justice Warren Burger described sodomy between consenting adults, in a concurring decision, as 
an “offense of deeper malignity than rape.” “Demonstration against S.C. Decision Wednesday at Fed. 
Bldg.,” Twin Cities Gaze, Jul. 06, 1986.  
28 Other speakers at the rally expressed a similar call to arms. State Rep. Karen Clark, who was openly 
lesbian, promised those in attendance at the rally that she would work to repeal the state’s sodomy law 
when the state legislature reconvened later in the year. In the meantime, she asked the crowd’s help in 
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 The Supreme Court’s conservative decision ignited a liberal political backlash not 
only among established gay and lesbian leaders but also from men and women who had 
previously maintained their self-identification as gay or lesbian hidden from friends, 
family, and employers. On July 26, 1986, State Rep. Karen Clark along with State Sen. 
Allan Spear, both of whom openly identified as lesbian and gay, hosted a community 
forum to discuss a working strategy to repeal the state’s sodomy law.29 At the forum, 
attended by about 100 people, Spear emphasized that Minnesota, describing it as an 
“island,” was the last state in the Upper Midwest with sodomy laws on the books. At the 
forum, Spear announced that the proposed repeal of the sodomy law would likely be a 
freestanding bill, not part of a larger piece of legislation. Yet, he was unsure whether 
sodomy repeal would also include repeal of laws against adultery and fornication (sex 
between unmarried heterosexuals): a strategic move. Clark acknowledged that adding 
fornication to the repeal bill might broaden support for the bill. One matter that was 
certain was that the proposed bill to repeal the sodomy law would only apply to private, 
consensual oral or anal sexual contact. Laws that prohibited public sex would without a 
                                                                                                                                            
election campaigns for state candidates who pledged support to repeal the sodomy law. Likewise, Emma 
Hixson attempted to assuage the crowd’s fear by assuring that the city’s Human Rights Ordinance would 
continue to protect gay men and lesbians from discrimination. She reminded the crowd, “Be glad you live 
here.” Other speakers expressed anger. Lesbian comic Becky Kent suggested to protesters that they 
consider oral and anal intercourse a form of civil disobedience of the state’s sodomy law. She urged 
protesters to show the Court, “we will not take this ruling standing up.” One woman was arrested by 
Minneapolis police officers on charges of disorderly conduct and trespassing after she kicked the locked 
glass doors of the buildings. She had written “soft on fascism, hard on gays,” with an arrow pointing 
toward the building, in chalk on the sidewalk of the building. Jim Schroeder, “Rally protests Supreme 
Court, Justice Dept.” Equal Time, Jul. 23, 1986. 
29 Allan Spear was first elected to the Minnesota Senate in 1972, representing the liberal district of 
Minneapolis centered on the University of Minnesota. Having publicly expressed his self-identification as a 
gay man in 1974, Spear was one of the first, if not the first, openly gay American politician elected to 
office. 
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question remain on the books.30 That Minnesota was the last state in the Upper Midwest 
to repeal its sodomy law was not lost on local gay leaders who underscored this fact as a 
contradiction of Minnesotans’ so-called Midwestern ethic of liberalism, progress, and 
tolerance.   
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling on behalf of the Georgia sodomy 
statute, the national trend had been away from sodomy laws. In 1961, all 50 states had a 
sodomy law; by December of 1986, only 24 states and the District of Colombia retained 
them.31 Minnesota’s sodomy law, which banned heterosexual and homosexual anal and 
oral sex alike and made no distinction or exception for married couples, had been on the 
books since 1849 when the state was a territory.32 The law, however, was hardly 
enforced. Doing so would have required law enforcement to physically peek into 
people’s bedrooms. During the infamous police crackdown on urban vice in the Twin 
Cities from 1979 to 1985, not a single person was charged or convicted of violating the 
state’s sodomy law, despite the arrest of five thousand people. Instead, law enforcement 
agencies focused their energies on sexual acts occurring in public. They arrested people 
                                                
30 Jim Schroeder, “Forum discusses repeal of Minnesota’s sodomy law,” Equal Time, Aug. 6, 1986. 
31 In 1961, Illinois became the first state in the United States to repeal its sodomy law when the state 
adopted a revision of its criminal laws. Ten years later, Connecticut followed Illinois’ lead. By the end of 
the 1970s, 19 more states had repealed their sodomy laws: Colorado, California, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  In the 1980s, courts in New York and 
Pennsylvania struck down their state sodomy laws. That same decade witnessed the legislatures of both 
Alaska, in 1980, and Wisconsin, in 1983, repealing their state sodomy laws. See: "Getting Rid of Sodomy 
Laws: History and Strategy That Led to the Lawrence Decision." American Civil Liberties Union. 
Retrieved August 24, 2015. https://www.aclu.org/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-led-
lawrence-decision. 
32 Supporters of sodomy repeal in Minnesota were apt to point out that most states with sodomy laws at the 
time were in the south and southwest with the exception of Minnesota. State law defined sodomy as 
“carnally knowing any persons by the anus or by or with the mouth.” Violating the law was a gross 
misdemeanor punishable by up to a year’s imprisonment and/or a $3,000 fine David Peterson, “Cautious 
high court unlikely to throw out state’s sodomy law,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Dec. 04, 1986. 
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and charged them with offenses ranging from indecent conduct, solicitation of 
prostitution, to lewd and lascivious behavior.33  
Notwithstanding opposition, the sodomy law survived numerous court and 
legislative attempts to wipe it off the books.34 For years, efforts to repeal the law in the 
Minnesota Legislature were unsuccessful. Beginning in the 1970s, local gay leaders made 
several unsuccessful attempts to win legislative repeal of the sodomy statute.35 These 
efforts were spearheaded by the likes of Allan Spear and Jack Baker, a noted figured in 
the local gay community.36 Their proposed legislation to repeal Minnesota’s sodomy 
                                                
33 Ryan Patrick Murphy and Alex T. Urquhart, “Sexuality in the Headlines: Intimate Upheavals as Histories 
of the Twin Cities,” in Queer Twin Cities: Twin Cities GLBT Oral History, ed. Kevin P. Murphy et al. 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
34 Minnesota’s sodomy law, considered a “legal anomaly” by the Star Tribune, lived in “uneasy 
coexistence” with “state and local anti-discrimination edicts and a legacy of liberalism.” Opponents to the 
law accused it of being out-of-date and irrelevant to modern society, comparing it to horse-and-buggy 
statutes, and insisting that it violated the privacy of the bedroom. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union 
described the law as “simple prejudice” whereas the Citizens League, a lobbying group, deemed the law 
ineffective public health policy because it inhibited the reporting of AIDS. Kevin Diaz and Staff Writer. 
"Sodomy Law Still on Books, and no Challenge is in Sight." Star Tribune, Aug. 31, 1991. 
35 Steve Endean, a local gay leader who had worked as a coat-checker at Sutton’s, a gay bar in Minneapolis, 
helped establish the Minnesota Committee for Gay Rights to lobby for a statewide gay rights bill and to 
repeal the sodomy law. In 1975, the unsuccessful effort to win a statewide gay rights bill and to repeal the 
sodomy law foregrounded internal battles within the local gay community. On one side, Endean and 
Senator Allan Spear sought respectability; their lobbying efforts were conventional and they defined gay 
rights as a civil rights issue. On the other side, Jack Baker and Tim Campbell, editor of GLC Voice, relied 
on confrontational politics and tactics; they insisted that any statewide gay rights bill include protections for 
“cross-dressing” and the right to same-sex marriage. During the 1975 attempt to repeal the sodomy law, 
Endean circulated a memo to members of the local gay community asking for their presence at the hearings 
held at the Legislature. However, Endean insisted that attendees “dress respectably.” According to Spear, 
Endean “didn’t want guys over there with dresses and mascara.” Campbell responded to Endean’s 
supplications with a squadron of gay men in drag, transvestites, and transsexuals. Campbell and the group 
held a press conference in a men’s restroom at the State Capitol where they argued that the political 
compromises agreed to by Spear and Endean would leave “cross-dressers” unprotected. These internal 
divisions among the budding gay community in the Twin Cities did not help in the fight for a statewide gay 
rights bill or in the repeal efforts of the state’s sodomy law. Kay Miller, “Gays fight first for acceptance, 
then for life,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Feb. 22, 1987. 
36 In 1970, Jack Baker, a 28-year-old law student, gained notoriety at the University of Minnesota, Twin 
Cities, fro trying to marry to his male lover, Mike McConnell, a librarian. Hennepin County denied Baker 
and McConnell a marriage license. As a result, McConnell adopted Baker. The pair then applied for a 
marriage license in Blue Earth County using Baker’s adoptive name, Pat Lynn McConnell. Blue Earth 
assumed Pat was a woman and issued the marriage license. In the fall, a United Methodist minister married 
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statute made it to the floor of the House of Representatives in 1973 and to the floors of 
both houses in 1975. But efforts to repeal always died on the floor of the legislature. 
These attempts were similar in that they all merely demanded repeal of the sodomy law; 
they did not differentiate between “respectable” and “deviant” forms of sexual identity 
and practice. That would drastically change after Bowers, when gay and lesbian leaders 
began to communicate their rebukes of sodomy statutes in terms of raced and classed 
norms of respectability.  
State of Minnesota v. Gray.  
 The decision in Bowers v. Hardwick influenced gay and lesbian leaders to pursue 
multi-prong attempts to decriminalize private homosexual acts in Minnesota.37 In these 
repeal attempts, gay community activists were not only required to spatially differentiate 
between private and public spaces. But they were also obliged to treat those sexual 
identities and practices characterized as private to be “normal.” By extension, gay and 
                                                                                                                                            
them. Their nuptials garnered international attention. By then, Baker had been elected the nation’s first 
openly gay student body president at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. Campaign posters included 
Baker wearing high heels with the slogan, “Put yourself in Jack Baker’s shoes.” Kay Miller, “Gays fight 
first for acceptance, then for life,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Feb. 22, 1987. 
37 The Bowers decision held far-reaching consequences for efforts to decriminalize state laws against 
private homosexual behavior. In November of 1985, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) had 
filed a judicial challenge in federal court against the Minnesota sodomy law, arguing that it conflicted with 
privacy guarantees in the U.S. Constitution. That judicial challenge was filed on behalf of Stephen 
McClellan, a physically challenged heterosexual man, for whom the sodomy law left him with the 
alternatives of “being unable to express his sexuality at all or being a criminal.” McClellan was joined by a 
gay man, a lesbian, a psychologist and a sex therapist in the suit; they all claimed that the law either harmed 
them personally or the people with whom they worked. With the assistance of the ACLU Lesbian-Gay 
Task Force, the MCLU strategically sought to highlight a diverse array of plaintiffs to underscore the 
“variety of ways” in which the law harmed the lives of all Minnesotans. After Bowers, however, efforts to 
overturn Minnesota’s sodomy law in federal court were essentially turned back to the state legislature and 
state courts. Nationally, the ACLU and the Lambda Legal Defense Fund conceded that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling had forced them to challenge state sodomy statutes in state courts and state legislatures. As a 
result of Bowers, other challenges to sodomy laws that were at various stages of litigation were also 
dropped. In fact, no state repealed its sodomy law between 1986 and 1991. If anything, some states even 
amended their sodomy statutes to explicitly target same-sex conduct. See: Kate Parry, “ACLU offers help 
in challenge to sodomy law,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jul. 25, 1986. 
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lesbian leaders decried those sexual identities and practices anchored around public sex to 
be deviant. This process of differentiation entailed significant consequences for those 
sexual identities and practices that gay and lesbian leaders could not recuperate as normal 
and, hence, be made worthy of constitutional protection. Gay and lesbian leaders 
sacrificed those sexual identities and practices that challenged both the ideological and 
spatial borders of privacy to continued state surveillance and societal scorn. Although 
Minnesota’s sodomy law was rarely observed, the law was occasionally used against 
those whose sexual behavior incited societal scorn.38 One such man was Richard Gordon 
Gray Jr., a 45-year-old real estate broker, accused of sodomy with a minor in the context 
of alleged prostitution. In State v. Gray, the defendant sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Minnesota sodomy law as applied to his private sexual behavior.39 
Gray illustrates how the court’s recognition and normalization of homosexuality within 
the home, rather than public spaces like the park, produces the conditions whereby 
homosexuality can achieve legibility and significance within neoliberal formations. The 
                                                
38 Gray was not the first person to have been prosecuted for sodomy in the state of Minnesota. In the 
summer of 1982, Hennepin County District Judge Crane Winton was found guilty of two misdemeanor 
charges of paying for sex with a 17-year-old young man and was fined $300. Winton, a judge since 1967, 
entered a guilty plea in exchange for prosecutors dropping two other solicitation misdemeanor charges and 
two felony charges of having sex with a minor. Yet, Winton faced a disciplinary hearing before the state 
Board of Judicial Responsibility that threatened to dismiss Winton because he refused to repudiate his gay 
sexuality. The board took issue with Winton’s past solicitations of male prostitutes, the possibility of future 
violations of Minnesota’s sodomy law, and the public’s possible lack of respect for a “judge who is known 
to be gay.” During the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked Winton if he intended to continue violating the 
state’s sodomy law. Winton answered: “That’s a difficult question...My life has changed. What I used to do 
furtively...has all changed. I suppose if I met a suitable person who wants a relationship that involved 
sexual acts, I’d probably do so. But it would be in private, behind closed doors, in such a manner that won’t 
bring disrepute to the bench.” Winton’s homosexuality was exposed in February of 1982 during a 
television investigation of teenage male prostitution in Loring Park. According to State Sen. Allan Spear, 
pressure to challenge the state law in court increased after disciplinary charges based on the sodomy law 
were filed against Winton. “News Notes,” Gay Community News (Boston, MA), Jul. 10, 1982; Loie Hayes, 
“Gay Judge Refuses to Bow to State Pressure,” Gay Community News (Boston, MA), Jun. 4, 1983. 
39 “A new way to tackle the sodomy law,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Dec. 06, 1986. 
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division of space into private and public—a process that was intensified by the 
gentrification of American central cities in the 1980s—normalized some previously 
understood “perverse” sexual identities and practices as “private.” But, because Gray’s 
sexual encounters did not originate in the private sphere, he was unable to mount this 
argument.  
 One day in May of 1986, Gray was out driving near Loring Park in downtown 
Minneapolis when he pulled his car over to the side of the road and asked a young man to 
hop in.40 According to the young man’s statement to the police, Gray offered to pay him 
for sex.41 When Gray asked the young man his age, the young man lied saying he was 18. 
Although he was actually 16 at the time, the young man later told the police, “If [Gray] 
was a retard he would believe that.” Gray drove the young man to his Shorewood, 
Minnesota home where they had oral sex. Shorewood, Minnesota, a second-ring suburb 
north of St. Paul with an estimated population of 20,000 in the mid-1980s, was a wealthy, 
significantly white, family-oriented residential town: the archetypal American suburb.42 
The young man told police the two had sex on two later occasions, with Gray paying him 
$200 for both times. In his statement to the police, Gray disputed these claims. He 
insisted the two only had sex once and that he did not pay him for sex. Rather, Gray 
claimed he made a loan out to the young man. When Gray suspected the young man and 
an unidentified adult had stolen from him, he contacted the Shorewood Police 
                                                
40 In the 1970s and 1980s, Loring Park had become a popular destination for gay male cruising and gay 
male prostitution.  
41 The young man later informed the police that he had been working as a sex worker for a year when he 
met Gray. 
42 City-Data. “Shoreview, Minnesota.” Retrieved Jul. 31, 2015. http://www.city-data.com/city/Shoreview-
Minnesota.html.  
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Department, which charged the young man and the unidentified adult with theft of Gray’s 
boat. Nonetheless, upon Gray describing their sexual relations, the police also arrested 
Gray, charging him with sodomy in July of 1986, three weeks after the Supreme Court’s 
Bowers decision.43  
 That Gray was charged with sodomy three weeks after the Bowers decision was 
no coincidence; his arrest marked the first under the state law since the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of sodomy laws. Shorewood city officials even publicly tied 
the arrest to the Bowers decision, revealing that the ruling answered any speculation 
prosecutors previously held whether the state sodomy law violated U.S. Constitutional 
guarantees to privacy.44 Previously, prosecutors rarely invoked the state’s sodomy law 
and when these charges were filed, they usually conjured the sodomy charge in 
connection with another charge, like rape or assault, implying that charges of sodomy 
were used in extreme cases of sexual violence to further penalize perpetrators. And yet, 
the Shorewood city attorney charged Gray with sodomy, not with prostitution or with 
having sex with a minor. Although Shorewood city officials initially considered charging 
Gray for having sex with a minor, they believed they would have faced a more difficult 
time proving Gray knew the young man was a minor.45 
In the fall of 1986, Gray’s Defense Attorney, Peter Thompson, moved for 
dismissal of the charges before Hennepin County District Court, claiming that the 
                                                
43 Arthur S. Leonard, “Commercial Sex and The Right of Privacy,” in Sexuality and the Law: An 
Encyclopedia of Major Legal Cases (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
44 Jim Schroeder, “Shorewood man charged under state sodomy law,” Equal Time, Aug. 20, 1986.  
45 Similarly, officials pondered a prostitution charge against Gray but the state prostitution law required 
both parties be older than 18.  
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sodomy law violated the federal and state constitutional rights of privacy.46 On December 
1, 1986, Hennepin County District Court Judge Pamela Alexander declared Minnesota’s 
sodomy law unconstitutional. Alexander absolved Gray from criminal prosecution by 
ruling that the state’s sodomy law violated Gray’s state constitutional right to privacy. In 
her ruling, Alexander interpreted Minnesota’s Constitution to guarantee state residents 
with a right to privacy “concerning sexual intimacy and decisions.”47 She argued that 
once a right of privacy in sexual affairs had been established, “the right of an individual 
to choose the form and nature of his or sexual activity should not be taken away so long 
as it involves private sexual activity between consenting adults” (emphasis added).48 For 
Alexander, the court could not infringe upon an individual’s freedom to choose with 
whom to engage in sexual activity and the type of sexual activity, as long as those 
involved were consenting adults in private space.49  
                                                
46 Thompson also served as the defense attorney for Judge Crane Winton.  
47 Alexander’s decision contradicted the recent ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. Alexander claimed that 
the Minnesota court was free to turn to the state Constitution even after the U.S. Supreme Court had made 
an opposite ruling on the U.S. Constitution. This legal maneuver was possible because Alexander’s 
decision interpreted a state law using only the state constitution, not the U.S. Constitution. Her decision 
suggested that the Minnesota constitution guaranteed state residents with a privacy right that entailed more 
activities than the federal constitution did. Activists in other states had similarly turned to state courts to 
argue that sodomy laws violated their state constitutions. State courts, in fact, possessed the authority to 
rule that state constitutions afforded citizens with greater individual rights than those distributed by the 
federal constitution. Bill McAuliffe, “Hennepin County judge rules state sodomy law is unconstitutional,” 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), Dec. 02, 1986; David Peterson, “Cautious high court 
unlikely to throw out state’s sodomy law,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Dec. 04, 1986; Jim Schroeder, 
“Sodomy law unconstitutional,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986. 
48 The ruling did not affect state laws against sex with minors, forced sex, or sex for pay. It did not void 
state laws against heterosexual adultery or fornication. Ibid.  
49 Alexander argued that the Minnesota sodomy law was unconstitutional because it cast a negative light 
over the private sexual activity of married, heterosexual couples. In striking down the law, Alexander first 
characterized it as too broad in making no distinction between “married or single persons, heterosexual or 
homosexual, adults or minors.” Alexander believed that the lack of prosecutions suggested that the law was 
unacceptably broad. Second, the law, according to Alexander, violated people’s constitutional right to 
privacy by “infringing upon a married individual or single individual right to make decisions concerning 
their sexual intimacies.” This second justification for ruling the sodomy law unconstitutional recognized 
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 The decision was met by both praise and animosity.50 Thompson applauded 
Alexander’s decision as an extension of privacy rights. This “courageous” exercise in 
constitutional law, Thompson opined, ensured Minnesotans’ right to privacy would be 
better protected than that of citizens in other states. He elaborated that the decision was “a 
big deal for the gay community, because now they [could] have some sort of sex without 
committing a crime.” For Thompson, the ruling marked a victory for gay men and 
lesbians because it legally legitimized gay male and lesbian sexuality, in the context of 
the home, as normative. Although Thompson celebrated the ruling’s implications for gay 
men and lesbians in Minnesota, gay and lesbian leaders did not publicly express support 
for Gray, as many of them believed he tarnished the claims of respectability upon which 
advocates of repeal had relied. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) 
purposefully sought to distance its suit from the challenge to the sodomy law filed in 
defense of Gray. The MCLU filed suit on behalf of Stephen McClellan, a physically 
challenged heterosexual man who was unable to engage in heterosexual vaginal 
intercourse with his wife. The MCLU explained that it pursued its own case even after 
Alexander’s ruling since it aspired to present a challenge to the sodomy law in “a neutral 
                                                                                                                                            
people’s prerogative to sexual expression unconstrained from dominant moral codes. Third, Alexander 
rejected the argument from Shorewood officials that the sodomy law should stand because it had public 
support and because it had been on the books since the 19th century. The State of Georgia employed 
“tradition” to successfully argue for the constitutionality of its sodomy statute in Bowers. Alexander 
countered by stating that the law should not stand for “the sole reason that some of the public finds that the 
activity the law prohibits to be immoral and unacceptable.” She added, “The concept of privacy embodies 
the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as whole.” Here, Alexander 
treated one’s sexuality as a private entity over which one could claim ownership. Ibid.  
50 Soon after Alexander initially ruled on behalf of Gray, the MCLU, with the input of several national 
lobbying groups, dropped its suit against the Minnesota sodomy law in federal court on January of 1987. In 
its place, it filed a new suit in Hennepin County District Court charging that Minnesota’s sodomy law 
violated privacy guarantees in the state constitution. The MCLU insisted that state constitutions could grant 
privacy guarantees covering actions not protected by the federal constitution. Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy 
law,” Equal Time, Feb. 18, 1987. 
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context.”51 Representatives from the MCLU concluded Gray’s case was blemished 
because he was accused of paying for sex with a minor. At the time of his arrest, Gray 
was under probation after pleading guilty in 1984 to criminal sexual conduct involving a 
boy he met through the Big Brothers program, whom he allegedly thought was older than 
18. To some gay and lesbian leaders, Gray confirmed the public’s negative perception of 
gay men as sexual predators and, thus, unworthy of rights.  
 Shorewood city and state officials, along with religious groups, swiftly delivered 
a response to the Court’s ruling in Gray. Special Assistant Attorney General Robert 
Stanich countered Thompson’s claim that most Minnesotans engaged in sodomy.52 
Stanich declared that if that were the case, the Legislature would have already repealed 
the law. Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III vowed to have Alexander’s 
                                                
51 Notwithstanding the case against Gray, the MCLU had filed a revised suit in Hennepin County District 
Court against the State of Minnesota on January of 1987. The MCLU sought a court order declaring that 
the sodomy statute violated the Minnesota Constitution because it violated the right of privacy inherent in 
the Minnesota Bill of Rights by infringing upon the most intimate and private aspects of an individual’s 
life. The suit even alleged that the sodomy law illegally tried “to use the state’s resources to further certain 
religious tenets.” The four Minneapolis residents named as plaintiffs in the suit included a married 
heterosexual couple, a gay man, and a lesbian, all who claimed to have violated the sodomy law. The 
heterosexual married couple remained Stephen McClellen and Joan Whitney-McClellen. The suit claimed 
that because McClellen had degenerative multiple sclerosis, he was unable to engage in heterosexual 
vaginal intercourse with his wife. The gay male plaintiff was identified as Eric Stults, an aide to Sen. Allan 
Spear. The lesbian was not named in the suit; it only identified her as a licensed professional who would 
experience sanctions from a state licensing board if she were charged with or convicted of violating the 
sodomy law. Because none of the plaintiffs had been charged with violating the law, the suit was a test of 
the law rather than an actual criminal case. Despite all expectation to the contrary, on March of 1989, the 
Minnesota District Court dismissed the McClellan et al. suit. Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy vote almost went 
other way,” Equal Time, July 23, 1986; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy statute upheld, Mn. court challenge 
reviewed,” Equal Time, Jul. 9, 1986; “MCLU sues to overturn sodomy law,” Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune, Feb. 04, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy law,” Equal Time, Feb. 18, 1987. 
52 To emphasize the ruling’s positive benefits for the state’s heterosexual population, Thompson reminded 
the public that the law that did not differentiate between heterosexual or homosexual acts of sodomy. 
Thompson’s strategic highlighting of the negative impacts of the sodomy statute on married heterosexual 
couples would be continuously deployed throughout repeal efforts in an attempt to win general public 
support.   
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ruling overturned on appeal.53 In addition, Shorewood Assistant City Attorney Paul 
Ahern defended the prosecution’s decision to invoke the rarely used sodomy law against 
Gray by noting that it was based on the facts of the case, not on homophobia.54 The 
following day, the State of Minnesota, on behalf of the City of Shorewood, filed an 
expedited appeal of Alexander’s ruling to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
 The defense’s strategy at the highest state court consisted of highlighting the 
benefits that would accrue to the state’s reputation for repudiating what it deemed to be 
the homophobic decision handed down by the nation’s highest court ruling in Bowers.55 
When he appeared before the Minnesota Supreme Court on behalf of Gray on May 7, 
1987, Thompson requested the court strike down the state’s “repugnant, archaic” sodomy 
statute by “pushing the frontiers of the state Constitution beyond those of the U.S. 
                                                
53 Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy repeal still a possibility,” Equal Time, Apr. 15, 1987. 
54 Bill McAuliffe, “Hennepin County judge rules state sodomy law is unconstitutional,” Minneapolis Star 
and Tribune, Dec. 2, 1986. 
55 Civil liberties advocates and organizations heralded Minnesota, of all the states with pending lawsuits 
against their respective sodomy laws, as having one of the best opportunities for repeal. Nan D. Hunter, 
director of the ACLU Lesbian-Gay Task Force, pointed to Minnesota’s “strong” gay and lesbian 
community as a sign that its chances of repeal were above average. Peter Fowler, then co-chair of the 
National Gay Task Force, similarly echoed Hunter’s statements during a visit to Minneapolis in which he 
declared that Minnesota had an above average chance of repealing its sodomy law because openly-gay and 
lesbian politicians held office here. Fowler deemed that other states lacked the “infrastructure in place” to 
witness the repeal of sodomy laws; “Minnesota is an exception.” The majority of the 24 states that had laws 
against sodomy were located in the south and southwest of the country where supposedly there existed 
smaller or highly closeted gay and lesbian populations. Minnesota not only had more openly-gay and 
lesbian elected officials, but the state as a whole was imagined as more tolerant than the American South. 
In addition to Hunter and Fowler, Tom Stoddard, executive director of Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, on a visit to Minneapolis in the fall of 1986, lamented that most states with laws against 
sodomy still on the books were mostly in the South and West, “with the unfortunate exceptions of 
[Minnesota], Michigan and Rhode Island.” Stoddard believed it “unfortunate” that Minnesota, a state 
characterized for its social progressivism, could be included alongside states in the deep south for holding 
on to such homophobic sodomy laws. Stoddard encouraged gay men and lesbians to employ the legal 
system as “a vehicle to change people’s minds,”to publicly express their same-sex identities and practices, 
and to “help through your checkbooks.” Jim Schroeder, “ACLU’s Nan Hunter on the ‘long fight’,” Equal 
Time, Aug. 6, 1986; Jim Schroeder, “Repeal of sodomy laws depends on coalitions,” Equal Time, Sep. 3, 
1986; Jim Schroeder, “Stoddard on rights for gays/lesbians,” Equal Time, Oct. 29, 1986. 
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Constitution.”56 Thompson maintained that it was unconstitutional for the state to 
regulate the sexual conduct of consenting adults in the privacy of their home merely 
because officials “don’t like gays.” Whether officials liked gay men and lesbians did not 
matter, Thompson declared. What truly mattered was that the courts afford the right to 
privacy to all consenting adults.57  
The prosecution refined its strategy when it went before the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. It had previously defended the sodomy statute on the basis of dominant traditional 
moral codes, insisting that the law remain on the books merely because it had been so 
since the 19th century. This time around, the prosecution based its case on the argument 
that Gray did not even have “standing” to challenge the sodomy statute because his 
partner was not an adult and he was a prostitute. Although the oral sex occurred in the 
privacy of Gray’s home, prosecutors argued the case had public implications because 
Gray was accused of meeting the young man in Loring Park, a public place, and because 
Gray had apparently paid for the sex, which invalidated the privacy claim. If the 
Minnesota Supreme Court regarded prostitution as a public act regardless of its location, 
then Gray’s sexual activities with the young man could not be constitutionally 
protected.58  
                                                
56 In preparation for the court case, Thompson received assistance from civil liberties attorneys in 
Minneapolis and Washington D.C. 
57 Thompson asked the justices to consider whether the state Constitution protected the privacy of 
Minnesotans more than the federal Constitution did. In other words, the seven justices had to decide if they 
would be exercising the power to interpret the state Constitution more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court 
had interpreted the federal Constitution. Dennis Cassano, “State Supreme Court asked to end enforcement 
of the sodomy statute,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, May 8, 1987. 
58 Thompson disagreed by countering that Gray did have standing to challenge the sodomy statute because 
that was the law with which he was charged. He contended that the state could not treat the case like a 
prostitution case unless it charged Gray with prostitution. Ibid.  
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 On October 2, 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
state’s sodomy law in cases involving prostitution, reversing the Hennepin County 
District Court’s decision. The Court argued that Gray could not characterize this case as 
one involving “private sexual conduct” merely by an invocation to the location in which 
the sex acts took place: Gray’s bedroom. In the opinion by Chief Justice Douglas K. 
Amdahl, the Court provided an extensive list of reasons as to why Gray’s sexual conduct 
was “public.” Amdahl wrote:  
Gray picked up the complainant, who was previously unknown to Gray, at or 
near a public park recognized as a gathering place of young prostitutes; the sexual 
contacts between the two were essentially no more separate ‘one night stands’ 
[and if, as Gray stated, the two committed only one sodomous (sic) act, our 
perception of the contact as a one night stand is bolstered]; and, most importantly, 
this is a case of sex for compensation. 
The Court characterized the case against Gray as one involving commercial, rather than 
private, sexual conduct and held that commercial sexual conduct was not a fundamental 
right.59 In other words, the Court ruled that the state Constitution did not create a 
fundamental right to engage in sodomy while paying for sex. According to the Court’s 
logic, had Gray and the young man been coupled, assuming he were of legal age, then 
Gray would have had standing to characterize this as a case of sexual privacy. 60 But, this 
                                                
59 Dick Hewetson, “Gay Movement in Minnesota and the Role of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union,” 
Friends of the Bill of Rights Foundation. 2013; Jim Schroeder, “State’s sodomy law upheld in prostitution 
cases,” Equal Time, Oct. 14, 1987.  
60 The Court ruled that the state constitution created a right to individual privacy for state residents.  It did 
not, however, address the question whether the sodomy law, if applied in non-prostitution settings, violated 
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was a double-edged sword for Gray. If he claimed to have had more than one sexual 
encounter with the young man, he would have further implicated himself in “trafficking 
commercial sex,” or prostitution. On the other hand, he would have given further 
credence to the belief that Gray and the young man were engaging in private sexual 
activity.61  
 In its ruling, the Court agreed that the state constitution did create a right to 
individual privacy for state residents, although it stressed that this protection did not 
extend to commercial sexual conduct, regardless of its location. As a result, the Court 
could not explicitly answer the question whether the sodomy law, if applied in non-
prostitution settings, violated that right to privacy. To answer this question, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court invited additional constitutional challenges to the sodomy law. 
                                                                                                                                            
that right to privacy. Rather, the Minnesota Supreme Court invited additional constitutional challenges to 
the law. Justice Amdahl said it "would like to resolve" the issue in a case where the details involve 
"consenting adults in private and not paying for sex." Dan Oberdorfer, "Court Partially Upholds Sodomy 
Law, Will Decide on Relevancy of Setting." Star Tribune, Oct 02, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “State’s sodomy 
law upheld in prostitution cases,” Equal Time, Oct. 14, 1987; Kevin Diaz, "Sodomy Law Still on Books, 
and no Challenge is in Sight,"  
Star Tribune, Aug 31, 1991. 
61 The Court concluded that “there does exist a right of privacy guaranteed under and protected by the 
Minnesota Bill of Rights,” but the scope of that protection only extended to fundamental rights; 
commercial sex was not one. Refusing to extend constitutional protection to Gray’s sexual conduct, the 
court cited the 1976 decision in State v. Price by the Iowa Supreme Court. That was a decision in which the 
court summarized the state’s interest in penalizing prostitution: “Prostitution implicates more than private 
sexual relations between consenting adults. It affects others including the community. Although usually 
transacted in private, it is nevertheless business which is frequently negotiated in public. Although intimate, 
it is impersonal. Although involving only consenting adults at the time, it may be a factor in the spread of 
venereal disease or have a close relationship with other criminal activity.” The Court in State v. Price had 
been unwilling to consider prostitution a form of sexual activity entitled to constitutional protection against 
prosecution. The Court declared that prostitution presented enough of a problem to the public order that it 
warranted state intervention, even if that sexual activity took place in private between consenting adults. 
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court did not cite the AIDS crisis as a factor in its decision to reverse 
Alexander’s ruling, it cited the decision by the Iowa Supreme Court, which explicitly stated that the state 
had a vested interest in regulating commercial sex to stop the spread of venereal disease. Thus, we can 
deduce that public health played a role in determining how the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted 
Gray’s sexual activities with the young man. Dick Hewetson, “Gay Movement in Minnesota and the Role 
of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union” Friends of the Bill of Rights Foundation. 2013.  
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In his opinion, Justice Amdahl declared the Court "would like to resolve" the issue in a 
case where the details involve "consenting adults in private and not paying for sex." 
Amdahl’s invitation suggests the Court was leaning toward legitimizing coupled 
homosexuality within the private sphere of the home. As Gray’s case demonstrates, 
nonetheless, the Court was unwilling to extend such constitutional protections to 
homosexual conduct defined by a commercial nature or located in public spaces like 
Loring Park. The Court rendered homosexuality legally legible only in relation to 
neoliberal interpretations of the private home.62  
Concerns over the public health implications of the Gray case also shaped the 
court’s decision. In refusing to extend constitutional protection to Gray’s sexual conduct, 
the court cited the 1976 decision in State v. Price by the Iowa Supreme Court. That was a 
decision in which the court summarized the state’s interest in penalizing prostitution:  
Prostitution implicates more than private sexual relations between consenting 
adults. It affects others including the community. Although usually transacted in 
private, it is nevertheless business which is frequently negotiated in public. 
Although intimate, it is impersonal. Although involving only consenting adults at 
the time, it may be a factor in the spread of venereal disease or have a close 
relationship with other criminal activity.  
                                                
62 Dan Oberdorfer, "Court Partially Upholds Sodomy Law, Will Decide on Relevancy of Setting." Star 
Tribune, Oct 02, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “State’s sodomy law upheld in prostitution cases,” Equal Time, Oct. 
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The Court in State v. Price had been unwilling to consider prostitution a form of sexual 
activity entitled to constitutional protection. It reasoned that prostitution presented 
enough of a problem to the public order that it warranted state intervention, even if that 
sexual activity took place in private between consenting adults. Although the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did not cite the AIDS crisis as a factor in its decision to reverse 
Alexander’s ruling, it cited the decision by the Iowa Supreme Court, which explicitly 
communicated that the state had a vested interest in regulating commercial sex to stop the 
spread of venereal disease.63 Thus, we can deduce that public health played a role in 
determining how the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted Gray’s sexual activities with 
the young man. In its reversal of Alexander’s ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
reinstated the complaint against Gray and remanded the case for trial. Nevertheless, 
following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, charges against Gray were eventually 
dropped when the prosecution was unable to ensure the anonymity of its sole witness, the 
young man, whom the Shorewood City Attorney praised as a “rehabilitated” adult with 
“an excellent job” and “a girl friend.”64  
                                                
63 Dick Hewetson, “Gay Movement in Minnesota and the Role of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union,” 
Friends of the Bill of Rights Foundation. 2013.  
64 The prosecution had initially requested a motion to close the hearing to the press and to the public to 
ensure the anonymity of the prosecution’s sole witness, the young man with whom Gray allegedly engaged 
in sodomy. The prosecution had promised the young man, whom Shorewood City Attorney Glenn Froberg 
described as a “rehabilitated” adult with “an excellent job” and “a girl friend,” that he would not be 
identified in the media to avoid the “embarrassment” of explicit sexual testimony. Yet, the Twin Cities 
media refused to promise anonymity to the key witness. In February of 1988, Hennepin County District 
Court Judge Pamela Alexander denied the prosecution’s motion to close the hearing. Without anonymity, 
the prosecutor declined to call the young man to testify. In a letter to Judge Alexander, Paul Ahern, 
Shorewood City Attorney, declared that the case would not be appealed or pursued.  
Shorewood City Attorney Glenn Froberg, expressing his frustration with the decision to deny a closed trial, 
said, “It’s frustrating because all the elements were there for a conviction.” Meanwhile, Gray’s Defense 
Attorney, Peter Thompson, noted that the reasoning for dropping the charges was as preposterous as filing 
the original charges. He said, “They (Shorewood) want public proceedings in a person's bedroom and 
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In evaluating the act of commercial sex to uphold Minnesota’s sodomy law, the 
Court used law to further cement the foundations of a moral geography of sexuality, 
confirming that courts function as arbiters of normative sexual identities and practices by 
determining which types of sex are worthy of privacy.65 Geographer Phil Hubbard 
describes moral geographies of sexuality as spatial landscapes that reflect the sexual 
hierarchies of society, where privacy extends for certain acts and to certain bodies that 
the majority already values. Hubbard explains that law and society decree certain acts as 
rightfully belonging within particular spaces depending on the legal and moral 
assumptions attached to those particular bodies in question. Simply put, spaces become 
public or private not just through acts of judicial ordering and lawmaking, but also 
through norms of public morality. Whether certain acts will “blend into or transgress” the 
character of specific private locations depends on the level of acceptability afforded to 
those bodies.66 In 1987, the year the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the state’s sodomy 
statute, the United States was deeply entrenched in a wave of AIDS moral panic. Public 
health officials, law enforcement agents, legislators, and the public stigmatized and 
punished dissident sexualities, including gay male sexuality and racialized sexuality, for 
what they perceived were irresponsible sexual practices that sustained the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Because only (white) heteropatriarchal arrangements could claim 
constitutionally protected privacy, gay male sexuality “transgressed” the legal and moral 
                                                                                                                                            
privacy in public courtrooms.” Margaret Zack, "Charges Dropped in Sodomy Case After Key Witness 
Refuses to Testify," Star Tribune, Feb 26, 1988; Lou Gelfand, "To Spare Shame to a Witness, a Trial is 
Scrapped," Star Tribune, Mar 6, 1988. 
65 Murphy and Urquhart, “Sexuality in the Headlines: Intimate Upheavals as Histories of the Twin Cities,” 
in Queer Twin Cities. 
66 Phil Hubbard, “The Moral Geographies of Sex,” in Cities and Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
34. 
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nature of the private bedroom. As Gray’s case elucidates, the private location in which 
sex occurred was not enough to warrant its constitutional protection. To evoke a sense 
that homosexual sodomy rightfully belonged in private, gay and lesbian leaders had to re-
script the legal and moral assumptions about gay male sexuality to better resemble 
dominant sexual norms.  
 In her famous essay, “Thinking Sex,” cultural anthropologist Gayle S. Rubin 
describes the processes through which systems of domination— state, law, media, 
religion, and psychiatry—hierarchically rank sexual identities and practices as part of 
securing the operations of control. At the top of the erotic pyramid, what Rubin calls “the 
charmed circle,” is sexuality that is considered “good,” “normal,” and “natural.” 
Examples include sexual identities and practices that are understood as heterosexual, 
marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-commercial, that occur within the same 
generation, and that occur in the privacy of one’s home. As the sexually privileged of this 
hierarchical system of sexual value, marital, reproductive heterosexuals reap the benefits 
associated with normativity including “certified mental health, respectability, legality, 
social and physical mobility, institutional support, and material benefits.” Rubin reveals 
that in mapping the moral center of the sexual value system, one simultaneously defines 
those sexual identities and practices deemed to be immoral, or outside the margins of 
acceptability.67  
                                                
67 Gayle Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” in The Lesbian 
and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin (New York: 
Routledge, 1993): 12. 
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 These “most despised sexual castes” at the bottom of the erotic pyramid, what 
Rubin calls “the outer limits,” include sexual identities and practices interpreted as 
homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, non-procreative, or commercial, that are casual, 
perhaps cross-generational, and that may take place in public, “or at least in the bushes or 
the baths.”68 Writing in 1983, Rubin describes these “bad,” “abnormal,” and “unnatural” 
sexual identities and practices to include “transsexuals, transvestites, fetishists, 
sadomasochists, sex workers such as prostitutes and porn models, and the lowliest of 
them all, those whose eroticism transgresses generational boundaries.” As those who 
engage in sexual behaviors deemed low status, this group of “perverts” confronts 
“presumptions of mental illness, disreputability, restricted social and physical mobility, 
loss of institutional support, and economic sanctions.”69 Although one’s location on the 
hierarchical system of sexual value predicts either wellbeing or adversity, the ideological 
boundaries between the charmed circle and the outer limits are fluid enough that some 
sexualities can shift from being “bad” to “good,” depending on the need of capital and the 
state to recalibrate its power.  
 Sexual identities and practices can and do cross from the outer limits to the 
charmed circle. Central to the hierarchical system of sexual value is “the need to draw 
and maintain an imaginary line between good and bad sex,” between order and chaos.70 
This imaginary line is drawn to differentiate between those sexual identities and practices 
that the ever-expanding discourses of religion, psychiatry, popular culture, and the state 
                                                
68 Ibid., 13-14. 
69 Ibid., 12.  
70 Ibid., 14. 
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decree as “sanctifiable, safe, healthy, mature, legal, or politically correct” from those that 
challenge the operations of control.71 If private property is one of the means through 
which citizens can demand privacy, and thus enact and legitimate citizen claims, then we 
can treat private property as that which Jennifer Nedelsky calls a “wall (of rights)” that 
sorts bodies into the charmed circle or the outer limits.72 Efforts to repeal Minnesota’s 
sodomy law, thus, represent a debate over “where to draw the line,” or which activities to 
allow passage into normativity. Gray’s defense team mistakenly assumed that mere 
participation in private property would render their client’s sexual behaviors 
constitutionally protected. But, as I show in the following section, access to private 
property is not enough to warrant state legitimation. Rather, entry to the “charmed circle” 
is also dependent upon the concerted repudiation of dissident sexual identities and 
practices, which are oftentimes racialized. In short, the legal recognition of same-sex 
sexuality relied on gay men and lesbians accepting certain compromises.  
The discursive re-spatialization of gay male sexuality, via private property, 
coincided with gay and lesbian leaders attempting to pass legislation through the 
Minnesota Legislature that decriminalized sodomy in return for the criminalization of 
sexual acts and practices outside the purview of the private bedroom. Like the criminal 
charges brought against Gray, the proposed public sex law differentiated between 
respectable and deviant homosexual identities and practices. That which was considered 
respectable cohered around private property and its attendant apparatuses of domesticity, 
                                                
71 Ibid.  
72 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Some Thoughts and Possibilities,” Yale Journal of Law 
and Feminism 1.6 (1989): 12, quoted in Nicholas Blomley, “Privacy, Propriety, and the Entanglements of 
Property.”   
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consumerism, and middle-class respectability. That which did not served as the catalyst 
for the expansion of the criminal punishment system in the Twin Cities.  
Public Sex Law.   
 The proposed Minnesota public sex law illustrates the interplay of legal privacy 
and private property in structuring the types of sexual behavior that individuals could 
engage, and in dictating the spaces where these acts could occur. Legal jurisprudence 
codifies both the range of sexual behaviors deemed appropriate, or normal, and the 
locations in which these can take place.73 In terms of sexuality, the courts have 
historically ruled the private bedroom the home of sex. Central to this ordering has been 
weighing the level of acceptability that particular sexual acts and bodies wield. As Gray’s 
case demonstrates, merely engaging in same-sex relations within the private sphere of the 
home does not warrant constitutional protection. The intimate nature of those relations 
must also adhere to the affective assumptions prescribed under heteronormativity. In spite 
of that, privacy is also a racialized category that privileges particular social formations 
that uphold coupled, heterosexual (or homonormative) intimacy and the domestic sphere 
of the private. As I reveal in this section, the architects of the public sex law proceeded 
from an understanding that all gay men and lesbians in Minnesota could equally access 
privacy.74 In return, they sought to offer legal protections to gay men and lesbians, not by 
unraveling the conflation of privacy with citizenship, but by privatizing same-sex 
sexuality. 
                                                
73 Nicholas Blomley, “The Borrowed View.”  
74 By public, I am referring to anything existing outside the hallmark realms of capital production: work 
and home. 
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 Soon after Hennepin County District Judge Pamela Alexander struck down 
Minnesota’s sodomy statute, gay and lesbian elected officials hosted a public meeting in 
December of 1986 to discuss legislative priorities for the coming year. Spear and Clark 
informed the crowd that modifying the sodomy law—along with increased funds for 
AIDS education and testing—would be the major priority for 1987. Officials were 
pessimistic Hennepin County Judge Pamela Alexander’s ruling would remain on the 
books.75 Because of this, Spear insisted efforts be redirected to modifying the law 
through the legislature.76  
  Key to legislative repeal efforts was demonstrating that striking down sodomy 
would positively affect the mainstream heterosexual community. At the public forum, 
Spear and Clark explained to the crowd how they would go about repealing the sodomy 
law through the legislature, following Wisconsin’s example.77 Instead of outright 
repealing the law, they would replace it with a law banning public sex, a political 
compromise of sorts. Although public sex was already forbidden under public nuisance 
and indecent conduct statutes, Spear believed the creation of a new crime of public sex 
would provide legislators with an opportunity to convince constituents that they had 
worked to remove state jurisdiction over private, consensual sex while still appearing 
                                                
75 Clark and Spear predicted the ruling would be reversed by what they considered a fairly conservative 
Minnesota Supreme Court. Attorney General Hubert Humphrey III had even vowed to defend the law 
before the state’s high court.  
76 Jim Schroeder, “Clark/Spear discuss 1987 session,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986. 
77 In 1983, Wisconsin passed a consenting adults law that repealed that state’s “sexual perversion” law as it 
simultaneously legalized private, non-commercial acts of sodomy between consenting adults. As a 
compromise to obtain the sufficient number of votes among legislators, the bill stated that Wisconsin 
possessed a duty “to encourage high moral standards” and that it did not “condone or encourage any form 
of conduct outside the institution of marriage” as this institution is “the foundation of family and society” 
and its “stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society” and Wisconsin. Laws 
of Wisconsin 1983, Vol. 1, page 37, ch. 17, enacted May 5, 1983, published May 11, 1983.  
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tough on crime.78 The law would have made it a crime to engage in certain sex acts where 
it reasonable to expect that the conduct could be seen by others. While speaking at the 
forum, Spear confessed that the “trick” was in defining public and private sex. The public 
sex law would not be used discriminatorily against men. He assured the crowd of mostly 
white gay men that private sex would include that which occurred behind locked cubicles 
or closed rooms in commercial places like adult bookstores and bathhouses. While 
“[p]ublic is where people can stumble upon you.”79 
As part of their strategy to win support for the modification of the sodomy law, 
Spear and Clark formed the ad-hoc group, Minnesota Coalition for Privacy.80 The group 
consisted of gay and lesbian, and mainstream organizations concerned with guaranteeing 
the right to privacy for all consenting adults in Minnesota.81 To avoid the public 
perception that this was a “gay rights bill,” the Coalition for Privacy ensured that neither 
                                                
78 Spear said there was no specific state law against engaging in sex in public. He acknowledged, “You can 
get people on indecent conduct, but it’s very vague.” Robert Whereatt, “Coalition brings new strategy to 
sex law fight,” Star Tribune, Mar. 26, 1987. 
79 Spear worried that Judge Pamela Alexander’s ruling in State v. Gray would have made it harder to pass a 
modification of the state law in the legislature. He believed that legislators might not seek to endorse repeal 
if they believed the case could win in courts. This way legislators would not go on the line publicly in 
defense of the law and, thus, alienate constituents. Repeal would have to wait until 1988 but that posed a 
problem as that was an election year and legislators were less likely to support it during an election year. 
Jim Schroeder, “Clark/Spear discuss 1987 session,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986. 
80 The coalition hired Minneapolis attorney Robert Hentges as a lobbyist to help win support for the bill. 
Hentges reminded the public and the Legislature of the negative implications the sodomy statute carried for 
Minnesota’s image as a liberal state with tolerant people. Like Spear, Hentges metaphorically characterized 
Minnesota as “an island” given that in the previous two decades, 25 states had repealed these “silly” 
sodomy laws including every Midwestern state bordering it. Robert Whereatt, “Coalition brings new 
strategy to sex law fight,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Mar. 26, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “Civil Rights 
Commission endorses repeal of sodomy law,” Equal Time, Feb. 4, 1987. 
81 Some of the 29 member organizations of the coalition included the League of Women Voters of 
Minnesota, the Minnesota Bar Association, the Minnesota Council of Churches, the Minnesota Medical 
Association, the Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, the Hennepin County Attorney’s office and 
Council 14 of the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees. Ibid.  
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Spear nor Clark authored the bill.82 Julia Classen, coordinator for the coalition, 
strategically suggested having Sen. Donna Peterson, of the Democratic-Farmer Labor 
Party, and Rep. Lee Greenfield as the authors of the bill. Peterson was a member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and Greenfield was a member of the House Judiciary 
Committee and its Health and Human Services Committee. Not only did Peterson and 
Greenfield possess clout in the Minnesota Legislature, Classen emphasized that Peterson 
and Greenfield both publicly identified as heterosexuals. She hoped that the legislators’ 
heterosexuality would garner a broader base of support among labor, religious, feminist, 
and mental health groups.83 In an interview with the Star Tribune, the largest daily 
newspaper in Minnesota, Peterson echoed Classen’s reasoning, admitting that she had 
actively discouraged Clark and Spear, Minnesota’s first and only openly lesbian and gay 
officials elected to state government, from sponsoring the bill to prevent the public’s 
perception of it being a “gay rights bill.”84 
 The Minnesota Coalition for Privacy held a community information meeting on 
February 14, 1987, in the St. Paul-Reformation Lutheran Church, to present its bill to the 
public and to discuss its legislative strategy for later that spring. The bill’s authors, 
Greenfield and Peterson, explained that the proposed public sex law was intended to 
replace Minnesota’s sodomy law, as well as laws against adultery and fornication, which 
made criminal any heterosexual sex outside marriage. Describing these latter laws as 
                                                
82 For that reason, Spear, the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair, who was openly gay and had been chief 
sponsor of previous bills to repeal the state’s sodomy law, was not even a sponsor in this effort. 
83 Jim Schroeder, “New bill drafted,” Equal Time, March 4, 1987. 
84 Robert Whereatt, “Coalition brings new strategy to sex law fight,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Mar. 
26, 1987. 
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“grossly sexist,” Greenfield described that a married woman who committed adultery—
that is, had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband—could have been 
convicted of a gross misdemeanor, carrying a fine of $3,000 and a year in prison, under 
the adultery law. But a married man could be convicted of fornication—sex with a single 
woman—and obtain a misdemeanor sentence, a lesser penalty.85 
 Although the bill removed any restrictions on consensual sexual acts between 
adults, including adultery and fornication, the proposed public sex law criminalized any 
sexual acts occurring in a public place where a person “may reasonably expect to be 
observed by individuals not engaged in the conduct.” Classen divulged to Equal Time, a 
gay and lesbian-themed newspaper in the Twin Cities, that after “careful consideration,” 
the Coalition decided to replace the sodomy law with one forbidden publicly observable 
sex, rather than simply acting to repeal the sodomy law. She conceded, “If you ever want 
to get the sodomy law repealed, you have to take an approach more palatable to all the 
legislators, including ones from more conservative districts.”86 Under the new crime, law 
enforcement agencies would have been authorized to seek out and arrest anyone found to 
be engaging in sex acts in automobiles, parks, or other public spaces. Prior to the 
proposed bill, law enforcement agencies merely charged those arrested for engaging in 
                                                
85 It is possible that Greenfield underscored the sexist nature of the adultery and fornication laws to elicit 
support from lesbian feminists who may have not necessarily seen their concerns included in the public sex 
law. Also in attendance at the forum were Clark and Spear though in a somewhat more reserved position. 
The Coalition for Privacy sought volunteers from the “very positive” crowd for fundraising efforts, 
community organizing, marketing, and organization efforts. “FYI,” Twin Cities Gaze, Feb. 02, 1987; Jim 
Schroeder, “New bill drafted,” Equal Time, March 04, 1987; Robert Whereatt, “Coalition brings new 
strategy to sex law fight,” Star Tribune, Mar. 26, 1987. 
86 Jim Schroeder, “Hearings set to replace sodomy law,” Equal Time, April 1, 1987. 
 
  109 
public sex with indecent conduct.87 In an interview with the Star Tribune, Peterson 
explained, “What’s done privately between two consenting adults should not be against 
the law.” She added, however, “What’s done publicly between two consenting adults is 
something that we can say, no, you won’t do that.”88 
 By assuming that all gay men and lesbians could equally access privacy, the 
architects of the public sex law in Minnesota—including Clark and Spear—overlooked 
the differentials of privilege and, by extension, the limited opportunities experienced by 
some gay men and lesbians contingent on race and class. The public sex law assumed as 
universal a subject who not only enjoyed unrestricted admission to the public world of 
erotic life, but one who could also withdraw to the personal domain of the private. All in 
all, this unmarked gay or lesbian subject was white. For Clark and Spear, the “axis of 
disenfranchisement” was “prominently and significantly sexual.”89 They neither 
discussed race and class differences or how those distinctions shaped the experiences of 
gay men and lesbians in public and private spaces. Clark and Spear might have omitted 
an analysis of race and class in their proposal because they anticipated that the subjects’ 
racial and class privileges would not lead to further inequality, surveillance, or 
prosecution. By virtue of authorizing law enforcement to seek out and arrest anyone 
found to be engaging in public sex—those who did not enjoy the race and class privileges 
                                                
87 Jim Schroeder, “Civil Rights Commission endorses repeal of sodomy law,” Equal Time (Minneapolis, 
MN), Feb. 4, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “New bill drafted,” Equal Time, March 4, 1987; Joe Kimball, “Panel 
approves repeal of sex laws,” Star Tribune, Apr. 7, 1987. 
88 Robert Whereatt, “Coalition brings new strategy to sex law fight,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Mar. 
26, 1987. 
89 Nayan Shah, “Policing Privacy, Migrants, and the Limits of Freedom,” Social Text 23 (Fall-Winter 
2005): 280.  
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to freely move about the public sphere or to comfortably retire to the privacy of private 
property—the public sex law endorsed the expansion of the criminal punishment system. 
The proposed public sex law reinforced the parameters through which the state could 
render legible homosexuality, within the context of the home. At the same time, it also 
created the conditions whereby those expressions of same-sex desire situated in public 
and informed by a commercial nature could be criminalized.  
 In “Race-ing Homonormativity: Citizenship, Sociology, and Gay Identity,” 
sociologist Roderick A. Ferguson situates homonormative formations within the 
genealogy of white ethnicity to highlight the ways in which said formations invest in 
practices of racial exclusion and racial privilege.90 In conforming to heteronormative 
protocols of gender and sexuality, white gay arrangements become homonormative 
formations. For instance, the public sex law operated as a homonormative formation that 
required that gay men and lesbians, as newly racialized whites, comply with 
heteronormative protocols of privacy. But, as Ferguson contends, homonormativity’s 
compliance with gender, sexual, and domestic space norms occasions assorted exclusions 
and regulations of nonnormative gender and sexual idiosyncrasies that are, in turn, 
interpreted through racial and class particularities. If so, then homonormativity indexes a 
contradiction: white homonormative formations demand privileges at the expense of 
those populations subjugated by normative regulations that are racialized, classed, and 
gendered. In other words, the appeal to gender and sexual normativity by white gay men 
                                                
90 Ferguson links sociological arguments about the socially constructed nature of (homo) sexuality to the 
contemporary entrance of white gay men and lesbians into the rights and privileges of American 
citizenship. 
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and lesbians functions as a mechanism of state identification that endorses racial 
exclusion.91  
 The proposed public sex law rendered homeless queers of color, who had to have 
sex in public, more vulnerable to surveillance and punishment. Two such people were 
Phyllis Olson and Dyke Johnson, whose material realities highlight the limitations and 
exclusions inherent to the public sex law. Olson was a 30-year-old Native American 
transgender sex worker. Tim Campbell, editor of the GLC Voice, described Olson as a 
“full-time transvestite” who frequented the Loring Park area and downtown gay bars. 
Because Olson, whom court documents referred to as a “preoperative transsexual,” 
lacked a permanent home address, she stayed at a cheap motel near downtown 
Minneapolis. On September 24, 1986, Olson was found strangled on a footbridge near 
gay businesses in downtown Minneapolis by a commuter in route to work.  
Olson’s transient relationship to private property along with her numerous 
prostitution arrests dating back to 1973 enabled homicide detectives and even gay leaders 
to portray her death as a natural extension of her deviant lifestyle. The Minneapolis 
Police Department “leaked” to the Star Tribune that Olson had tested positive for HIV, 
igniting a slew of public animosity that underscored the racial and class anxieties of the 
epidemic. Because law enforcement authorities surmised Olson continued to engage in 
sex work even after her AIDS diagnosis, her case was denied not only police time and 
attention, but also public sympathy. While health officials used Olson’s death to call for 
stricter restrictions on sex workers, openly gay Minneapolis City Council Member, Brian 
                                                
91 Ferguson, “Race-ing Homonormativity.”  
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Coyle, used Olson’s death to reflect on the dangers of unregulated queer sexuality. He 
informed the Star Tribune: “There’s great cause for concern when anybody is discovered 
dead, gay or straight. And I’m also very concerned when anybody has AIDS and doesn’t 
modify their behavior.” Coyle commiserated over the death of Olson as he 
simultaneously condemned her actions. Since Coyle presupposed Olson knowingly 
infected others and that she did not practice safe sex, he agreed that it was “important” to 
publish the story of Olson’s HIV status “to turn up people who might have been exposed 
to him (sic).” In focusing on her behaviors rather than on her death or the conditions that 
led to it, Coyle failed to denounce the actions of her clients, policymakers, and, by 
extension, implicated Olson in her own murder.92 
 Further compounding the practices of racial exclusion and racial privilege at the 
forefront of the public sex law is the case of Dyke Johnston, a 28-year-old “gay transient 
from California.” Johnson arrived in Minneapolis in March of 1987. Having experienced 
difficulty securing a steady of source of income, Johnson became homeless. On April 27, 
1987, Johnson was fatally stabbed as he slept in north Minneapolis, near a secluded and 
dark railroad trestle where homeless men and women typically slept. Homicide detectives 
did not consider Johnson’s death a gay-related hate crime. Instead, they suggested that 
Johnson was killed, perhaps by another transient. Likewise, Coyle refused to tie 
Johnson’s death to the string of gay killings in the Twin Cities occurring at the time. 
Coyle explained that earlier killings were of long-term residents, who were employed. 
                                                
92 In chapter two, I discuss Phyllis Olson’s case in further detail, arguing that her case exposes the 
limitations of the mainstream gay rights agenda at the forefront of gay hate crime activism. Julie Gravelle 
and Kevin Diaz, “Transient found slain had tested positive for AIDS,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Sep. 
24, 1986. 
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Johnson did not fit this model. What Coyle did, instead, was use Johnson’s death to 
publicize what he perceived as the growing problem of “transients” (read: homeless) in 
Minneapolis. In an indirect reference to the trope of the “Cadillac-driving welfare queen” 
of Ronald Reagan’s anti-welfare speeches, Coyle described that many of these homeless 
men and women shuttled between the Twin Cities and the West Coast because public 
assistance benefits in Minnesota were ideal but the winter climate was better on the West 
Coast. In an interview with Equal Time, Coyle shared why he thought people were 
homeless: “Some people are adopting homelessness as a way of life and are not trying to 
get out of the cycle.”93 Phyllis Olson and Dyke Johnson, homeless queers of color, were 
the antitheses of homonormativity’s compliance and identification with the propertied 
belongings of American citizenship. The public sex law did not extend an invitation to 
the rights and privileges of the liberal state; it further criminalized them and justified their 
marginalization.  
 The public sex law made a first offense a misdemeanor with penalties increasing 
with subsequent convictions. A second offense within three years would have been 
considered a gross misdemeanor and a third or subsequent offense, within five years, 
would have been considered a felony. At the time, breaking the sodomy and adultery 
laws were gross misdemeanors, while breaking the fornication law was a misdemeanor. 
The proposed public sex law allowed judges to stay imposition or execution of a sentence 
for someone found guilty under the law and instead order the person to undergo 
                                                
93 Jim Schroeder, “Murder bulletin received at ET,” Equal Time, May 13, 1987; “The homelessness among 
us: a growing population,” Equal Time, Aug. 5, 1987. 
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treatment, the assumption being that people repeatedly caught engaging in public sex 
required psychiatric intervention.94   
 On its final stretch to the legislature, proponents of the public sex law emphasized 
the supposed benefits that the law would entail for the city’s public health given the 
AIDS crisis. On March 30, 1987, Peterson introduced the public sex law to the Minnesota 
Legislature. The following week, the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee heard 
testimony in regards to the bill. Representatives of several public health organizations 
testified before the Committee that the public sex law would assist efforts to educate the 
public about AIDS. In addition to highlighting the negative effects of the sodomy statute 
on the mainstream heterosexual population, proponents pointed to the immediacy of the 
AIDS crisis. Dr. Frank Rhame, a University of Minnesota Hospital physician who had 
cared for people with AIDS since the epidemic’s inception, told the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that reporting AIDS contacts was necessary to combat disease. Yet, many gay 
men were reluctant to discuss their sexual activities with health care professionals 
because of the sodomy law.95 Doctors contended that the existing sodomy law inhibited 
health officials from curbing the spread of AIDS because those carrying the virus often 
                                                
94 Jim Schroeder, “Civil Rights Commission endorses repeal of sodomy law,” Equal Time, Feb. 4, 1987; 
Jim Schroeder, “New bill drafted,” Equal Time, March 4, 1987; Joe Kimball, “Panel approves repeal of sex 
laws,” Star Tribune, Apr. 7, 1987. 
95 Dr. Edward Ellinger of the Minnesota Public Health Association echoed Rhame’s expert testimony when 
he insisted that sodomy be decriminalized so that health officials could “legally work with individuals” on 
AIDS matters. Ellinger added, “We don’t endorse sodomy or adultery, but we recognize the reality of 
diverse sexual practices.” For that reason, he continued, “‘Just say no’ doesn’t work. Public health workers 
need to work with the alternatives.” State Sen. Allan Spear echoed the sentiments of Rhame and Ellinger, 
saying that some gay and bisexual men were hesitant to be tested for the virus because a positive test would 
be tantamount to self-incrimination and they feared that names of sexual contacts would be demanded. Joe 
Kimball, “Panel approves repeal of sex laws,” Star Tribune, Apr. 7, 1987. 
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declined to identify sexual contacts since the acts involved were criminal.96 That same 
day, the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee approved the bill, in a vote of 11 to 4, to 
repeal the state’s sodomy law, adultery and fornication laws and replace them with a law 
forbidding public sex. The vote sent the measure directly to the full Minnesota Senate. 
However, the Committee, made up entirely of Twin Cities’ metropolitan area senators, 
was considered more liberal than the Senate as a whole. The House Judiciary Committee, 
which was to consider the bill the following day, April 7, was by far more conservative.97 
 The morning of the House Judiciary Committee vote on the public sex law, the 
chambers was overflowing with the buzzing energy of spectators, many of whom carried 
large signs. Greenfield, who sponsored the bill, pleaded with members of the House 
Judiciary Committee that Minnesotans were “entitled to the privacy of their bedroom.” 
He related, “The vast majority of Americans and Minnesotans break these laws.” 
Whether or not the majority of Americans and Minnesotans broke these laws was beside 
the point for those in attendance, since many of them opposed the bill. Several groups 
opposed the bill on moral grounds. They believed repeal would damage public morals 
and family values. But, many more groups cited public health as reason to not 
decriminalize sodomy, even in private. They warned that repeal of sodomy would 
                                                
96 Those who testified on behalf of the public sex law before the Senate Judiciary Committee cited a gamut 
of reasons in support of the decriminalization of sodomy between consenting adults in private. They argued 
that the government should not regulate private sexual activity. They defined sodomy as the only sexual 
activity available to many physically challenged individuals. They characterized the sodomy law, along 
with the adultery and fornication laws, as inherently sexist and rarely enforced. And they reminded the 
Senate Judiciary Committee all states surrounding Minnesota had previously repealed similar laws. 
Supporters included the Minnesota Council of Churches, Minnesota Medical Association, the Minnesota 
League of Women Voters and the Minnesota Bar Association. Robert Whereatt, “Coalition brings new 
strategy to sex law fight,” Star Tribune, Mar. 26, 1987. 
97 Kimball, “Panel approves repeal of sex laws.”  
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facilitate AIDS transmission. One woman in the audience carried a sign that read: 
“Millions of our taxpayer’s dollars spent on AIDS research. Why legalize the mode of 
transmission?” Wayne Olhoft, a former state senator and then-executive director of the 
Berean League, a Christian public affairs group, argued that promiscuous sex was the 
primary cause of AIDS. He implied that the law needed to be better enforced, not 
repealed.98 In its vote, the House Judiciary Committee was essentially swayed by the 
opposition’s line of reasoning.  
 The Minnesota House Judiciary Committee voted 14-11 to block the measure, 
placing the repeal of Minnesota’s sodomy law at a standstill. Spear described the 
outcome “a major setback,” attributing it to the lobbying by conservative opponents of 
repeal.99 The House Judiciary Committee’s vote to block the repeal of the sodomy law 
                                                
98 The Berean League was a Christian public affairs group that advocated the use of law to protect society’s 
sexual health and morality. It had vehemently defended the sodomy law as it stood on the books, changing 
its position only to propose legalizing sodomy “just within marriage for heterosexuals.” In addition to the 
Berean League, opponents included the Eagle Forum and Concerned Women for America, two 
conservative political groups. 
Jim Schroeder, “Clark/Spear discuss 1987 session,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986; Joe Kimball, “Panel 
approves repeal of sex laws,” Star Tribune, Apr. 7, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy repeal still a 
possibility,” Equal Time, Apr. 15, 1987. 
99 Proponents of the public sex theorized a number of different possibilities to explain the House 
Committee’s vote to block the measure. Although the “powerful” Berean League openly opposed the bill, 
Spear believed opposition “went beyond the Berean League.” Spear and Classen blamed the anti-abortion 
group, Minnesota Concerned for Life (MCL), with defeat of the measure. Although the anti-abortion group 
did not usually lobby on issues not directly related to abortion, the group objected to provisions that would 
have repealed state adultery and fornication laws. The MCL had supposedly approached several House 
Committee members and pressured them into voting against the measure. Proponents also considered other 
factors for the defeat of the public sex law. Spear acknowledged that some gay men in the Twin Cities had 
objected to provisions of the public sex law. But he did not necessarily believe the dissension had harmed 
the bill. Spear explained that the opposition was “internal” and that “we were able to close ranks and 
present a united front.” Meanwhile, Classen pointed out that Minnesota Republican leaders had threatened 
Republican legislators who did not vote against the bill with challenges in the 1988 primary election. 
Similarly, Coyle believed the “biggest problem” were the “freshmen” members of the House Committee 
who were “frightened by the right-to-lifers” to vote against the public sex law. Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy 
repeal still a possibility,” Equal Time, Apr.l 15, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy law repeal fails,” Equal 
Time, May 13, 1987. 
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ignited a flurry of public reaction.100 In a surprise move, the Pioneer Press-Dispatch, a 
daily newspaper based in St. Paul, Minnesota, wrote a lead editorial criticizing the House 
Judiciary committee’s vote to block the repeal of “the intrusive, unwarranted statutes.” 
The Pioneer Press characterized the sodomy law as making “sexual relations a crime for 
the one out of every 10 citizens who is homosexual, forbid the only kind of intimate 
sexual contact possible for many handicapped (sic) people, (and) are offensively sexist.” 
The Pioneer Press countered conservatives’ claims by stating, “repressive laws may 
make [AIDS] spread more likely, not less.” In spite of this, last-ditch efforts to revive the 
proposed repeal of the state’s sodomy law eventually failed.101 On May 13, 1987, Classen 
admitted to the Star Tribune that the bill replacing the sodomy law with one banning 
public sex “looks pretty much dead at this point in time.”102  
                                                
100 Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy repeal still a possibility,” Equal Time, Apr. 15, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy 
law repeal fails,” Equal Time, May 13, 1987. 
101 In the wake of the House Judiciary Committee rejection, Peterson, who introduced the bill in the Senate, 
had to decide whether to send it to the Senate floor. Legislators frequently stalled measures in a Senate 
committee if they appeared unlikely to pass in the House. Although Classen believed the measure could 
have passed the floor of the state Senate, the Coalition for Privacy decided not to “push it out of the 
committee” as that would have been “a good way to lose friends.” Last-ditch efforts consisted of gay and 
lesbian leaders and their advocates persuading at least two members of the House Judiciary Committee to 
change their initial votes against the bill. Despite “a considerable number of phone calls” from constituents 
about the vote, none of the opponents changed their vote. Because attempts to repeal the law in 1988, an 
election year, were not “realistic,” leaders and advocates would have to wait until at least 1989. In the 
meantime, Classen encouraged gay men and lesbians to use the two-year interval to brainstorm more 
practical mechanisms for repeal of the sodomy law. Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy repeal still a possibility,” 
Equal Time, Apr. 15, 1987; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy law repeal fails,” Equal Time, May 13, 1987. 
102 Although the strategy of repealing sodomy via the criminalization of public sex did not prove successful 
in Minnesota in 1987, the strategy proved fruitful elsewhere. In June of 1993, Nevada repealed its sodomy 
law with a bill that included a provision that rendered public acts of sodomy, including oral and anal sex 
between heterosexuals, a felony punishable by up to six years in prison. The repeal bill passed the Nevada 
Senate 14-6 and the Assembly 29-12. The sodomy law had been in place since 1911. See: Laws of Nevada 
1993, ch. 236, enacted June 16, 1993, effective immediately; “Nevada Assembly Votes to Repeal Law on 
Sodomy,” Orlando Sentinel, Jun. 16, 1993; Jim Schroeder, “Sodomy law repeal fails,” Equal Time, May 
13, 1987. 
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 The proposed public sex law in Minnesota epitomizes the ways in which 
community claims for social membership hinged upon mechanisms of assimilation that 
bolstered spatial arrangements of race and class-restricted privacy. Gay and lesbian 
leaders called for the eradication of public sex. They believed that unless gay men traded 
in promiscuity for monogamy, gay men and lesbians would never attain rights. In other 
words, liberation was contingent upon an unquestioned set of universal values where 
freedom was remapped as privacy. Although the proposed inclusion of white, middle-
class same-sex couples at the top of Rubin’s erotic pyramid of sexual value may suggest 
an expansion in the definition of those sexual identities and practices deemed normal, it 
does not necessarily entail a critique of a system that ranks sexual identities and practices, 
in the first place. If anything, as Dean Spade and Craig Willse remind us, these shifts 
merely “strengthen the line” between those identities and practices considered “good, 
healthy, and normal,” and those that remain “bad, unhealthy, stigmatized, and 
criminalized.” Spade and Willse conclude, “The line moves to accommodate a few more 
people, who society suddenly approves of, correcting the system and keeping it in 
place.”103 The incorporation of previously stigmatized populations, such as middle-class 
gay and lesbian couples, does not critique the processes through which systems of 
domination continue to exert social control by regulating sexuality and family formation. 
Quite the opposite, it solidifies the role of the state, media, and law as arbiters of 
normative sexuality.  
                                                
103 Dean Spade and Craig Willse, “Marriage Will Never Set Us Free,” Organizing Upgrade, last modified 
Sept. 06, 2013. Retrieved on Aug. 26, 2015. http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/modules-
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Efforts to repeal Minnesota’s sodomy law post-Bowers also reflect how local gay 
and lesbian leaders demanded a constitutionally protected (sexual) privacy by defining 
gay male (and lesbian) sexuality in opposition to public sexual cultures. Leaders 
disparaged the sexual practices of some gay men and queers as anachronistic and 
antithetical to a newly consolidating homonormative rights platform. In doing so, leaders 
imposed a Western model of heteronormativity and repudiated a gay liberationist and 
feminist understanding of sexuality. They did not interrogate the notion of privacy. But, 
rather, they reframed the fight for rights in terms of homonormative cultural practices: 
domesticity, privacy, and visibility. Overall, Clark and Spear endeavored to claim a right 
to privacy for gay men and lesbians at the expense of demanding their right to occupy 
public space via transgressive modalities of erotic contact.  
 Public sex, however, can cultivate a transgressive, anti-racist, and anti-capitalist 
potential. Queer uses of space, after all, can contest the production of privacy because 
they destabilize the illusorily neat boundaries between public and private. Writing about 
the erosion of public sexual cultures in the wake of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s “quality of 
life” campaign in the mid-1990s in New York City, Michael Warner argues that a public 
culture of sex is “something to value, something whose accessibility is to be protected.” 
Warner characterizes this public sexual culture as not just a “civil liberty,” but rather as 
“a good thing” that “queer politics should make...a priority.”104 Warner explains that the 
“practices of public sexual culture...involve not only a world-excluding privacy but also a 
                                                
104 Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal, 171.  
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world-making publicness.”105 It is this “world-making publicness” that affords gay men 
“the pleasure of belonging to a social world, in which one’s sexuality finds an answering 
resonance not just in one another, but in the world of others.”106 For Warner, a public 
culture of sex opens up a world of possibility in which queer transgressions of public 
space work in the service of assailing heteronormativity, public morality, and the 
privatizing imperatives of cities. This, of course, is not to suggest that all gay men, 
lesbians, and trans people equally benefit from the freedom to move about public space 
without eliciting racial suspicion. As historian Nayan Shah points out, the universal gay 
male subject that Warner assumes is one who has “both free access to participate in the 
public world of the intimate and may also retreat to a private realm of intimacy.”107 That 
is, the race and class privileges of this “undifferentiated subject” award him the freedom 
of movement and association. This universal gay male subject possesses the social and 
spatial arsenal to push and pull the boundaries of privacy in ways that abstract the 
socially contingent nature of space and that elevate his fitness for social membership. 
Yet, Warner never discusses how these differentials of power and mobility constrain or 
facilitate the opportunities of gay men to reap the benefits of his so-called “world-making 
publicness.”108 The liberatory potential of public sex, Shah believes, is undermined when 
one considers that this supposed freedom is contingent on privileges of race and class. As 
I demonstrated above, the architects of the public sex law in Minnesota similarly 
                                                
105 Ibid., 177.  
106 Ibid., 179. 
107 Nayan Shah, “Policing Privacy,” 280.  
108 Shah observes, “Class and race differences, the differences of access and opportunity, the differential 
relation to public spaces and how that might impact the dynamics of sociability, erotics, and subjectivity 
are not discussed” by Warner. Ibid.  
 
  121 
proceeded from an understanding that all gay men and lesbians could equally access both 
privacy and the freedom to move about public space without eliciting racial suspicion. 
That was incorrect. The inequitable policing of sodomy in the United States attends to the 
disparate access to the institution of privacy.  
 In his analysis of early twentieth-century sodomy court cases among male 
laborers in the interracial and interclass migrant world of the western United States and 
Canada, Shah suggests that sexual identity was not the sole determining factor in 
prosecuting sodomy. Rather, differences in race, class, and age framed the surveillance 
that led to arrests for sodomy. Law enforcement’s inequitable policing of sodomy was 
informed by the racial suspicion of migrant male laborers.109 Given this heightened racial 
suspicion and surveillance of the law, migrant men were denied free movement and 
association. Because of their hyper visibility, migrant men were unable to move about the 
public sphere without eliciting suspicion from the authorities, much like Phyllis Olson 
and Dyke Johnson. Furthermore, the cramped living quarters of labor camps and the 
transient nature of their labor foreclosed any possibility of privacy. Shah’s analysis 
confirms that privacy is a racialized category of privilege afforded to those whose 
sexuality normalizes and is normalized by private property.  
 In addition to assuming that all gay men and lesbians could equally access 
privacy, the engineers of the public sex law in Minnesota were unable or unwilling to 
consider the benefits that some gay men and lesbians experienced from participating in 
public sexual cultures. Queer subjects who participated in public sexual cultures could 
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have derived more than mere sexual gratification. They might have also experienced a 
sense of community as Samuel R. Delany recounts in the classic queer ethnography, 
Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, which recalls participation in street life and porn 
theaters in New York City’s Times Square before the “violent reconfiguration” of that 
city’s cultural and sexual landscape. Delany laments the loss of the community, social 
fulfillment, and other social functions that these commercial sex establishments in Times 
Square afforded strangers. He argues that cross-class and inter-racial contact, even via 
sexual practices and venues, represent one of the most valuable amenities of urban life 
that ought to be a basic experience of everybody. Unlike Warner’s analysis, Delany’s 
analysis centers the race and class-based dynamics of sociability. Part of the richness of 
queer public life, Delany claims, is rooted in the possibility of contact among strangers. 
Public spaces condition the meeting of people of diverse races, classes, genders, 
sexualities, ages, religions, cultures, and ideological worldviews. In public, difference 
cannot be avoided; it must be negotiated.110 That negotiation, however, has been rendered 
obsolete in the wake of neoliberal urban policies.111 Such a set of dynamics was also at 
play with the proposed public sex law in Minnesota. Threatening to eliminate the 
possibilities for contact among gay and bisexual men in the Twin Cities, the public sex 
law foreclosed one of the touchstones of democratic queer urban life and delimited the 
                                                
110 Phil Hubbard, “Public Sex,” in Cities and Sexualities.  
111 Delany attributes the destruction of these public sexual cultures and cross-class social encounters to the 
culmination of real estate and business interests. Accomplished through police harassment, real estate 
development deals, and changing laws about sex, health, and zoning, Delany shows that the “cleaning up” 
of Times Square was part of a social agenda to render the area “safe” for tourist and family consumption. 
Samuel R. Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (New York: New York University Press, 1999).  
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liberatory potential of queer public life. Instead, the public sex law bolstered the 
significance of private property to neoliberal claims for queer citizenship.  
  For homeless queers of color, such as Olson and Johnson, the promise of privacy 
that the public sex law espoused was not central to their narrative. In “The Shadows of 
Stonewall: Examining Gay Transnational Politics and the Diasporic Dilemma,” cultural 
anthropologist Martin Manalansan highlights how gay and lesbian compliance with 
teleological and developmental discourses of liberal capitalism creates the conditions of 
possibility for racial exclusion. Manalansan identifies the mainstream gay and lesbian 
significance placed upon the act of “coming out” as a formation that has worked to 
manage the racialized and gendered particularities of immigrant queers of color. 
Manalansan argues that gay and lesbian leaders posit coming out as a measure of 
liberation and modernity as they simultaneously racialize the closet as a marker of 
premodern backwardness. For Manalansan’s gay Filipino informants, coming out, or the 
public avowal of identity, is not necessary for their self-fashioning. Their gay identities 
are not just proclaimed verbally; they are also felt and intuited. For them, gay identity is 
worn, not necessarily declared. As a result, Manalansan’s gay Filipino informants treat 
public modes of gay identity articulation to be superfluous. Instead, they realign the 
closet in light of other experiences as immigrants in the United States. In fact, 
Manalansan suggests that public visibility could be dangerous for his gay Filipino 
informants as they risk deportation. Their disavowal of overt displays of gay identity, 
hence, does not reflect homophobia, Manalansan argues. On the contrary, it exists as a 
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racial and class position shaped by the boundaries and exclusions of immigrant 
experience.112  
 We can apply Manalansan’s observations to interrogate the mainstream gay and 
lesbian logic that presents identities and practices not organized around privacy as 
deviant. The mainstream gay and lesbian emphasis on privacy exists as a location that 
regulates the racialized and gendered differences of homeless queers of color. Gay and 
lesbian leaders exalted privacy as the sine qua non of liberation and modernity while 
denigrating public sex as a reflection of internalized homophobia or gay shame. They did 
not query whether identities and practices not organized around privacy were the result of 
racial exclusion and material inequality. Nor did they ponder whether those who engaged 
in public sex did so out of an economic necessity or as something erotically stimulating. 
Had they done so, gay and lesbian leaders would have been confronted with the 
realization that homeless queers of color violate the norms, rights, and privileges that gay 
ethnic formations claimed to embody. Homonormative formations emerge to the 
detriment of homeless queers of color who cannot seize privacy. As same-sex desire 
moved into a white homonormative formation in the 1980s, it transformed itself into a 
technology of race that understood race and class difference as the antitheses of 
compliance, discipline, and normativity necessary for membership in the body politic of 
the United States.  
 The public sex law failed to take into account how race, class, and gender are 
among some of the social and spatial particularities that either bestow or deny individual 
                                                
112 Martin F. Manalansan, IV, “In the Shadows of Stonewall: Examining Gay Transnational Politics and the 
Diasporic Dilemma,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 2, no. 4, (1995): 425-38.  
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autonomy and sexual liberty upon subjects in both public and private spheres. Particular 
expressions of race, class, gender, and sexuality that operate in the service of capital by 
perpetuating (and performing) the notion of a liberal public-private framework of space 
are those social formations that can easily navigate the artificial contours of the public 
sphere and the private.113 Clark and Spear endorsed a liberal public-private framework of 
space as a racially and class-neutral mode of distributing rights, benefits, and protections 
without noting how this socially contingent system has been historically mobilized to 
channel resources to white heteropatriarchy, to justify the gender subordination of 
women, and the ownership of people of color as white property.  
 Quite the opposite, the public sex law in Minnesota sought to offer legal 
recognition to gay men and lesbians in coupled relationships with access to private 
property. In his analysis of the 2003 Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
which invalidated sodomy laws to render same-sex sexual activity legal in every U.S. 
state and territory, Shah highlights that the decision conferred freedom for privacy to gay 
men and lesbians only within the confines of homosexual domestic identities and 
practices. It did not extend those privileges and protections to sexual identities and 
practices that did not uphold the heterosexual family ideal or the private domestic space. 
Similarly, the public sex law only embraced a particular segment of same-sex identities 
and practices. According to Shah, the logic behind Lawrence, and I would add the public 
                                                
113 Although I am arguing that the liberal public-private framework of space is a socially contingent 
process—that it erects ideological walls depending upon the particular demands of capital and the 
disciplinary needs of the state—I am not denying the materiality of this public-private distinction on the 
quotidian experiences of individuals unable (or unwilling) to adhere to the norms of gender, sexuality, and 
domestic space upon which social membership hinges. 
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sex law, “keeps intact the public sphere idealization that protects the liberties of those 
who possess a recognizable home.”114 Both bolster the notion that “personhood and 
citizenship” derive from the “domestic private” and coupled intimacy, either heterosexual 
or homosexual. Shah concludes, “For those identified outside norms and normativity, the 
liberties to pursue ‘certain intimate conduct’ remains unfathomable in a liberal ethos that 
links private intimacy with respected and protected public status.”115 This “liberal ethos” 
relies upon the legal process, as evident in Bowers, Lawrence and the public sex law in 
Minnesota, to strengthen the illusory divide between the public sphere and privacy in 
order to naturalize norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space upon which 
citizenship is enacted. The homonormative subject’s entrance into the rights and 
privileges of white supremacy, however, hinges on managing homosexual difference. 
Only then can the homonormative subject claim coherence as a public citizen. This 
coherence and emancipation is achieved through rights-based actions and investments, or 
at the least indifferences to, in racial exclusion.116  
Conclusion.  
 Part of the reason why sodomy repeal efforts proved unsuccessful in Minnesota is 
because the opposition framed the AIDS crisis as a moral crusade to protect women and 
children from the putative dangers of decriminalizing sodomy. To this extent, the 
decriminalization of sodomy would have granulated the walls erected to insulate white, 
middle-class suburban domesticity from HIV. This logic was clearly articulated on May 
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02, 1987, at a debate in the Minnesota House of Representatives for a bill requiring all 
couples applying for marriage licenses in the state to undergo testing for AIDS. At the 
debate, Rep. K.J. McDonald, of the Independent-Republican Party, distributed an article 
from the Conservative Digest that claimed the disease to be “associated with loathsome 
homosexual practices” that “organized faggotry” was trying to conceal. In a heated 
exchange between McDonald and Rep. Karen Clark, the openly lesbian representative 
called the article “hate literature.” McDonald countered, that as a father of seven, he had 
a duty to ensure the disease was not being “politically protected.” Even though no 
professional group favored the tests, calling them costly and ineffective, the House 
approved the bill.117 Opponents to the decriminalization of private homosexual acts, like 
McDonald, called forth the AIDS crisis to successfully thwart sodomy repeal. 
This widespread characterization of gay male sexuality as responsible for the 
spread of HIV is partly the reason why gay and lesbian leaders labored to discursively 
frame gay male sexuality as “normal” through the institutions of privacy and private 
property. In the process, gay and lesbian leaders upheld the criteria by which 
marginalized populations could claim legal worth: norms of gender, sexuality, and 
domestic space, what I call racialized norms of sexual hygiene. This strategy proved even 
more contradictory when one considers that community claims for social membership 
depended upon the creation of a new crime of public sex that authorized law enforcement 
with the policing of interclass and interracial public sexual cultures, identities, and 
practices. Community claims for social membership also endorsed the expansion of the 
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criminal punishment system at a time when the racialized poor found itself caught in the 
crosshairs of punitive carceral measures as part of the war on drugs. And, finally, gay and 
lesbian leaders were unable or unwilling to fathom the benefits that such interclass and 
interracial contact afforded gay men via public sex.118  
No one questioned the investment in privacy canonized by the mainstream gay 
and lesbian community. For homeless queers of color, such as Olson and Johnson, the 
bifurcation of space (to consign homosexual difference to the private sphere) was not 
possible, nor central to their personal narrative. That is, privacy was not their main 
preoccupation. The home is, thus, not a monolithic space for all gay men and lesbians. 
For queers of color, the home is culturally constituted in a divergent fashion to 
homonormative subjects. For queers of color, private spaces are not locations of privacy 
but potential arenas of further state regulation and residential exclusion. Without race or 
class access to privacy, if these queers of color relocated elsewhere, they risked losing the 
family and extended kin networks established to protect against the race-based economic 
disenfranchisement they experienced in Minneapolis in the 1980s. Still, even with class 
access to privacy, queers of color had to contend with racism in patterns of residential 
living and home ownership. They, therefore, experienced the private bedroom not as a 
space of liberation, as Spear and Coyle promoted, but as another reminder of their race 
and class marginality in the United States. For that reason, a politics of homonormativity 
                                                
118 I do not mean to romanticize public sex, either, since it is likely that biases of race and class equally 
informed men’s desires to “cruise” particular individuals. What I am suggesting is that Clark and Spear 
could not, or would not, ponder the liberatory potential that public sex entailed for challenging private 
property, and race and class-based divisions. It is important to remain mindful that people of color, given 
their racial hyper visibility, would have faced a greater risk of policing and surveillance from law 
enforcement even within the liberatory potential of public sex. 
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that posits privacy as liberation is another marker of exclusion. Given their divergent 
relationship to home and privacy, queers of color contest the universality of these 
heteropatriarchal institutions by realigning the permeable boundaries of public and 
private spheres in light of their experiences as people of color in the United States.  
 Efforts of sodomy repeal on the part of gay and lesbian leaders also remind us 
how they strategically sought to distance themselves from individuals and practices that 
undermined the middle-class respectability they sought to cultivate. As I revealed above, 
this ontological and spatial distancing was evident in the Gray case. Gay and lesbian 
leaders could not recuperate Gray as a representative for the larger queer community 
because, although he did have access to the private, he did not adhere to the bourgeoning 
moral dictates of homonormativity. Consequently, local leaders did not treat his case as a 
gay-rights issue. On the contrary, leaders purposely sought to distance themselves from 
Gray’s tarnished image.  
 In this chapter, I revealed how efforts to repeal Minnesota’s sodomy law 
depended upon the criminalization and disavowal of public sexual cultures, identities, 
and practices, and on the regulation of racialized difference as a sign of non-
homonormative compliance. I looked at the sodomy case against Richard Gray Jr., a real 
estate broker accused of paying for sex with a young male sex worker. I also explored the 
specificities of a proposed public sex law in Minnesota that legalized private same-sex 
sexual activity via the creation of a new crime of public sex. By discussing how gay and 
lesbian leaders, and their advocates used private property to demand the inclusion of 
some gay men and lesbians within the fold of the state, I argued that this strategy 
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overlooked the racial- and class-based exclusivity of privacy. More generally, I 
confirmed that the liberal public-private framework of space is inherently malleable, 
adapting to the particular ideological demands of capital at the moment. The socially 
contingent nature of the public-private divide enables us to make sense of how previously 
marginalized populations (i.e. gay men and lesbians) are able to now vouch for their 
admissibility within this system as long as they perform norms of coupled monogamy, 
consumerism, and domestic space. 
 Additionally, I have demonstrated in this chapter that the liberal private-public 
framework of space privileges heteronormativity (and homonormativity) by treating most 
sexual conduct as non-public.119 Gay and lesbian leaders campaigned to decriminalize 
sexual intercourse among gay men and lesbians by implementing a system of 
categorization that defined sexual identities and practices as either private or public. The 
criteria for such a binary system consisted of spatial privileges—private property—along 
with race- and class-based performances of sexual morality. By employing this liberal 
public-private framework of space to vouch for the legal recognition of same-sex 
sexuality, gay and lesbian leaders prohibited other versions of erotic expression a 
semblance of public life, as they concomitantly naturalized a compulsory set of norms of 
gender, sexuality, and domestic space that were wedded to racial and class exclusivity. 
Through their ideological distancing from public sexual cultures, gay and lesbian leaders, 
activists, and their advocates inadvertently confirmed for many that gay male sexuality 
was chaotic, deviant, pathological, and, as such, responsible for the spread of HIV. This 
                                                
119 Phil Hubbard, “Public Sex,” in Cities and Sexualities. 
 
  131 
was the price that leaders paid to present gay men and lesbians as “worthy” of 
constitutional protections to privacy. Eventually, the process of categorization also 
upheld private property as the conduit through which gay men and lesbians would 
continue to articulate their worthiness for citizen rights, benefits, and protections in the 
following decade. Among the myriad of limitations inherent to this expression of 
“freedom with violence” is that there does not exist a naturally occurring division 
between the public sphere and privacy.120 More recently, with the advent of neoliberal 
capital, we have witnessed a refashioning of those same boundaries to include some gay 
men and lesbians and some people of color. 121 What we have not seen has been a critique 
of this liberal public-private framework of space in the first place. If anything, its illusory 
nature has been strenuously maintained.  
  With the AIDS crisis in mind, policymakers and health officials in Minneapolis 
reframed the decriminalization of private homosexual sex acts as a public health issue to 
encourage gay men to practice safer sex and to eradicate public sexual cultures. To 
underscore the dangers of commercial sex establishments to the public health of white, 
middle-class suburban domesticity, journalists relied upon medicalized tropes of diseased 
prostitutes of color with AIDS. The domestication of gay male sexuality in the Twin 
Cities, therefore, hinged upon the criminalization of racialized sexuality. I look at this set 
                                                
120 Chandan Reddy, Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the U.S. State (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press), 2011.  
121 As outlined in the introduction, these distinctions were spearheaded by industrialization and 
urbanization in the 1800s to organize both people and their perceptions about space in the service of capital 
accumulation and disciplinary regimes of social control. 
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of racial, class, and spatial dynamics further in the next chapter where I discuss the 




Play It Safe: Anti-Violence Gay Activism, Racialized Criminality, and the Spatial 
Politics of Homonormativity 
Introduction.  
 
 In late October of 1986, members of the Minneapolis anti-violence gay activist 
group, Community United Against Violence (CUAV), distributed approximately 5,000 
flyers of warning literature in areas frequented by gay men, including the downtown bars, 
the local bathhouse, and the public parks. Brian Coyle, the city’s first openly gay City 
Council Member, who founded CUAV, designed the flyers “to warn everyone on 
Hennepin Avenue, especially the gay and bisexual community, that they must not put 
themselves at risk” by picking up strangers.1  Although violence largely took the form of 
verbal harassment and physical assault, from 1984 to 1987, Minneapolis, a city of about 
350,000, witnessed upwards of 15 murders against gay men and transgender women.2 In 
spite of the wide array of victims, white gay leaders largely focused their efforts on a 
particular subset of victims, older, white gay men with ties to private property. Because 
these men were robbed and killed in their own homes without any sign of forced entry, 
leaders suspected victims invited their killer home for sex. Therefore, to warn others of 
the dangers of anonymous sex, leaders dwelled on the sexual practices of victims. 
                                                
1 In addition to members of CUAV, members of the Twin Cities Goodtime Softball League and Rep. Karen 
Clark distributed the flyers. The Northland Business Association, a gay and lesbian merchants association 
in the Twin Cities, attached the flyers to election endorsement materials and announcements. Press 
Conference Speech, Oct. 22, 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota 
History Center. 
2 I use the term transgender as an umbrella term to describe people whose gender identity or performance 




 The flyers, which contained detailed descriptions of 11 gay murder victims, read: 
“Play it safe! Don’t go home with strangers—no matter how hot they are. If you do, 
introduce your trick to a buddy” (Figure 2.1). The language in the flyers suggested that 
victims had brought upon their own death by engaging in the “dangerous” behaviors of 
cruising, and promiscuity. The flyers explained, “These 11 men believed their killer was 
O.K.—maybe even attractive. Don’t kid yourself, it could be you next!” The flyers then 
shamed gay men who continued to cruise for sex: “Despite several well publicized deaths 
during the last two years, some of us obviously are still putting ourselves at risk.”3 The 
sexual behaviors that Coyle regarded as dangerous in the flyers (i.e., cruising, 
promiscuity) were also behaviors that public health officials deemed to be “high risk” 




                                                
3 Although Coyle designed the flyers with the intent to “educate” gay men of the supposed physical risks of 
anonymous sex, the vindictive tone alienated a portion of the intended audience. Not all gay men easily 
understood the message of the flyers despite Coyle’s insistence that the flyers were written in “street 
language” to be most effective. Some gay men rejected the flyers because they received they were being 
handed Christian fundamentalist literature. Others noticed the “play it safe” theme and believed they were 
being handed safer sex educational material and rejected it. Kari Enger, “AIDS campaign not without 
controversy,” Twin Cities Reader, Oct. 15, 1986. 
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 A confluence, thus, emerged between the sexual practices that CUAV demonized 
and those that health officials associated with a greater exposure to HIV. This 
relationship, however, was not an accidental one. Coyle purposefully usurped the rhetoric 
of HIV-prevention, including the promotion of racialized norms of sexual hygiene—
domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability—to shed light on what he considered 
an equally important epidemic, violence against gay men.4 For some anti-violence gay 
activists, like Coyle, unregulated gay male sexuality contributed to both immunological 
and corporeal risk.  
Given the alleged converge between AIDS and violence, Coyle patterned 
CUAV’s literature after similarly worded warnings meant to prevent the spread of HIV. 
He appropriated the “play it safe” tagline from the Minnesota AIDS Program’s (MAP) 
very own HIV-education materials.5 MAP’s “play it safe” HIV-prevention ad campaign, 
produced with assistance from the City of Minneapolis and Hennepin County, featured 
posters of white male models in athletic attire gearing up for a slew of strenuous physical 
activity including biking, mountain climbing, and hockey. MAP’s campaign, nonetheless, 
was not without value judgment. Although the ads stressed the benefits of safer sex 
                                                
4 Coyle postulated that previous attempts to raise violence awareness among gay men failed because AIDS 
was consuming all their attention. As a result, Coyle articulated CUAV’s mission through the lexicon of 
safer sex. However, unlike safer sex practices, condoms were not effective measures against physical 
violence. Therefore, Coyle also pushed for a gay moral politics that celebrated dating instead of cruising. In 
an interview with the Pioneer Press, after the murder of a gay man and a transgender woman, Coyle 
indirectly recommended as an immediate safety valve that gay men date instead of engage in anonymous 
sex. He encouraged gay men: “Get to know someone before you are alone with them, and let an 
acquaintance know where you are.” Through the promotion of privacy, Coyle hoped to curb the rates of 
violence. Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986. 
5 Founded in 1983, the Minnesota AIDS Project is a non-profit service agency committed to stopping the 
spread of HIV through prevention, advocacy, awareness and services to Minnesotans living with 
HIV/AIDS. Jim Schroeder, “Special task force forms to solve string of gay murders,” Equal Time 
(Minneapolis, MN), Oct. 29, 1986. 
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practices, they equally endorsed other less-scientifically but morally approved measures.6 
For instance, the November 26, 1986, issue of the Twin Cities Gaze, a local gay and 
lesbian-themed newspaper, featured one of MAP’s “play it safe” ads. This ad featured 
Jim St. George, Coyle’s former aide and then-MAP chairman. St. George appeared bent 
over a bike; helmet in hand, sternly staring off into the camera, ready to take off (Figure 
2.2). The caption read: “Fight AIDS by staying in control. Alcohol and drugs can mess 
you up. Poppers can make you go too far. Keep the caps on—and live.” At the time, 
poppers were at the center of a heated debate as to whether they directly contributed to 
HIV-transmission. For some gay leaders, poppers, like alcohol, impaired men’s judgment 
enough that they ought to have been actively discouraged, if not outlawed altogether.7 
                                                
6 Posters and ads were displayed in bookstores, bars, bathhouses, and clinics in Minneapolis and St. Paul. 
Kari Enger, “AIDS campaign not without controversy,” Twin Cities Reader, Oct. 15, 1986. 
7 CUAV’s “play it safe” flyers further illustrate the confluence between HIV-education and violence 
awareness. According to the Twin Cities Gaze, Coyle directed funds collected on behalf of CUAV to pay 
for the dissemination of the “play it safe” HIV-prevention ads. Perhaps Coyle assumed that since the 
message conveyed by both campaigns was the same—do not pick up strangers for sex—then gay men 









In this chapter, I analyze the campaign actions and literature materials of 
Community United Against Violence to examine the co-constitutive relationship between 
discourses and practices of HIV-prevention and violence awareness. By asserting that the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic was central to the development of violence awareness discourses 
and practices in the United States, I build upon the work of historians of gay hate crimes 
activism.8 I extend their analyses, nevertheless, to argue that gay hate crimes activism and 
HIV-prevention functioned as duel forces working toward a culture and politics of 
homonormativity via the criminalization of the racialized poor in the economically 
transitional period of the 1980s.   
                                                
8 Christina Hanhardt, Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2013).  
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 In order to spur police and state intervention, gay leaders focused on tearing apart 
the association of homosexuality with criminality. As I indicated in the previous chapter, 
leaders had unsuccessfully tried to legally separate gay men and lesbians from the 
category of criminal associated with sodomy measures. This time around, given popular 
rhetoric about “homosexuals” as immoral individuals and threats to the public health, 
leaders sought to produce a counter-narrative declaring gay men and lesbians as victims 
of crime entitled to the full protection under the law. Central to this process was 
highlighting the heteronormative compliance of particular gay men and lesbians to a 
culture and politics of homonormativity. According to historian Lisa Duggan, 
homonormativity is a set of ideologies and practices that assert citizenship rights for gay 
men and lesbians via neoliberal politics and heteronormative assumptions, values, and 
behaviors.9 Because homonormativity exalts privacy, some gay leaders endorsed it as a 
cure to AIDS and violence. They believed that privacy and its attendant discourses of 
sexual monogamy would encourage gay men to curb anonymous sex, date, and settle 
down.  
 In an effort to advocate privacy as a responsible AIDS and violence prevention 
strategy, CUAV attacked promiscuity and “the gay lifestyle.” CUAV’s embrace of 
privacy was explicitly articulated in its promotional materials. In one of its pamphlets 
                                                
9 Lisa Duggan defines homonormativity as a “politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative 
assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a 
demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and 
consumption.” In other words, homonormativity reifies articulations of heteronormativity, including 
consumerism, domesticity, and privacy, in the hopes of securing citizen rights, benefits, and protections. 
Rather than pushing for the freedom to sexual difference, homonormativity situates freedom around 
dominant arrangements of reproductive sexuality (i.e., the gendered family) as it simultaneously accepts the 
exclusions of those queer bodies marked as deviant and unintelligible. Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of 





titled, “Dating,” Tim Campbell, editor of the gay-themed Twin Cities newspaper the GLC 
Voice, insisted on the safety of dating as he cautioned against the dangers of anonymous 
sex. To prevent violence, Campbell provided a set of ten safety tips for gay men to 
observe.10 Yet, most of the advice invoked morality to argue that gay men should be 
sober, more selective about sex partners, and, in general, have less sex. Campbell urged 
gay men to “date whenever possible.” Instead of cruising for sex, he encouraged gay men 
to meet their date through friends. If gay men did meet their “tricks” elsewhere, Campbell 
suggested that gay men introduce them to their friends as “anyone planning a murder will 
want anonymity.” Accordingly, Campbell warned gay men against having sex with “total 
unknowns” and “straights.” He surmised that if “a potential trick knows nobody and 
nobody knows him…that’s a high risk.” As for heterosexual men, Campbell cautioned, 
“Severe homophobes are not likely to acknowledge gayness in themselves verbally” and, 
thus, would lash out in a fit of homophobic rage. In addition to reifying constructs of 
homosexual identity, Campbell encouraged gay men, “Count your chemicals.” Police 
investigators previously publicized that a number of gay victims were under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol at the time of their death. Campbell, who described some of the gay 
victims as “heavy drinkers,” warned men that severe alcohol and drug use impaired their 
                                                
10 The pamphlet also illustrates how anti-violence LGBT activists in the Twin Cities employed a number of 
rhetorical tools to align themselves with the larger national anti-violence LGBT movement in the 1980s. In 
the pamphlet, Campbell provided a brief history of anti-gay violence in the Twin Cities, before tying this to 
violence against gay men and lesbians. He described anti-gay violence to be “as old as civilization.” 
Campbell also included data from the NGLTF to suggest that over 10 violent acts were committed against 
gay men and lesbians in the United States in 1985, an overestimation given NGLTF’s actual numbers. Like 
NGLTF’s insistence that violence was linked to AIDS backlash, Campbell likewise reiterated that the 
“AIDS crisis seems to have fueled more violence against gays than ever before in recent history.” On the 
second page, the pamphlet listed the names of all those gay men murdered in the Twin Cities between 
Thanksgiving of 1985 and February of 1987. Campbell, however, did not differentiate between solved and 
unsolved homicides, giving off the illusion that the same person might have committed all the murders, a 
theory that police investigators discounted. CUAV Pamphlet: Dating: It’s Safer, February 1987. Box 13, 




ability to reasonably judge a sex partner. He elaborated, “Every drink and every 
additional drug consumed decreases your judgment and increases your vulnerability.”11 
Although one could argue that Campbell’s gay moralism was effective by bringing 
attention to particular behaviors that increased one’s risk to AIDS and violence, by 
promoting privacy and personal responsibility as cures, Coyle and other gay community 
activists obscured the structural systems in place that rendered some individuals more 
prone to early death.12 This flyer and the one I describe at the opening of this chapter 
illustrate how CUAV was reflective of an emerging politics of homonormativity, one that 
provided for a shrunken public sphere and a limited zone of responsible domestic privacy 
in line with the neoliberal restructuring of urban spaces. In short, homonormative 
formations achieved cultural normativity and state legitimacy by appealing to neoliberal 
capital’s investment in privacy. 
 These homonormative formations emerged out of a historical setting in which the 
liberal capitalist state ushered in a new mode of governance: neoliberalism. Economists 
and policymakers heralded neoliberalism, a set of ideologies and policies prioritizing the 
free market, as a solution to the economic crises of the late-1970s (i.e., the Vietnam War, 
and the oil crisis).13 However, the dismantling of a Keynesian system of governance 
                                                
11 Jacqui Banaszynski, “Gays seeking safety after slaying series,” St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, 
Oct. 23, 1986. 
12 These demands by activists that gay men observe sexual monogamy to protect against AIDS and 
violence also coincided with police representations that cast gay men and trans women as sexually aberrant 
subjects. Investigators relied upon queer criminal archetypes of sexually promiscuous gay men and 
pathological trans women to suggest that victims brought upon their own grisly deaths by engaging in 
sexually deviant behaviors. 
13 According to David Harvey, neoliberalism arising in the late 20th century is a “theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade.” In late capitalism, unfettered markets, thus, serve as 
purveyors of democratic freedoms and as solutions to social and economic disparities. David Harvey, A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.  
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characterized by state responsibility in reducing economic and social inequality 
occasioned a moment of crisis, including rollbacks in social services, and a rise in 
unemployment, poverty, and homelessness. To abstract the state’s waning role in the 
provision of social services and safety guards, neoliberalism ushered in a cultural 
emphasis towards discourses and practices of “personal responsibility” and 
“privatization.” Seeing that the racialized poor—populations characterized as 
irresponsible and underserving—were held responsible for the destruction of the welfare 
state, the economic crises of the late-1970s were partly solved by the discursive 
scapegoating of the racialized poor. As the dismantling of the welfare state gave way to 
the neoliberal capitalist state, homonormative formations materialized as a positive foil to 
discipline the racialized poor and, by extension, to justify said shifts in the political 
economy.  
On that condition, homonormativity is synonymous with neoliberal capitalist 
expansion where gay identities and practices coincide with privacy, private property, and 
propriety. At the same time, white homonormative formations demand privileges at the 
expense of those populations subjugated by the normative itineraries of race, class, and 
gender. Namely, homonormativity’s compliance with heterosexual normativity instigates 
exclusions and regulations of subjects whose non-normative gender and sexuality is 
interpreted through race and class. For instance, in the 1980s, gay leaders invoked 
homonormativity to support state-sponsored solutions to violence that further 
strengthened the state’s regulatory mechanisms against racial and sexual minorities. 
Homonormativity buoys racial discourses that interpret the racialized poor as the 
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aberrations of citizenship and normativity. As a solution to AIDS and violence, spatial 
monogamy operated alongside the criminalization of various “deviant” constituencies.  
 On account of these reasons, I am interested in questioning the emancipatory 
potential of gay hate crimes activism for sexual and gender non-conforming people. 
Although there are positive aspects to anti-violence gay activism, including the rewards 
that come with the legal “naming” of marginalized groups seeking political recognition, 
this assimilationist mainstream gay agenda is fraught with limitations and shortcomings, 
including pathologizing sex-positivity and upholding the police.14 In this chapter, I 
outline the limits of criminal punishment remedies to structurally based problems of 
racial, gender, and economic subordination in the United States by describing how spatial 
monogamy, as manifest through anti-violence gay activism and racialized norms of 
sexual hygiene, emerged as a neoliberal spatial fix to AIDS and violence. By showing 
that anti-violence gay activists and HIV-educators fully conflated the call to monogamy 
with threats of violence, I uncover that the criminalization of the racialized poor worked 
alongside a push towards gay sexual privacy.   
First, I will examine how gay hate crimes activism operates as a project of white 
racial formation by upholding homonormative identities and practices at the exclusion of 
the racialized poor. Beginning in the 1980s, activists and police used racial and class 
biases to determine which deaths they could classify as “gay related.” This process of 
interpellation privileged those men whose gender presentation and relation to private 
property could be recuperated as normal, respectable, and worthy of belonging under the 
fold a bourgeoning neoliberal politics of homonormativity. Recuperating white gay men 
                                                
14 Dean Spade and Craig Willse, “Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical 
Critique,” Chicano-Latino Review 21, no. 38 (2000): 38-52.  
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as “victims” likewise depended upon reinforcing criminalizing tropes of the racialized 
poor.  
Next, I discuss how gay hate crimes activism, as an expression of Western human 
liberalism, is contingent on discourses of racialized criminality and deviance by 
portraying poor, people of color as culturally predisposed to homophobia, intolerance, 
and, by extension, crime. Gay hate crimes activism emerged in the context of entrenched 
anti-black racism in Minneapolis. At a time when the area was being primed for its post-
industrial rebirth, city officials worried over what they perceived as an influx of poor, 
people of color from the Midwestern Rust Belt. Because they cited racial difference as 
the catalyst behind an increase in crime, city officials called for the dismantling of 
welfare policies and practices in Minnesota to halt the flow of “urban migrants.” Rather 
than challenging this line of logic, gay leaders embraced it by relying on race and class 
particularities to decipher whose death they could recuperate as “gay related.” The 
resulting image embedded in the public imaginary was the conviction that gay men, 
victims of violence, were white and that perpetrators of violence were people of color.  
And, lastly, I illustrate how gay hate crimes activism operates in the service of 
neoliberalism by endorsing the upward redistribution of state resources to law 
enforcement. Since CUAV, like the anti-violence movement from which it emerged, 
professed that violence against gay men persisted due to the indifference and 
incompetence of police, CUAV did not challenge criminalization. On the contrary, 
CUAV demanded its amplification by advocating for state-centered solutions. 
Eventually, the interests of CUAV’s leadership—those of white, middle-class, gay 
cisgender men—would come to nearly align with those of law enforcement, resulting in 
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the anesthetizing of queer culture and politics amid the global restructuring triggered by 
neoliberalism.  
An “Epidemic of Violence.”  
 In the mid-1980s, white gay leaders pointed to an increase in the number of 
reports sweeping through the country of verbal and physical assaults against people who 
were gay or appeared to be gay. Due to the indifference and incompetence of police 
investigators, gay leaders in several cities created organizations to document what they 
considered a rising wave of violence against gender and sexual non-conforming 
populations, to demand greater protection from all branches of government, and to 
provide support services to survivors.15 Whether or not bias-related violence actually 
increased, what remained certain was that gay men, lesbians, and, to a lesser extent, 
transgender people underwent the development of a collective consciousness born out of 
their shared vulnerability to repression and violence, both private and public.  
One such organization was Community United Against Violence in Minneapolis, 
named and modeled after an anti-violence project in San Francisco.16 CUAV and other 
newly founded anti-violence projects reported on what their staff described as an 
“epidemic of violence.” For example, in June of 1984, the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force (NGLTF) released a report based on an eight-city survey of 2,074 
“homosexuals” that found that “more than 1 in 5 gay men and nearly 1 in 10 lesbians 
                                                
15 Spade and Craig Willse, “Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism.”  
16 In an organized effort to promote community safety in San Francisco’s Castro District, Community 
United Against Violence (CUAV) was founded in 1979 following the assassinations of Harvey Milk and 
George Moscone, along with police attacks on gay men, lesbians, and transgender people. CUAV’s 
campaigns included a safety whistle campaign, a gay and lesbian speakers bureau for public schools, and a 




[had] been punched, hit, kicked, or beaten because of their sexual orientation.”17 
Although gay rights groups such as the NGLTF recognized that gay men and lesbians had 
always been subject to violence, they differentiated this wave of violence for the brutality 
and frequency of attacks.18  
Throughout the decade, the NGLTF released subsequent reports revealing that 
assaults and harassment against gay men and lesbians, or at least their reporting, was on 
the exponential rise. Without a proper mechanism in place to document hate violence 
against gay men and lesbians, the NGLTF was unable to truly confirm such an increase 
on a nationwide level. For that reason, the NGLTF developed and systematized a 
transferrable model of documentation.19 Gay and lesbian leaders throughout the country 
                                                
17 The report, one of the first of its kind, claimed that the number of reported incidents had increased 
significantly in the 1980s. The NGLTF’s Anti-Violence Project surveyed “homosexuals” in Atlanta, 
Boston, Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, New York, St. Louis, and Seattle. Anti-Gay/Lesbian Victimization: 
A Study by the National Gay Task Force, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center. 
18 Urvasi Vaid, spokesman for NGLTF, explained that gay men were more likely than lesbians to be 
victims of such attacks because “gay men [were] more visible than lesbians, and gay male establishments—
such as bars, businesses, and clubs—[were] far more numerous.” James Coates, “AIDS Backlash Gets 
Violent, Gays Say,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1986. 
19 In 1985, the NGLTF recorded 2,042 acts of violence in a random survey of 44 communities and 31 
states. The following year, the NGLTF reported that incidents of violence and harassment against gay men 
and lesbians more than doubled to 4,946 complaints of violence. Of these complaints, 70 percent involved 
insults or threats. Eighty homicides in which a person’s homosexuality appeared to have been a relevant 
factor were also reported. In 1987, the NGLTF reported that incidents of anti-gay violence rose 42 percent 
over the previous year as documented by 64 groups in 32 states and the District of Columbia. That year a 
record 7,008 incidents ranging from verbal abuse to murder were reported to the NGLTF. Despite these 
staggering numbers, the NGLTF argued that they did not actually reflect the exact extent of anti-gay and 
lesbian violence because the vast majority of such attacks went underreported. The NGLTF argued that 
accurate measurement of the problem’s full scope was still hampered by lower than desired rates of 
reporting by victims and the lack of systematic data collection throughout the U.S. One of the central 
actions of the NGLTF and of CUAV would, therefore, be to press all level of governments to respond to 
anti-gay hate violence by collecting data. The mainstream LGBT anti-violence movement argued that the 
empirical documentation and awareness of violence were central to ensuring its prevention. NGLTF Press 
Release, Apr. 27, 1987, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History 
Center.; Anne-Christine d’Adesky, “Congress to Study Anti-Gay Violence,” The New York Native, Sep. 22, 
1986.; Jean Latz Griffin, “Reports of Gay Harassment Soaring,” Chicago Tribune, May 11, 1987.; Jim 
Schroeder, “Anti-gay harassment, violence rises dramatically,” Equal Time, May 13, 1987.; “AIDS blamed 
as study reports 42% increase in violence against gays,” Star Tribune, Jun. 08, 1988; Cynthia Scott, “Hate 
crimes, anti-gay violence: what you can do,” Equal Time, Aug. 17, 1988. 
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then applied this model of data collection to verify what they suspected as the growth of 
hate violence. More than a third of the organizations reporting back to the NGLTF 
concluded that hate violence was more frequent in 1986 than the year prior.20 The New 
York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project communicated an 83 percent increase 
in the number of victims who sought its services from 1985 to 1986. San Francisco’s 
Community United Against Violence noted a 50 percent increase in anti-gay violence in 
1985 and a 14 percent increase in 1986. As one of the epicenters of the AIDS crisis in the 
United States, San Francisco experienced what many community activists proclaimed 
was a continuing rise in the frequency and intensity of anti-gay incidents.21 But this 
increase, activists argued, was not merely confined to large urban centers such as New 
York City and San Francisco. Gay rights groups in other cities similarly reported a rise in 
violence and harassment against their LGBT constituents.22 In showing that hate violence 
                                                
20 The NGLTF operated as a national clearinghouse, collecting data from local anti-violence gay and 
lesbian organizations throughout the United States to examine the rise in assaults around the time AIDS 
had become a national news story. Brian Coyle informed the Chicago Tribune that he and other gay leaders 
in the Twin Cities were supplying data about the attacks on gay men to the NGLTF. 
21 In 1984, CUAV received reports of 185 attacks on gay men. In 1985, that number rose to 278. In 
February of 1986, CUAV released a report discussing rates of violence from October to December of 1985. 
The report showed that the number of anti-gay incidents reported to CUAV increased 69 percent in the 
fourth quarter of 1985 (61 incidents) as compared to the fourth quarter of 1984 (36 incidents). The majority 
of incidents were concentrated to the Castro/Polk area of San Francisco, the historic “gay neighborhood” of 
the city. More than half of assailants were white men under 20 years of age. Similarly, the majority of 
clients served by CUAV were gay white men. Meanwhile, between August and October of 1986, police 
had recorded the murders of five gay men in the Mission District. Quarterly Report and Analysis of Anti-
Gay Violence, October-December 1985, CUAV, Feb. 10, 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
22 Like San Francisco, Atlanta had similarly witnessed a growing number of homicides against gay men 
which police were unable or unwilling to solve. The victims’ race and transient relationship to property 
added layers of complexity to the murders that further contributed to police indifference. In the summer of 
1986, Atlanta recorded more than 170 homicides, six of which involved the deaths of whom police 
described as street hustlers. They were black men, ages ranging from 18 to 30. Michael Terry, an African-
American 26-year-old tire store employee, confessed to police after being confronted with evidence to 
killing all six men after having had sexual relations with them. However, the police was unable to notice or 
unwilling to recognize a “gay” pattern. The police insisted there was no proof that a “homosexual 
connection” existed and did not believe that the victims even identified as homosexual. Lieut. Horace 
Walker of the city’s homicide squad said, “They were street hustlers who would do a lot of things to turn a 




was rampant throughout the country, in both large cities and small towns, activists 
bolstered claims that hate violence had reached epidemic levels.  
 White gay leaders offered a number of reasons to explain this rise in violence. 
They insisted that violent acts and threats were conditioned by a climate of fear and 
hatred bred by right-wing fundamentalism, police indifference, and bias in the criminal 
punishment system.23 Still, perhaps the most powerful tool in fostering violence, 
according to gay leaders, was AIDS backlash. With the epidemic, Americans were forced 
to confront homosexuality. Those Americans who lacked deep, personal connections to 
gay men and lesbians were swayed to conflate homosexuality with AIDS, or so leaders 
argued. The disease, therefore, provided assailants with a justification for their hostility to 
homosexuality while rendering gay men more vulnerable to physical attack.24  
 Given these developments, gay leaders framed violence in terms of assailants’ 
fear of HIV contagion. In its 1984 national report, the NGLTF explained that “lone 
assailants and gangs harassed and attacked gay men” (emphasis added) whom they 
believed to have been “disease-carrying queers” due to news stories of a new “gay 
plague” that threatened to spread to mainstream America. In San Francisco, CUAV 
estimated that about 20 percent of all incidents reported to its staff in 1984 stemmed from 
                                                                                                                                            
that was voluntary or not.” William E. Schmidt, “Atlanta Homosexuals Fear Surge in Random Violence,” 
The New York Times, Dec. 2, 1986; In Washington D.C., the United States Park Police reported a series of 
random attacks against gay men at that city’s P Street Beach, including three incidents in October of 1986 
in which different “gangs” attacked lone men. James Coates, “AIDS Backlash Gets Violent, Gays Say,” 
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1986. 
23 Gay leaders reasoned that violence could also have been a reaction to the growing visibility of a 
politically active LGBT constituency as witnessed in mobilizations around sodomy repeal. Along with this 
newfound political consciousness, leaders believed gay men and lesbians were more willing to come 
forward and report incidents. 
24 See: Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).; Christopher Capozzola, “A Very American Epidemic: 
Memory Politics and Identity Politics in the AIDS Memorial Quilt, 1985-1993,” Radical History Review 82 
(2002): 91-110.  
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fear and hatred associated with AIDS.25 The New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-
Violence Project uncovered that in 28 percent of all New York incidents reported in 
1985, assailants taunted their victims with comments about AIDS.26 Certifying the 
significance of AIDS backlash to hate violence was also the NGLTF, which emphasized 
that perpetrators made references to AIDS in 681 or 14 percent of the incidents 
documented in 1986. The NGLTF ardently propagated the position that the AIDS crisis 
instigated assailants into attacking and harassing their victims. In its 1987 national report, 
Kevin Berrill, Director of the NGLTF’s Violence Project, wrote: “The AIDS crisis has 
clearly fanned the flames of anti-gay bigotry.”27 That same year, at a press conference 
outlining the findings of the group’s third annual report, Berrill added, “We are a 
community under siege. We are battling AIDS and we’re battling violence.”28  
                                                
25 The Dorian Group in Seattle also attributed 22 brutal attacks against gay men to “AIDS backlash.” Anti-
Gay/Lesbian Victimization: A Study by the National Gay Task Force, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian 
J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
26 Most of the groups reporting to the NGLTF indicated that the public’s misconceptions about the 
transmission of AIDS, and fear and hatred associated with AIDS had worsened the violence. In Chicago, 
spokespeople for the gay community expressed their belief that violence against gay men was increasing, 
largely due to AIDS fears. They pointed to bumper stickers announcing, “Clean up Hyde Park. Stop AIDS, 
Castrate Gays,” in the predominantly African-American Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago’s south side 
in the fall of 1986 to highlight what they perceived as the relationship between AIDS and violence. 
However, the Chicago Tribune interviewed the director of research for the Illinois Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force who revealed that the anti-gay violence had been centered in the predominantly white Boystown area 
of East Lakeview in Chicago, where “gaggles of young men” attack gay men. (The director of IGLTF 
accused the Chicago Police Department of not responding adequately to violence: “They assume any gay 
man who gets beat up was asking for it by lurking or cruising.”) By being unwilling to locate anti-gay 
violence in other areas of the city, including Hyde Park, the director of IGLTF normalized anti-gay 
violence as something that was inflected against primarily white gay men in the north side of Chicago. 
According to this logic, all other assaults or harassment inflected against gay men, lesbians, or trans people 
of color in the west side or south side of Chicago were not necessarily reflective of anti-gay violence. Race, 
class and place, therefore, were just as important as sexuality in determining whose assault or harassment 
classified as “gay-related.” James Coates, “AIDS Backlash Gets Violent, Gays Say,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 
26, 1986. 
27 Jean Latz Griffin, “Reports of Gay Harassment Soaring,” Chicago Tribune, May 11, 1987; “NGLTF 
Press Release, Apr. 27, 1987.” Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota 
History Center. 
28 “AIDS blamed as study reports 42% increase in violence against gays,” Star Tribune, Jun. 08, 1988. 
 
 149 
 Despite the insistence of activists that verbal and physical assaults against gay 
men and lesbians was on the rise, police departments in many cities were unable, or 
unwilling, to investigate. This is possibly the result of how police investigators defined 
“bias related crime” differently than activists. Whereas activists treated assaults as “gay 
related,” by virtue of the victim’s sexual orientation, police primarily focused on the 
details of the crime.29 Another discrepancy fueling the tense nature between police and 
activists is that there existed no government-mandated recording of bias-related crimes. 
Because police did not record the sexual orientation of victims and perpetrators, the 
studies conducted by organizations such as the NGLTF and CUAV were the only sources 
of such data.  
To bring greater awareness to anti-gay attacks, gay leaders proposed creating gay 
and lesbian hate violence a criminal category unto itself. Throughout the latter half of the 
1980s as the AIDS epidemic wreaked havoc on gay and bisexual men and IV-drug users, 
anti-violence gay activists focused their energies on garnering support in Congress to 
pass sexual orientation-inclusive hate crime legislation. However, as historian Christina 
B. Hanhardt reminds us in Safe Space, the pursuit of state-centered solutions to violence 
coincided with the expansion of mass imprisonment in the United States as part of the 
war on drugs. This confluence illustrates how demands for social membership for gay 
men and lesbians hinged on discourses and practices of racialized criminality and 
deviance. I extend Hanhardt’s analysis by elaborating upon gay hate crimes activism as a 
project of white racial formation that privileged homonormative identities and practices.30  
                                                
29 Hanhardt, Safe Space.  
30 Lesbians were largely absent from gay hate crimes activism for several reasons. First, the Twin Cities 




The Mean Streets of Minneapolis. 
In Minneapolis, white gay leaders agreed with the NGLTF’s assessment of an 
increase in anti-gay violence. They acknowledged that the recent murders of gay men 
were representative of a nationwide increase in anti-gay violence triggered by the AIDS 
crisis. Minneapolis City Council Member Brian Coyle, who represented a ward which 
included a large portion of the city’s gay population, supported the NGLTF’s position. 
He concurred that AIDS had “given justification to homophobic and psychotic 
individuals to attack gays.”31 The truth of the matter, however, was that violence against 
gay men and trans women transpired long before the AIDS crisis. In the 1970s, about 
four-dozen gay men and trans women were murdered in the Twin Cities. The greatest 
predictor of one’s vulnerability to violence, in both its private and public guises, was race 
and sexuality. According to Ryan Murphy and Alex Urquhart in their history of public 
sexual cultures in the Twin Cities, “to deviate from nuclear norms―whether as a gender-
nonconforming person, a poor or homeless person, or a person of color―could cost a 
person his or her life.” Visible differences in race, class, gender, and sexuality rendered 
people more vulnerable to interpersonal and systemic violence.32   
                                                                                                                                            
underscored the vast ideological disagreements between lesbians and gay men. In their definition of 
violence, lesbian feminists stressed the harms of pornography against women. However, gay men largely 
defended the social benefits of pornography and the adult businesses that sold these items for enabling gay 
male sociality. Lesbian feminists also critiqued gay men for their own unexamined misogyny, citing their 
treatment of Anita Bryant as sexist. See: Georgina Hickey, “The Geography of Pornography: 
Neighborhood Feminism and the Battle against ‘Dirty Bookstores’ in Minneapolis,” Frontiers: A Journal 
of Women’s Studies 32, no. 1 (2011): 125-51; Stewart Van Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves: A History of 
Queer Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).  
31 Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986. 
32 Ryan Patrick Murphy and Alex T. Urquhart, “Sexuality in the Headlines: Intimate Upheavals as Histories 
of the Twin Cities,” in Queer Twin Cities: Twin Cities GLBT Oral History Project, ed. Kevin P. Murphy et 
al. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010): 68. 
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By the mid-1980s, more than forty individuals who violated this “white, 
suburban, middle-class, heterosexual domesticity,” were murdered.33 In 1984, the Crime 
Victims Centers of Minneapolis reported an increase in the rates of violence directed 
against sexual and gender non-conforming populations.34 From 1984 to 1987, more than 
12 gay men or trans women were brutally murdered.35 Although police investigators did 
not suspect the killings to be related, gay leaders underscored the similarities.36 Because 
most victims, primarily older, white gay men, were robbed and killed in their own home, 
without any sign of forced entry, leaders suspected victims invited their killers home, 
possibly for sex. Leaders, therefore, zeroed in on the sexual practices of victims to warn 
others of the dangers of anonymous sex. Conversely, police investigators implied that 
victims were partly responsible for their own death. In the eyes of leaders and police, a 
noticeable pattern emerged. Middle-aged or older gay men cruised for sex in public parks 
or gay bars and invited young men into their homes for sex. Instead of sex, the younger 
                                                
33 Ibid.  
34 Eric Stults, “Crime Victims Center: more attacks, more police mistreatment,” Equal Time, Nov. 14, 
1984. 
35 It is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of gay men/trans women murdered between 1984 and 1987 in 
part due to differences in categorizing. While gay leaders tended to treat homicides against gay men as 
“gay-related,” the police were more likely to characterize homicides as robberies. Also, some of the gay 
men murdered were not publicly “out” so there was uncertainty whether their sexuality played a factor in 
their deaths.  
36 In April of 1984, D.J. Johnson, a close friend of Brian Coyle’s in his 60s, was beaten to death in his 
Cedar Square West apartment. A couple of months later on June 10, 1984, James Traetow, a 33-year-old 
free-lance public relations consultant and former writer for Equal Time, a gay and lesbian newspaper in the 
Twin Cities, was shot to death in his Seven Corners Coop Apartment by two men, 21 and 19, that he had 
invited home to engage in sex. The third violent killing of a gay man in Minneapolis in less than two years 
occurred on September 15, 1985, when the body of James Michael McArthur was found in his Loring Park 
apartment. An 18-year-old man he had also met in Loring Park for the purposes of sex stabbed McArthur, 
who worked as an ambulance dispatcher, in the back. “Gay men need support, too,” Equal Time, Oct. 2, 
1985; “Men charged in Traetow’s murder,” Equal Time, Oct. 30, 1985; “Traetow’s murderers convicted,” 




men would beat, rob, and, at times, kill their hosts.37 Gay leaders used this wave of anti-
gay violence to promote a gay moral politics that upheld privacy, private property, and 
propriety: homonormativity. This politics exalted sexual monogamy and made gay men 
personally responsible for preventing both violence and the spread of AIDS. At the same 
time, gay leaders invoked homonormativity to support state-sponsored solutions to 
violence that further strengthened the state’s regulatory mechanisms against racial and 
sexual minority formations.  
Those in positions of power within the gay community in the Twin Cities 
conjured this politics of homonormativity to frame the quick succession of murders in the 
winter of 1985. These murders ignited fears among gay men that a serial killer was 
roaming public parks, stalking his next victim. On December 23, 1985, a building 
manager at a “prestigious” address just off Loring Park discovered the body of Lyle E. 
Kastner, a 43-year-old retired contractor. Neighbors requested Kastner’s apartment be 
checked after he had last been seen six days prior. Then, on December 31, 1985, the body 
of John J. Kieley, a 58-year-old maintenance worker at the Veterans Administration 
Medical Center, was discovered at his south Minneapolis apartment, after he failed to 
show for work the evening before. Homicide detectives suspected the same person was 
responsible for both deaths, given similarities in the cases. Both bodies had been found 
nude or semi-nude. Kastner had several neckties wrapped tightly around his neck and 
Kieley was strangled with a cord. Detectives announced that they believed the killer met 
Kastner and Kieley at a gay bar where the two men were identified as patrons. Since 
                                                
37 Coyle told the Star Tribune that the James Michael McArthur killing was a reminder that gay men 
“continue to be wary of the park. There are always going to be those kinds of personalities around. 
Homicides are increasing and it’s dangerous on the streets.” “Gay men need support, too,” Equal Time, 
Oct. 2, 1985. 
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there were no signs of a forced-entry at either location, detectives concluded the victims 
invited their killer inside. Police investigators, certain that a killer was preying on men in 
downtown bars, circulated flyers seeking information. After performing interviews, 
investigators generated a vague description of a possible suspect: a white hustler, in his 
early 20s, who had recently moved to Minneapolis.   
Gay leaders concluded from the grisly deaths of Kastner and Kieley that gay men 
who engaged in anonymous sex faced not only a heightened risk for HIV, but also 
corporeal harm.38 In an interview with Equal Time, Coyle warned that any gay man “who 
doesn’t first ask around about somebody they are interested in is making a big mistake.” 
Coyle described the victims as older gay men who “[tended] to be more lonely and 
desperate for sexual contact, especially if they hadn’t had much contact in a while.” It 
was this so-called desperation for “sexual contact,” Coyle stated, that overcame men’s 
“fear of taking home a stranger.”39  
Prompted by the string of violent attacks, Coyle called an emergency meeting to 
discuss “this murderous rampage by a few sick but dangerous individuals.” In an 
impassioned letter addressed to the mayor, leading police officers, elected officials, 
prosecutors, gay bar owners, and gay leaders, Coyle pleaded that “us all, gay and straight, 
wake up to this murder wave and come together to plan...strategies to stop the killing.” 
The letter condemned the actions, or lack thereof, of city officials for being “silenced by 
                                                
38 A few months after Kastner and Kieley’s murder, the MPD would release a sketch of a man whom they 
believed to have strangled Kieley and Kastner in December of 1985. The sketch was of a man whom store 
clerks had seen using credit cards belonging to Kieley and Kastner. Clerks had described him as a white 
male in his late teens and early twenties. The MPD distributed the sketch to gay bars on Hennepin Av., 
other law enforcement agencies in the surrounding municipalities, and the local media. “Police seeking 






their own homophobia,” insisting that if those killed were “straight Norwegian 
bachelors,” officials would be more active (Figure 2.3). He also criticized the supposed 
dearth of attention placed on the crimes by both mainstream and the local gay press. But 
he reserved his harshest critique for individual gay men, whom he argued had failed to 
mobilize in response to the violence and, instead, continued to engage in casual sex with 
anonymous partners. Coyle attributed this “complacency” among gay men to being 
“increasingly preoccupied and traumatized by the impact of AIDS.” Ultimately, the 
“burden...to defend itself ⎯ as seriously protecting their safety as their health” lay within 





                                                
40 Coyle observed that there had been no sign of forced entry in these cases, therefore, the victims probably 
knew their assailants. He believed that the victims, “older, acknowledged gay men,” took home hustlers, 
“younger [men], probably uncomfortable with [their] own sexuality.” Coyle hypothesized that rage as well 
as robbery were motivating factors in the murders. Emergency Meeting Announcement from Council 





The only people, whose actions were commendable, according to Coyle, were the 
police investigators. After long criticizing police for their raids on gay bookstores and 
bathhouses at the peak of the anti-pornography feminist-led movement in the Twin 
Cities, Coyle publicly praised the Minneapolis Police Department for “responding to a 
growing threat” and for “doing an adequate job in this whole situation.” For Coyle, the 
MPD had “presented the facts in a dispassionate manner, [had] interviewed the affected 
community, and [had] pursued suspects where there are leads.”41 Perhaps part of the 
reason why Coyle admired the actions of police investigators is because the two so 
readily agreed on the psychological profile of victims.  
 Police investigators echoed Coyle’s critiques of gay men’s sexual behaviors. In an 
interview with the Star Tribune, the leading daily newspaper, Minneapolis Police Chief 
Tony Bouza agreed with Coyle that the murder rate among gay men in the Twin Cities 
had risen and that it was disproportionately higher than among heterosexual men and 
women. Although Bouza recognized that gay men were “at risk” and “vulnerable,” he 
conceded that this risk and vulnerability was exacerbated by the nature of gay men’s 
sexual behaviors. Bouza described gay men as being too “trusting, frequently bringing 
strange people into their homes and seeking a good deal of casual encounters.” While 
Bouza did not believe that gay men deserved to be killed, he remained convinced that 
they placed themselves at greater risk by engaging in anonymous sexual encounters. In 
that same Star Tribune article, Coyle partly challenged Bouza’s claims but did not defend 
the victims. Rather, Coyle insisted that not all gay men sought sexual partners at gay bars 
or public parks. He countered, “A majority of gays in this town don’t even go to the bars. 
                                                
41 Emergency Meeting Announcement from Council Member Brian Coyle, Jan. 28, 1986, Box 13, Folder 
Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
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And I am in no way claiming that a majority of people who go to bars take home 
strangers.” There were, however, “people out there” (emphasis added) who were “willing 
to take that risk.”42   
The police department’s confirmation that a recent murder-arson victim was gay, 
and Coyle’s growing frustration with gay men for not taking precautions to protect 
themselves, led Coyle to call a late emergency afternoon meeting on January 30, 1986, at 
City Hall. In attendance were prominent members of the local gay and lesbian 
community, police officials, and political leaders including the city attorney, and six 
council members.43 Meeting attendees brainstormed several strategies for alerting gay 
men to the supposed dangers of casual sex with anonymous partners. Gay bar owners 
decided to match the $5,000 reward offered by Crime Stoppers for information leading to 
the arrest of the killer or killers. Because most of those murdered were middle-aged and 
older gay men, those at the meeting proposed a number of different ways to better 
address the needs of this population, including offering community services. Tim 
Campbell, editor of the GLC Voice, pleaded with police representatives that they permit 
the operation of escort services for middle-aged, older gay men.44 Campbell also 
suggested a type of buddy system, “Adopt-An-Auntie,” in which younger gay men 
watched out for older gay men, ensuring that the latter did not go home with strangers. 
Coyle’s office, on the other hand, proposed establishing a “Gay and Gray Center” that 
offered social activities, discussion groups, and “outreach to senior closeted gays.” In 
                                                
42 Ibid.  
43 Before the meeting, Coyle held an impromptu news conference, during which he praised the 
investigative efforts of the MPD. He also publicly lashed out at the “complacent attitude” of gay men who 
continued to bring home strangers. Later in the meeting, Coyle scolded gay men for being “naive and 
indifference.” Van A. Hayden, “Gay killings prompt ‘summit’,” MN Daily, Jan. 31, 1986. 
44 Campbell asked the MPD to treat these escort services with the same discretion given to massage parlors. 
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spite of these proposals, everyone in attendance agreed that a message warning gay men 
of casual sex with anonymous partners was the appropriate course of action. Jon Tiggas, 
owner of the Cloud 9 bar, echoed this directive when he encouraged gay men to date 
instead of merely partaking in anonymous sex: “There’s a lot of fear out there. I’d 
encourage gay men to meet a person a second time and get to know them before going 
home with them.”45 
In addition to coordinating the ideological response to violence against gay men, 
the meeting was noteworthy because Coyle requested that police representatives survey 
other major U.S. cities to determine if a visible pattern of anti-gay violence existed. 
Farrell promised to communicate with police departments in other cities to confirm if 
they were similarly witnessing a surge in anti-gay violence.46 Officials from MPD’s 
Administration Service Division (ASD) conducted a telephone survey of ten large cities 
randomly selected. They hoped to gather “pertinent information that may assist the 
administration and concerned investigating division in tactical planning measures.” 
Despite these hopes, once they compiled the results, ASD officials “found nothing that 
would indicate a clear pattern of homicides upon homosexual males, nor any indication 
of a developing trend.”47 
                                                
45 J.C. Ritter, “Bar owners offer reward to solve string of gay murders,” Equal Time, Feb. 5, 1986.; Van A. 
Hayden, “Gay killings prompt ‘summit’,” MN Daily, Jan. 31, 1986.; Mike Kaszuba, “Gay leaders ask 
support from community,” Star Tribune, Jan. 31, 1986. 
46 Tim Campbell, “Wave of murders may total nine: Brian Coyle calls emergency meeting,” GLC Voice, 
Feb. 3, 1986. 
47 The Administration Service Division of the Minneapolis Police Department randomly surveyed Miami, 
Dallas, San Francisco, Houston, San Diego, Seattle, Baltimore, and Cincinnati. New York and Detroit were 
asked to participate but did not respond to the request for information. Of the cities that did participate in 
the survey, none felt that their jurisdiction had experienced a recent increase in homicides directed at 
“homosexual victims” in 1985 as compared to previous years. The ASD, thus, reported “there was not a 
significant difference in the total number of homicides with homosexual victims comparing each of the 
responding surveyed cities or in comparison to Minneapolis.” The ASD, however, did acknowledge that the 




 Coyle was not satisfied with the results of the ASD’s survey. In an interview with 
Equal Time, Coyle discounted the survey’s results, claiming that that he had personally 
received information from other major cities confirming an increase in anti-gay violence. 
If anti-gay hate violence was on the rise, Coyle believed the Twin Cities was particularly 
hurt by the absence of a single, on-going agency or organization devoted to documenting 
and studying violence against gay men. After lauding the work of anti-violence gay 
organizations in major U.S. cities, Coyle confessed, “Maybe we have something to learn 
from New York and San Francisco.”48 These two cities were home to the biggest anti-
violence gay organizations in the country to which Coyle looked in replicating the Twin 
Cities’ very own anti-violence project.  
At the beginning of 1986, after the unsolved murders of Kastner and Kieley and 
other attacks against gay men, Coyle jumped into action, leading the effort to educate the 
public about the killings, to foster cooperation with police, and to encourage the launch of 
an anti-violence campaign. Regardless, these efforts never truly materialized. Gay leaders 
were more preoccupied with AIDS-related campaigns and with sodomy repeal efforts. In 
an interview with the St. Paul Pioneer Press, J.C. Ritter, a long-time writer for Equal 
Time, stated that “AIDS, politics, everyday survival,” pressed the attention of gay men, 
                                                                                                                                            
maintained in such a fashion,” therefore it would prove “difficult to measure any increase or decrease in the 
number of homicides directed at homosexual victims.” Because law enforcement departments did not 
document the sexual orientation of crime victims, the ASD’s survey could not statistically confirm an 
increase or decrease in the rates of violence directed against gay men, lesbians, and trans people. The 
survey did question assumptions that anti-gay hate violence was largely a stranger-to-stranger crime 
motivated by bias. The survey found that the primary motive―among both homosexual and “other” 
suspects―was robbery, burglary and domestic violence, with 75 percent of all assailants knowing their 
victims. The ASD concluded: “The survey did not provide information that could significantly impact our 
tactical planning measures.” Homicide Survey, March 14, 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
48 Coyle confessed that he was “not terribly happy” with the results. He characterized the ASD’s survey to 
be “indicative of what we get when we ask other people to do our work for us.” Coyle insisted that his 
office staff had received an increased number of calls concerning anti-gay violence in Minneapolis. J.C. 
Ritter, “MPLS. police conduct gay homicide gay survey,” Equal Time, Apr. 2, 1986. 
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more so than violence. Although gay men talked about violence and became “scared for a 
little while,” Ritter explained that news sources did not cover anti-gay violence nearly as 
much as they did AIDS. He explained, “You can’t forget about [AIDS], much as you 
want to. With violence, it’s news today and gone tomorrow.”49 To summon gay men’s 
attention, therefore, Coyle had to forge a connection between HIV-prevention and 
violence awareness. Although the summer of 1986 remained relatively quiet in terms of 
anti-gay violence, the autumn saw a number of gruesome murders against gay men that 
galvanized the public and the national press. That same year Coyle learned he had 
contracted HIV.50 Although he did not publicly disclose his status at the time, Coyle’s 
diagnosis pervaded his mission to convince gay men of the dangers of anonymous sex.  
Queer Criminal Archetypes.  
 
The nine-month streak of no gay-related murders was broken in the autumn when 
a deaf gay man and a homeless transgender woman of color, Phyllis Olson, whose case I 
introduce in chapter one, were murdered. Their marginalization within gay hate crimes 
activism reveals how gay leaders privileged constructs of same-sex desire rooted in a 
politics of homonormativity that, in turn, exalted white racial formations and able-bodied 
discourses. This assimilationist drive of gay hate crimes activism also exposes how gay 
leaders isolated specific instances of violence against gay men and transgender women as 
mere acts of individual prejudice—not a hate crime—in the process, obscuring an 
understanding of the systemic, institutional nature of gender and sexual marginalization 
and its intersection with other forms of social inequality. As a result, gay hate crimes 
                                                
49 Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986. 
50 Jon Jeter, “A Will to Live, to Speak Out: City Council’s Coyle Reveals 5-Year Fight with AIDS Virus,” 
Star Tribune, Apr. 24, 1991.  
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activism operated in the service of white racial formation given its disavowal of the 
institutional and intersectional articulations of violence. Because it privileged particular 
racial, class, and spatial positionalities, gay hate crimes activism codified homonormative 
identities and practices as it simultaneously ostracized the racialized poor and transgender 
women, ironically enough, the populations most likely subjected to bias-related crime. 
On September 17, 1986, after the still unclaimed $5,000 reward had been 
established by gay bar owners, Fred Riga, a 30-year-old gay deaf man, was found 
strangled in his south Minneapolis apartment. Summoned by concerned neighbors, a 
police officer discovered Riga’s nude body. Riga was the fourth gay man to have been 
slain in Minneapolis in the previous 12 months.51 Police investigators focused on his 
deafness to deduce that Riga was vulnerable to violence because he was “handicapped.” 
And then on September 24, 1986, a commuter in route to work found the body of Phyllis 
Olson, a 30-year-old American Indian transgender woman, on a footbridge in downtown 
Minneapolis. At the time of her death, Olson had been staying at a cheap downtown 
motel. Homicide detectives and gay leaders focused on her transient relationship to 
private property and her numerous prostitution arrests dating back to the 1970s to 
conclude that her death was a logical extension of her deviant lifestyle. The Minneapolis 
Police Department even “leaked” her HIV-positive status to the press, generating a flurry 
of public hostility that highlighted the racial and class tensions animating AIDS moral 
panic.52 Although details in Olson’s death were similar to those in the December 1985 
                                                
51 Some gay leaders even claimed Riga might have been the 11th victim in the past two years. 
52 Because police suspected Olson continued to engage in sex work even after her HIV diagnosis, gay 
leaders denied her the same attention, time, and sympathy devoted to other gay victims. While health 
officials used Olson’s death to call for stricter restrictions on sex workers, Coyle used her death to reflect 




slayings of Kastner and Kieley, homicide detectives refused to publicly tie Olson’s death 
to theirs.53  
What homicide detectives did emphatically acknowledge was that Riga and 
Olson, like Kastner and Kieley, engaged in sexual practices that contributed to their 
death. In an interview with the St. Paul Pioneer Press, Captain Jack McCarthy, head of 
the Homicide Unit in Minneapolis, described Riga and other homicide victims as “high-
risk gays.54 For homicide investigators, the links in the homicides lay not in the 
perpetrators, but rather in the lifestyle of victims. Their focus on the victims’ sexual 
practices, in turn, shaped how police conducted their investigations.  
In an official interoffice communication sent out to “concerned public officials” 
pertaining to “gay-related homicides for the past three years,” McCarthy included bullet-
point descriptions of the sexual practices of victims. Under Riga’s name, along with the 
date of death, case number, and home address, McCarthy added that Riga was a 
“[s]exually active gay, known to take strangers home frequently and get into fights.” 
McCarthy employed this tone to throughout the interoffice communication, focusing first 
and foremost on the sexual practices of victims, at the expense of addressing the actions 
of assailants.55 McCarthy simply referred to Olson as a “transvestite prostitute.” 
                                                                                                                                            
that she did not practice safe sex, he thought it was important to publish Olson’s HIV status to turn up 
others who might have been exposed to her. 
53 Kevin Diaz, “City man found strangled to death is fourth gay to be slain in 12 months,” Star Tribune, 
Sep. 18, 1986. 
54 Although McCarthy pointed out that the murders were dissimilar in a number of ways, he underscored 
that all the homicide victims participated in casual sex with anonymous partners. In all three cases of 
strangulation, McCarthy observed, the victims frequented gay bars and their apartments showed no signs of 
forced entry, suggesting the victims invited their killer home. Like McCarthy, Robert Lutz, Deputy Police 
Chief for Investigations, told the Star Tribune that the links in the homicides lay not in the perpetrators but 
rather in the lifestyles of victims. 
55 For Lyle Kastner, McCarthy wrote: “Active gay; picked up strangers in Loring Park and bars on 
Hennepin―robbery.” Like Riga, McCarthy similarly focused on the actions of Kastner, “picked up 




McCarthy’s approach in the interoffice communication reflects how police investigators 
collected information, or rather interpretations, on the sexual practices of victims and 
included this “data” along with other quantifiable case details. By doing so, police 
investigators shifted responsibility on gay men and trans women to prevent their own 
violence and shamed them into modifying their sexual practices.  
The mainstream press reinforced the negative characterization of gay victims 
created by police investigators. The press depicted Riga as a monstrous figure whose 
predatory behaviors caused his death. The St. Paul Pioneer Press claimed that a 
“disabled” Riga was “known at the gay bars as an aggressive hustler and heavy 
drinker.”56 The Chicago Tribune called him “a deaf-mute who frequented gay bars and 
took young men home to live with him until they found jobs.” The Star Tribune divulged 
that Riga was unemployed and that he had no known relatives in the area, meaning he 
was an outsider. The Star Tribune even interviewed acquaintances of Riga who 
substantiated that he often took strangers home from the gay bars. Mike Bloom, manager 
of the Gay 90s, disclosed to the Star Tribune that Riga, who frequently came to the bar 
                                                                                                                                            
murdered on June 10, 1984, and for whom Jerry Volk and John Hamilton were arrested and charged, 
McCarthy described his case: “Gay―picked up strangers in Loring Park & took them home―murdered in 
robbery.”  “Interoffice Communication from McCarthy pertaining to Gay-Related Homicides,” Nov. 7, 
1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
56 Writing for the St. Paul Pioneer Press, Jacqui Banaszynski described Riga and the other gay male 
victims as “vulnerable.” However, Riga, who was in his early 30s, did not fit the age pattern of the other 
victims. Therefore, Banaszynski characterizes the “younger ones, who would seem better able to defend 
themselves,” as individuals known to have been “drunk or emotionally disturbed at the time of their 
deaths.” To substantiate her claims, Banaszynski interviews Jim St. George, the then-Chairman of the 
Board of MAP (Minnesota AIDS Project), who agrees that the “leading lifestyle” of all these victims 
placed them at a greater risk for violence. Banaszynski elaborates upon St. George’s comments by pointing 
out “according to police and members of the gay community,” some of the victims were “regulars at the 
gay bars and had a reputation for cruising or picking up strangers for sex.” Those who were “less open 
about their homosexuality,” she writes, were believed “to cruise in the parks and adult bookstores in search 
of anonymous liaisons.” Banaszynski reasons that these “secretive encounters” were “dangerous” because 
gay men did not truly know whether their partners were “safe” both in terms of transmitting the AIDS virus 
and in their potential to inflict physical harm. Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear haunt gays,” St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986.  
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with a group of other deaf gay men, was “well known for picking up people or being 
picked up on Hennepin Av. and Loring Park.” 57 A Gay 90s’ bartender who was 
“familiar” with sign language and often waited on Riga notified the Star Tribune that 
Riga sometimes dressed as a woman, contributing to the psychological profile of Riga as 
someone who might have presumably experienced “gender dysphoria.” Riga’s deafness 
along with his and Olson’s gender nonconformity illustrates that gender, race, and 
physical ability circumscribed the ways law enforcement authorities, the mainstream 
press, and even gay leaders memorialized or shunned victims. When making sense of 
these deaths, police, the media, and gay community activists treated deviations from 
socially constructed norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space as legitimate bases 
for suspicion.  
Law enforcement authorities, gay leaders, and the mainstream press underscored 
the gender nonconformity of Riga and Olson to call into question their victimhood. In 
Queer (In)Justice, Joey Mogul, Andrea Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock argue that dominant 
actors and institutions have historically characterized gender nonconformity as 
intrinsically confused and deceptive. For law enforcement, gender transgressive people 
tend to signal disorder and fraud. They explain, “Gender nonconformity in appearance or 
expression gives rise to police presumptions of disorder, violence, and mental instability, 
among other qualities.” 58 Police officials do not treat gender nonconformity as a value-
free category of social difference. On the contrary, gender non-normativity negatively 
                                                
57 Kevin Diaz, “City man found strangled to death is fourth gay to be slain in 12 months,” Star Tribune, 
Sep. 18, 1986.; Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986.; 
James Coates, “AIDS Backlash Gets Violent, Gays Say,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1986. 
58 Joey L. Mogul, Andrea J. Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock, Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT 
People in the United States (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2011): 67. 
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shapes police perceptions of criminality and victimhood. Gender nonconformity, 
therefore, comprises a set of criteria that dominant actors and institutions employ to deny 
rights and protections to particular victims of violence.  
Historically, a specter of criminality has cast a suspicious shadow on the lives of 
queers in the United States. The narratives and scripts that emerge in its wake are so 
“vivid, compelling, and entrenched” that they are properly characterized as archetypes or 
“recurring, culturally ingrained representations that evoke strong, often subterranean 
emotional associations or responses.”59 These archetypes, however, do not operate in a 
vacuum. More precisely, they meld with broader notions of criminality informed by race, 
class, and gender. Together, they result in a number of closely related and mutually 
reinforcing “queer criminal archetypes” that influence the policing and punishment of 
queer people, or those living outside appropriately gendered and raced heterosexual 
norms. At once political and cultural creations, queer criminal archetypes become fixed 
in the public consciousness through prosecutorial and media depictions. In some 
instances, advocacy groups and community activists even play a critical role in 
reinforcing and amplifying these paranoia-inducing images and narratives. Built upon 
early pathologizing medical and scientific assessments of homosexuality and gender 
nonconformity from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, queer criminal 
archetypes do not describe actual human beings; they merely reflect “cold, terrifying 
abstractions.” Yet they “wield significant societal clout.”60 In addition to shaping policy 
and determining the distribution of protections and rights, queer criminal archetypes and 
their unifying narratives determine state and activist responses to violence against LGBT 
                                                
59 Ibid., 23. 
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people. Ultimately, queer criminal archetypes determine who is labeled a victim and who 
is labeled a criminal.  
As gender non-conforming pariahs, Riga and Olson embodied the emblematic 
traits of the queer criminal archetype of the “lethal gender bender” including “gender 
anguish, deception, and disguise.” 61 Law enforcement authorities, gay leaders, and the 
press emphasized that Riga dressed as a woman and described Olson as a “transvestite” 
to portray them as individuals caught in the grips of psychological gender confusion hell 
bent on the destruction of innocent others. Since Riga oftentimes housed young, 
presumably heterosexual, men in his apartment until they found their footing, police 
descriptions of Riga harkened back to stereotypes of gay men as sexually depraved 
predators. On the other hand, as an HIV-positive “straight prostitute,” Olson supposedly 
deceived white suburban heterosexual married men and, by extension, posed an imminent 
danger to unsuspecting wives and children. Together, Riga and Olson were cast as the 
perpetual threat to the raced, gendered, and classed social order of America’s heartland. 
According to this logic, Riga and Olson’s death were necessary to re-stabilize that social 
equilibrium. Their deviance, as manifest through gender non-conformity, was further 
amplified by Riga and Olson’s particular social positioning. As a deaf man, Riga 
confronted descriptions that cast him as a mentally unstable individual whose immature 
decision-making and twisted sexual desires led to his death. As a homeless person of 
color, Olson encountered images of threatening, hyper-sexualized men and women of 
color that further denied her victimhood status. Although Riga and Olson were both 
                                                




marginalized within gay hate crimes activism, they each experienced that marginalization 
differently given their racial positionality and material relationship to private property.  
Despite similarities in Olson’s death with those of other gay victims, police and 
gay leaders refused to publicly tie them together because they understood and defined 
violence according to a race- and class-based homonormative logic.62 Gay community 
activists created an image of the typical hate crime victim as a white, middle-class gay 
man without a criminal past, with access to the private sphere of the home. Specifically, 
police and leaders long stressed that victims fit a pattern. They focused on victims as 
single white men, usually older, who were allegedly unsuccessful building intimate 
connections with other men in socially approved settings, possibly the result of shame, 
itself a supposed product of gay men’s marginalized status in society. That is why, police 
                                                
62 On Nov. 13, 1986, Eau Claire Police discovered the nude body of Dale Staupe, a 28-year-old dairy herd 
analyst, on the floor of his bedroom, hands and feet bound, a steel collar wrapped around his neck. Eau 
Claire remains a sleepy, economically depressed town of Wisconsin, 80 miles east of the Twin Cities. Eau 
Claire is a sleepy, economically depressed town of Wisconsin, 80 miles east of the Twin Cities. The gay 
press observed that Staupe’s death shared “eerie similarities to some of the gay-related homicides in 
Minneapolis.” For one, Staupe was a closeted gay white man whose “secret [might] have killed him.” 
Friends agreed with police that Staupe fit into a pattern of victims: single men who floated on the edge of a 
gay lifestyle and were willing to take sexual risks. They suspected that Staupe might have been careless one 
night and picked up someone, confused over his own sexuality, who in a fit of homophobic rage killed 
Staupe. Before Eau Claire Police apprehended a suspect, Brooklyn Center Police contacted the department 
to discuss the similarities between Staupe’s case and that of Steven Kangas. (Three months later, police 
arrested and charged a 19-year-old white man for the murder of Staupe.) On Jan. 6, 1987, the partially clad 
body of Steven Kangas, a 32-year-old nursing assistant, was found tied to his bed in his Brooklyn Center 
townhouse apartment. Like Staupe, Kangas’ feet and hands were bound. He had also been beaten about the 
head, and strangled.62 Investigators believed Kangas, a white man, brought someone home he met the night 
before. According to eyewitnesses at the Gay 90s, Kangas visited a nearby erotic bookstore where police 
believed he picked up the person who killed him. The following day, Brooklyn Center Police released a 
composite sketch of the suspect and like in previous cases it was of a white man in his late 20s. Police 
publicly disclosed that Kangas’ case might have been related to that of Kastner, Kieley, and even Riga. It 
did not mention Olson. “Suspect charged in Eau Claire slaying,” Equal Time, March 04, 1987.; John Ritter, 
“Wisconsin man sentenced to 12 years for gay murder,” Equal Time, May 27, 1987.; Mark Brunswick, 
“Slain man was victim of suffocation,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jan. 08, 1987.; Mark Brunswick, 
“Police study possible link between 2 killings,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jan. 09, 1987; Jim 






and leaders argued that victims cruised for sex in public. The victims, however, always 
relocated to the private sphere; police found their bodies at home. Even Riga, who was 
cast as deviant because of his gender non-conformity and physical impairment, was 
found at home. Inasmuch as they mobilized race and class to assess the significance of 
anti-gay hate violence, white gay leaders marginalized other categories of individuals—
namely, queers of color. Case in point, Olson’s socio-economic status did not lend itself 
to the narrative of hate violence crafted by gay leaders. At the time of her death, Olson 
was homeless. Her body was discovered in a footbridge in downtown Minneapolis. And, 
unlike other victims, Olson’s interaction with her assailant was likely not based by a 
desire for intimacy or pleasure but as a needed source of income. Gay leaders, therefore, 
could not treat Olson’s death as “gay related” because she challenged their claim that gay 
men sought anonymous sex either out of a society-inducing shame or because of their 
barred access to privacy, certainly not out of economic necessity.63  
Olson’s death, therefore, exposes the narrow anti-homophobic agenda of gay 
leaders, one that refused to confront the systemic nature of racism, poverty, and sexism 
                                                
63 The process through which anti-gay violence activists primarily mobilized on behalf of homonormative 
identities and practices is further illustrated in the community reaction and police response to the death of 
Dyke Johnston, a 28-year-old “gay transient from California.” On April 27, 1987, Johnston was fatally 
stabbed as he slept in north Minneapolis, near a secluded and dark railroad trestle where homeless men and 
women typically slept. However, police investigators did not treat his death as one related to the victim’s 
sexual orientation. Police disclosed that Johnston was killed, perhaps by another “transient,” for reasons 
unrelated to his sexuality. (Yet, if robbery was the primary reason for the murders of other gay men, then 
the same could be said, that their sexuality did not play a role in their murders.) Similarly, Coyle insisted 
that Johnston’s differed from the string of gay related killings. Coyle told Equal Time that earlier killings 
were of long-term residents, most of who were employed. Johnston, on the other hand, had recently arrived 
in the Twin Cities, one month before his death. Coyle further discounted Johnston’s death as one motivated 
by bias by saying that Johnston “just happened to go to the Saloon and [just] happened to be gay.” Like 
other gay victims, Johnston visited a gay bar the night of his death. However, given his relationship to 
private property along with his race and class, activists were unable or unwilling to recuperate his death as 
being “gay related.” If anything, Coyle lashed out against social service providers for concentrating 
homeless populations in the area where Johnston’s body was found. Coyle admonished, “The Salvation 
Army and the Catholic Church are going to realize they had a responsibility beyond simply feeding these 
people.” Jim Schroeder, “Murder bulletin received at ET,” Equal Time, May 13, 1987. 
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by masking the fault lines of structural violence in the United States. In “Confronting the 
Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical Critique,” legal scholars Dean Spade 
and Craig Willse argue that gay hate crimes activism, by focusing on violent crimes 
enacted against members of subordinated identity categories, constructs anti-gay violence 
as a series of individual expressions of personal prejudice. They contend that this sole 
focus on violent crime obscures an understanding of the systemic nature of inequality. 
Per Spade and Willse’s interpretations, anti-violence gay activists demand that members 
of marginalized communities should not be exposed to death or violence simply by virtue 
of their identity. They do not issue a larger challenge against systemic inequality or 
ponder how individual acts of violence are connected to larger structural forces. As a 
result, law enforcement only focuses on the punishment of individuals whose 
homophobia or transphobia culminates in acts of individual violence. According to Spade 
and Willse, a focus on violent individuals “constructs a world in which the racist/not 
racist or homophobic/not homophobic line is drawn at the point of violence and excuses 
an ignorance of the myriad systemic and institutional manifestations of subordination that 
do not rise to the level of physical violence.”64 Since activists overlook the institutional 
dynamics of social inequality, they cannot consider structural solutions to violence. 
Alternately, the remedy to homophobic acts of violence becomes centered on isolating 
individual assailants, uncovering their objectives, and punishing them accordingly. In the 
process, law enforcement and courts avoid an engagement with the systemic 
manifestation of structural inequality, including how some bodies are rendered more 
vulnerable to both interpersonal and state violence.  
                                                
64 Spade and Willse, “Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism,” 46.   
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Roderick A. Ferguson expands upon Spade and Willse’s critique to outline how 
gay hate crimes activism intersects with white racial formations. Given this individualist 
understanding of violence, Ferguson argues that gay hate crimes activism indexes 
homonormativity’s ascendancy into white supremacy. Ferguson cites George Lipsitz, 
who in The Possessive Investment of Whiteness, argues that white racial formations 
develop out of a disavowal of racism’s institutional articulations.65 According to this line 
of thinking, gay hate crimes activism similarly operates as a technology of white racial 
formation given its individualist understanding of structural violence. Ferguson explains, 
“Inasmuch as hate crime legislation individualizes violence, and inasmuch as it 
constitutes the core agenda of mainstream gay organizations, such legislation points to a 
homonormative racial formation consolidated through a disavowal of inequality’s 
fundamentally structural nature.”66 Gay hate crimes activism consolidates homophobia as 
a personal prejudice, not a structural force. To that extent, this narrow anti-homophobic 
agenda fails to consider the interlocking nature of racism, sexism, and poverty, while it 
simultaneously extends racial privileges and exclusions to those adhering to the legislated 
rubric of homonormative victim.     
Although one of the goals of Community United Against Violence was to craft 
legal and social services to treat hate crime victims, no gay leader ever acknowledged 
how Olson’s racial positionality or material conditions rendered her more vulnerable to 
violence, in all its different permutations. Olson lacked access to proper medical care and 
                                                
65 George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).  
66 Roderick A. Ferguson, “Race-ing Homonormativity: Citizenship, Sociology, and Gay Identity,” in Black 
Queer Studies: A Critical Anthology, ed. E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson (New Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2005), 62.  
 
 170 
legal services. As a person of color and a sex worker, she was overexposed to the 
criminal punishment system and police harassment. Sex workers, like Olson, were 
criminalized for their sexual practices yet encountered no protection under gay hate 
crimes activism. And, as a victim of violence, she had few options for assistance. But, 
even if she did, it is unlikely Olson would have reached out to the police as it posed a 
great threat for her. As a transgender sex worker of color, racism, transphobia, and the 
policing of sex made Olson more vulnerable to violence, at times even at the hands of 
law enforcement. Nonetheless, gay hate crimes activists could not “name” that violence. 
As a result, they obscured the interlocking forces of marginalization experienced by 
multiply-positioned sexual and gender non-conforming populations. Unable to reconcile 
Olson’s needs with their normative itineraries, anti-violence gay activists simply erased 
Olson from the narrative. Ascribing victimhood status on gay men and gender non-
normative queers was informed by archetypical racialized representations of people of 
color as overly sexualized gender transgressors, who always already stirred suspicion—
even in their own murder. 
Race, Crime, and Homophobia.   
 Because gay hate crimes activists failed to address the structural nature of 
violence, they relied instead on discourses of racial difference to explain crime. In an 
effort to avoid the stigma of being labeled racist and to maintain the illusion of tolerance, 
policymakers used the language of culture, not race or class, to discuss the permanent 
moment of crisis engendered by urban migration to Minneapolis in the 1980s, a period of 
intense welfare reform where “personal responsibility” rhetoric justified public hostility 
and punitive measures against the racialized poor. Policymakers and gay leaders alike 
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framed the incompatibility between Minnesota and urban migrants of color as a conflict 
between Western liberal humanism, committed to tolerance, and a backwards, dangerous, 
anti-social culture. Whereas Minnesota was imagined as a reservoir of modern secular 
values of liberalism, universal human rights, political democracy, and tolerant and 
inclusive multiculturalism—what locals call “Minnesota Nice—urban migrants of color 
were perceived as a fundamental threat to those progressive foundations. Therefore, 
urban migrants of color were acknowledged but only to the extent that they were defined 
against a new, post-industrial Minneapolis, one designated by an ethos of tolerance and 
an investment in neoliberal capital expansion. Central to this discursive Othering of urban 
migrants of color were the unlikely alliances between gay leaders and those they had 
previously fought against: conservative state and police interests. The draconian, racist 
sentiment that permeated urban politics in Minneapolis in the 1980s was partly a result of 
a coalition between a conservative political right and a liberal gay constituency. Both 
groups were committed to a white liberal discourse and practice of “Minnesota Nice” that 
promoted neoliberalism’s upward redistribution of resources, heightened policing, and 
privatization, but that obfuscated deeply-entrenched structural inequalities along racial 
lines.  
 On October 20, 1986, two days after the grisly murder-arson of Robert Churchill, 
a 52-year-old white, middle-class gay professional in the “homosexual enclave” of 
Loring Park, Minneapolis Police Chief Tony Bouza announced the formation of a special 
three-officer investigative task force to take a fresh look at all 15 unsolved homicides in 
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Minneapolis that year.67 Bouza assigned the task force, comprised of a veteran homicide 
lieutenant and two experienced sergeants, to determine whether there existed any 
correlation among the unsolved murders, including the possibility that one or two people 
may have been responsible for several of the gay related homicides.68 By October of 
1986, Minneapolis recorded more homicides, 41, than any year since 1979, when the city 
recorded 49 homicides.69 Residents responded to this perceived increase in crime with 
                                                
67 The murder of Robert Churchill, a 52-year-old medical records clerk, in the fall of 1986 deeply impacted 
gay men in the Twin Cities. On October 18, 1986, Churchill’s charred body was found after a fire in his 
apartment in the “homosexual enclave” of Loring Park. According to arson investigators, Churchill’s 
gasoline-soaked body had been draped partly over a room couch that was then set on fire. Churchill’s body 
was so badly burned, that the Hennepin County Medical Examiner’s Office used dental x-rays to positively 
identify Churchill. An autopsy revealed that Churchill had been stabbed in the chest before the fire. As the 
13th gay man or trans woman murdered in the Twin Cities since December 1984 under similar 
circumstances as other victims, police officials insisted there was no evidence linking Churchill’s death 
with that of the others.  However, they did point out that the door to Churchill’s apartment was unlocked 
and that there was no sign of a forced entry, suggesting that Churchill must have invited the killer home. 
Like in other cases, homicide investigators and journalists focused on how Churchill’s sexual behaviors led 
to his death. The St. Paul Pioneer Press described Churchill as someone who “lived his private life alone 
and on the edge, sometimes drinking too much, hustling strangers in the so-called ‘fringe bars’ that 
neighbor the gay bars, befriending young women who were down on their luck, often providing a home and 
money for them until they got back on their feet.” “That private life” of hustling young men for sex, the 
Pioneer Press concluded, “may have killed him.” Dennis J. McGrath and Kevin Diaz, “Lingering fear 
spurs search for links in 15 unsolved murders,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 22, 1986; Jacqui 
Banaszynski, “Gays private life may have killed him,” St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, Oct. 22, 1986.; 
James Coates, “AIDS Backlash Gets Violent, Gays Say,” Chicago Tribune, Oct 26, 1986; Pat Doyle, “Link 
to gay slayings sought in latest case,” Star Tribune, 1986. 
68 The special task force was assigned with looking at patterns, crossover factors, psychological profile and 
any other similarities. In an attempt to search for any clues that might point to a common suspect, the task 
force would computerize all the cases and cross-reference all the names, addresses, aliases, hangouts, and 
vocations of the victims. The MPD hoped that details from some of the killings would take on added 
significance when compared to other cases. Because the task force was designed as an information-
gathering and dissemination group, it would then pass new leads or tips to the original investigators. From 
the data gathered by investigators, the FBI would construct psychological profiles on potential suspects. 
The MPD, however, dismissed the serial killer theory. Although Captain Jack McCarthy, head of the 
homicide unit, confirmed that community speculation as to “whether or not there may [have been] a serial 
killer out there” prompted the formation of the task force, he downplayed the serial killer theory. McCarthy 
was unwilling to even confirm an increase in anti-gay violence in Minneapolis. Instead, he explained that 
the gay population had risen dramatically in Minneapolis, what he called “the gay mecca of the Upper 
Midwest” in the 1980s. Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 
1986. 
69 Although the number varied widely from year to year, the average was 30 to 35. More troubling for some 
was not that Minneapolis was on the verge of surpassing its record of homicides. Rather, a significant 
portion of those homicides remained unsolved. From January of 1985 to October of 1986, there had been 
24 unsolved murders in Minneapolis, five of whom were of gay men or trans women. The rest of the 




panic. Coyle briefed the Star Tribune that elderly white residents in the ward he 
represented were suddenly locking their doors and refusing to come out of their homes, 
an apt metaphor for how the city itself felt towards urban migrants of color.70  
The murder rate in Minneapolis prompted widespread speculation over what 
factors contributed to its increase. Although race was never explicitly stated, police, city 
officials, and gay leaders blamed an influx of poor, people of color from the Rust Belt of 
the Midwest for bringing with them crime-ridden, anti-social values that inflected 
violence upon a white, middle-class population and that tarnished the wholesome 
reputation of the city as portrayed on The Mary Tyler Moore Show.71 The press even 
dubbed this phenomenon, the Gary Syndrome, after the primarily black and working-
class town of Gary, Indiana, which had witnessed an economic exodus in the 1980s as a 
result of manufacturing factories moving overseas. The Gary Syndrome indexes the 
social experience of white injury in which white Minnesotans demand increased policing 
in order to protect themselves from the changing racial demographics of the state. In 
projecting the status of victim onto white Americans, white injury inoculates them from 
having to confront their own privilege or complicity in systems of oppression. White 
                                                                                                                                            
senior citizens, three involving drug-trafficking, two of “street people,” two which were heterosexual rape 
incidents, and two child-beatings. Racially, the victims included 11 whites, 10 African-Americans, and 
three Native Americans. McCarthy downplayed the numbers, insisting that 15 unsolved murders in 41 
represented a 63 percent closure rate, which was average or “pretty good for the number of cases we’ve 
got.” “Minneapolis police forming panel to study 12 unsolved murders,” Star Tribune, October 1986.; 
Dennis J. McGrath and Kevin Diaz, “Lingering fear spurs search for links in 15 unsolved murders,” Star 
and Tribune, Oct. 22, 1986. 
70 Coyle informed the Star Tribune, “It used to be that you couldn’t get the seniors to lock their doors. Now 
you can’t get them to come out of their homes.” Mark Brunswick, “Officials try to allay fears about 
slayings,” Star Tribune, Nov. 5, 1986. 
71 According to Coyle, these crimes also threatened the reputation of the city. In an interview with the 
Chicago Tribune, Coyle worried that Minneapolis had devolved into a “place of mean streets.” He added, 
“The streets are getting meaner every day.” James Coates, “AIDS Backlash Gets Violent, Gays Say,” 
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1986. 
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injury, in turn, fuels the enforcement of larger cultural, economic, and political structures 
that sanction “the containment, exploitation, and surveillance of communities of color.”72  
In an interview with the Star Tribune, Sgt. Marvin Rorvick of the Minneapolis 
Police Department publicly pondered the changing nature of crime in the city. He 
hypothesized, “We have more drug-related murders now. And we have a lot of strangers 
in town from places like Gary, Kansas City, and Cuba. Generally, they’re unknown 
around here, meaning the witnesses and people involved are less likely to be able to 
identify them.”73 According to Rorvick, investigators were unable to solve homicides 
given the newfound character of crime in the city.74 No longer was crime committed by 
small-time thieves, it was now the result of an invading horde of black and brown drug-
peddling outsiders. That they came from a diverse array of places with wide cultural and 
regional differences, such as Gary, Indiana and Cuba, implies that race was the 
overarching vector of threat.  
Inherent to Rorvick’s claims that out-of-town people of color were responsible for 
crime, gay related included, was the suggestion that people of color, regardless of class, 
were more homophobic than white, middle-class people.75 Ascribing homophobia onto 
                                                
72 Lisa M. Cacho, “‘The People of California Are Suffering’: The Ideology of White Injury in Discourses 
of Immigration,” Cultural Values 4.4 (2000): 415.  
73 Larry Oakes, “Detectives grapple with rise in slayings,” Star Tribune, Nov. 5, 1986. 
74 In July of 1987, the Minneapolis Police Department reported that violence against “transients” was 
increasing and that “transients” were arriving in record numbers to the Twin Cities. According to the MPD, 
two-thirds of the suspects and half the victims in the city’s 26 homicides by July of 1987 were transients, or 
new arrivals who lived in Minneapolis less than two years. However, one of the problems with this 
designation is that the MPD did not specify whether “transient” referred to any recent arrival to the city, 
regardless of living arrangement, or if it implied the homeless. One certainty, though, is that “transient” like 
“urban migrant” was often a euphemism for the racialized poor, outsiders who supposedly brought cultural 
behaviors that were antithetical to the universal human rights, political democracy, and tolerant and 
inclusive multiculturalism of Minnesota. “The homelessness among us: a growing population,” Equal 
Time, Aug. 5, 1987. 
75 Christina B. Hanhardt shows us that the conflation of racialized populations with homophobia is partly 




communities of color serves to further distance these populations from an imagined 
community defined by tolerance. In European Others: Queering Ethnicity in 
Postnational Europe, queer theorist Fatima El-Tayeb examines how the discursive 
construction of the Muslim Other in contemporary Europe as homophobic, misogynist, 
and intolerant serves to frame Muslims as a threat to a secular, liberal Europe. Central to 
the discursive consolidation of European Muslim difference is gender and sexuality. El-
Tayeb argues that Islam and Europe are imagined as incompatible not necessarily due to 
religious differences. To be precise, the conflict is one framed as a clash between 
European humanism, devoted to gender equality and sexual freedom, and a Muslim 
culture shaped by hostility, intolerance, and foreignness.76 Indeed, Muslim cultural 
difference is mobilized as a negative foil for a post-national, secular Europe that is 
invested in Western “universal cosmopolitanism.”77  
El-Tayeb’s analysis supports the notion that it is “culture,” one that is conjugated 
through gender and sexuality, that has so readily replaced race in discourses and practices 
directed against immigrants and racialized populations. Given her analysis of the works 
by Dutch feminist playwright, Adelheid Roosen, El-Tayeb highlights that the language of 
culture, not that of race, religion, or nation, shape contemporary discussions of Muslims 
                                                                                                                                            
urban centers in the early years of the LGBT rights movement. Hanhardt elaborates that the alleged 
incompatibility between race and same-sex desire was bolstered by social science research in postwar 
liberal politics that explained socio-economic inequality through cultural pathology and damaged 
psychology. Hanhardt, Safe Space. 
76 Muslim youth, in particular, “the violent male and the veiled young woman,” comprise the central Other 
through which a unified Europe is presented. Fatima El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in 
Postnational Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).  
77 El-Tayeb defines this cosmopolitanism as one rooted in a European humanist tradition that has produced 
both the concept of human rights and, ironically enough, the means to systematically violate those rights: 
colonialism, slavery, and genocide. Therefore, this European universal humanism is contingent on 





in Europe. By focusing on culture, instead of race, policymakers are able to escape 
accusations of overt racism while still ensuring the same material outcome. For this 
reason, gender and sexuality—proxies for racial and cultural difference—are cast to 
appear as unchanging, discrete constants. This discursive construction of the Muslim 
Other as the most serious cultural threat facing Europe’s modern identity occurs in three 
steps: (1) Muslim culture is characterized as being fundamentally different from 
European culture; (2) Muslims, imagined as a coherent community, are perceived as 
being fundamentally stratified along gender and sexuality; (3) European LGBT and 
feminist movements build alliances with former enemies—a Christian political right—in 
the pursuit of universal values of human liberty, gender equality, and sexual freedom. 
This discursive scapegoating of Europe’s Muslim population masks the underlying 
Christian bias of the secularism argument expressed in relation to Muslims. It also 
suggests that there is only one interpretation of Islam and that there are no Muslim 
feminists or queer Muslims who are currently challenging the perception of Islam as 
incompatible with modernity. Lastly, the Othering of Muslims suppresses any 
introspection on the part of Europeans to their own internal homophobia and sexism. We 
can apply El-Tayeb’s observations to the context of Minneapolis in the 1980s to reveal 
how policymakers relied on perceived cultural differences among urban migrants of color 
to explain social inequality and to address anti-gay violence. Those in positions of 
power—gay leaders included—singled out the racialized poor as a group that particularly 
subscribed to homophobic sentiments. This narrative implied that white Minnesotans 
treated sexual minorities with respect. But, as an analysis of the New Right’s moral 
crusade against homosexuality makes ardently clear, that was not necessarily the case. 
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Although a discourse and practice of Minnesota Nice denies racist intent, it empowered 
its adherents to enact policies with racialized consequences, a contradiction I discuss 
further in chapter three.  
Despite policymakers and others insisting that crime had increased and intensified 
given this wave of urban migration, the specifics of the crimes reveal that the culture of 
fear enveloping residents was largely unfounded. Police Chief Bouza told the Star 
Tribune that the increase in homicides was not statistically significant and that residents 
had little to fear from the increase. Bouza tried to further assuage anxieties by reminding 
the public that police had made arrests in most of the cases, and that the homicides were 
largely not stranger-to-stranger crimes, the latter of which contradicted Rorvick’s 
comments.78 Yet, even with these re-assurances, city officials continued to fan the flames 
of fear.  
In an interview with the Star Tribune, City Council President Alice Rainville 
refused to consider Bouza’s supplications. Instead, she maintained that an analysis of the 
suspects in these homicides confirmed that few of them had any ties to the area. 
Moreover, she alleged that Minnesota’s progressive welfare and public assistance 
programs lured a large number of people with criminal histories to the state.79 Rainville 
                                                
78 The MPD’s statistics supported Bouza’s characterization of the homicides. Of the 35 homicides reported 
at the end of September of 1986, suspects included two family members, two friends, and 16 
acquaintances. Mark Brunswick, “Officials try to allay fears about slayings,” Star Tribune, Nov. 5, 1986. 
79 Likewise, in an article appearing in Equal Time, Coyle used the death of a homeless gay man of color, 
Dyke Johnston, as an opportunity to discuss what he perceived as the growing scorch of welfare subsidies 
by “transients,” or racial outsiders. In an indirect reference to the “Cadillac-driving welfare queen” trope of 
President Ronald Reagan’s anti-welfare speeches, Coyle argued that many homeless men and women 
shuttled between the Twin Cities and the West Coast because public assistance benefits in Minnesota were 
ideal but the winter climate in the West Coast was better. Coyle explained, “Some people are adopting 
homelessness as a way of life and are not trying to get out of the cycle.” Inherent to Coyle’s remarks is the 
belief that homelessness was a personal choice, not a structural condition abetted by a number of 




explained, “If the system is a movable feast, Minnesota happens to have the best menu. 
The perpetrators of these crimes are not really Minnesota people. They are people who 
float to the best opportunity.” Instead of challenging Rainville on these unfounded 
claims, the Star Tribune alleged that these “urban migrants,” a euphemism for poor, 
people of color, accounted for a large number of the Minneapolis residents on Hennepin 
County’s welfare rolls. Rainville agreed that many criminals came to rely on Minnesota’s 
welfare system as their only means of support. To lower crime rates, therefore, Rainville 
proposed rolling back welfare benefits. She announced, “We’ve got to find those homes 
with 24 souls in them where no one knows anything but being on welfare…This has to be 
done right now.” 80 Rainville hypothesized that by cutting off resources, poor, people of 
color— deviant ones at that with non-normative family arrangements extending into the 
20s—would be less prone to migrate to Minnesota and, by extension, crime rates would 
drop.  
Nonetheless, people of color were not necessarily responsible for any more crime 
in the Twin Cities in the 1980s than were any other racial/ethnic minority groups. The 
Governor’s Task Force on Prejudice, formed to document crimes prompted by hate and 
prejudice, concluded that some of the bias-related crime against gay men and lesbians, 
contrary to police descriptions and the city’s fear-mongering, was actually committed by 
“skinheads” who maintained a presence in Minnesota.81 The fact that all the assailants 
arrested and charged in the gay homicides were young white men, ages 18 to 21, not 
                                                                                                                                            
violence since he was also unable to articulate the structural nature of the latter. “The homelessness among 
us: a growing population,” Equal Time, Aug. 5, 1987. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Jim Schroeder, “Hate crimes legislation passes Senate committee,” Equal Time, Mar. 30, 1988; Jim 
Schroeder, “Status of “Hate Crimes” legislation locally, nationally,” Equal Time, Mar. 16, 1988. 
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people of color, gives further credence to the task force’s conclusion. Yet, no such vitriol 
was directed against young white men, or white people for that matter. In fact, police 
investigators offered a sympathetic view of assailants as being “sexually confused.” In a 
slight revision of the “homosexual panic” defense, Deputy Police Chief Patrick Farrell 
described assailants as being mere “latent homosexuals” who were moved to violence 
against “older, less sought after gay men,” partly due to internalized “homophobia and 
fear of AIDS.”82 Farrell generated a psychological profile of suspects and assailants as 
being simply confused about their sexual identities. If anything, Farrell blamed the 
victims, as they were the ones who brought young, “sexually confused,” hustlers home 
from cruising in gay bars or public parks, alluding to stereotypes of gay men as sexual 
predators. 
Despite counter evidence, city officials continued to insist that people of color 
were responsible for this perceived increase in crime. Their insistence illuminates the 
centrality of race in perpetuating presumptions of criminality. City Council Member 
Walter Dziedzic, whose predominantly white and middle-class ward in northeast 
Minneapolis was deemed one of the safer and wealthier areas in the city, maintained that 
many of the city’s crime problems came from outside, that is, from people of other states 
and countries “whose different values and violent beliefs have come with them.”83 Rather 
than calling for a social safety net for recent arrivals to Minneapolis, city officials like 
Dziedzic endorsed the expansion of the criminal punishment system to address social 
                                                
82 Farrell described that assailants and suspects fit a pattern of “an unruly transient youth in his late teens or 
early twenties who will hustle or pose as a hustler with the intention of robbing or exploiting his victim in 
some way.” It is interesting to note how law enforcement infantilized assailants so as to minimize the 
severity of their actions. Tim Campbell, “Wave of murders may total nine: Brian Coyle calls emergency 
meeting,” GLC Voice, Feb. 3, 1986. 
83 Mark Brunswick, “Officials try to allay fears about slayings,” Star Tribune, Nov. 5, 1986. 
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inequality. Dziedzic demanded additional police patrols and harsher sentencing to deter 
would-be criminals.84 This response by city officials echoed and amplified growing white 
anxiety and resentment about poor, people of color receiving social service benefits in 
Minnesota. Rainville and Dziedzic’s comments allude to how “tolerance” in neoliberal 
political economies can operate as a superficial promise rather than a wide-ranging 
action. With tolerance as a promise, there is no material commitment to welcoming racial 
minorities and immigrant populations. As a result, there is an actual lack of engagement 
with minority social difference. Tolerance as a promise operates in the service of 
neoliberalism and white racial formation by paying lip-service to inclusive 
multiculturalism without addressing the structural constraints—police brutality, for 
instance—that deny communities of color a welcome mat.  
In response to the perceived surge in violence, Mayor Donald Fraser called for an 
additional 30 police officers to be added to the police force of 691. Coyle, who had long 
criticized the actions of the Minneapolis Police Department against gay men, came out in 
support for increasing the police department’s budget, hiring more patrol officers, and 
enforcing harsher sentences for repeat offenders.85  In an effort to safeguard Minnesota’s 
supposed universal values of human liberty, gender equality, and sexual freedom, Coyle 
and members of CUAV established alliances with former enemies: the Minneapolis 
Police Department. Together, they rallied around commonly shared values against a new 
external threat: urban migrants of color.  
                                                
84 Like Rainville and Dziedzic, Captain McCarthy used race to explain violent crime in Minneapolis. He 
told the Pioneer Press, “We’ve got a hell of a lot more street people. We’ve got a hell of a lot more 
minorities and gang members from Chicago and Gary. And they’ve brought more violence with 
them...We’re becoming a big city and our population is changing.” Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, fear 
haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986. 
85 Mark Brunswick, “Officials try to allay fears about slayings,” Star Tribune, Nov. 5, 1986. 
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Since they never explicitly stated “race,” lest it impinge on the city’s illusory investment 
in tolerance via a discourse and practice of “Minnesota Nice,” Coyle and other city 
officials framed the city’s newfound “tough on crime” stance in racially coded ways. 
Coyle and CUAV publicly adhered to a colorblind liberal discourse of tolerance, one 
privately invested in whiteness. They prescribed to an ethics of tolerance without 
necessarily addressing the systematic exclusion and marginalization of communities of 
color in Minneapolis. That people of color were accused for this perceived increase in 
crime despite Police Chief Bouza discounting its size and intensity is telling of how white 
injury shaped the policing of urban public spaces in the 1980s, even in the face of facts.   
The commentary expressed by city officials, police investigators, and gay leaders 
confirms that social constructions of crime, safety, and justice are predicated on race, 
national origin, class, gender, ability, and immigration status. In Are Prisons Obsolete?, 
Angela Y. Davis observes, “Race has always played a central role in constructing 
presumptions of criminality.”86 This theory is exemplified through the work of 
criminologist Marvin Wolfgang whose “subculture of violence” erroneously insists that 
violent values serve a common, culturally adaptive feature of African-American 
communities.87 Cultural representations and sociological studies of criminalized 
populations, such as Wolfgang’s, that are sensational, dehumanizing, and alarming drive 
“get tough on crime” and “law and order” initiatives that create the very targets for 
them.88 Criminologist Jeff Ferrell describes this process of “cultural criminalization” as 
one consisting of institutions, including mass media, dehumanizing and delegitimizing 
                                                
86 Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 28-29.  
87 Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in 
Criminology, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967).  
88 Mogul et. al., Queer (In)Justice.  
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those individuals and groups it targets. Ferrell explains that cultural criminalization 
“helps construct a perceptual context in which direct criminal charges can more easily 
follow.”89 Responses from law enforcement, the judicial system, and mass media are, 
thus, always already mediated by previously existing “cultural ideas” about which 
populations are intrinsically innocent and respectable, and which are inherently 
blameworthy and trouble stirring.  
Social constructions of non-white criminality, hinging on gender and sexual 
deviance, fueled the expansion of policing and punishment of communities of color in 
Minneapolis in the mid-1980s. Rather than critiquing law enforcement for targeting 
communities of color, anti-violence gay activists endorsed the expansion of the police 
force, even demanding the greater representation of gay men and lesbians. By insisting 
on the link between race, crime, and poverty, gay leaders became complicit with law 
enforcement authorities in the criminalization of communities of color all the while 
endorsing the expansion of neoliberal urban policies and practices. Coyle and other gay 
rights activists were unable to acknowledge the disparate impact of their approach on 
those gay men and trans women outside the mainstream as they lacked an awareness of 
the ways in which systems based on race, class, gender, and sexuality intersected with 
one another to create specific social positionalities that, in turn, fomented power 
differentials within this so-called gay community.    
The Pink Police. 
In response to Churchill’s murder, Coyle held a press conference at City Hall on 
October 22, 1986 to discuss the police investigation, the response from gay men, and the 
                                                
89 Jeff Ferrell, “Cultural Criminology,” Annual Review of Sociology 3, no. 2 (1999): 405.   
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emerging pattern of murders.90 The press conference transpired on the heels of Bouza’s 
announcement of the formation of the special investigative task force. Although Coyle 
applauded the task force’s creation after “pressure from [his] office helped bring about 
the beefing up of the police effort,” Coyle criticized the police department for not 
devoting sufficient resources to what he insisted was a pattern in the gay slayings.91 He 
believed that these murders deserved additional attention because information that had 
come to his office suggested a serial killer or killers might have committed them, a 
pattern that did not apply in the other unsolved murders.92 Despite publicly celebrating 
the actions of the MPD, in private Coyle remained frustrated that the MPD failed to 
follow up on leads supplied by his office. Because of police indifference and harassment, 
gay men were more likely to contact Coyle’s office with information surrounding the 
murders. Coyle’s office would then relay that information to the MPD but according to 
Coyle, the MPD did not act on this information. 
                                                
90 Coyle called the press conference to “rattle the cages” of the MPD, hoping that by publicly expressing 
concerns about the focus of the police department’s murder investigation, that it would force detectives to 
look at this so-called emerging pattern of the gay murder victims. The immediacy was also necessary, as 
Coyle had come to believe that a serial killer might have been responsible for the killings. Because he also 
suspected that another murder was imminent, the press conference was meant to generate coverage from 
mainstream media to alert gay men. At the press conference, he told reporters: “We’re facing the potential 
of another murder. We can’t wait for a sweeping investigation that might take months. And I don’t want to 
wait four to six weeks before the next follow up.” 
91 At the press conference, Coyle explicitly stated that he was “concerned” that the MPD would look at all 
the unsolved murders together and not devote the sufficient amount of time and energy on just the gay-
related murders. He worried that to “simply lump all the murders with (the gay victims) is the wrong way 
to go. Police should do more with the gays because that’s where the patterns are.” Coyle also accused 
police of not making adequate use of resources in the gay community that might have better assisted with 
investigations, including interviewing gay bar owners and employees. Press Conference Speech, Oct. 22, 
1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
92 At the press conference, Coyle disclosed that his office had received reports from victims of violence of 
two different types of assailant: “a young man, a hustler type, around age 20;” and “a very attractive but 
closeted man in his 30s.” David Scheie, “Gays push for self-defense, police protection,” The Surveyor, 
Dec., 1986.; Press Conference Speech, Oct. 22, 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, 
The Minnesota History Center. 
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 Provided that there was no system in place to address anti-gay violence in the 
region, Coyle and others formed the citizens anti-violence task force, Community United 
Against Violence, modeled after the group with the same name in San Francisco.93 In 
addition to documenting violence against gay men and lesbians in the Twin Cities, Coyle 
established CUAV to maintain pressure on the police to investigate the gay murders more 
thoroughly. Accordingly, the focus of the organization included gathering data on 
citywide and statewide rates of anti-gay violence and comparing those numbers with 
national statistics.94 Nonetheless, CUAV’s initial effort, according to a press release, was 
simply to urge gay men “not to go home with strangers, no matter how ‘hot’ they are.”95 
Coyle firmly believed that CUAV’s formation was “necessary to shake homosexuals out 
of their complacency about the recent killings.”96 As part of its consciousness-raising 
imperative, CUAV created education-oriented prevention programs that stressed the 
dangers of casual sex with anonymous partners and that promoted the health and physical 
virtues of sexual monogamy. Coyle believed that since anti-gay violence had stifled the 
attitude of local gay men, one of CUAV’s goals would be to challenge the 
                                                
93 Coyle’s office contacted SF’s CUAV and the NGLTF’s Anti-Violence Project requesting literature from 
both organizations to develop the Twin Cities’ very own anti-violence gay and lesbian organization. 
94 Coyle also designed CUAV to examine the contributing factors to anti-gay violence. According to an 
early outline of the group’s objectives, some of the contributing factors to anti-gay violence included: 
“economics of assailants/victims,” “chemical dependency/abuse of assailants/victims,” “AIDS Phobia,” 
“Possible closetry of victims,” “Assailant self-hate poss. confusion on own sexual preference,” “New right 
moralism,” and “Gay men’s complacency.” Proposal For Task Force on “Violence Against Gays,” 1986, 
Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
95 In the press release, CUAV described itself as a “local task force...committed to a long range effort to 
make Gays/Lesbians aware that many gay murders are occurring in the Minneapolis metro area and that 
they need to protect themselves.” “CUAV News Release, Nov. 13, 1986,” Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, 
Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
96 Jacqui Banaszynski, “Gays seeking safety after slaying series,” St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, 
Oct. 23, 1986.  
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“complacency” he witnessed among gay men through “safer sex” education.97 While 
police detectives ignored Coyle’s leads, CUAV provided a space for Coyle to pursue 
such leads.  
Changing sentiment among gay men at the time suggested that CUAV’s moral 
campaign was somewhat successful. The night after Coyle’s press conference, the Star 
Tribune interviewed patrons of the gay bar the Saloon about any actions they undertook 
to protect themselves (Figure 2.4). Interviewees reported relief at hearing that Bouza had 
appointed a three-detective team to investigate the homicides, though they wondered why 
it had not occurred sooner. Although none of the interviewees used overt racial 
references, they all employed the trope of “outsiders” to articulate their newfound safety 
regimen. One patron disclosed that he was keeping “an eye out for people who [look] 
suspicious, who don’t look like they fit in with the crowd.” Another claimed to have been 
“smart enough to stay out of dark alleys.” Meanwhile another patron “used to meet 
friends at Loring Park after the bars closed, but now he goes home.”98 The fear 
surrounding the murders led to reduced business at the gay bars in Minneapolis. In an 
interview with the St. Paul Pioneer Press, Jim Anderson, co-owner of the Saloon, argued 
that the social atmosphere at the bar had changed because of AIDS and the perceived 
increase in anti-gay violence. Anderson reported that “customers dance and date and visit 
                                                
97 CUAV carried out its drive to educate gay men on the dangers of casual sex with strangers by posting 
warnings in gays bars and by encouraging staff of those bars to be alert for “possible trouble.” Coyle’s 
office also brainstormed establishing a whistle alert system and publishing articles in the local gay press on 
“complacency in gay/lesbian community.” Coyle told Equal Time, “I don’t like the complacency I have 
seen in the community.” Jim Schroeder, “Special task force forms to solve string of gay murders,” Equal 
Time, Oct. 29, 1986. 




with friends instead of hustling strangers for the night,” (emphasis added) before adding, 





 On Oct. 24, 1986, CUAV hosted its inaugural meeting. Forty people attended the 
session, including concerned community leaders and nearly a dozen Gay 90s’ bartenders 
and security staff.100 Unlike previous efforts, Coyle was more adamant about producing 
quantifiable strategies that brought community awareness to anti-gay violence.101 Those 
                                                
99 Banaszynski had written that according to some members of the local gay community, “the threat of 
AIDS [had] prompted a fairly dramatic shift in gay lifestyles and behavior.” Jacqui Banaszynski, “Murders, 
fear haunt gays,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Sep. 28, 1986. 
100 Tim Campbell, “Seven gay murders in one year,” GLC Voice, Nov. 3, 1986. 
101 From CUAV’s inception, Coyle had imagined it fulfilling a number of different actions. First and 
foremost, CUAV was to organize gay men by creating an awareness of their shared vulnerability to 
violence and repression. By doing so, CUAV was at the forefront of framing gay (white) men and, to a 
lesser extent, lesbians as victims of crime, not perpetrators of violence. Second, through self-defense 
classes, distribution of “awareness flyers,” and publicity of violence against gay men and lesbians to the 
mainstream press, CUAV sought to inculcate the importance of self-protection to gay men. Third, CUAV 
was concerned with assessing whether existing legislation in Minnesota was adequate enough to address 
anti-gay violence or threats. If not, it would explore “stronger remedies, criminal or civil, [that could] be 
enacted to combat this type of violence.” In other words, CUAV located the solution to anti-gay hate 
violence in the expansion of the criminal punishment system and in access to gay men and lesbians to that 




in attendance endorsed a series of proposals. Meeting attendees endorsed implementing a 
campaign to warn gay men against going home with strangers. This “buddy system,” a 
type of “personal insurance,” consisted of gay men policing the community. If gay men 
decided to go home with strangers, CUAV encouraged them to tell friends with whom 
they were leaving. Meeting attendees also discussed establishing a hotline where gay men 
could call with tips about possible suspects, instead of contacting the police whom gay 
men argued treated them with disdain. CUAV would then relay that information to 
investigators.102 In essence, Coyle designed CUAV as an extension of the Minneapolis 
Police Department, one that catered specifically to the interests and needs of white gay 
men. Although Coyle recognized that law enforcement authorities were purveyors of 
violence against gay men, lesbians, and trans people, he and other white gay leaders 
perceived police brutality as a problem largely impacting communities of color. 
Admittedly, CUAV demanded police accountability, but not for the policing of racialized 
and queer sexualities. Quite the opposite, CUAV requested that the police department 
escalate its surveillance and investigative work.  
White gay leaders envisioned anti-violence gay activism operating as a vehicle for 
gay enfranchisement.103 This strategy was reflected on November 6, 1986, when CUAV 
                                                                                                                                            
Nov. 17, 1986; “Proposed Task Force on Prejudice and Violence,” 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, 
Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
102 Dennis J. McGrath and Kevin Diaz, “Lingering fear spurs search for links in 15 unsolved murders,” Star 
Tribune, Oct. 22, 1986. 
103 Local gay leaders were able to strategically vouch for civil rights for gay men and lesbians when 
discussing the root causes of anti-gay violence. The murders provided gay leaders with a platform to 
discuss the social conditions that facilitated intolerance against sexual minorities. On November 14, 1986, 
the Minneapolis Commission for Civil Rights (MCRC) sent Police Chief Bouza a letter “expressing 
concern about the growing number of murders of gay men in Minneapolis.” The letter informed Bouza that 
gay men and lesbians were a “Protected Class” under the Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance. As such, 
they were entitled to full protection under the law. The MCRC demanded that the Minneapolis Police 




held a press conference at Loring Park, near the apartment of a gay homicide victim. 
There, CUAV declared November “Violence Awareness Month.” Speakers highlighted 
the connections they witnessed between violence and prejudice. Although openly-gay 
Minnesota State Sen. Allan Spear warned gay men against placing themselves in 
situations “where they [could] be subjected to violence,” he also cautioned against living 
closeted lives. He professed: “We must reach out and not be forced into the closet 
because of the pressures of society. The only way to move forward is to make sure gays 
and lesbians have full rights in society.”104 At the time, Spear played a prominent role in 
Minnesota’s sodomy repeal efforts, as I discuss in chapter one. If Spear believed that 
anti-gay violence would diminish once gay men were granted “full rights in society,” 
then Spear must have assumed that gay men had anonymous sex in public because their 
sexual interactions were illegal. For Spear, the right to privacy reduced the risk of anti-
gay violence, but only for those men with racial and class access to the private sphere.   
 As part of Violence Awareness Month, CUAV implemented a number of different 
projects designed to raise public awareness and community consciousness on anti-gay 
violence. In addition to the “play it safe” flyer campaign discussed at the beginning of 
                                                                                                                                            
effort is made to solve outstanding cases.” “Leather from MCRC to Bouza, Nov. 14, 1986,” Box 13, Folder 
Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
104 At the press conference, Coyle not only urged gay men to observe caution, and to look out for one 
another. pleaded with gay men that they provide information to police investigators. Other speakers 
included State Rep. Karen Clark, Tim Cole of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, Emma Hixson of 
the Minneapolis Human Rights Department, the Rev. Jack Holman, an Anglican priest from St. Paul, 
Seventh Ward Council Member Barbara Carlson, and Tim Campbell who had pressed unsuccessfully to 
have the city hire a community aide to help police investigate the gay slayings. Jacqui Banaszynski, “Gays 
seeking safety after slaying series,” St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch, Oct. 23, 1986.; Tina Burnside, 
“Gay murders focus of Violence Awareness Month,” Minnesota Daily, Nov. 7, 1986.; Press 
Announcement: Press Conference in Loring Park, Oct. 31, 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.; “Priest urges action to end gay prejudice,” St. Paul Pioneer 
Press, Nov. 7, 1986.; “Leaders hold news conference to call attention to violence against gays,” Star 




this chapter, CUAV brought its message to print. For its October 31, 1986 issue, the Twin 
Cities Gaze donated several full-length pages to CUAV to publicize its message of sexual 
monogamy. Via a series of public service announcements, CUAV continued to warn gay 
men of the dangers of anonymous sex in racially coded ways. One of the full-page 
announcements consisted of a black and white photograph of an unclothed man’s torso 
blurred out of focus and multiplied across the greater half of the page (Figure 2.5). The 
photo’s bolded heading warned: “Be Careful!” Below the photo, the caption read, “Is this 
your idea of Mr. Right―for tonight?” The announcement included a short blurb allegedly 
penned by a local personality in the gay bar scene, Big Mama from the Gay 90s: 
Wake up and hear the birdies, kids!...There are persons out there killing gay guys, 
and there are persons running around with AIDS who just do not care who they 
give it  to!...Know who you are going home with! If you don’t know the person 
well, you are much better off going home alone. If you really want to take a 
stranger home, stop by and introduce him to me (or your favorite bartender), just 
in case something later happens to you!...There are some people who really care 
about your welfare. I happen to be one of those people...I care about, and love all 
of you!...Love, Big Mama. 
Big Mama’s supplications reflect Coyle’s intended convergence between HIV-prevention 
and violence awareness. Her insistence that “some people...really care about your 
welfare,” although kind-hearted, also suggests that the architects of the campaign 
presumed gay men engaged in anonymous sex because they lacked self-esteem, not 
because they enjoyed sex or did so out of economic necessity. According to this logic, 
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those gay men involved in committed, monogamous partnerships embodied the 




 Another full-page PSA in the same Twin Cities Gaze issue consisted of a black 
and white photograph of a knife slicing through a condom lying on the concrete ground 
(Figure 2.6). The bolded headlined reiterated: “Safe Sex Is More Than Just Wearing A 
Condom.” Below that photograph, the PSA elaborated, “Condoms help shield against 
disease―but not violence.” The caption added that although “safe sex had become a 
household word for stopping the spread of disease during sex,” condoms did not protect 
against “the disease of anger, hatred, and fear of Gays.” The PSA elaborated, “VD, 
herpes, and AIDS aren’t the only threats to gays these days. Protect yourself against harm 
by following some sound advice: know who you’re taking home! It may be exciting to 
meet and pick up a total stranger, but it can a dangerous proposition.” The PSA 
concluded with indirectly suggesting to gay men that instead of anonymous sex, that they 
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date: “Know who you’re taking home. Talk first. Get to know him. Ask a few questions. 
Don’t be afraid...it’s better to be safe, than sorry!” These PSAs illustrate CUAV’s 
proposed solution to both AIDS and violence: domesticity, monogamy, and privacy—
racialized norms of sexual hygiene central to petitioning the state for social 
membership.105 However, these were private cures to problems that contained vast social 
implications. Although the government’s willful negligence enabled the rapid spread of 
AIDS, none of CUAV’s literature included a critique of government agencies or officials.   
 
                                                
105 A third PSA in the same Twin Cities Gaze issue emphasized the dangers of cruising. The PSA consisted 
of a black and white photograph of an empty phone both in a park (presumably Loring Park) at nighttime, 
the light of a street lamp piercing the booth. Outside the focus of the phone booth lay a darkened figure of a 
male looking in the booth’s direction. A red circle with a line across it covers the booth to suggest its 
inherent danger. “Be Safe!” is written in bolded letters above the photograph. The caption below reads: 
“Excitement and danger may lurk in the shadows!” The PSA then proceeds to encourage gay men to avoid 
both dangerous places and to forego of dangerous behaviors. “Violence against innocent persons occurs 
easily in the dark shadows...whether in the park, on the street or in your own neighborhood...Travel in the 
company of friends...Avoid locations where attackers can lurk. Avoid involvement with strangers who may 
have the potential for causing harm.” The PSA acknowledges the “certain excitement” that can come with 
“looking for a trick in the nighttime shadows,” but insists this becomes “a foolhardy game” given the large 
number of assailants that lurk in the shadows.” The PSA ends by informing gay men to practice safety and 
to be particularly careful at night to deny “an attacker the opportunity to commit yet another act of violence 
against Gay men and Lesbians.” The PSA reflects how CUAV interpreted an individual attack against a 
gay man or a lesbian as a symbolic attack on the entire gay and lesbian community. Twin Cities Gaze, Oct. 







 In addition to its print campaign, CUAV scheduled a self-defense workshop held 
at the Gay 90s and a community forum that addressed the causes and solutions to 
violence.106 About 50 people, mostly white gay men, attended the community forum held 
on November 17, 1986, at a local Methodist church.107 The community forum consisted 
of four presentations including a short seminar on how to detect the warning signs of 
violence in people.108 The short seminar was noteworthy for its reliance on expert witness 
                                                
106 The self-defense workshop, held Monday, Nov. 24 1986, at the Gay 90s Dance Annex from 7:00 P.M.- 
9:00 P.M., was not as widely attended as had been expected. Only 10 people were present. CUAV had also 
scheduled a memorial service for the murder victims. “Interoffice Communication from McCarthy 
pertaining to Gay-Related Homicides,” Nov. 7, 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, 
The Minnesota History Center. 
107 After opening the forum by reviewing the 11 murders of publicly identified gay or bisexual men in Twin 
Cities beginning in April of 1984, Coyle proceeded to reiterate to the crowd the importance of cooperating 
with homicide detectives: “Gays and police have to keep working together.” The Twin Cities Gaze 
described Coyle’s strategy with the MPD as “push and cooperate.” Mark Kasel, “Community United 
Against Violence Hosts Bouza At Forum; Two More CUAV Meetings Scheduled in Dec.,” Twin Cities 
Gaze, Nov. 26, 1986. 
108 Among the other three presentations, one included testimony from survivors of anti-gay hate violence. 




testimony. Stoney Bowden, a therapist working with perpetrators of violence, described a 
four-point safety checklist. He lectured that when meeting someone at a gay bar or in an 
anonymous situation that they stop, look, and listen. First, Bowden instructed men to 
“make an initial judgment.” He advised, “If one you’re feeling nervous, that may not be 
irrational.” Second, Bowden urged men to ask questions to reveal more of the “trick’s” 
personality. Third, he recommended that in high-risk situations men ought to observe 
personal security by telling friends where they were going and with whom. And finally, 
Bowden urged that men “take inventory of [their] own vulnerabilities.” Consequently, 
Bowden alerted men to the dangers of substance abuse: “And remember that drinking too 
much and feeling isolated and lonely can make you more vulnerable to someone than you 
might otherwise be.”109 Although he did not mention race, Bowden played on 
Minnesotan’s fear of racial outsiders, suggesting to gay men that they be weary of 
“tricks” that did not look like they belonged, which could be interpreted as being code for 
people of color. In spite of the community forum offering practical steps for gay men to 
minimize their risk, the night’s conversation centered mostly on the proposed position of 
                                                                                                                                            
CUAV employed a number of the strategies mobilized by the latter. Like Andrea Dworkin and Catherine 
MacKinnon, CUAV highlighted the personal experiences of survivors of violence as evidence, in and of 
itself. The specificities of survivors’ personal experiences with violence significantly differed from one to 
the other. The time and location of the assaults ranged from a few weeks to several years prior, and from 
the public street, a party with other gay men, and a college dorm. The assailants in question included both 
straight and gay men. (One of the survivors of anti-gay violence who spoke at the community forum 
included a gay man who described his experience at party in which he was assaulted by another gay man 
after disagreeing with him on a political debate. That survivor of “anti-gay violence” insisted that violence 
did not always come from “outside the group” and that gay men had to watch out for the combination of 
drugs and alcohol as a source of violence, not just “psychotic” individuals.) The vastness of these narratives 
denotes the wide net under which CUAV defined violence. Perhaps, by stretching the parameters of anti-
gay hate violence, CUAV believed it could point to the immediacy for state intervention. For a discussion 
on the hearings of the anti-pornography ordinance in Minneapolis, see: Paul Brest and Ann Vandenberg, 
“Politics, Feminism and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis,” Stanford Law 
Review 39, no. 3 (1987): 607-61.  




a special gay liaison to the police department, illustrating CUAV’s utmost commitment to 
the expansion of policing and surveillance. 
Earlier in the week, Campbell, on behalf of CUAV, wrote a letter to Mayor of 
Minneapolis Donald Fraser, Police Chief Tony Bouza, and Police Captain Jack 
McCarthy. In the letter, Campbell requested their support for a proposed position of 
“temporary special gay assistant to police investigators.” Campbell described the 
liaison’s duties to include working “with police to follow up leads on murders of gay 
men, [and] others killed who frequented Hennepin Avenue establishments.”110 CUAV 
asked that applicants have a “clean police record.”111 So confident was Campbell the 
position would be approved that he announced it to the public even before Fraser, Bouza, 
or McCarthy authorized it. Publicizing the position in the GLC Voice, Campbell implied 
that City Hall had responded favorably to the position. However, the police chief did not 
believe such a position was even necessary.  
In his response to Campbell’s letter, Bouza thanked him for the suggestion, 
agreeing that the police department needed “a system to solicit, collect and evaluate 
information from a gay community that [was] clearly anxious and willing to help.” Bouza 
even conceded that an overview of the department’s investigation was necessary “to 
detect connections; possible patterns or even the possible existence of a killer(s) being 
responsible for more than one case.” However, Bouza considered the task force of three 
                                                
110 The liaison would also “interview gays in person and on phone.” As proposed by CUAV, the assistant 
“would go over other data gathered by police, look for facts that have special meaning to him (sic), ponder 
the material and suggest possible analysis for other investigators.” In addition to having an extensive 
background of knowledge of the Twin Cities gay community, qualifications required that the investigator 
have an “active network of friends in the gay community or bar community who [would] have confidence 
in him or her and be willing to confide in him or her.” “Letter from Tim Campbell to Brian Coyle about 
Police Job Investigator, Oct. 28, 1986,” Box 13, Folder Gay Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center. 
111 Ibid.  
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“top flight” investigators capable of pursuing the aforementioned actions. As such, Bouza 
concluded: “I am not sanguine about chances to fund the position you suggest, nor am I 
convinced it is either needed or practicable.”112 Campbell immediately penned a 
response, expressing his indignation that Bouza had “given so little consideration to the 
idea of hiring a member of the gay community to help investigate the unsolved murders.” 
Campbell expressed that he was not “sanguine” about the effectiveness of the task force. 
If the police department could hire civilians as decoys to entrap gay men in commercial 
sex establishments, Campbell reasoned, then it could surely “solve the problems to hiring 
an assistant to investigate murders on a temporary basis.” Campbell ended his response 
by confessing that CUAV had already received “several serious applications” for the 
position and he exhorted Bouza to review the applications before finalizing his 
decision.113 But, Bouza remained resolute in his opposition to a gay liaison. In an 
interview with the Minnesota Daily, Bouza explained: “We need help in assistance, but 
we have enough of our own investigative experts to perform the job and it’s not common 
practice to hire outsiders [emphasis added].”114 Interestingly enough, Bouza used the 
same rhetoric— “outsiders”—to refer to the gay community that white gay leaders used 
to refer to the racialized poor. Campbell’s persistence that the MPD hire a special gay 
liaison underscores how CUAV attempted to use violence awareness as a backdoor 
attempt to achieve other legislative goals.   
                                                
112 Ibid. 
113 At the community forum, as part of CUAV’s “Violence Awareness” month, Coyle said that the position 
would cost “so little money” that if Fraser and Bouza wanted the position created; they could do so within 
their budgets. He estimated it costing about $3,000. David Scheie, “Gays push for self-defense, police 
protection,” The Surveyor, Dec. 1986. 
114 Tina Burnside, “Gay murders focus of Violence Awareness Month,” Minnesota Daily, Nov. 7, 1986.  
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CUAV reiterated that the special gay liaison was necessary because the police’s 
slow response to solving gay homicides. In fact, Coyle had previously called for the 
formation of CUAV because he did not believe police investigators possessed an 
adequate amount of “insider” information to effectively address anti-gay violence. He 
assured to the Star Tribune, “There are just some things you don’t know unless you’re 
gay.”115 At the community forum, Coyle and Campbell challenged Bouza to recruit 
openly gay police officers from other cities, similar to efforts made to recruit African-
American and Latino officers. Still, the MPD remained unreceptive to the position of 
special gay liaison. At the community forum, Bouza shot back: “We don’t hire a 
Scandinavian when a Scandinavian is murdered, or a black when a black is murdered.” 
Bouza remained steadfast in his insistence that such a position was not necessary or 
logistically possible. First, Bouza explained that gay men and lesbians were already on 
the police force, even if they were not publicly out. Second, Bouza stressed that since the 
MPD was making arrests in the homicides and receiving cooperation from gay men, a 
gay liaison was not necessary. Third, Bouza commented that even if such a position were 
favored, applicants would still have to undergo the same certification as all other public 
officers. The crowd jeered and booed its overt dissatisfaction with Bouza’s statements.116 
For his part, Coyle vowed to continue pushing for city council support in the hiring of a 
gay liaison or any gay presence on the police force. Coyle’s office even wrote a letter to 
the Gay Officers Action League in New York to be published in its newsletter. The letter 
                                                
115 Kate Parry and Kevin Diaz, “Police investigation into killings of gays welcomed,” Star Tribune, Oct. 
23, 1986. 
116 Bill McAuliffe, “Bouza cites diligence in probes of crimes against gays,” Star Tribune, Nov. 18, 1986.; 
David Scheie, “Gays push for self-defense, police protection,” The Surveyor, Dec., 1986.; Kate Parry and 
Kevin Diaz, “Police investigation into killings of gays welcomed,” Star Tribune, Oct. 23, 1986.; “Letter 
from Tim Campbell to Brian Coyle about Police Job Investigator, Oct. 28, 1986,” Box 13, Folder Gay 
Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
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was designed to encourage openly gay or lesbian police officers in the New York Police 
Department to consider applying for openings in Minneapolis. Coyle and Campbell’s 
persistence that the MPD hire a gay liaison illustrates their adamant belief that having a 
greater gay representation on the police force would somehow ameliorate anti-gay 
violence. CUAV’s attempt to secure a gay liaison also illustrates how Coyle and others 
designed CUAV as an extension of the Minneapolis Police Department, one that catered 
specifically to the interests of white gay men. Moreover, the figure of the urban—New 
York City—haunts the heartland—Minnesota—in which the latter repudiates the former 
as the home of the racialized poor and a bastion of vice but still looks to it as a model of 
white gay cosmopolitanism.   
Perhaps Bouza was encouraged to stand his ground at the community forum 
opposing the special gay liaison given the announcement made earlier that day that police 
had arrested a suspect in Churchill’s death. On November 17, 1986, police in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, arrested Willie Bias, a 23-year-old white man, whom police described 
as a “street person.” Police charged Bias with killing Churchill in a failed robbery 
attempt. According to a homicide detective, “Robbery was apparently the motive for the 
killing...It had nothing to do with the victim being gay.117 The suspect’s arrest weakened 
                                                
117 Bias was present at a party hosted by Churchill in his Loring Park apartment the night of the murder. 
According to witnesses, Bias and Churchill argued about a gun at the party. Bias was allegedly overheard at 
the party saying that he intended to rob Churchill. By the end of the night, after the party, Bias had stabbed 
Churchill and set his apartment on fire. Police had not yet discovered Churchill’s body when a beat 
policeman on patrol near Churchill’s home stopped Bias, presumably suspecting him as a “hustler,” as he 
walked in an alley several blocks from Churchill’s apartment. After questioning Bias as to why he was in 
the area, the policeman found a pistol lying in the weeds a short distance from where the conversation had 
taken place. The gun, which was later traced to Churchill, had been stolen by Bias the night of the murder-
arson. Bias fled Minneapolis after the killing, traveling to Texas and then to Baton Rouge. A second-
degree-murder warrant was issued two and a half weeks prior Bias’ arrest. The MPD did not notify the FBI 
because it thought an FBI search would alert Bias that he was under suspicion. Jim Parsons, “Man arrested 
in Churchill killing; robbery seen as motive,” Star Tribune, Nov. 1986.; Jim Schroeder, “Suspect booked in 
Churchill murder,” Equal Time, Nov. 26, 1986. 
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the serial killer theory circulated by CUAV and, thus, undermined their reasoning for a 
gay liaison. The arrest also challenged CUAV’s assessment of Churchill’s murder as one 
motivated by bias.  
Nevertheless, the growing pressure mounted on the MPD by gay leaders 
prompted investigators to intensify their efforts to make arrests in the gay homicides. In 
the early morning hours of November 18, 1986, on an anonymous tip from a citizen who 
saw a Crime Stoppers television segment, police arrested Thomas Jarrett, a 34-year-old 
bisexual black man, at his south Minneapolis workplace, in connection with the 
strangulation death of Phyllis Olson, a trans Native American woman.118 Capt. Jack 
McCarthy explained to the press that the tip came from someone “who knew the 
(suspect’s) life style—that he was bisexual and prone to losing his temper.”119 Homicide 
detectives followed up on the tip and found probable cause to arrest Jarrett, including 
physical evidence linking him to Olson.  
 Prosecutors relied heavily on a bite mark found on Olson’s chest as a key piece of 
evidence against Jarrett. A forensic dentist for the prosecution concluded that Jarrett 
could have bitten Olson.120 Since physical evidence linking Jarrett to Olson was faulty at 
best, police relied instead on racial stereotypes that cast people of color as violent and 
homophobic, and sociological theories of black criminality to prosecute Jarrett. 
According to these theories, only someone as depraved as a black man, a bisexual one at 
that during the AIDS crisis, could have bitten his victim. In spite of his arrest, Jarrett was 
                                                
118 The Star Tribune described Olson as “a 30-year-old gay prostitute who frequently dressed as a woman 
and had tested positive for AIDS.” 
119 “Minneapolis man held in death of gay prostitute,” Star Tribune, Nov. 19, 1986. 
120 Prosecutors charged Jarrett with Olson’s death because his teeth appeared to match bite marks on 
Olson’s body. Jarrett’s defense, however, argued unsuccessfully that such testing was not scientifically 
accurate, that it was still in its infancy and would not be a reliable test. Even if bite mark testing was 
reliable, Jarrett’s defense stressed that there was no physical evidence linking Jarrett to the strangulation. 
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not the assailant in Olson’s death. Even after another man confessed in the summer of 
1987 to killing Olson, Jarrett remained the suspect. After one year behind bars in lieu of a 
$100,000 bond, and less than one week before his trial was to begin, on October 27, 
1987, a Hennepin County District Court judge dismissed first-degree murder charges 
against Jarrett due to DNA testing confirming that blood and hair samples found on the 
scene did not match either Jarrett or Olson.121 Since bail was set so high, the courts 
perhaps feared Jarrett acquired HIV from Olson and would likewise spread the virus. 
After Jarrett’s release, the police department reopened Olson’s case for a second look.122 
To this day, Olson’s case remains unsolved. 
Jarrett’s arrest underscores the limitations of a gay hate crimes activism that 
uncritically celebrated the criminal punishment system as the mediator of anti-
homophobia. Coyle and other gay leaders had long pressured the Minneapolis Police 
                                                
121 Prosecutors revealed that tests conducted by the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation showed samples 
of blood found on Olson’s clothes and near her body did not match either Jarrett or Olson’s blood. The 
Bureau of Criminal Investigation also discovered that hair particle samples from the crime scene did not 
match Jarret’s hair because he was African-American, and the “samples appeared to be from a Native 
American.” Prosecutors defended the lapse of time, claiming they sent the hair and blood samples to the 
Bureau of Criminal Investigations for testing a year prior but did not receive the results until late October 
because of backlog requests. However, even after another man confessed in the summer of 1987 to killing 
Olson, Jarrett remained the suspect. Police did not believe the confession to have been credible as the 
man’s account of the crime was supposedly inaccurate. The forensic dentist also eliminated the man who 
confessed as a suspect because “his teeth did not match the bite marks.” Jim Schroeder, “Hair samples clear 
accused man,” Equal Time, Nov. 11, 1987. 
122 As a result of the MPD reopening Olson’s murder, members of American Indian Gays and Lesbians 
(AIGL) mailed a letter to Police Chief Tony Bouza to express concern over the investigation. The letter, 
which was reprinted by Equal Time in its Jan. 20, 1988 issue, expressed AIGL’s concern that the 
investigation could be “hampered because the media has not been favorable to the victim.” AIGL attached 
a cut-out of a Star Tribune article which negatively portrayed Olson by disclosing her seropositive status 
and by characterizing her as a prostitute. AIGL also worried that Olson’s race and sexuality would work to 
further devalue Olson as a victim. The letter, which identified Olson as a gay man, emphasized: “We are 
further concerned that, as a homosexual and an American Indian, Floyd Olson was a member of two groups 
which are frequently victimized and often discounted due to homophobia and racism. It is our hope that 
these factors will not be a hindrance to a thorough investigation.” AIGL ended its letter by stating that 
Olson was “a victim of the most severe crime,” and therefore the MPD had to pursue the investigation with 
“maximum effort.” Unlike Coyle, AIGL recognized that race collaborated with sexuality to further render 
the life of Olson as disposable. “Letters: Olson murder,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
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Department to make arrests in the gay homicides. Even upon Jarrett’s release, CUAV did 
not come to his defense. Although Coyle, and other members of the organization, 
recognized that law enforcement authorities were purveyors of violence against gender 
and sexual minorities, they perceived police brutality as a problem largely impacting 
communities of color. In light of the string of murders against gay men and transgender 
women, Coyle and other gay leaders offered explanations and provided potential 
solutions that often veered in the direction of more punitive law enforcement methods or 
practices that heralded privacy as safety. This myopic approach came at the expense of 
increasing social programs, banning weapons, or implementing other preventive 
measures anchored in community-based restorative justice. Seeing that their advocacy on 
behalf of anti-gay hate violence victims relied almost exclusively on law enforcement 
agencies, gay community activists expended copious amounts of energy in establishing 
police as protectors rather than perpetrators of violence. Consequently, violence by law 
enforcement agencies and by the state against queers of color was understood as 
operating outside the framework of anti-gay hate violence and, as such, was allowed to 
proceed unquestioned. 
Inasmuch as CUAV demanded that the police department escalate its surveillance 
and investigative work, CUAV missed an opportunity to bring attention to the systemic 
violence experienced by communities of color. Members of CUAV sought to make the 
police the recipient of limited resources that might have been gained from their 
redistribution. They requested that more resources be injected into the police (i.e., 
increasing the police department’s budget, hiring more patrol officers, enforcing harsher 
sentences for repeat offenders, and hiring a special gay liaison) rather than channeling 
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those resources into community organizations. In so doing, CUAV helped fulfill one of 
the central tenets of neoliberalism: the upward redistribution of resources.  
Beginning in the early 1970s, U.S. corporate interests established a 
countermovement in response to global competition and diminishing profit rates. This 
new vision of a national and world order, also known as neoliberalism, was defined by 
competition, inequality, law and order, market discipline, and public austerity. In The 
Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy, 
historian Lisa Duggan offers a historical genealogy of neoliberalism, focusing on its close 
relationship to identity and cultural politics. Duggan outlines that from its inception 
neoliberalism opposed a more equitable redistribution of the world’s resources. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the general standard of redistribution of resources in the United 
States and around the world was channeled upwards, resulting in the greater 
concentration of wealth. In an effort to enhance corporate profit rates, neoliberalism was 
fashioned to dismantle the limited U.S. welfare state implemented in the 1930s through 
the New Deal consensus among business, government, and unions and in place through 
the Great Society era of the 1960s. Writing in regards to neoliberalism’s ascendancy, 
Duggan elaborates, “The raising of profit rates required that money be diverted from 
other social uses, thus increasing overall economic inequality.”123 These economic 
diversions necessitated a supporting political culture, compliant constituencies, and pliant 
social relations. In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate interests laid the groundwork for a 
political and cultural infrastructure that lubricated the upward redistribution of resources 
and the social acceptance of widening inequalities.  
                                                




During this time, one of the earlier stages of neoliberalism, downwardly 
redistributive social movements, including the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, 
feminism, gay and lesbian liberation, and countercultural mobilizations, were attacked 
and discredited by corporate activists. Since these early progressive-left social 
movements adhered to a culture of downward redistribution, their members mobilized to 
eradicate hierarchies and to distribute cultural capital, freedom, money, and political 
power in a downward direction. These groups were shaped by an intersectional analysis 
of inequality; they did not fall into factions with culture on one side and economics on the 
other. Nonetheless, by the 1980s, Duggan asserts that an economics and culture split 
emerged and bifurcated U.S. progressive-left politics. 
In order to facilitate the upward redistribution of resources, neoliberalism is 
presented as separate from politics and culture. Duggan describes that this “rhetorical 
separation of the economic from the political and cultural arenas disguises the upwardly 
redistributing goals of neoliberalism—its concerted efforts to concentrate power and 
resources in the hands of tiny elites.”124 Abstracting economic policy from political and 
cultural life enables neoliberalism to forego accountability or cultural critique as it 
simultaneously enforces the upward redistribution of resources. Since contemporary 
neoliberal policies operate in and through culture and politics, Duggan stresses that the 
economy cannot be abstracted from the state or everyday social relations. In short, 
cultural resources, money, political power, and social organization circulate via the 
categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality.  
                                                
124 Ibid., xv. 
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Neoliberal “equality” politics bolster this ideology of discrete categories of social 
life. Duggan defines this politics as a narrow, stripped-down, non-redistributive form of 
“equality,” implemented for global consumption and made consistent with the upward 
redistribution of resources.125 The homonormative agenda of gay hate crimes activism 
operates within this paradigm of neoliberal equality politics. Owing to CUAV pursuing 
“equality” through liberal reform, this rhetoric of equality was disarticulated from class 
politics and material life. For that reason, gay hate crimes activism worked in the service 
of the naturalizing wide-ranging socio-economic disparities, all the while demanding the 
upward redistribution of state resources to the police.126 Coyle elicited support for the 
upward redistribution of state resources to the police by presenting the expansion of 
punitive measures as beneficial to the safety of white gay men, using affective 
economies, and obscuring its racist, classist, and anti-sex cultural values. Consequently, 
Coyle’s narrow equality rhetoric accommodated rather than opposed the global 
inequalities spurred by neoliberalism.  
 
                                                
125 Duggan compares progressive-left critiques and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (anti-racist 
and anti-imperialist, feminist, lesbian and gay, radical labor, and environmentalist) with the formal, non-
redistributive form of neoliberal “equality” politics drawn from the lesbian and gay rights movement of the 
last thirty years. Duggan argues that these national lesbian and gay civil rights, lobbying, and litigation 
organizations have shifted away from constituency mobilization and community-based consultation toward 
neoliberal rhetoric and corporate decision-making models. (This shift is, in part, the result of the demands 
of fundraising for survival and the national political culture’s move to the right.) Two organizations that 
Duggan declares espouse gay “equality” rhetoric and vouch for specific policies that work within the 
framework of neoliberal politics are the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the Independent Gay Forum 
(IGF). According to Duggan, the HRC and the IGF advance homonormativity, the new sexual politics of 
neoliberalism, through a rhetorical remapping of public and private boundaries devised to diminish gay 
public spheres and disregard vast economic inequalities. In so doing, they rearticulate gay liberation away 
from the progressive and radical left politics of the 1960s and 1970s toward mere access to institutions of 
domestic privacy, the free market, and patriotism. Duggan concludes that mobilizations like the HRC and 
the IGF serve as vital elements in the cultural machinery of neoliberalism. See: “Equality, Inc.,” in The 
Twilight of Equality? 
126 In order to facilitate the upward redistribution of resources, politicians have enacted complex, shifting, 
and unlikely alliances between former foes (i.e., the police and gay leaders). 
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Conclusion: The Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism.   
 By the late-1980s, anti-violence gay activists succeeded in demanding the 
inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected category, alongside race, religion, and 
national origin, in hate crime legislation. Activists forged connections between violence 
and AIDS to bring immediate awareness to their cause. To garner bi-partisan support 
among politicians, they argued that anti-gay violence had reached “epidemic” 
proportions.127 This confluence between AIDS and violence was ardently expressed on 
October 9, 1986, when gay leaders testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice in the first-ever Congressional hearing on anti-gay violence.  
The hearings were scheduled to discuss the extent of anti-gay violence and to 
propose strategies to combat the “growing problem.” An array of witnesses testified 
including law enforcement authorities and social science researchers. In arguing that anti-
gay violence was rising, those who testified emphasized AIDS as a contributing factor. 
They used epidemiological language to frame anti-gay violence as a social disease. By 
way of illustration, Kevin Berrill, Director of NGLTF’s Violence Project, testified: “The 
Gay community is not only battling AIDS, but is also confronting a second epidemic, one 
                                                
127 Despite anti-violence LGBT activists’ insistence of an epidemic of violence, by the end of 1986, the 
Minneapolis Police Department solved 71 percent of the record-tying 48 homicide cases that year. 
Ultimately, it was normal investigative work that resulted in those cases being solved, not the much-
publicized task force created by Bouza. Police investigators made arrests in three of the year’s four gay 
slayings. Only the murder of Fred Riga remained unsolved but they quickly dismissed his death as a logical 
extension of his deviant lifestyle. (In Olson’s case, police made an arrest. However, as I showed above, 
charges were later dropped when DNA tests confirmed that blood samples found on Olson were neither 
hers nor the suspect’s. When Olson was found strangled on a pedestrian overpass, a sweatshirt was knotted 
around her neck and hooked to a fence, prompting some forensic experts to question whether Olson’s death 
was a homicide or act of sexual asphyxia. The defense for Thomas Jarrett argued that Olson died while 
deliberately restricting her supply of air to heighten sexual pleasure. However, a former Hennepin County 
chief medical examiner, along with the FBI, ruled that Olson’s death was likely a homicide given the 
evidence and partly because a public place was an unusual location for such an act of sexual asphyxiation.) 
To this day, no arrests have been made in the deaths of Kieley, Kastner, Olson, and Riga. David Peterson, 
“Hennepin medical examiner’s office torn by professional rivals’ uncivil war,” Star Tribune, May 8, 1988; 
Kevin Diaz, “Detectives solve 71 percent of year’s homicides,” Star Tribune, Dec. 30, 1986. 
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that has received far less attention from our public officials. That epidemic is anti-gay 
violence.” Echoing Berrill’s sentiments was David Wertheimer, head of the New York 
City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, who declared that gay men and lesbians in 
New York City were in the middle of an “epidemic of violence.” Meanwhile, Diana 
Christensen, executive director of San Francisco’s Community United Against Violence, 
testified that the situation was aggravated by public backlash against AIDS. She 
stipulated that “AIDS and homosexuality have become synonymous in the American 
public’s mind...For the homophobic mind, AIDS is simply another justification for 
violence.”128 The committee also heard written testimony from the criminologist, Marvin 
Wolfgang, who testified that anti-gay violence ought to have been a concern to all 
Americans. He proposed, “Just as whites march with blacks in their struggle for civil 
rights, and as non-Jews band with Jews in keeping the lessons of the Holocaust before the 
public eye, so should heterosexuals join with homosexuals in fighting the injustice of 
anti-gay and anti-lesbian violence.” Wolfgang was most famous for his “subculture of 
violence” theory, which postulated that violence served a common, culturally adaptive 
feature of African-American communities. The witnesses at the Congressional Hearing 
were successful enough in linking anti-gay violence with the AIDS crisis that the office 
                                                
128 The Subcommittee heard testimony from three panels of witnesses who argued that violence against gay 
men and lesbians was a serious national problem requiring government intervention. In addition to the three 
panels, a variety of organizations and scholars, both gay and non-gay, presented written testimony. 
“NGLTF Urges Gov’t Action At Congressional Hearings on Violence,” Twin Cities GAZE, Oct. 31, 1986.; 
Dave Walter, “Gays Testify on Homophobic Violence,” The Advocate, Nov. 11, 1986.; William R. Greer, 
“Violence Against Homosexuals Rising, Groups Seeking Wider Protection Say,” New York Times, Nov. 
23, 1986.; Rick Harding, “With violence escalating, NGLTF calls on Congress,” 1986, Box 13, Folder Gay 
Violence, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
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of Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), who chaired the hearing, petitioned the Justice Department 








 Eventually, by 1990, President George H.W. Bush, signed the Hate Crime 
Statistics Act, which required that the Attorney General collect data on crimes committed 
because of the victim’s race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. Whereas 
sodomy repeal had proven largely unsuccessful, hate crime legislation enabled white gay 
leaders to seek civil rights protection, a backdoor attempt for legal recognition. The Hate 
Crime Statistics Act of 1990 was the first federal statute to openly recognize and name 
                                                
129 The spokesman to Rep. Conyers told the New York Times that it appeared “clear from the testimony that 
there have been dramatic increases in violence directed against gay men and lesbians, and the violence 
seems to be connected with the AIDS problem and a general hostility directed against the gay and lesbian 
population.” As a result of the hearing, Conyers’ office also planned to include protection for gay men in 
the civil rights provisions of the Federal criminal code. William Geer, “Violence Against Homosexuals 
Rising,” New York Times, Nov. 23, 1986.  
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gay men and lesbians. At the state level, the Minnesota Legislature passed the bias crimes 
documentation bill in 1988, as a result of the findings by the Governor’s Task Force on 
Prejudice and Violence. The law requires police officers to report incidents that are 
motivated by bias.130 Although Coyle and Campbell were unsuccessful in hiring a special 
gay liaison to the Minneapolis Police Department, they were successful enough in laying 
the groundwork for a greater gay and lesbian presence on the force. By recruiting the 
police in their anti-violence efforts, gay leaders rejected the notion that police were the 
enemy of the gay and lesbian community. This revisionary approach made it possible for 
Janeé Harteau to become Minneapolis’s first-ever female and openly gay police chief in 
2012, some twenty-five years after Campbell and Coyle pleaded for the hiring of a 
special gay liaison.131    
 Gay leaders established anti-violence groups to provide vital services and support 
to victims at a time when community needs were being unmet by other service agencies 
and government offices. Their goals included increasing public awareness about anti-gay 
violence, as well as providing specific legal protections to marginalized populations. To 
promote violence awareness among gay men, activists explicitly forged a connection 
between HIV-prevention and anti-gay violence. Though one could argue that this strategy 
was effective because it showed that specific practices made particular individuals more 
vulnerable to violence, this confluence endorsed a bourgeoning politics of 
homonormativity that failed to critique state violence against queers along racial, class, 
                                                
130 Since 1989, law enforcement agencies have compiled bias-related crime statistics in Minnesota. Also, in 
1989, Minnesota passed the hate crimes penalty bill, which made assaults based on sexual orientation, race 
national origin, religion, sex, age, and disability into gross misdemeanors, punishable by a year’s 
imprisonment, $3,000 fine, or both. Jim Schroeder, “Hate crimes legislation passes Senate committee,” 
Equal Time, Mar. 30, 1988. 




and gender lines. It also bolstered claims for social membership through the compulsory 
performance of gender, sexual, and domestic norms. Undoubtedly, racialized norms of 
sexual hygiene—domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability—very much 
permeated police interactions with gay leaders so that who was understood as a legitimate 
victim of anti-gay hate violence and, by association, who was likely to be a perpetrator of 
that violence was a racialized and classed process. And, lastly, forging a connection 
between HIV-prevention and anti-gay violence placed the onus of responsibility on 
preventing AIDS and violence on individual gay men. By individualizing approaches to 
both AIDS and violence, gay hate crimes activism ensured that the AIDS crisis would be 
further perceived as a moral failing of individuals who brought the disease upon 
themselves, not a social condition abetted by institutional neglect.  
Gay hate crimes activism, therefore, falls short of broad political efforts for social 
justice. First, the assimilationist push of anti-violence gay activists fails to reflect on 
previous commitments to anti-racism, economic redistribution, and feminism by LGBTQ 
organizations. Gay leaders mobilized on behalf of homonormative identities and practices 
that coincided with privacy, propriety, and property. On the other hand, when it came to 
queers of color, leaders, along with police, employed queer criminal archetypes that 
denied multiply marginalized victims of violence any semblance of legibility, construing 
their death as necessary to safeguard homonormative inclusion. Second, the rhetoric of 
gay hate crimes activism isolates particular instances of anti-gay violence as mere acts of 
individual prejudice. For that reason, it obscures an engagement with the structural nature 
of social inequality and, by extension, reifies white racial formations. Third, as a 
neoliberal project that seeks remedies to homophobia within the criminal punishment 
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system, gay hate crimes activism endorses the upward redistribution of resources to the 
police state. All three of these points reveal that anti-violence gay activists seek inclusion 
within systems and institutions that reinforce the inequality and subordination of multiply 
marginalized: all those “deviants” situated outside the legislated rubric of white 
heteronormativity and, more recently, homonormativity. 
In the next chapter, I revisit the anxieties that sex workers of color posed for city 
officials, law enforcement authorities, the press, and gay leaders. In particular, I discuss 
how urban policymakers responded to what they perceived were sex workers of color 
with AIDS who continued to engage in unprotected sex. Threats of racial contagion 
permeated the public’s psyche prompting public health officials to endorse draconian 
ordinances that further criminalized queers of color and women of color in the name of 
safeguarding white heteropatriarchy and readying urban public spaces for the incursion of 




Racialized Bodies on Lockdown: AIDS Moral Panic, and the Criminalization of HIV in 
Times of White Injury  
Introduction.  
The moral panic accompanying HIV/AIDS reflected a crisis in hegemony within 
the American state. At the height of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the mid-1980s, during a 
period of intense social anxiety induced in part by economic distress, mainstream media 
presented sensationalistic cases of sex workers—mostly of color—with HIV/AIDS who 
“knowingly” engaged in sexual activity with bisexual married men, primarily white. 
These stories not only exploited white public fears of HIV/AIDS to warn of the dangers 
of deviating from sexual monogamy and heterosexual marriage. But, through crude 
depictions of sex workers of color as contagious, irresponsible, and toxic, these stories 
also cautioned against interracial sex. In so doing, these stories urged public health 
officials and law enforcement authorities to abandon the civil liberties of sex workers of 
color in favor of protecting the public good. In response, states throughout the country 
adopted a slew of social controls designed to delimit the freedom of movement and 
association of sex workers of color and people with HIV/AIDS (PWHAs). These social 
controls both criminalized the transmission of HIV as they simultaneously sought to 
“sanitize” the built environment, priming urban locations for the influx of private capital. 
Although scholars have previously discussed HIV/AIDS in terms of a moral panic, less 
has been written about the role of white injury in shaping public health and law 
enforcement responses to the epidemic, a significant omission given the advent of 
neoliberal modes of governmentality. Through a queer of color critique lens, I study 
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cases of “non-compliant carriers” from the mid-1980s to describe the ways in which the 
moral panic about the urban presence of uncontrolled racialized sexuality was 
symptomatic of and referenced aspects of the more general crises of economic 
marginalization and dwindling social services triggered by neoliberalism. Without a 
doubt, the moral panic of HIV/AIDS was both a sexual and racial project and the basis of 
white normative recovery.  
  Scholars have repeatedly theorized the concept of a “moral panic” in cultural and 
media studies and in the sociology of deviance. They have used this analytical concept to 
evaluate situations in which individuals and groups are imagined to pose a threat to the 
future or reproduction of society. In his 1972 book, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The 
Creation of the Mods and Rockers, British sociologist Stanley Cohen first communicated 
his concept of a moral panic in his study of youth subcultures, delinquency, and police 
control. Drawing from the influential school of “new” criminology from the 1960s, 
Cohen defines a moral panic as “an episode in which a particular [vulnerable or 
powerless] group or phenomenon becomes defined as a threat to the integrity of the 
nation-state” and to societal values and interests. In a moral panic, Cohen argues, the 
media, clergy, elected officials, and criminal justice officials, through a collaboration of 
interests, construe certain individuals, groups, and events as threats to society. This 
characterization, in turn, enables moral entrepreneurs to single out marginalized 
individuals and groups for action through self-serving solutions.1 Cohen strongly 
                                                
1 The mechanisms of a moral panic, according to Cohen, are as follows: “A condition, episode, person or 
groups of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people…Sometimes the panic passes over and its 




suggests that the mainstream media is partly responsible for moral panics by politically 
inventing and mobilizing an exaggerated risk that essentially distorts the immediate 
reality.2  
In order for a moral panic to materialize, there needs to be a preexisting set of 
social attitudes and feelings towards the group labeled “folk devils.” For instance, in his 
inquiry into the perceived problem of muggings in England in the 1970s, cultural theorist 
Stuart Hall discovers that accounts in the British press about this “new” phenomenon of 
“muggings” were merely inflated claims “factualized” in the media with the assistance of 
elected officials and the criminal justice system. These groups, Hall argues, purposefully 
set off the moral panic surrounding the muggings in response to changing racial 
demographics. Unlike their parents, those young immigrants, primarily black Caribbeans, 
accused of presiding over the muggings were unwilling or unable to politically assimilate 
in the face of mounting economic disenfranchisement and racist state policies.3 Hall’s 
investigation into the muggings reveals that moral panics tend to take place during 
moments of social anxiety when a heightened risk by “evildoers” sparks societal reaction. 
Moreover, Hall’s analysis also confirms that moral panics, to achieve social equilibrium, 
                                                                                                                                            
repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way that 
society perceives itself.” Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and 
Rockers (New York: Routledge, 1972), 9.  
2 For Cohen, the mass media provides “a main source of information about the normative contours of a 
society…about the boundaries beyond which one should not venture and about the shapes the devil can 
assume.” Ibid., 17.  
3 According to Hall, moral panics are indicative of how people are persuaded “to experience and respond to 
contradictory developments in ways which make the operation of state power legitimate, credible and 
consensual. To put it crudely, the ‘moral panic’ appears to us to be one of the principal forms of ideological 
consciousness by means of which a ‘silent majority’ is won over to the support of increasingly coercive 
measures on the part of the state, and lends its legitimacy to a ‘more than usual’ exercise of control.” Stuart 




bolster mechanisms of policing and control while circulating new cultural meanings via 
media.  
 In spite of the fact that Cohen and Hall shed light on the processes through which 
conditions, episodes, and groups become defined as threats, they do not address sexuality 
as a constitutive factor of moral panics. Gayle Rubin, Jeffrey Weeks, and Simon Watney, 
among others, later linked sexuality to Cohen’s scholarship by observing that anti-
homosexual discourse plays a central role in moral panics about HIV/AIDS.4 They argue 
that social commentary on the epidemic drew largely from prevailing discourses on 
sexuality at the time. And, given the rise of neo-Conservatism in the West in the 1980s, 
these discourses were inherently anti-homosexual in nature.  
 In her 1984 essay, “Thinking Sex,” cultural anthropologist Gayle Rubin provides 
a cultural model for discussing moral panics in relation to sexuality in the United States. 
                                                
4 The cultural politics of homosexuality in the United States have been saturated with moral panics. The 
“sex crime panic” that swept through the country in the late-1940s and the first half of the 1950s enacted a 
major repressive threat for homosexuals. During this time of heightened national anxiety, various iterations 
of sexual expression and identity were criminalized. Because many of the sexual psychopath laws of the 
time applied to private, consensual same-sex behavior between adults, the sex crime panic encouraged “a 
public understanding of homosexuality in which the criminal sexual psychopath and the homosexual were 
just different points on the same continuum—the difference between their psychological makeup a matter 
of degree, not of kind.” In “Murder, Perversion, and Moral Panic: The 1954 Media Campaign Against 
Miami’s Homosexuals and the Discourse of Civic Betterment,” Fred Fejes examines how the murder and 
rape of a seven-year-old girl in Miami, Florida, in the summer of 1954 prompted a new awareness of 
Miami’s homosexuals from a colorful if somewhat embarrassing part of Miami nightlife, “discreet 
tolerance,” to a serious threat to the safety and moral wellbeing of the community, “stigmatized tolerance.” 
The murder occurred just as the city was undergoing rapid growth and transformation from a pre-war resort 
community to a postwar major metropolis. According to Fejes, this was a time when a number of social and 
media discourses and practices about sexuality, criminality, and civic betterment coalesced to mark the 
beginning of a moral panic whose target was Miami’s homosexuals. Fejes shows that the city’s media and 
civic leaders implemented and enforced the campaign against the city’s homosexuals as part of an overall 
campaign to redefine the image of Miami as a major, respected urban center, free of vice and flamboyance. 
Local government took heed of this panic and in October of that year passed a Miami law designed to shut 
down bars catering to homosexuals. Fejes analysis substantiates how moral panics can be harnessed to 
fundamentally change the social meanings attached to particular sexual expressions and identities in the 
name of protecting the family and upholding dominant capital interests tied to private development. Fred 
Fejes, “Murder, Perversion, and Moral Panic: The 1954 Media Campaign against Miami’s Homosexuals 
and the Discourse of Civic Betterment,” Journal of History of Sexuality 9, no. 3 (2000): 305-347.  
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Writing in the context of a spiraling HIV/AIDS epidemic, Rubin expanded Cohen’s 
concept of a moral panic by defining it as a crusade enacted against a sexual community 
or deviant sexual practice. For Rubin, moral panics, therefore, are a method of inflecting 
structural discipline and punishment on particular categories of sexual identities and 
practices. Her cultural model famously describes a “charmed circle” of social hierarchy 
as the top tier where the sexual “normal,” or those who adhere to “traditional” 
heteronormative standards, reside. On the other end, relegated to the lower ranks of the 
social hierarchy are the sexual “scapegoats,” who because of their sexualities are deemed 
“evil.” The New Right, by magnifying social anxieties pertaining to HIV/AIDS, 
according to Rubin, was successful in tapping into this source of “erotophobia” in its 
accession to state power.5 Rubin’s theorization of sexual hierarchies in the United States 
attests to the importance of gender and sexual normativity in the administration of 
citizenship in societies.  
 More broadly, Rubin’s interpretation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic elucidates how 
moral panics have increasingly become infused with sexuality to achieve cultural and 
political objectives. As a sub-form of moral panics, sex panics encapsulate that dynamic. 
Sex panics are oftentimes manifested through the figure of “sexual scapegoats” whose 
threat is rooted in sexuality. Historian Jeffrey Weeks ascribes “the prostitute as ‘fallen 
woman’ [and] the pedophile as ‘child molester’” as two examples of a “particular species 
of monsters” that the mainstream media stereotypes as sexual threats to the social order.6 
                                                
5 Gayle Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” in The Lesbian and 
Gay Studies Reader, ed. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 3-44. 
6 Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meanings, Myths, and Modern Sexualities (London: 
Routledge, 1985), 45.  
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In his historical analysis of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and the New Right, 
Weeks explains that sexuality operates as a “a fertile source of moral panic, arousing 
intimate questions about personal identity, and touching on crucial social boundaries.”7 
Weeks’ point is that sexuality functions as a proxy for other social anxieties. He explains, 
“The erotic acts as a crossover point for a number of tensions whose origin lie elsewhere: 
of class, gender, and racial location, of intergenerational conflict, moral acceptability and 
medical definition [emphasis added].”8 If sexuality operates as a proxy for other social 
anxieties during a moral panic, as Rubin and Weeks suggest, then the concept of moral 
panic itself is limited in its ability to theorize the relationship between such wide-ranging 
social phenomena.  
Given these limitations, historian Simon Watney emphasizes the inadequacy of 
using the concept of moral panic to explain the overall ideological policing of sexuality, 
in general, and the panic associated with HIV/AIDS, in particular. In challenging moral 
panic theory’s ability to fully explain the British response to the epidemic in the 1980s, 
Watney insists that it is “important to avoid any temptation to think of the ongoing AIDS 
crisis as a form of ‘moral panic,’ which carries the temptation that it is an entirely 
discrete phenomenon, distinct from other elements and dramas in the perpetual moral 
management of the home.”9 Moral panic theory, Watney argues, is limiting because it 
presents social phenomena as discrete and unconnected. Proceeding from this line of 
thinking, HIV/AIDS is not a distinct, coherent, and progressing moral panic. Rather, it is 
“the latest variation in the spectacle of the defensive ideological rearguard 
                                                
7 Ibid., 44.    
8 Ibid.  
9 Simon Watney, “The Spectacle of AIDS,” in AIDS: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Activism, ed. Douglas 
Crimp (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 75.  
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action…mounted on behalf of ‘the family’ for more than a century” to buttress the 
“profoundly unstable identities” those institutions of family life induce.10 Watney 
rightfully avoids heralding HIV/AIDS moral panic as a single moment in history unique 
onto itself. Instead, he couples the panic associated with the epidemic to the endless 
Western “scandal” of homosexuality, ever reminding us of the danger of identifying 
individual “moral panics” in a simple one-to-one fashion with their targets since this 
approach forecloses an understanding of how social phenomena intersect.11 Although the 
works of Rubin, Weeks, and Watney provide us with a much needed examination of 
sexuality as a category of analysis in moral panics, these accounts fail to address the 
interconnections between anti-homosexual discourse and racism in the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, a connection particularly important given not only the disproportionate number 
of people of color impacted by the disease, but also the discursive racialization of the 
epidemic itself—both abroad and domestically.      
HIV/AIDS reflected a symbolic attack on white supremacy. White Americans’ 
need to re-assert supremacy in the face of mounting economic conservatism and the 
growing political clout of (some) people of color fueled the moral panic associated with 
HIV/AIDS. As mainstream media and politicians represented whiteness under siege in 
U.S. society, the moral panic of HIV/AIDS became a crucial site for securing the central 
and dominant cultural position of white supremacy. AIDS moral panic communicates the 
social experience of white injury. In the 1980s, as many white Americans witnessed 
cutbacks in state and federal funding in welfare, education, and social services, many of 
                                                
10 Simon Watney, Policing Desire: Pornography, AIDS, and the Media, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 43.   
11 Ibid.  
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them conflated their mounting economic instabilities with their escalating racial 
anxieties, animating an ideology of white injury. In a changing global economy that 
commands gendered and racialized labor, white injury symbolizes the incompetence and 
impotence encountered by many white (male) Americans. As an ideology that portrays 
white Americans as victims of efforts to mitigate racial inequality and injustice, white 
injury, according to social theorist Lisa M. Cacho, is “a node in a network of intensifying 
the suffering of people of color in order to (once again) artificially augment the wealth, 
opportunities, and power of white middle-class people in U.S. society.”12 The ideology of 
white injury inverts social hierarchies so that the racialized poor are perceived as 
perpetrators and the state and its white voting constituents are identified as victims. In the 
process of this inversion, the state, capital, and white Americans escape accountability.  
AIDS moral panic, as white injury, provided white Americans with a guise to 
reinvent themselves and to bolster cultural, economic, and political structures in the midst 
of white supremacy’s dwindling dominance. Contrary to popular belief, moral panics do 
not represent chaos or lawlessness. On the contrary, moral panics generate well-known 
forms of political and social organization. Sociologist Roger Lancaster notes that moral 
panics resemble what anthropologists call “social revitalization movements” which 
describe efforts to restore social relations in the wake of some real or perceived threat or 
against some state of social collapse or moral decay. Lancaster elaborates, “Whenever a 
                                                
12 Cacho theorizes white injury in relation to Proposition 187 in California. In 1994, California voters 
infamously approved a measure that curtailed education and healthcare to undocumented immigrants. 
Proponents argued that the measure was necessary to mitigate the economic and social crises afflicting the 
state. For Cacho, Proposition 187 did not originate solely out of economic concerns but from a history of 
“white injury” in anti-immigrant discourses. Cacho argues that supporters levied the measure as an effort to 
assuage the “suffering” of white Americans in California allegedly spurred by the illegality of 
undocumented workers and their families. See: Lisa M. Cacho, “‘The People of California Are Suffering’: 
The Ideology of White Injury in Discourses of Immigration,” Cultural Values 4.4 (2000): 393.  
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race/class group perceives itself as being in crisis or decline, its members can seek to 
revitalize or renovate themselves by applying the reconstructive logic of moral panic.”13 
Lancaster comments that political responses to perceived moral peril serve as a form of 
mass mobilization that seeks to transform society in particular ways. In the context of the 
shifting political economy of the 1980s, HIV/AIDS moral panic was not necessarily an 
isolated phenomenon but a connective strategy mobilized by the dominant class to restore 
hegemony in civil society through the confinement and policing of the racialized poor.  
Moral panics are popular during moments of crisis because they have the potential 
to alter future society in ways that please the interests of the ruling groups that initiated 
the panic in the first place. Although moral panics may emerge from exaggerated fears 
that distort social reality, their effects are quite material. New institutional or 
organizational apparatuses, along the lines of surveillance, regulation, discipline, and 
punishment, are created to deal with the threats. And those alleged perpetrators are 
dehumanized and stripped of their rights by these mechanisms. In perpetuating structural 
violence and promoting forms of inferior citizenship, cultural anthropologist Gilbert 
Herdt asserts that moral panics “expose the ideologies, hierarchies, and social fissures of 
societies” while strengthening the hegemony of elites.14 White Minnesotans harnessed 
AIDS moral panic to demand increased policing as a means of protecting themselves and 
their loved ones from the changing racial demographics of the state.  
Moral panics, thus, are likely to flare up during periods of intense economic stress 
because they provide the means for displacing or redirecting unwanted emotions and 
                                                
13 Roger N. Lancaster, Sex Panic and the Punitive State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2011), 30.  
14 Gilbert Herdt, “Introduction: Moral Panics, Sexual Rights, and Cultural Anger,” in Moral Panics, Sex 
Panics: Fear and the Fight Over Sexual Rights (New York: NYU Press, 2009), 18.   
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experiences associated with larger patterns of social failure. They have the effect of 
diverting responsibility for economic insecurity away from the state towards imagined 
others at the margins of society.  
In the United States, moral panics have historically obtained their power through 
the cultural anger exhibited by working- and middle-class whites for the benefit of 
elites.15 Since these spectacles of crime and victimization deflect a focus from quotidian 
business practices and policies that render people economically vulnerable, the 
mainstream media and the political establishment make use of orchestrated cultural anger 
to fuel moral and sex panics. Central to prodding acceptance of neoliberal policies of 
deregulation, incarceration, and privatization, is panic—in all its guises. In The Shock 
Doctrine, political commentator Naomi Klein argues that business interests and free-
marketeers foist unpopular laissez-faire policies by formulating them as responses to 
catastrophes and emergencies.16 Essentially, moral panics can be used to harness 
transformations in the political economy. Klein urges us to consider how moral panics are 
instrumental in coercing people into embracing free market capitalist solutions and, I 
would add, urging people to conform to gender, sexual, and domestic space norms—
racialized norms of sexual hygiene, which operate as a proxy for white supremacy.   
In this chapter, I show that the symbolic reordering of urban space in the 1980s 
was a reflex of sexual anxieties tied to white injury and concerns activated by the shift in 
the political economy of central cities in the United States. AIDS moral panic proved 
particularly salient because it provided elites with the means to “cleanse”—through the 
                                                
15 Herdt defines cultural anger as “the marshaling of intense emotion across diffuse domains and arenas of 
action to unite disparate individuals and groups in political pursuit of a common enemy or sexual 
scapegoat.” Ibid., 5. 
16 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan, 2007).   
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implementation of neoliberal urban policies—both the social body and the built 
environment of sexual miscreants, particularly sex workers of color with HIV/AIDS. I 
argue that the moral panic associated with HIV/AIDS served racial and political interests, 
employing the threat of non-white transmission to cultivate technologies of social control 
and urbanization. Public health officials and urban policymakers surveyed, zoned, and 
tidied up the city through technologies of social control designed to banish, constrain, and 
discipline racialized subjects deemed “high-risk.” To garner support for these policies 
and practices, elites eschewed structural analyses of transmission in favor of discourses 
of racialized deviance. This process was further corroborated when white gay leaders 
actively participated in the demonization of racialized sexuality. In conjunction with 
mainstream media, law, and public health, white gay leaders used moral panic discourses 
that were racialized to make poor, people of color the center of the panic around 
HIV/AIDS. This move provided white gay leaders with a space to vouch for the social 
value of white gay men infected with the virus. Since matters of sexual hygiene 
comprised a significant portion of the discourse of respectability, white gay leaders 
defined the social position of gay men and lesbians by emphasizing their difference from 
poor, people of color—both heterosexual and homosexual. In short, sex workers of color 
mobilized gay leaders into a nascent homonational collective over and against the 
racialized bodies that undermined the morality and respectability on which white gay 
leaders rallied for social recognition. By pursuing this political strategy, gay community 
activists inadvertently attributed social inequality to the mere nonconformity of social 
norms and, as a result, foreclosed a critique of structural inequality’s crucial role in 
abetting the epidemic.  
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I first look at the role of the mainstream media in fabricating the moral panic 
surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic by discussing the case of Fabian Bridges, a black 
gay man with AIDS, who was accused of recklessly exposing others to the virus. I 
analyze how the media’s representation of Bridges purposefully stoked anxieties about 
interracial sexual relations. The case of Bridges, and others like him including Rea 
Robinson, another alleged sex worker of color in the Twin Cities region, alert us to the 
centrality of white injury in shaping public health and law responses to HIV/AIDS. This 
neoliberal project placed the interests of not only municipal governments into play but 
those of white gay organizations as well. As I reveal, the need to police and discipline the 
behavior of PWHAs and sex workers of color was more than a self-imposed prerogative 
of heterosexual agencies and institutions, it was also a duty performed by white gay 
organizations and a white gay middle-class, evermore invested in a politics of 
respectability, to re-energize a white liberal discourse and practice of “Minnesota Nice.” I 
frame AIDS moral panic as the nucleus for producing respectability among white gay 
leaders and their constituents, a respectability politics that worked to criminalize people 
of color with HIV/AIDS and helped extend the media and the law’s neoliberal advances. 
Rather than thinking of AIDS moral panic as episodic, I propose that we think of it as a 
continuing struggle of race and sexuality.  
“I guess I’m to the point where I just don’t give a damn:” The Fabian Bridges 
Story.  
  As one of the most important institutions shaping mainstream opinion and 
delineating community goals, the mainstream media, Stanley Cohen argues, is the 
originator and main culprit in the construction of moral panics by practicing a type of 
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sensationalist journalism that spreads fearful imagery and ideas that actually distort the 
facts.17 Inasmuch as mass media possesses the capacity to appall, outrage, or conjure 
angst and terror, it is indispensable to the mechanics of moral panics.18 Although moral 
panics have occurred throughout history, in the 20th century, the media occupied a central 
element in their development by providing, maintaining, and regulating “the available 
frameworks and definitions of deviance, which structure both public awareness of and 
attitudes toward social problems.”19 Those running mainstream media institutions 
determine the significance of everyday interactions when they dictate what should be 
classified under the category of “news,” and, accordingly, what should be interpreted as 
important. Historically, white men have exercised authority over these institutions. 
Provided that mainstream media’s institutionalized relationship with the dominant parties 
among race, class, and gender groupings, we can witness how cultural elites mobilize 
moral panic discourses in civil society and media as a means of fabricating collective 
narratives and cultural scripts that enforce hegemony.20 As an instrument of elites, the 
mainstream media, through excessive news coverage and strong editorial support, can 
marshal public opinion and oblige action by local government in support of particular 
agendas and policies. I reveal in this chapter that mainstream media, moral entrepreneurs, 
                                                
17 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. 
18 Media companies maintain a vested in the manufacture and administration of particular types of fear. 
According to Lancaster, mass media instigates panic to sell newspapers and magazines, to urge community 
building, to subdue dissent, and to nurture other kinds of social discipline. These features play a crucial role 
in fabricating panic as a normal condition in the United States. Lancaster, Sex Panic.  
19 Tim O’Sullivan, Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 
1994), 186.   
20 Fred Fejes breaks modern media-driven moral panics into three stages. First, an event and/or a group 
garner extensive media coverage. This attention then leads to the implementation of a primary frame of 
reference in which subsequent events are interpreted. Second, continued media attention amplifies the 
initial frame and interprets the event and/or the group as threats to the larger moral order of society. Third, 
given the undercurrent of panic, greater state control and regulation is enacted to solve the problem. 
However, as Fejes points out, the perceived threat is all out of proportion to the actual reality. Fejes, 
“Murder, Perversion, and Moral Panic.” 
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and white gay leaders repeatedly incited and allayed the public’s racial and sexual 
anxieties in order to justify neoliberal policies of privatization, retrenchment, and 
incarceration that facilitated the subsequent gentrification of central cities in the United 
States. These mainstream discourses and practices further marginalized those who did not 
serve the interests of elites, namely the racialized poor.   
 From early in the epidemic, mainstream media constructed and circulated 
representations of PWHAs that inflamed the moral panic associated with the disease.21 
The state’s absence in public policy on HIV/AIDS provided mainstream media with an 
opportunity to step in and assemble its own narrative. What mainstream media produced, 
Martha Gever observes, were the very same sensationalist fears it purported to 
objectively arbitrate.22 Since AIDS commentary inexhaustibly focused on the non-
existence threat of transmission by casual contact, the moral panic associated with 
HIV/AIDS destabilized scientific knowledge. In its place, a cultural agenda that was 
“medically misinformed…socially misleading and politically motivating” shaped the 
media, public, and state response to the epidemic.23 Needless to say, the mainstream 
media’s disavowal of epidemiology in lieu of a “moralized etiology of disease” rendered 
its own audience at risk of HIV infection by evading attention from scientifically proven 
means of blocking transmission.24 In shaping the public’s perception of HIV/AIDS, 
broadcast journalism and print media—instead of allying fears—provoked a continued 
state of fear among the American public.  
                                                
21 James Kinsella, “The AIDS Channel,” in Covering the Plague: AIDS and the American Media (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989).   
22 Martha Gever, “Pictures of Sickness: Stuart Marshall’s Bright Eyes,” in AIDS: Cultural Analysis, 
Cultural Activism, ed. Douglas Crimp (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).   
23 Watney, “The Spectacle of AIDS,” 80.  
24 Ibid., 72. 
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In 1986, when it became apparent that HIV/AIDS could pose a threat to “the 
general population,” a vague term, according to James Kinsella, that white journalists 
used to refer to themselves and those they knew personally, mass media conveniently 
shifted its focus to covering HIV/AIDS.25 This threat narrative subsequently dominated 
the airwaves and print. Major U.S. newspapers and magazines published cover stories on 
the imminent danger HIV/AIDS posed, not to risk groups such as gay or bisexual men 
and IV-drug users of color, but to white, heterosexual, middle-class suburban 
Americans.26 Mainstream media used white women and children as a compelling way of 
telling the story of the epidemic. In particular, the most innocent victims, Douglas Crimp 
observes, were the white, middle-class hemophiliac children, including Ryan White, who 
were “so innocent that they [could] even be shown comforted, hugged, and played 
with.”27 (The lack of news stories devoted to women and children of color being infected 
by HIV implies that the category of “innocent” was racially inflected.) News media 
played an instrumental role in disseminating the ideology of white injury. Through their 
stories of white women and children as helpless victims of AIDS and their 
characterizations of most gay men and prostitutes of color as agents of HIV, news media 
stressed white injury and minimized the state’s culpability in fomenting the epidemic.  
                                                
25 Kinsella, “The AIDS Channel,” 210.   
26 Since the public already perceived gay men and “junkies” as the culprits of the epidemic, a gay man or 
an IV-drug user with AIDS did not figure as a story in and of itself. On the other hand, white heterosexual 
people with AIDS, primarily women and children, were frequently regarded as innocent victims. Gever, 
“Pictures of Sickness.”  
27 These white, middle-class, hemophiliac children included Dwight Burke, a white baby from Crescent, 
Pennsylvania, who was dying from the disease after his father who was a hemophiliac infected his mother. 
Another such figure was Ryan White, a white teenager from Kokomo, Indiana, who acquired the virus as a 
hemophiliac. White’s fight to stay in school after he was diagnosed with AIDS galvanized the nation’s 
attention and enlisted the support of celebrities including Elton John. Douglas Crimp, “Portraits of People 
with AIDS,” in Melancholia and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2002), 90.  
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 Despite the newfound media interest, the overuse of images of white hemophiliac 
children gravely distorted the facts over who was actually acquiring the virus and 
developing the disease. According to a study conducted by the Center for Media and 
Public Affairs of television depictions of PWHAs in the United States, heterosexuals 
were ten times more likely to be shown than gay or bisexual men despite the latter being 
eight times more likely to contract HIV.28 Not only were these enduring cases 
heterosexual, they were almost always white and middle-class despite HIV/AIDS among 
heterosexuals being largely relegated to African-Americans and Latinx. Since blacks and 
Latinx have been construed as racially other vis-à-vis their alleged sexual deviance, cases 
of them becoming infected by HIV did not garner the same public attention or outcry. 
Therein lay a contradiction. On the one hand, the risk of transmission to white 
heterosexuals was relatively minor. On the other hand, AIDS advocates realized early on 
that perhaps the only way they would garner attention by the government and the media 
was by stoking the fears of white heterosexual transmission.29 Still, by largely focusing 
on white heterosexuals, media coverage distorted who was acquiring the disease.30 This 
                                                
28 Kinsella, “The AIDS Channel,” 220.  
29 See: Jennifer Brier, Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009).   
30 When gay or bisexual men and IV-drug users of color were the main protagonists of news stories, they 
were almost always portrayed in a negative light. One of the central problems with the epidemic, Crimp 
articulates in his critique of early media representations of PWHAs, is the “bureaucratic abstraction” of 
those living with the virus. As a result, the portrait of the PWHA in print and television became a genre 
onto itself to “give AIDS a face,” to “bring AIDS home,” so to speak. Crimp identifies the infamous set of 
pictures of PWHAs by Nicholas Nixon as one of the most notable entries to this genre. In Nixon’s portraits, 
we saw the “AIDS victim” as a hospitalized subject “ravaged, disfigured, and debilitated by the 
syndrome…alone, desperate” and, ultimately, relinquished to impending death. Such portraiture, Crimp 
contends, was designed to deny difference by urging the audience to see itself reflected in the images. This 
representative strategy, however, privatized the mode of transmission by obscuring the institutional neglect 
that facilitated the spread of the virus. Early media representations of PWHAs such as Nixon’s withheld 
how the epidemic was abetted by the government’s policy of benign neglect. According to Crimp, Nixon’s 
photographic framing of PWHAs obscured “the mostly deliberate failure of public policy at every level of 




distortion strengthened public fears and shaped the perceptions and, by extension, actions 
of policymakers.  
 Scholars have largely attributed the media’s early portrayal of HIV/AIDS to 
homophobic sentiment. Be that as it may be, fears of racialized sexuality also animated 
the cultural anger associated with AIDS moral panic. The state’s absence in public policy 
on HIV/AIDS created an opening for mainstream media to step in and create its own 
narrative. Included within that narrative was a cultural agenda of morality. The other part 
of the narrative centered on recycling preexisting categories of racialized sexual 
deviance. As it was becoming apparent that HIV/AIDS disproportionately impacted 
people of color, mainstream media began circulating stories that exploited deep-rooted 
fears of interracial sexual relations. These stories centered on the mythic figure of the 
prostitute of color who purposefully terrorized clients and their families by spreading 
disease. Even if these men and women of color were not prostitutes, they were always 
already understood as suspect given ongoing perceptions of racialized sexuality as 
“excessive.” Racism and, in particular, anti-blackness contributed to fueling the waves of 
paranoia that mainstream media incubated in reporting on HIV/AIDS. Under these 
circumstances, racialized sexual anxieties fused with homophobia to produce a particular 
discourse of AIDS moral panic. Because they interpreted the epidemic as evidence of 
                                                                                                                                            
conduct massive and ongoing preventive education campaigns.” The administration of President Ronald 
Reagan infamously delayed and, at times, criminally obstructed funding measures for medical care, 
research, and social services for PWHAs. Yet, none of these early media representations recognized the 
disease’s public dimension or acknowledged the social conditions that engendered and perpetuated the 
crisis (e.g., racism, homophobia, government inaction, and inadequate healthcare and housing). What the 
media did sanction were stories that only strengthened the public perception that people were dying 
because of personal irresponsibility. Conversely, whenever early media representations of AIDS portrayed 
public fears, prejudices and misunderstandings, these were always conveyed as individual. In doing so, the 
role of broadcast television and print media in planting and cultivating the seeds of panic were never 
acknowledged. Crimp, “Portraits of People with AIDS,” 86, 91.  
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racialized sexual deviance, policymakers implemented a number of punitive measures 
that ran counter to halting the spread of the virus. Nonetheless, a single-issue lens cannot 
tell that story; it merely focuses on homophobia. What we need instead is an 
intersectional approach to broach the crosscutting political, social, and economic factors 
that fueled the HIV/AIDS epidemic in its local, national, and global permutations.    
 The mass mobilization of racist and homophobic characterizations of PWHAs—
accounts which actively elided the role of the government—served as the ideological 
fodder on which AIDS moral panic could propagate. But, if moral panics mask other 
social anxieties, then AIDS moral panic was not about the virus or disease, per se. Taking 
into account the shifts in the country’s political economy, I argue that AIDS moral panic 
symbolized white injury, or a desire to restore white supremacy and heteropatriarchy at a 
moment in time when capital and the state apparatus ushered in a changing global 
economy and neoliberal forms of governmentality, replete with a cultural emphasis on 
morality and privatized “family values.” That is, HIV and narratives of its cross-racial 
transmission functioned as a metaphor for the material threat of dwindling white 
supremacy in the United States. As I discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, 
beginning in the late-1970s and culminating in the 1980s, morality became a rallying cry 
for conservatives. As a result of the Civil Rights movement, the women’s movement, and 
gay liberation, conservatives berated society for supposedly undermining the established 
order of capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and white supremacy. Neoliberalism, therefore, was 
a means of re-centering white supremacy and heteropatriarchy as much as it was a means 
of accumulating capital. With this goal in mind, cultural representations of PWHAs by 
mainstream media, a technology of the state and private capital, were commissioned in 
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support of neoliberal policies including retrenchment (the curtailment of social services), 
privatization (the sanitation of the public sphere and the body politic of “immoral” and 
“diseased” bodies), and punishment (the passage of punitive measures such as “contact 
tracing,” non-compliant carrier ordinances and quarantine orders). The cultural 
representations of prostitutes of color, as I indicate below, were ideologically fixated to 
achieve those neoliberal policies. Prostitutes of color were easy targets. Although their 
status as PWHAs could illustrate the interplay of structural factors in mediating risk for 
transmission, mainstream media effortlessly abstracted the state’s role in the epidemic by 
individualizing their transmission as the mere result of personal irresponsibility, the latest 
example of racialized sexuality’s inherent deviance and non-compliance. The media’s 
racial storytelling of the AIDS crisis capitalized upon a shared social lexicon that berated 
racialized sexuality as intrinsically dangerous.  
 As mainstream media obsessed over the threat HIV/AIDS posed to white 
heterosexual populations, it placed no such focus on how the epidemic was wreaking 
havoc on those most at risk, namely gay and bisexual men, and IV-drug users of color. 
Perhaps with an awareness of the disease’s faceless abstraction, WCCO-TV, the CBS 
affiliate in Minneapolis, a major local media conglomerate in its own right, in partnership 
with the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), searched for subjects to feature in a story 
about the epidemic’s impact. Fabian Bridges was not the story WCCO had initially set 
out to tell.31 He was penniless, hungry, and dying of AIDS.32 When he appeared on 
                                                
31 The Frontline episode begins with the WCCO-TV crew roaming the country in search of a “good” AIDS 
story. In the summer of 1985, the WCCO team had ventured to Houston after learning that the gay 
community there had been “hurt badly” in a referendum and would be “very vulnerable” to an outbreak of 
AIDS moral panic. WCCO was unable to locate enough material to justify an entire documentary. 




camera, Bridges, a “wiry,” 30-year-old African-American gay man from Houston, Texas, 
spoke in an “affectless” voice, looking frail and vulnerable.33   
 On March 19, 1986, WCCO broadcast its first version of the Bridges story for the 
Twin Cities’ consumption. Less than a week later, PBS then re-aired the story, this time 
in a special two-hour episode of the documentary series, Frontline, titled “AIDS: A 
National Inquiry.”34 The Frontline episode, one of the first primetime productions about 
AIDS in the United States, followed the last, lonely months of Bridges as he moved from 
city to city in an unsuccessful attempt to secure shelter and support. Although WCCO 
and PBS might hoped to provide a human face to the epidemic through Bridges, the 
documentary promulgated a number of damning messages about the “deviance” of 
racialized sexuality that further stoked the flames of AIDS moral panic.  
WCCO and PBS billed the episode as an exploration of the struggles communities 
encountered when negotiating between the health of the public and the civil rights of 
PWHAs.35 At the opening of the episode, host Judy Woodruff, solemnly informed the 
audience, “You realize, coming away from seeing this film, that they’re human beings.” 
Yet, filmmakers were unable to portray Bridges as a victim. Quite the opposite, Bridges 
“provided a compelling story to show America the ugly face of the epidemic’s spread.”36 
                                                                                                                                            
could not secure care there; no nursing homes in Houston would care for people with AIDS. James Davies, 
“Protestors question WCCO’s methods, intent in AIDS story,” Equal Time, Nov. 13, 1985. 
32 Originally, the TV crew centered their attention on four different persons with AIDS, but producers 
found the story of Bridges so compelling that they decided to focus solely on him. 
33 Martha Bayles, “Television: Documentary: A Case of AIDS,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 24, 1986. 
34 The format of the special Frontline episode was a departure for the series. It consisted of the 35-minute 
documentary and a special discussion with satellite connections to Denver, Houston, and San Francisco. 
“AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” Prod. Michael Kirk, Michael Mierendorf, Ben 
Loeterman. Boston, MA, and Minneapolis, MN: WGBH and WCCO, 1986.  
35 Judith Michaelson, “PBS’ Woodruff Hosting National Aids Inquiry,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 24, 1986. 




In his wake throughout the country, Bridges generated controversy and ignited public 
health concerns that he was engaging in unprotected sex with unsuspecting victims. The 
WCCO crew interviewed his doctor, his family, and various state officials who, because 
they were resolutely unaware of how to address his emotional, housing, and medical 
needs, were subsequently unsuccessful in controlling his behavior without violating his 
rights. For the most part, filmmakers provided a resounding “no” to the question they had 
initially set out to answer: could one protect public health while safeguarding individual 
civil liberties? The episode’s simplistic emphasis on public health versus civil rights 
obscured an equally important discussion on the troubling legal, moral, and social 
conditions of possibility that rendered Bridges susceptible to institutional neglect and 





Figure 3.1: This image promoting the PBS airing of the Fabian Bridges story 
appeared in Equal Time, a gay and lesbian-themed newspaper in the March 19, 1986 
issue.  
In Houston, Bridges worked as a $19,000-a-year employee for county flood 
control until disease disabled him. In April of 1985, doctors at Jefferson-Davis Hospital 
in Houston diagnosed Bridges with a number of AIDS-related infections. After three 
months of in-patient treatment, Bridges was no longer sick enough to stay. In this short 
time span, Bridges had already lost his job, had no money, and had nowhere to live 
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outside the hospital.37 In a highly suspect move, officials at Jefferson-Davis Hospital paid 
for a one-way plane ticket to Indianapolis, where Bridges’ sisters lived.38 
Once in Indianapolis, however, Bridges’ family refused to take him in because 
they feared HIV transmission through casual contact. One of Bridges’ sisters expressed 
her concerns to the WCCO crew: “We just didn’t know enough about the disease and we 
knew that when you had it you would die and that certain aspects of it...you, it was 
contagious.” She added, “We weren’t sure of how you can contract it, you know. We 
heard only sexual conduct, but now we’re hearing other things like saliva or whatever.” 
Part of the reason neither one of his sisters was willing to open their home to Bridges was 
because their husbands opposed it. Bridges’ brother-in-law confessed to the WCCO crew 
that he was afraid for his toddler son: “He doesn’t know what AIDS is. He doesn’t know 
what homosexuality is. He’s...he’s innocent.”39 Filmmakers did not correct Bridges’ 
family on their mistaken understanding of HIV transmission. With this exchange, 
filmmakers overlooked a teachable moment and allowed misinformation to air on 
national primetime television.  
 Without money, Bridges drifted around Indianapolis, sometimes staying in 
shelters for the “indigent.” It was there where Bridges was jailed for stealing a bike. 
Because of his disease, he was placed in isolation. Bridges later recounted to the WCCO 
crew, “I felt I was being treated like an animal.” So humiliated was he by the whispers of 
sheriffs and maintenance crew wearing rubber gloves as they passed his cell that Bridges 
snapped he “could have grabbed them by the neck, chocked the hell out of them.” He 
                                                
37 Although Bridges had applied for Social Security, he had yet to receive his first check. 
38 “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986.  
39 Ibid.  
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would have liked “to [have] transmit[ed] the disease...and [seen] how they reacted.” 
Upon learning that Bridges had AIDS, the jailer rushed him to court where the judge 
pulled twenty dollars out of his own pocket and demanded that Bridges “get out of town.” 
Authorities dropped the charges on the condition Bridges leave town immediately.40 They 
provided Bridges with a bus ticket to Cleveland where his mother lived.41 But, like his 
sisters, his mother too refused to let him come home because her husband opposed it.42  
In late summer of 1985, the WCCO crew located Bridges in a cheap hotel room in 
Cleveland paid for by the American Red Cross.43 Since he did not know where to sleep 
and the city lacked adequate facilities for someone of his circumstances, the WCCO crew 
provided Bridges with money to rent a hotel room. The narrator explained the crew’s 
decision-making process: “He said he had no money, so sometimes we bought him 
meals, and we had his laundry done. One day Fabian saw a small portable radio he liked, 
                                                
40 In jail, Bridges was placed in isolation “to keep him away from the other prisoners, so he wouldn’t 
contaminate them or anybody else.” Bridges described being treated in a “very dehumanized” fashion, that 
“it went beyond slavery.” According to Bridges, "Everyone put on rubber gloves, like they were ready to 
go into surgery. They were afraid if I breathed on them.” Because there was nothing he could do, Bridges 
“turned around in the cell and just hit [his] my head against the corner and...started to cry.” Deputy Terry 
Dale of Indianapolis explained to the WCCO crew that his “biggest concern was for [himself] and the other 
prisoners and other deputies that [Bridges] possibly would come in contact with and spread the disease.” As 
soon as learning there was a person with AIDS being held in jail, municipal judge, Judge John Downer, met 
with the prosecutor and the deputy. They decided to drop the charges against Bridges. Afraid Bridges 
would transmit the virus to 900 other inmates, a bewildered Downer “chipped in $20 and the county fund 
chipped in the rest of the money” to provide Bridges with a one-way bus ticket to Cleveland. Deputy Dale 
transported Bridges to the bus station and “made sure he got on the bus OK.” Judge Downer feared people 
in the courtroom might erupt into a panic if they had learned there was a person with AIDS in their midst. 
So concerned were authorities of transmission through casual contact that they reportedly threw away the 
pens and pencils that Bridges used to sign some of the required documentation. Ibid.  
41 It is also in Indianapolis where a reporter from the Indianapolis Star picked up the story that led WCCO 
to Bridges. The WCCO-TV crew learned of Bridges from a story by Kyle Neiderpruem for the 
Indianapolis Star. Frontline episode. Ibid.  
42 This scene was re-enacted for the cameras. In the scene, a fatigue-clad Bridges hovered over an open 
telephone in a Cleveland bus station. He phoned his mother and begged her, “Can you please come and 
pick me up?...Why not?...Can I come home? Where am I going to stay? You want to me stay in the street?” 
Ibid.  
43 After his mother was unable to take him in, Bridges visited the American Red Cross for assistance. The 
Red Cross was unable to locate a shelter that would take a person with AIDS. As a result, the Red Cross 
paid for the hotel room where the WCCO-TV crew located Bridges. Ibid. 
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so we bought it for him.”44 To justify the gifts, the narrator alluded to Bridges’ supposed 
sex work at commercial sex establishments. “Fabian hung out on the streets [of 
Cleveland] and said he made friends there. He spent time in adult bookstores and movie 
houses and he admitted, it was a way, he helped support himself.”45 The narrator justified 
WCCO’s donation of gifts to Bridges on the account that the funds helped Bridges curb 
his activities at commercial sex establishments.   
In Cleveland, Bridges notified filmmakers that he was continuing to engage in 
sexual relations without informing his partners that he had AIDS. Bridges admitted to the 
camera: “Sometimes I do it for money, especially when I don’t got any. I did it for money 
yesterday. I made five dollars.”46 In the following scene, Bridges detailed a private 
encounter with one of his “tricks.” Bridges recounted that he brought an unidentified man 
over to the hotel where the two engaged in “intimate” sex. The interviewer pressed 
Bridges if there was kissing involved, assuming such an activity could transmit the virus. 
There was not, Bridges insisted. But there was unprotected sex. Bridges revealed, “I 
came inside him, an accident, ‘cuz the minute I was pulling it out, it was coming out and 
I cleaned him up. We cleaned each other up. We got dressed and we exchanged phone 
numbers. He called me the other night.”47 In a voiceover, the narrator reacted to the 
                                                
44 WCCO paid for several “inexpensive” meals for Bridges, which he ate with the crew. The crew also 
provided Bridges with money at Bridges’ request for room and board. The crew never checked the receipts 
or verified how the money was spent. James Davies, “Protestors question WCCO’s methods, intent in 
AIDS story,” Equal Time, Nov. 13, 1985. 
45 “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
46 The mainstream media portrayed Bridges as a homosexual prostitute with AIDS. Mike Sullivan, the 
public affairs director of WCCO-TV, refuted this claim. Although he admitted Bridges was poor, according 
to Sullivan, this was the only time that Bridges had told the WCCO crew of a paid encounter for sex. 
Sullivan characterized Bridges as someone who was experiencing a kind of “nihilism” about his own life 
and by extension other people’s lives because he was apparently engaging in unsafe sexual activity. James 
Davies, “Protestors question WCCO’s methods, intent in AIDS story,” Equal Time, Nov. 13, 1985. 
47 Bridges lacked an understanding of HIV’s transmission. The interviewer asked Bridges if the man knew 




admission: “After Fabian told us he was having unsafe sex, we faced a dilemma. Should 
we report him to authorities or keep his story confidential, knowing that he could be 
infecting others? We decided to tell health officials what we knew.”48 When Bridges 
revealed to filmmakers that he was allegedly engaging in unprotected sex for money, 
filmmakers made the decision to turn him over to health authorities in Cleveland.49  
 Bridges’ “story had suddenly changed,” the narrator exclaimed. “He was no 
longer just a victim.” Rather than contacting an HIV/AIDS resource group which might 
have been more prepared to deal with Bridges’ emotional, housing, and medical needs, 
the WCCO crew contacted the president of the Cleveland City Council.50 In a symbolic 
scene reflecting the inadequate social infrastructure in place to address a crisis of this 
magnitude, the president of the Cleveland City Council called officials of health, legal, 
and social services together to discuss the best course of action against Bridges. 
Cleveland’s quarantine laws only allowed for a 10-day hold. At the round table 
discussion, one of the panelists of all men warned: “The guy’s got a gun and he’s out 
shooting people. You don’t die in fifteen seconds; you die in two years.” The panelist 
characterized Bridges as a dangerous criminal—a terrorist—whose free movement 
threatened the general population of white heterosexuals with a painful, slow death. 
                                                                                                                                            
shook his head once again: “He seems pretty healthy.” This was perhaps even more of a reason as to why 
Bridges required service from an AIDS care organization. “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV 
Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
48 In an interview with the Chicago Tribune, Mike Sullivan, the public affairs director of WCCO-TV, 
denied accusations that WCCO leaked the story to the press. According to Sullivan, a Cleveland City 
Council Member alerted the media about the situation. “Police trail AIDS victim who vows to have sex,” 
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3, 1985: 4. 
49 WCCO claimed that Bridges had informed the crew that he had admitted to having upwards of six sexual 
partners a night and that he refused to stop having sex even though he knew he had AIDS. Joanne Ostrow, 
“AIDS victim who had sex raises issues of morality,” The Citizen (Ottawa, Ont.), Mar. 24, 1986: A18. 




While the city brainstormed punitive measures to restrict Bridges’ movement, Bridges 
finally began receiving disability benefits.51 His mother, however, confiscated the check; 
she planned on using the funds for Bridges’ funeral arrangements. Upon learning this, 
Bridges took the money and fled back to Houston.52   
 In Houston, Bridges was met with media frenzy. In late September of 1985, news 
sources throughout the country picked up the story, reporting that Bridges was a 
“transient” who knowingly had sex with others despite knowing he had AIDS. Time 
magazine called him a “pitiful nomad.”53 The Los Angeles Times described him as an 
“awful, awful person,” a “miserable, wretched, uncaring victim-turned-victimizer who 
used his body as a lethal weapon.”54 Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal branded Bridges 
as a “gloomy, remote, acne-scarred stranger” who came across as “pathetic rather than 
threatening—a scruffy little plague ship adrift in the lower depths.”55  
                                                
51 “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Judith Michaelson, “PBS’ Woodruff Hosting National Aids Inquiry,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 24, 1986. 
54 The Los Angeles Times added that the PBS/WCCO-TV documentary was “shabby and voyeuristic” 
similar to “dwelling on a freeway crash.” The Los Angeles Times questioned the relationship between the 
WCCO-TV crew and Bridges, accusing the documentary of blurring the line between “reporter and story” 
when the crew provided Bridges with money for a hotel room and when it bought Bridges a radio Howard 
Rosenberg, “‘Frontline’ AIDS Controversy: Documentary Makers’ Relentless Focus on the Lethal Life 
Style of a Dying Fabian Bridges Puts Minneapolis Station and PBS in the Spotlight,” Los Angeles Times, 
Mar. 27, 1986. 
55 In its review of the Frontline episode, the Wall Street Journal reported that the documentary produced 
two contradictory effects. On the one hand, the documentary raised important questions regarding the 
tension between public health and civil liberties. On the other hand, the WSJ accused the filmmakers of 
casting such a negative light on Bridges that it prevented the audience from identifying or sympathizing 
with Bridges and, by extension, coming to terms with AIDS. Thus, to encourage readers’ identification 
with Bridges, the WSJ attempted to reverse Bridges’ demonization by claiming that his sexual behaviors 
may not have been so anti-social as initially assumed. The WSJ suggested that Bridges’ desire for “love and 
intimacy” mirrored people’s desires to be love. However, Bridges’ failure, the WSJ contended, was his 
inability to regulate his sexual impulses or to recognize the consequences of his actions. The WSJ 
appropriated the tragic figure of Bridges to illuminate both the dangers of promiscuity and to vouch for the 
benefits of personal responsibility. But, to salvage the humanity of Bridges, the WSJ characterized him as a 
victim of a “gay lifestyle” that was “compulsively promiscuous.” The WSJ scolded, “The brutish 
promiscuity of certain gay bars and bathhouses is alien to most of us” (emphasis added). The WSJ’s use of 
the pronoun “us” reveals the author’s identification with the heterosexual public. But, it also seeks to 




Perhaps sensing his limited options, Bridges phoned the WCCO crew and asked if 
they would be interested in continuing the story.56 Filmmakers traveled down to Houston 
where they encountered a homeless Bridges intermittently living in bathhouses.57 After 
Bridges allegedly informed the WCCO crew that he continued to engage in sex to meet 
his housing needs, the WCCO crew once again provided Bridges with funds to secure a 
room. Unlike the previous time, this offer came with a stipulation. The narrator 
explained, “Because Fabian didn’t know where he was going to sleep, we gave him the 
money on the condition that he not practice unsafe sex and that he stay away from the 
bath houses.” In an interview with Equal Time, a gay and lesbian-themed newspaper in 
the Twin Cities, Mike Sullivan, WCCO Public Affairs Director and executive producer of 
the Frontline episode, acknowledged that WCCO “gave [Bridges] fifteen bucks each 
night” during the last weekend of September of 1985 to purchase lodging.58 When asked 
by Equal Time why WCCO provided Bridges with so little money, Sullivan hesitated 
                                                                                                                                            
from the “normal male-female sexual conduct” precariously nestled in the private sphere of white 
domesticity. Simply put, the only way the WSJ could recuperate Bridges as a victim was by demonizing 
gay men who did engage in non-monogamous sexual acts and by naturalizing the private sphere of the 
home as the domain of white, heterosexual domesticity. The WSJ accomplished the dubious task of further 
perpetuating AIDS hysteria in its attempt to curb these fears. The WSJ even cited data from African 
countries to warn that heterosexual contact via “drug-taking prostitutes” could in fact spread the virus into 
the home of American families. Martha Bayles, “Television: Documentary: A Case of AIDS,” Wall Street 
Journal, Mar. 24, 1986. 
56 Mike Sullivan described Bridges at this point as “basically indigent” but believed he may have continued 
receiving social security benefits. James Davies, “Protestors question WCCO’s methods, intent in AIDS 
story,” Equal Time, Nov. 13, 1985. 
57 In a voiceover in the episode, the narrator informed the audience: “Fabian told us he was broke again.” 
When Bridges was unable to afford admission to bathhouses, he lived on the streets and slept in empty 
buildings “where he said he brought people for sex.” Bridges had supposedly spent his social security funds 
attempting to pay off an old debt, and “he had squandered the rest.” “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline 
TV Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
58 Sullivan, who authorized the payments to Bridges, defended WCCO’s payment of money to Bridges as 
“the right thing” since it ostensibly encouraged him to have less sex. Filmmakers worried Bridges would 
have sex with someone simply to stay the night. Sullivan elaborated, “I think in this case we probably kept 
him out of a lot of sexual encounters by just being with him and…hopefully by giving him some money for 
a place to stay. That is certainly the hope and intent…It seemed a reasonable thing to do at the time.”  
James Davies, “Protestors question WCCO’s methods, intent in AIDS story,” Equal Time, Nov. 13, 1985. 
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before finally admitting “it [would have been] inappropriate to support him in a style [of 
living] to which he was not accustomed.”59 Although Sullivan deservedly worried of 
negative public opinion regarding WCCO’s dispersal of money to Bridges, filmmakers 
raised a number of other ethical concerns that were left unaddressed.60 What the WCCO 
crew did do was urge Bridges to schedule a doctor’s appointment that they then 
conveniently filmed.  
 Like the WCCO crew, the medical establishment in Houston was no better 
equipped to address Bridges’ needs. The WCCO crew filmed Bridges as he visited a local 
doctor to discuss modes of transmission. Bridges lacked basic knowledge over the virus, 
including its mode of contact. In a matter-of-fact tone, Bridges proudly informed the 
doctor that he had avoided kissing since “that’s another way to get it.” Instead of 
educating Bridges, the doctor revealed to Bridges that the county public health director 
would be sending Bridges a letter demanding that he refrain from “sexual activities and 
particularly from prostitution.”61 The doctor further warned Bridges that if he continued 
to “misbehave” by having sex, he would not receive much needed medical assistance. On 
                                                
59 Sullivan told Equal Time: “Well, I think we’re uneasy about it...I mean…it’s...you know...we were trying 
to find a way to do with some minimum...it makes journalists very uneasy to be this wrapped up in a story. 
It did from the beginning. $15 was the amount requested by Bridges.” Sullivan claimed that if WCCO had 
put Bridges in a two hundred dollar a night hotel, “people would reasonably ask whether we’re buying 
information.” Ibid.   
60 First, the WCCO crew continued to film Bridges while they paid him. Second, despite Sullivan denying 
that filmmakers purposefully kept Bridges on the streets, enabling him to remain sexually active when 
other help was available, the WCCO crew did not contact the Houston AIDS Project. In fact, Sullivan 
admitted that the WCCO crew did not attempt to educate Bridges about safer sex. Additionally, in a jarring 
example of human subject violation, filmmakers failed to inform Bridges that they were the ones who 
reported him to the Cleveland Health Department. Ibid. 
61 The doctor warned Bridges: “If you [prostitute] in Houston, then you can be put under protective custody 
and, we just can’t take that chance, Fabian.” In a patronizing tone, the doctor added, “Now if you behave 
yourself and you know, we want to take care of you. If you get sick we will be glad to see you anytime, but 
if you see, if you go out and start being a male prostitute, then, we’re going to have to call the constables 
and have you locked up.” The doctor stressed that “it’s your obligation not to spread it to other people, you 
just can’t do that.” “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
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the contrary, Bridges would be subjected to a slew of social controls designed to 
constrain his mobility. Bridges’ health, thus, hinged on his ability to comply with 
discourses and practices of personal responsibility outlined by medical health and law 
enforcement authorities. Perhaps pessimistic about the medical establishment’s ability to 
assist him, Bridges ignored the warning. Due to Bridges’ non-compliance, the county 
public health director issued him a carefully worded letter ordering him to “desist from 
having sexual relations and donating blood.”62 
 Bridges did not use the $15 a night he received from the WCCO crew on hotel 
rooms—as though he could locate such inexpensive lodging. After he reportedly admitted 
to filmmakers to engaging in unprotected sex, the interviewer asked Bridges on-camera, 
“If you know how dreadful the disease is, how could you go ahead and take the chance 
that you might give it to somebody?” Bridges paused. He stared into the camera and 
softly murmured: “I don’t know…I just guess I’m to the point where I just don’t give a 
damn, you know? I really don’t.” Bridges’ remarks confirmed the audience’s irrational 
and rabid fears of both the promiscuous homosexual and the sexually aberrant prostitute 
of color endangering public safety. Filmmakers enforced these perceptions by failing to 
                                                
62 Violation of the directive entailed a third-degree felony, carrying a maximum sentence of 10 years in 
prison and a $5,500 fine. In the letter, the county public health director, Dr. James Haughton, wrote, “A 
person who deliberately spreads a fatal disease is a danger to others and should be subject to psychiatric 
commitment.” Haughton told filmmakers that Bridges remained “infectious” until the medical 
establishment found a cure or “until he dies.” Bridges had also prompted Haughton to propose a plan to 
quarantine all AIDS patients who were “non-compliant.” That is, those who were unwilling or unable to 
stop engaging in sex. Haughton made no distinction between “safe” and “unsafe” sex. To enforce the order, 
the county public health director contacted the Houston vice squad. Four undercover officers were assigned 
to “follow” Bridges. Prosecutors admitted that officers could not arrest Bridges unless he personally 
solicited sex from them or they actually witnessed him having sex. However, because officers “obviously 
were not going to [entrap Bridges],” without risking their safety, the vice squad abandoned efforts to arrest 
Bridges. “Defiant AIDS victim checks into hospital,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 3, 1985: 2.  
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contextualize Bridges’ remarks as the final straw in a series of setbacks with family, 
doctors, and police.  
  When it appeared authorities had exhausted all options, the KS AIDS Foundation 
in Houston, an early AIDS service organization, eventually came out in support of 
Bridges by providing Bridges with housing assistance.63 Despite finally having his 
housing needs met, the “inevitable” happened as did in so many of these early media 
representations of PWHAs. Bridges’ AIDS symptoms returned. One week after he moved 
into his new home, Bridges was readmitted to the hospital. On November 17, 1985, 
Bridges died.64 Because his family lacked the funds to bury him, after a week of his 
passing, Bridges received a pauper’s funeral at public expense and was buried in the 
county cemetery. He was 30-years-old.65 
The Theory of Secondary Marginalization and the Politics of Respectability.  
 To describe the Frontline episode as controversial is putting it lightly. Critics of 
the episode accused filmmakers of sensationalism, inaccuracy, and purchased reporting. 
Among the loudest critics were gay leaders and AIDS advocates, who pointed to the 
                                                
63 Authorities contacted “an old political adversary,” gay activist Ray Hill who, in turn, called the Kaposi’s 
Sarcoma AIDS Foundation. (When the WCCO team asked Haughton why he had not previously solicited 
help from gay activists, he answered: “It would have never occurred to me to turn to the gay community for 
help in resolving this problem.”) Since the KS AIDS Foundation did not immediately respond, Hill 
“decided to go after [Bridges] and take the responsibility [upon himself].” Hill had to steer clear of media 
frenzy that continuously grew in scope. Hill convinced Bridges to voluntarily enter the hospital for 
evaluation after authorities gave him an ultimatum: check himself into a hospital for a psychiatric 
evaluation or be arrested and jailed on a charge of loitering. On October 2, 1985, Bridges admitted himself 
to the hospital in Houston. He left a day later. Eventually, the KS AIDS Foundation came out in support of 
Bridges. A lawyer on its Board of Directors opened his home to Bridges. Soon after, filmmakers lost 
contact with the protagonist of their documentary. The narrator explained: “The gay community was 
protecting him from the local press…and from us.” “AIDS: A National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” 
WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
64 One night, after being transferred to the intensive care unit, Bridges began to bleed from his stomach and 
nose. He had a convulsion, went into a coma, and then into shock. According to one of Bridges’ doctors, 
Bridges died peacefully. “He was not in pain during the last day of his life.” Ibid.  
65 Dan Hinson, “Life Story,” Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 24, 1985: A.22. 
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ethical questions involved in filmmakers providing Bridges with money and gifts.66 
Critics also questioned whether Bridges was even a sex worker due to the lack of 
evidence. However, white gay leaders and AIDS advocates focused the bulk of their 
critique on WCCO and PBS publicizing what they deemed was a negative representation 
of PWHAs and gay men.  
 Perhaps anticipating the negative reaction from gay leaders and AIDS advocates, 
producers of the Frontline episode issued a disclaimer at the beginning of the show. Host 
Judy Woodruff prefaced the episode: “The film you are about to see is controversial; 
that’s because it’s a portrait of a man with AIDS who continued to be promiscuous.” 
Woodruff acknowledged that the “gay community” in San Francisco and other cities was 
protesting the film because they maintained that it was “unfair” to PWHAs. She 
explained that the gay community was concerned that “the general population [would] be 
unduly alarmed by this story and conclude that this man’s behavior is the rule rather than 
the exception.” Notwithstanding the violation of ethics involved in their relationship with 
Bridges, producers of the Frontline episode recognized the danger in circulating Bridges’ 
story to an American public that lacked an intimate understanding of the virus. Therefore, 
in an alleged attempt to educate the public, Frontline producers presented Bridges’ story 
as part of a live discussion on the epidemic.  
 Following the PBS broadcast, Harvard law professor Charles Nesson 
accompanied Woodruff, as both moderator and host of the after-show live discussion at 
the National Library of Medicine at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, MD. 
They were connected via satellite to experts in Houston, Denver, and San Francisco, 
                                                
66 The WCCO crew had even talked with Bridges about possibly getting his van out of hock. “AIDS: A 
National Inquiry (Frontline TV Episode).” WGBH and WCCO, 1986. 
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including former San Francisco Public Health Director Mervyn Silverman, who had 
previously ordered that city’s 14 bathhouses and sex clubs closed. A number of AIDS 
experts, including gay leaders and AIDS advocates, declined to participate in the on-air 
national panel as they feared the public would regard Bridges to be emblematic of most 
PWHAs, “instead of the aberration that he was,” as Silverman brashly put it.67 Those 
panelists who did participate focused much of the follow-up discussion on dispelling the 
public’s perception that Bridges was the stereotypical “homosexual with AIDS.”68 
Whether or not the panelists were successful in convincing the public that Bridges was an 
“abomination,” what remained certain was that the documentary ignited a frenzied public 
response. The PBS broadcast of the Frontline episode garnered a stockpile of concerned 
calls from the public. On the night of its airing, KCET, the PBS-affiliate in Minneapolis, 
logged 168 calls, the largest telephone response to a KCET program in a decade. Of the 
73 callers expressing opinions, 69 were negative.69  
                                                
67 Silverman worried that “the image of this man doing what he did, demented as he was, [would] stay in 
people’s minds.” Ibid.  
68 Silverman explained that the documentary had garnered such widespread controversy because “it [had] 
painted a picture and stated as reality what is really an aberration.” Silverman worried of “the harm” in the 
public seeing Bridges as “a stereotype of the gay male in America.” He countered against this by insisting 
that in San Francisco gay men had dramatically changed their behaviors. Supposedly, there had been over a 
90 percent reduction in STDs among gay men there. Silverman even added that this might have been the 
biggest behavioral change in medical history. But the public might not know this. Instead, Bridges would 
be remembered, “demented” as he was. Silverman explained that he considered Bridges “demented” 
because “anyone who knowingly infects someone else with a lethal germ has a problem.” Silverman 
conclude that Bridges “wanted to go down as a hero,” that he craved the attention. Silverman’s 
characterization was based in part by the manner in which Bridges spoke, in a “bland...almost histrionics” 
fashion. Silverman added that when analyzing Bridges’ behaviors: “You don’t see a normal, rational 
individual.” For that reason, Silverman believed, Bridges ought to have been placed in a psychiatric 
hospital where he ought to have received mental health care. Rep. William Dannemeyer agreed with 
Silverman in calling Bridges “mentally ill.”  On the other hand, other panelists came to Bridges’ defense. 
Diego Lopez, director of clinical services for the Gay Men’s Health Crisis in New York, insisted that “all 
the institutions that failed him” victimized Bridges. Ibid.  
69 Howard Rosenberg, “‘Frontline’ AIDS Controversy: Documentary Makers’ Relentless Focus on the 
Lethal Life Style of a Dying Fabian Bridges Puts Minneapolis Station and PBS in the Spotlight,” Los 
Angeles Times, Mar. 27, 1986. 
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Even during filming, WCCO sustained criticisms for its actions. Just as the 
national media picked up the story of Bridges, a group of demonstrators—comprised of 
white gay leaders and their followers—picketed the WCCO headquarters in downtown 
Minneapolis to protest the station’s “unusual” involvement with Bridges. Protesters 
carried signs ranging from “WCCO SHAMEFUL CONDUCT,” to “SOME CANNOT 
PROTEST.” The Gay Rights Alliance (GRAM), a short-lived local organization, 
endorsed and organized the demonstration.70 At the protest, a member of GRAM 
explained to Equal Time that he worried the media’s circulation of such negative PWHA 
images would foster a culture of anger and fear among the public that would lead directly 
to anti-gay hate violence, an “epidemic” in its own right as expressed by gay community 
activists (Figures 3.2-3.3). 
 
                                                
70 Jeff Strand, Chairperson of GRAM, informed Equal Time that GRAM planned to make further inquiries 
to WGBH in Boston, which produced the PBS documentary series Frontline, and explore the possibility of 
further action through the Minnesota Press Council. Strand countered the news station’s humanitarian 
defense of the funds and gifts to Bridges. Strand explained, “WCCO is not a charity. They’re trying to hide 
behind the guise of humanitarianism when in fact their actions were to the detriment of a gay man with 







Figure 3.2: Representatives from GRAM protesting outside WCCO-TV’s 
headquarters in downtown Minneapolis. Image appeared in the Nov. 13, 1985 issue 
of Equal Time. 
 
Figure 3.3: Representatives from GRAM protesting outside the WCCO-TV 
headquarters in downtown Minneapolis. Image appeared in the Nov. 13, 1985 issue 
of Equal Time. 
To offset WCCO’s negative PWHA representation, white gay leaders countered 
such representations with what they deemed were more positive depictions of PWHAs 
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and gay men in general.71 Following WCCO’s local airing of the Bridges story, Brian 
Coyle, an openly gay Minneapolis City Council Member, and Gary Rankila, an attorney 
and Minneapolis Civil Rights Commissioner, appeared before a town hall-style meeting 
to discuss HIV-prevention. Because organizers of the event did not provide Coyle and 
Rankila with a preview of the program, the men agreed not to discuss the ethics of the 
film. Instead, the men accepted the invitation to the meeting to provide the public with 
“positive” representations of gay men. Speaking in regards to the meeting’s organizers, 
Rankila told the gay press, “We rolled with their dice and played their game rather than 
to be ignored. We had a very sharp discussion [on the issue of ethics] (off camera) and 
decided to take part so we could present a positive side about who gays are” [emphasis 
added]. Although he chose not to sound off on WCCO’s relationship with Bridges, 
Rankila used the meeting as a platform to highlight the positive racial, class, gender, and 
professional attributes of white gay men like himself and Coyle.72 Rankila and Coyle 
attempted to circumvent the devaluing processes of homosexuality by pointing to other 
signifiers of value such as morality and respectability. While Rankila and Coyle were 
more strategic in their vocal opposition to the documentary (given their public status as 
elected officials and, thus, their relationship to city politics), other gay leaders were more 
forthright in their criticism of WCCO’s ethics and involvement with Bridges.  
                                                
71 WCCO responded to criticisms by maintaining filmmakers acted accordingly. In regards to the claim that 
the documentary circulated a negative representation of PWHAs, Mike Sullivan, WCCO Public Affairs 
Director and executive producer of the documentary, reiterated in an interview with Equal Time that 
anchorman, Dave Moore, in the introduction to the episode, “was extremely clear on the point” that Bridges 
was an unusual case. Lewis Cope, “WCCO documentary on alleged gay prostitute receives divided 
reviews,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Mar. 21, 1986.; “Mixed reviews for WCCO documentary,” Equal 
Time, Apr. 2, 1986.  
72 Coyle agreed with Rankila’s reasoning in accepting the invite to appear in the town hall-style discussion. 
Additionally, Coyle believed the meeting provided an important venue for him and Rankila to bring up 
effective strategies to curb the spread of the AIDS virus. “Mixed reviews for WCCO documentary,” Equal 
Time, Apr. 2, 1986. 
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In spring of 1986, following the day of WCCO’s local broadcast, white gay 
leaders in Minneapolis held a joint press conference to publicly convey their disapproval 
of the Frontline episode. They argued that filmmakers “victimized a victim” while the 
episode left the public with mistaken images of PWHAs. Tom Agar, a steering committee 
member of the Minnesota Alliance Against AIDS (MAAA), the antecedent to the local 
chapter of ACT-UP, accused filmmakers of irresponsibly “contributing further to this 
society’s irrational response to AIDS.” He jeered, “We regret that uninformed viewers 
will be left with a mistaken impression that Mr. Bridges’ reaction is typical.” Agar added, 
“Broadcasting images like that of Fabian Bridges is equivalent to yelling ‘Fire’ in a 
crowded theater.”73 At that same press conference, Tim Campbell, editor of the gay-
themed Twin Cities newspaper, the GLC Voice, questioned whether Bridges was even 
selling sex as the Frontline episode had strongly insinuated: “[Filmmakers] created a 
hooking…Typhoid Mary…where none existed.”74 Campbell suggested Bridges 
“manipulated” the WCCO crew to have them spend money on him for a hotel room, 
which Bridges used on admission to a bathhouse, and for a $60 radio that Bridges 
listened to on-screen.75 Both Agar and Campbell, along with a third speaker at the press 
conference, Eric Engstrom, executive director of the Minnesota AIDS Project, 
                                                
73 Ibid. 
74 Campbell challenged WCCO’s depiction of Bridges as a prostitute, calling the supposition 
“preposterous.” Campbell explained, “I have known hundreds of male prostitutes or hustlers...Fabian had 
no characteristics in common with them. He was not flirtatious. He did not cruise. He was not particularly 
sensual. He has no record of arrest for prostitution. WCCO would have us believe that one year he held a 
$19,000-a-year job and that he began a hustling career at about age 27.” “Mixed reviews for WCCO 
documentary,” Equal Time, Apr. 2, 1986. 
75 In an article appearing in the New York Native, Campbell accused the WCCO reporters for “pass[ing] this 
story on to the public officials around the country, [giving] their subjects money, radios, and promises of 
wheels—but no condoms!” Campbell claimed that the WCCO crew launched a storm of AIDS panic. Its 
reporters then “turned their cameras on all the parties whom they had just put into a frenzy.” Tim 
Campbell, “AFRAIDS in Minnesota,” New York Native, May 26, 1986.	
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condemned WCCO’s “humanitarian” defense of their actions. The white gay leaders 
claimed that a $15-a-night room was impossible to locate in Houston or Minneapolis—
the exception being a bathhouse.76  
WCCO’s payments of cash and gifts to Bridges were contentious, generating 
charges that WCCO engaged in “checkbook journalism.”77 Claude Peck, co-producer of 
KFAI’s Fresh Fruit Radio Show, a local gay-themed radio show, delivered an editorial on 
WCCO’s questionable involvement with Bridges. Peck accused WCCO of committing 
“the lowest form of checkbook journalism.” For Peck, the small amount of money—$112 
by WCCO’s admission—given to Bridges was beside the point. What truly mattered was 
that filmmakers violated the protocol of investigative journalism “to uncover and 
investigate stories with public interest, not create them by bankrolling sources.” In an 
interview with Equal Time, Peck underscored the disparity between Bridges, a homeless 
black gay man with AIDS, who lacked power in society, with the powerful media 
conglomerate of WCCO-TV. Like Agar and Campbell, Peck countered that WCCO’s 
                                                
76 At the joint press conference, Eric Engstrom, executive director of the Minnesota AIDS Project, focused 
on the information the documentary relayed. Engstrom was “pleasantly surprised overall” by the WCCO-
TV documentary, in particular, by the amount of “good, sound information on AIDS” the hour-long town-
hall style meeting that followed the documentary provided about AIDS. However, there were various 
pieces of misinformation that were publicly broadcast without a corrective. In the follow-up discussion, Dr. 
Mathilde Krim warned against kissing. She said there was no evidence confirming that kissing was immune 
to transmitting the virus. But she cautioned that one had to remain cautious. Also, during the documentary, 
the narrator did not comment on the fears of transmission through casual contact exhibited by Bridges’ 
family, and authorities in Indianapolis who dropped the charges against Bridges on the condition he leave 
town immediately. Also, when Bridges informed the WCCO-TV crew that he engaged in unprotected anal 
sex with a man in Cleveland, the crew did not correct Bridges when he discounted that the man could have 
acquired the virus since he looked “healthy.”  
77 According to the Star Tribune, checkbook journalism is the widely-condemned practice of paying 
sources for stories. The Tribune explained that paying money to a source such as Bridges could affect his 
behavior and encourage him to alter what he has to say, in turn, placing his credibility as a source in 
question. Throughout filming, the WCCO crew bought Bridges meals, a portable radio, had his laundry 
done, and paid his hotel bills “on the condition that he not have unsafe sex.” When Bridges apparently 
broke this condition, WCCO notified health officials and police in both Cleveland and Houston. WCCO 
was conveniently there to record the public health and media circus that ensued in the wake of those 
revelations. Nick Coleman, “KSTP’s arctic exclusive has foes howling,” Star Tribune, May 6, 1986: 01C. 
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treatment of Bridges was not motivated by a humanitarian concern for a homeless man 
with AIDS but rather by a desire to obtain “pictures of a community in uproar.” 
According to Peck, by “arming the enemies of gay people with half truths” about AIDS, 
WCCO fanned “the flames of anti-gay hysteria” at the center of a number of conservative 
agendas, including proposed policies to quarantine PWHAs.78 Nevertheless, Peck, like 
other white gay leaders and AIDS advocates, focused his critique on WCCO’s negative 
representation of PWHAs. He believed that such images of PWHAs as contagious, 
irresponsible, and toxic instigated greater harm for PWHAs and gay men throughout the 
country. 
 White gay leaders and AIDS advocates rightfully pointed out the material 
consequences (i.e., anti-gay hate violence, anti-AIDS policies) that could arise out of the 
Frontline episode’s characterization of Bridges as a promiscuous homosexual that 
endangered public safety. The local gay and lesbian press played a significant role in 
circulating these critiques. Gay- and lesbian-themed newspapers, such as Equal Time, the 
GLC Voice, and Twin Cities Gaze, all provided a platform for gay leaders and AIDS 
advocates to openly critique WCCO and PBS. Even then, the coverage in the local gay 
and lesbian press focused mostly on emphasizing how Bridges was not like most cases of 
PWHAs. Although Bridges’ story offered an opportunity to discuss how social 
positionality rendered some individuals more susceptible to HIV/AIDS, white gay 
leaders, AIDS advocates, and the local gay and lesbian press chose not to tell this story. 
As I mentioned earlier, the Frontline episode did not so much as question the inertia of 
the government or the medical establishment’s response to HIV/AIDS. In fact, the subject 
                                                




of President Ronald Reagan’s administration delaying and, at times, criminally 
obstructing funding measures for medical care, research, and social services for PWHAs 
was barely broached in the documentary. The Frontline episode also did not correct the 
vast array of misinformation about HIV/AIDS offered by law enforcement and public 
health officials, and Bridges’ family members. In spite of all these opportunities to 
critique filmmakers and the government, white gay leaders and AIDS advocates honed 
their critique on the representational implications of Bridges on other PWHAs and gay 
men.    
The critiques leveled against WCCO and PBS by white gay leaders and AIDS 
advocates for the funds and gifts donated to Bridges reveal the symbolism behind 
Bridges’ “unworthiness.” Gay community activists were unable to ascribe value onto 
Bridges and his life choices because his behavior was construed as aberrant, delinquent, 
and illicit. As a gay man, Bridges did not perform his sexuality in proper, respectable 
ways that contested, mitigated, or vindicated his “deviance.” For these critics, Bridges 
authenticated what conservative politicians and their constituents suspected—that 
HIV/AIDS was born out of personal shortcomings. Gay leaders and AIDS advocates did 
not so much as consider whether Bridges should have received assistance and care even if 
he did engage in sex work and frequented bathhouses. As I showed in chapter two, white 
gay leaders had begun employing a culture and politics of homonormativity to 
differentiate between worthy and unworthy gay victims of violence. Similarly, they 
applied this homonormative logic to determine which PWHAs were worth rallying 
behind. This politics of homonormativity was informed by an adherence to sexual 
monogamy, itself reflective of the neoliberal tenet of personal responsibility in the wake 
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of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and by a race and class-based exclusivity. Together, they 
gave shape to racialized norms of sexual hygiene. Given his social positionality as a 
working-class black gay man who allegedly had sex for money, Bridges undermined such 
efforts to promote this newly consolidating homonormativity. Moreover, considering that 
Bridges allegedly squandered the funds donated to him on admission to a bathhouse, his 
consumer choices were even deemed irresponsible. For these reasons, white gay leaders 
and AIDS advocates could not recuperate his image to evoke public sympathy for the 
larger community of PWHAs and gay men. To do so would have required an 
intersectional approach to glean how structural factors positioned some individuals at 
greater risk for HIV/AIDS. Indeed, Bridges’ limited life choices made abundantly clear 
that state agents, institutions, and structures were purveyors of violence, a fact that some 
white gay leaders were unwilling to reconcile given their investment in coordinating 
partnerships with the state (i.e. anti-gay violence activists’ collaboration with police). 
Unwilling to reconcile the ideological challenges that Bridges’ material reality posed to 
homonormativity, white gay leaders and AIDS advocates purposefully distanced 
themselves from Bridges so as to maintain a semblance of respectability and control over 
the media’s representation of PWHAs and gay men.  
 In ascribing value to some PWHAs, white gay leaders and AIDS advocates 
attempted to bypass the devaluing processes of homosexuality by citing other signs and 
signifiers of value such as morality and respectability. They engaged in an exclusionary 
process of relational valuing that naturalized and universalized the normative criteria on 
which “worthiness” is ascribed in the United States: gender, sexuality, and domestic 
space—racialized norms of sexual hygiene. What Bridges’ case illustrates is that efforts 
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to be included within populations deemed worthy, deserving, and valuable hinges on 
marginalized communities attempting to conform to those normative metrics deemed to 
be “universally American” and cemented as the “national family.” Nonetheless, this 
process of “ascribing legible, intelligible, and normative value is inherently violent and 
devaluing” because the “object” of value requires a negative referent. Writing in regards 
to the unexpected passing of her cousin, Brandon J. Martinez, social theorist Lisa M. 
Cacho describes how those around him were unable to ascribe value to his life because he 
was construed as “deviant,” “illegal,” and “criminal” not only by his race and ethnicity 
but also because “he did not perform his masculinity in proper, respectable ways to 
redeem, reform, or counter his (racialized) ‘deviancy.’”79 Here, Cacho reminds us that 
racialized deviancy is often conjugated as gender and sexual nonnormativity. Like 
Bridges, Brandon’s life was not considered valuable because he was unable to achieve 
the milestones of heteronormative life. In late capitalism, life has become increasingly 
organized around “the universalized expectations of the family and its gendered roles in 
naturalizing private property (buying your first home), wealth accumulation (passing 
down inheritance), and the pleasures of domestic consumption (planning weddings and 
baby showers).”80 When time and space are organized through heteronormativity and 
governed by American neoliberalism’s logic of capital accumulation, it is unfeasible to 
                                                
79 Cacho juxtaposes the San Diego Union-Tribune’s representations of her cousin’s automobile accident 
with those of the fatal accident of San Diego Padres outfielder Michael Darr. Her analysis confirms that 
“facts” have little if anything to do with whose deaths are tragic and whose deaths are deserved. Cacho 
shows how the articles on Darr evoke public sympathy by representing his embodiment of heterosexual, 
white masculinity as socially valuable and by depicting his friends’ and family’s grief as universal. On the 
other hand, the article about her cousin and his friends arouses racial anxieties over criminalized youth and 
young men of color. While the stories on Darr facilitate public identification with his death, the article on 
Brandon and his friends do not encourage readers “to empathize with the car-crash victims nor with those 
who survived them.” Lisa M. Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the 
Unprotected (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 148.  
80 Ibid., 165.  
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value lives as those of Brandon and Bridges. Brandon could not be fully valued through a 
politics of racial normativity because he defied normative investments in heteropatriarchy 
and American enterprise. Likewise, Bridges could not be valued through a politics of 
sexual normativity—homonormativity—because he undermined those investments in 
morality and respectability lauded by white gay leaders. When the lives of non-normative 
subjects are construed as illegible, unintelligible, and expendable, their erasure from their 
own communities becomes the more facile.  
 White gay leaders and AIDS advocates used a “politics of respectability” to vouch 
for the worthiness of some PWHAs and gay men. Promoting respectability politics has 
been one of the most significant strategies for upward mobility among marginalized 
communities in the United States as the extensive literature on African-American history 
attests. In Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 
1880-1920, historian Evelyn Brooks-Higginbotham examines women in the black church 
during the period known as the “women’s era” and the “nadir” in American race 
relations: Jim Crow segregation. Brooks-Higginbotham argues that black women were 
vital to making the black church the most powerful institution of racial self-help in the 
African-American community.81 This educated female elite promoted middle-class ideals 
and aspirations among the masses of blacks in the belief that such investments “ensured 
the dual goals of racial self-help and respect from white America.”82 Brooks-
Higginbotham contends that the women of the black Baptist church, in teaching the 
                                                
81 Leaders of the women’s black Baptist convention movement consisted of a bourgeoning cohort of school 
administrators, journalists, businesswomen, and reformers who served an all-black community. Through 
the fund-raising efforts of these women, the black church built schools, donated clothes and food to poor 
people, established orphanages and nursing homes, and disseminated a number of needed social welfare 
services. Evelyn Brooks-Higginbotham, Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black 
Baptist Church, 1880-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
82 Ibid., 14.   
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importance of religion, education, and hard work, adhered to a “politics of respectability” 
that conflated public behavior with individual self-respect and the advancement of the 
black community as a whole.83 Because these women were adamant that respectable 
behavior in public and in private would bestow upon African-Americans a modicum of 
respect from white America, they pushed the black lower class towards temperance, 
cleanliness of person and property, industriousness, thrift, refined manners, and Victorian 
sexual mores. A politics of respectability proved particularly effective for black 
churchwomen since it subverted the logic behind their racial subordination. In light of the 
crude stereotypes of blacks permeating popular culture and scientific racism, black 
women emphasized respectable behavior to convey alternate images of black women. 
Respectability, therefore, afforded black women, subjugated by racism and poverty, with 
an opportunity to reinforce their moral superiority over whites.  
Although the politics of respectability comprised a counter-discourse to the 
practices of racism, it was aimed dually at white and black Americans, particularly at the 
masses of blacks that expressed rural comportments of speech, dress, and worship.84 
                                                
83 Black Baptist women reviled what they perceived to have been the negative attitudes and practices of 
their community. As a result, their commitment in assimilation resulted in their demand that blacks 
conform to dominant society’s norms of manners and morals. Brooks-Higginbotham herself writes, “The 
politics of respectability emphasized reform of individual behavior and attitudes both as a goal in itself and 
as a strategy for reform of the entire structural system of American race relations.” Ibid., 187.     
84 In “Policing the Black Woman’s Body in an Urban Context,” Hazel V. Carby shows us that the 
indictment of “deviant” sexual behavior is not historically limited to dominant white agencies and 
institutions. Carby documents how the movement of black women in the early 20th century between rural 
and urban areas and between southern and northern cities ignited a series of moral panics that identified the 
behavior of uncontrolled, migrating black women as sexually degenerate and, thus, a threat to the 
advancement of the black middle-class. Carby argues that indigenous black institutions and organizations 
and the black middle-class equally participated in demonizing black female urban behavior as pathological. 
Carby reasons that the moral panic associated with the urban presence of uncontrolled black women 
became one way of responding to the many anxieties of social displacement and dislocation intensified by 
northern urban migration. For that reason, migrating black women could simultaneously be positioned as 
threats to “the progress of the race, as a threat to the establishment of a respectable urban black middle-




Black leaders and institutions engaged in a process called “secondary marginalization.” 
In her discussion of the political response to AIDS in African-American communities, 
Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics, political scientist 
Cathy Cohen offers a detailed exploration of the ways in which black leaders and 
institutions understood and responded to the social and health crisis of the epidemic. 
Cohen argues that the political construction and response to the AIDS crisis in African-
American communities reflects how black political leaders refused to define AIDS as a 
“consensus issue”—or a matter pertinent to the entire black community, deserving of 
community attention, resources, and response. They did this in an attempt to police the 
boundaries of acceptable blackness as it pertained to sexuality. As a consequence, in the 
initial stages of the epidemic, there appeared to be no major political activism from the 
black community in response to AIDS, despite the disproportionate number of African-
Americans afflicted by the disease. Cohen insists that homophobia alone does not explain 
the response to AIDS in black communities. Instead, Cohen urges us to consider the role 
of non-normative, or “deviant,” sexuality in motivating the marginalization of African-
Americans with HIV/AIDS—IV-drug users but, in particular, gay and bisexual men. Out 
of an attempt to protect the black community from the stigma associated with AIDS and 
homosexuality, and to safeguard collective claims to full incorporation and legitimacy, 
Cohen establishes that black elites mobilized an indigenous system of exclusion—
                                                                                                                                            
black masculinity in an urban environment.” As the sexual scapegoats of this moral panic, migrating black 
women, particularly those who were alone, either single or, at least, without men, were believed to 
compromise the status and mobility of the black middle-class. On account of their supposed social danger, 
black migrating women were subjected to an intensified process of secondary marginalization, including 
social reform, from within the group. Hazel Carby, “Policing the Black Woman’s Body in an Urban 
Context,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 4 (1992): 741. 
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secondary marginalization—to internally police and regulate the public behavior and 
image of African-Americans.85 
The scholarship on black respectability politics helps us to more fully understand 
the genre of respectability politics coming from white gay leaders. As marginalized 
communities seeking inclusion within the state, both black leaders and white gay leaders 
engaged in a process of secondary marginalization. In prioritizing a politics of 
respectability, secondary marginalization upheld white America’s hegemonic values of 
gender and sexuality. Under secondary marginalization, community elites are provided 
social mobility in exchange for policing, both literally and figuratively, the most 
resource-poor and alienated segments of their community. As community elites secure 
access and integration into dominant institutions through conformity to hegemonic norms 
of gender, sexuality, and domestic space, they acquire a level of control over state 
apparatuses, private resources, and indigenous institutions. Due to this position of power, 
community elites take on the role of internal regulators. Confronted with dominant scripts 
that cast them as inferior and (sexually) “other,” marginal communities fashion an 
indigenous and oppositional group identity for the dominant, heteropatriarchal, and white 
gaze. Marginal communities, in other words, reconstitute their collective identity not 
necessarily by questioning the arbitrary nature of dominant categories of gender and 
sexuality but, rather, by reformulating their identity in opposition to the very same norms 
and values used to subjugate them. Through these efforts at redefining the boundaries of 
the collective for the larger public, community elites highlight those characteristics and 
                                                
85 In Cohen’s view, “Too often worried that highlighting the growing epidemic of AIDS would turn the 
spotlight on drug use, men having sex with men, and sex work in black communities, too many leaders, 
advocates, church people, and radicals were quiet about AIDS and only joined the discussion when forced.” 
Ibid., 122.   
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contributions of marginal group members believed to be positive and in alignment with 
dominant values. This process of secondary marginalization, nonetheless, hinges on 
replicating rhetoric of blame and punishment. In attempting to portray the larger 
community as representative of dominant norms and values, community elites participate 
in the stigmatization and policing of group members engaged in behaviors thought to be 
deviant, destructive, and dangerous, oftentimes tied to sex.  
Gay community activists engaged in a process of secondary marginalization in 
their response to the Frontline episode, which portrayed Bridges as a figure of overt and 
degenerate sexuality whose behavior lay outside moral boundaries. Admittedly, the 
Frontline episode illustrates the tremendous discursive weight that media-generated 
AIDS commentary and some portions of the political establishment placed upon the 
notion of promiscuity. AIDS commentary made an implicit slippage from homosexuality 
to promiscuity to AIDS. Considering this context, gay community stakeholders agonized 
that the general public and the political establishment would interpret Bridges’ “deviant” 
behaviors as representative of all PWHAs and gay men. Community elites worried 
Frontline’s depiction of Bridges would risk the hard-won access, mobility, and 
respectability of some gay men through the passage of sexually restrictive legislation, 
cuts in AIDS funding, and heightened anti-gay hate violence. Therefore, to circumvent 
being lumped together with the likes of Bridges who allegedly spread the virus on 
purpose and endangered the lives of “innocents,” gay community activists implemented 
strategies of secondary marginalization. On the one hand, they distanced Bridges from 
the larger community of PWHAs and gay men by insisting that Bridges was not worthy 
of the funds and gifts donated to him by filmmakers and by agreeing with public health 
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officials and law enforcement authorities that Bridges was, in fact, an “abomination.” On 
the other hand, gay leaders and AIDS advocates conveyed alternate images of gay men 
that openly embraced a politics of homonormativity—the raced and classed politics of 
sexual respectability bourgeoning under the neoliberal shifts of the country’s political 
economy. These images, rooted in a set of racialized norms of sexual hygiene, invalidated 
stigmatized representations of gay men as promiscuous, immoral, and deviant that were 
then being disseminated throughout dominant channels. Gay community stakeholders 
insisted that “proper” and “respectable” behavior confirmed for dominant state agents 
and institutions that gay men were worthy of equal civil rights and political rights, 
something they believed could not be argued if gay men were seen as promiscuous.  
Those in positions of power within the gay community not only mobilized 
homonormativity to challenge charges of gay immorality; they also used it in winning 
sympathetic white heterosexual allies. Homonormativity, thus, functioned as what 
Brooks-Higginbotham calls a “bridge discourse” that mediated relations between the gay 
middle-class and dominant state agents and institutions. As my analysis also suggests, the 
fear and regulation of prostitutes of color with AIDS, irrespective of sexual orientation, 
signified one of the strongest ties between gay rights interests and mainstream agencies 
and institutions. Prostitutes of color with AIDS were doubly situated as threats to the 
progress of the gay community, one committed to the establishment of a respectable 
urban middle-class, and to the relations between heterosexual and gay interests. Gay 
leaders regulated these alleged public health threats in an attempt to improve relations 
between themselves and dominant institutional actors. Owing to the fact that issues of 
sexual hygiene figured prominently in the discourse of respectability, the gay middle-
 
 258 
class defined its social position by emphasizing its difference from people of color. In so 
doing, gay leaders and AIDS advocates, however, inadvertently attributed social 
inequality to the mere nonconformity of social norms. This approach, in turn, foreclosed 
a critique of structural inequality’s crucial part in abetting the AIDS pandemic—not to 
mention that it also naturalized categories of race and sexuality as discrete formations 
without any overlap.  
Due to their failure to employ an intersectional analysis in their response to the 
Frontline episode, white gay leaders and AIDS advocates were unable to articulate how 
Bridges’ life choices were systematically constrained by structural racism and material 
inequality. Instead, they “privatized” Bridges’ AIDS diagnosis as the result of his 
irresponsible decisions and pathological desires. In their move to protect the public image 
of the group while erasing Bridges as a deviant subject who engaged in sexually 
irresponsible behavior, gay community activists missed an opportunity to critique the 
Reagan administration for its criminal passivity on the epidemic. Likewise, they gave 
further credence to the belief that AIDS was the result of individual shortcomings. 
Without an overt understanding of inequality’s roots in structures, respectability’s 
emphasis on individual behavior enabled gay community activists to cast blame on 
individuals—like Bridges—for their own marginalization. As a formulation that neatly 
aligned with the cultural tenets of neoliberalism, this politics of respectability emphasized 
a discourse of personal responsibility over broad structural changes. To circumscribe the 
“questionable” sexual practices of some gay men and to transform their behavior under 
the premise of advancing the gay community as a whole, white gay leaders and AIDS 
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advocates upheld the social structures and symbolic representations of white 
heteropatriarchy. 
My investigation into patterns of secondary marginalization within gay 
communities cautions us that the policies of any marginal group must rely upon more 
than a single-axis approach to liberation lest it reduce the effectiveness of its political 
mobilization by merely replicating the mechanisms of state power. In this case, although 
a politics of respectability challenged homophobic characterizations of gay men, it failed 
to demand broad structural changes in American laws and institutions. By prioritizing 
and promoting only those issues and members believed to enhance the public image of 
the group, community elites rendered invisible those other issues and members feared to 
threaten the newfound, precarious status of the group, oftentimes the most vulnerable 
within the group. For some community elites, there were some lives that were 
salvageable and then there were those that were simply beyond redemption.  
The Specter of Racial Miscegenation. 
 The case of Bridges exemplifies how public health officials and law enforcement 
authorities colluded to publicize that the supposed predilection to vice by prostitutes of 
color was predetermined by culture, not a symptom of economic need or chemical 
dependency. To accentuate this claim, mainstream media and the political establishment 
recycled images and messages that cast racialized sexuality as inherently immoral and 
intrinsically dangerous to a white American social and political order. These depictions 
of people of color as objects of fear are narratively meaningful for their historical 
particularity. The media portrayal of Bridges as sexually dangerous did not operate in a 
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vacuum; it was a representation of the black body behaving in threatening ways 
according to historically prescribed patterns.  
In its characterization of Bridges as a dangerous criminal roaming the streets of 
America, the Frontline episode insinuated that Bridges was a full-blown prostitute, a 
mobile one that. Although the evidence to confirm such a claim was lacking, by the mere 
virtue of his racialized status, this insinuation forced the audience to consider how many 
other AIDS-stricken prostitutes of color were allegedly lurking in the shadow of the 
night. The Frontline episode’s depiction of Bridges as a prostitute with AIDS, thus, 
fulfilled an ideological imperative: to elicit public fear that Bridges, and others like him, 
remained sexually active. Branding the racialized poor, especially women and queers, as 
prostitutes made them identifiable, legible, and readable for state interference—in 
particular, for health regulations and police harassment.   
Depictions of PWHAs as “desperately ill and grotesquely disfigured…wasted to 
fleshless ethereal bodies,” such as those of Bridges, are what Crimp describes as “phobic 
images” or images at “the terror at imagining the person with AIDS as still sexual.”86 
Crimp argues that these images are not designed to assuage the public’s fear of disease 
and death, or to necessarily reinforce the association of PWHAs with victimhood or 
pariah status. Instead, these phobic images are mobilized to incite public terror that 
PWHAs can still remain sexually active and, thus, transmit the virus to unsuspecting 
victims.87 Per this logic, the Frontline episode presents Bridges as a visibly debilitated 
                                                
86 Crimp, “Portraits of People with AIDS,” 106.  
87 One of the ways in which the media manipulate public fear of PWHAs as sexually active is through the 
use of before-and-after images of PWHAs. Gever observes that media represents sexual deviances through 
physical deformities. A prime example is Kenny Ramsaur whose before-and-after images dominated the 




and pathetically ill sexual being to stoke public fears over the continued sexuality of 
PWHAs. Giving further credence to this claim is the fact that throughout the country, 
public health officials, law enforcement authorities, and politicians sought to explicitly 
circumscribe Bridges’ sexuality.  
Filmmakers emphasized the difficulty policymakers across Indianapolis, 
Cleveland, and Houston encountered when dealing with Bridges. In one particular scene, 
towards the end of the episode when Bridges returns to Houston, the Public Health 
Commissioner of Houston, with fear and loathing in his voice, warns: “Fabian was only 
diagnosed last April. He might live another two years, and furthermore this person is in 
remission now. He’s not demonstrating any signs of illness!” The commissioner was 
alarmed that Bridges did not show any physical manifestation of his infection that would 
deter his would-be sexual partners. The commissioner also lamented that Bridges would 
probably “live another two years,” time during which he might infect others.88 The 
Frontline episode’s portrayal of Bridges as lifeless and deformed, yet still sexually active, 
symbolized a deeper public anxiety, rooted in homophobia, that PWHAs would infect the 
general population of suburban, white heterosexual women and children.89 Disease itself 
                                                                                                                                            
deviance in which nature’s punishment is visible through physical deformity. Gever elaborates that 
Ramsaur’s photos are treated as “the grotesque product of insidious viruses and unnatural sexual practices, 
whose portrait is meant to serve as an icon of moral decay.” Gever, “Pictures of Sickness,” 124.   
88 Filmmakers used the trope of the sexually promiscuous PWHA to introduce Bridges to the audience. In 
the opening to the documentary, host Judy Woodruff, described Bridges as “a man with AIDS who 
continued to be promiscuous.”  
89 If media did not portray PWHAs as sexual beings, they would depict PWHAs as de-sexed individuals but 
not necessarily to assuage the public’s fears. Rather, by representing PWHAs as asexual individuals, media 
representations denoted a loss of optimism. Crimp reveals that portraits of PWHAs were designed to 
reinforce hopelessness. Whenever media portrayed a PWHA conveying words of optimism, he or she 
would subsequently be revealed to have died. Therein lied a “comfortable fantasy,” according to Crimp, 
that AIDS would signal the demise of gay promiscuity or gay sex altogether. Crimp, “Portraits of People 
with AIDS,”  
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or anti-homosexual sentiment alone, however, were not the sole roots of these public 
concerns.  
More precisely, racial miscegenation, itself a proxy for white economic anxiety, 
underwrote the demonization of PWHAs and the subsequent criminalization of HIV 
transmission in the 1980s. As the state ushered in an era of neoliberal multiculturalism in 
which some people of color accessed dominant institutions long denied to them, white 
Americans perceived a loss in prominence.90 White Americans’ fear of HIV/AIDS was, 
in fact, symptomatic of deeper social anxieties fueled by shifts in the political economy 
of the United States. Accordingly, we can treat the moral panic associated with 
HIV/AIDS as a concerted attempt to restore white supremacy. The passage of draconian 
public health measures intended to constrain the movement of “non-compliant” PWHAs 
underscores attempts at the re-entrenchment of white supremacy. Officials primarily 
enforced these measures against people of color, including the homeless and sex workers. 
Whether or not those criminalized under these statutes were more likely to intentionally 
spread the virus is a moot point. By sheer virtue of being people of color, their sexuality 
was always already perceived as deviant, in excess.91 Forasmuch as HIV could be 
transmitted to one another without the knowledge of those involved, racialized physical 
features and behaviors became indicators of the virus. In that fashion, the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, by equating the virus with racialized sexual deviance, intensified notions of 
racial difference. This is partly the reason the mainstream media often portrayed the 
                                                
90 Jodi Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).   
91 People of color were also more likely to come into contact with public health officials and law 




racialized poor as prostitutes. As I show below, racialized discourses of sex workers of 
color as contagious, dangerous, and toxic became a rallying point for public health 
officials, law enforcement authorities, and urban policymakers in passing new 
communicable disease laws designed to “cleanse” the public sphere and body politic of 
deviance, immorality, and vice.  
 Throughout the country, the public became increasingly alarmed over prostitutes 
with AIDS allegedly spreading the virus. Mainstream media exacerbated these fears by 
offering sensational stories of prostitutes, mostly homosexuals and people of color, 
having sex with white heterosexual men who would then go on and infect their wives and 
unborn children. Prostitutes of color were situated as threats to the fitness and health of 
the nation. Although most public health officials assured the public that the virus was not 
transmitted via casual contact, they continued to endorse policies designed to regulate 
non-compliant AIDS carriers. Public health officials regarded sex workers as a 
“bridging” population carrying the virus towards white suburban wives and children. In 
New York City, by May of 1985, non-homosexual drug users—a significant number of 
whom were sex workers—represented 26 percent of the city’s then-AIDS cases. As a 
result of the increased number of AIDS detected among heterosexual drug users and sex 
workers, several noted doctors within the field called for immediate action. Dr. Arye 
Rubinstein of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine warned that New York City 
“urgently” needed sex education for “city teenagers” since this population had their first 
sexual contact with possible AIDS carriers. Rubinstein suggested that “city teenagers,” a 
moniker for black and Latinx youth, were not only having sex at a younger age, but they 
were also having sex with prostitutes and IV-drug users. Unfortunately, Rubenstein was 
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not the only prominent doctor to make such outlandish claims. In an interview with the 
New York Native, a gay-themed newspaper, Dr. Mathilde Krim of the Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center forecasted that widespread heterosexual transmission could be 
the next stage of the epidemic.92 Krim expressed concern over the national implication of 
AIDS in prostitutes. She forewarned, “In my opinion, it is out already. Think of all the 
salesmen who come to spend a weekend [in New York City] and go back to Cincinnati to 
their wives and families. It’s scary.”93  Krim’s comments attest to the general perception 
that AIDS was an “urban” disease transmitted unidirectional from the city to the suburb. 
Her comments also placed the onus on preventing HIV transmission on urban sex 
workers, not those “salesmen” from “Cincinnati” (read: white middle America). While 
prostitutes of color became associated with disease, white married men were pictured as 
passive victims of the danger and depravity of these deviant figures. That Krim alluded to 
“salesmen” also implies concerns regarding the threat that prostitutes of color posed for 
the economic wellbeing of the nation. Together, Krim and Rubinstein’s rhetorical 
maneuvers point to the use of metaphor to signify the racialized anxieties of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Admittedly, people of color were disproportionately overrepresented in AIDS 
cases. The Centers for Disease Control reported that 25 percent of the 24,576 cases of 
AIDS reported to it through September 9, 1986, were identified in black people, who 
comprised only 12 percent of the U.S. population. Similarly, 14 percent of people with 
                                                
92 Dr. Mathilde Krim was the founding chairman of amfAR, the American Foundation for AIDS Research, 
in September of 1985. The non-profit organization was founded in support of AIDS research, HIV 
prevention, treatment education, and the advocacy of AIDS-related public policy. Actress Elizabeth Taylor 
was co-founder of amfAR.  
93 “News Digest: Prostitute, AIDS link feared,” Equal Time, May 1, 1985. 
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AIDS were “Hispanics,” who comprised up to six percent of the U.S. population.94 
Communities of color were more susceptible to HIV/AIDS for a number of reasons.95 
Although the epidemic was shaped by the racial disparities of society, some public health 
officials and most conservative politicians hypothesized that communities of color were 
overrepresented in the epidemic due to sexually licentious behaviors. They deduced that 
people of color were simply less likely to regulate their sexual behaviors in accordance 
with public health bulletins. For these critics, AIDS was a behaviorally acquired 
disease.96  
In the Twin Cities, the racial disparities in AIDS diagnoses were even starker. 
Although African-Americans comprised three percent of the population in the Twin 
Cities, they made up 10 percent of the 200 or so cases reported to the Minnesota 
Department of Health (MDH) by August of 1987. In an interview with the Star Tribune, 
chief state epidemiologist Michael Osterholm acknowledged that it was difficult to speak 
openly about the pattern of sexual practices among people of color without coming across 
as “racist.”97 Still, in explaining the disproportionate rate of AIDS among communities of 
color in the Twin Cities, Osterholm referred to cultural practices. He attributed the 
                                                
94 “Ratio of AIDS in Hispanics, blacks noted,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 24, 1986. 
95 Among children with AIDS, the numbers were more staggering. In the summer of 1987, about 80 percent 
of AIDS cases in children were diagnosed in African American or Hispanic children. “AIDS conferees urge 
no-nonsense campaign,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Aug. 09, 1987.  
96 The mode of transmission differed according to race and class. The CDC estimated that intravenous drug 
use or heterosexual transmission accounted for 45 percent of all AIDS cases among African Americans and 
39 percent among Hispanics. However, only 6 percent of AIDS among whites could be attributed to 
intravenous drug use or heterosexual transmission. Among whites, most AIDS cases had been identified in 
gay or bisexual men. Ibid.  
97 Even if such talk sounded racist to some, Osterholm opined that it was necessary to have such a frank 
discussion. He told the Tribune, “Five years from now society will tend to think of the people who knew of 
this problem and said nothing as having been unintentionally racist.” For Osterholm, racism was allowing 
the epidemic to advance in communities of color without publicizing how the sexual practices of people of 
color rendered them vulnerable. Lewis Cope, “Twin Cities AIDS cases are higher among blacks,” 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Aug. 7, 1987.  
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“relatively high rates of sexually transmitted diseases,” including gonorrhea, among 
African-Americans in Minnesota to multiple sexual partners.98 With multiple sexual 
partners, Osterholm deduced, people increased their chances of acquiring HIV. To 
substantiate this theory, Osterholm pointed to the “high rate of out-of-wedlock births 
among blacks” as reflecting the type of early age sexual activity that resulted in a 
heightened risk for sexually transmitted diseases.99 Like Rubenstein, Osterholm 
concluded that because African-Americans allegedly had sex at a younger age, and with 
multiple partners, they put themselves at greater risk for the heterosexual spread of HIV. 
Osterholm, thus, ascribed AIDS in communities of color to a supposed cultural 
predilection to sexual vice. He did not consider the role of structural racism, material 
inequality, or the government’s policy of benign neglect as playing a significant part.100 
Ascribing HIV/AIDS among the racialized poor to a cultural predilection to sexual vice 
                                                
98 In 1986, the Minnesota Department of Health identified 5,046 cases of gonorrhea. Forty-five of those 
cases were identified in African Americans. And many of these gonorrhea cases were diagnosed in black 
gay men. Ibid.  
99 The Star Tribune reported that the out-of-wedlock birth rate in Minnesota was five times higher for 
African Americans than for whites. Ibid.  
100 Public health officials also attributed intravenous drug use as a factor in the disproportionate rate of 
AIDS among people of color. The CDC estimated that about 40 percent of the cases in African Americans 
and Hispanics involved needle-sharing drug use. The spread of the AIDS virus among IV-drug users was 
particularly evident in New York, New Jersey, and Florida. In the summer of 1987, New York City 
accounted for one-third of all AIDS cases. Thirty-six percent of the city’s cases were identified in IV-drug 
users. Public health officials estimated that at the time over half of the city’s 200,000 addicts were infected 
with the AIDS virus. Even though IV-drug use played a significant role in the rates of AIDS among people 
of color in the rest of the country, in Minnesota this was not the pattern. (The rate of heterosexual 
transmission in Minnesota remained below the average compared to the national average because drug-
related cases of AIDS were also relatively minor. Officials attributed the low incidence of AIDS among IV-
drug users in Minnesota to a state law that allowed pharmacists to sell “clean” syringes and needles without 
prescriptions.) In the summer of 1987, 29 of the then-222 confirmed cases of AIDS in Minnesota had been 
documented in people of color. Twenty-two had been diagnosed in African Americans. Six had been 
reported in Hispanics and one had been documented in “a person of Asian descent.” And most of the cases 
of AIDS in people of color in Minnesota had been diagnosed in gay or bisexual men. Only three of the 
state’s 222 AIDS cases had been attributed to the heterosexual spread of the virus; one of which was 
identified in an African American. George Will, “Don’t trim the truth about AIDS,” Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune, Jun. 5, 1987.; Lewis Cope, “Twin Cities AIDS cases are higher among blacks,” Minneapolis Star 
and Tribune, Aug. 7, 1987.; Rob Hotakainen, “Ways to limit AIDS in drug users pondered,” Star Tribune, 
Feb 3, 1988. 
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operates in the service of neoliberalism by disavowing systemic inequality and negating 
state accountability. Given the racist assumptions that people of color harbored a cultural 
predilection to sexual vice, public health officials and conservative politicians were 
particularly uneasy about prostitutes of color with AIDS in the context of interracial sex. 
The policies and practices they implemented to constrain the movement of sex workers 
stemmed from turn-of-the-century measures designed to protect the public health from 
foreign foes.101  
The medical belief that HIV was a disease of racial deviance required the social 
and sexual isolation of prostitutes of color from the general public (read: white 
Americans). In the 1980s, as officials and politicians conflated homosexuality with 
promiscuity, venereal disease, and the threat to the nation’s health, discussion over when 
and how to isolate PWHAs from the rest of society emerged. Between 1985 and 1987, 
nine states amended their old quarantine laws or passed new laws conferring health 
officials with the power to segregate “non-compliant” AIDS carriers who endangered the 
public health. Owing to the fact there was not one general consensus on how to most 
effectively deal with the epidemic, the laws differed significantly. In Colorado, legislators 
passed a statute that provided up to three months of isolation. On the other end, North 
Carolina passed a law that authorized health officials with the power to limit indefinitely 
the “freedom of movement or action” of people with a communicable disease. Still, other 
                                                
101 At the turn of the twentieth century, at the same time as anxieties over Eastern and Southern European 
immigrants reached a boiling point, legislators in every state authorized health officials to combat 
contagious disease by enforcing quarantine and imposing whatever measures were deemed necessary to 
protect the public health of white Americans. Under these laws, a health official could confine an infected 
individual to his or her home, close his or her business, or place him or her in an isolation ward. Health 
officials used quarantine laws primarily to fight off contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and typhoid. 
However, these laws were also used against prostitutes suspected of carrying venereal diseases. Tamar 
Lewin, “Rights of Citizens and Society Raise Legal Muddle on AIDS,” New York Times, Oct. 14, 1987. 
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states implemented laws outright criminalizing the transmission of HIV. Alabama, 
Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, and Nevada passed laws that made knowingly transmitting the 
virus a crime. Under Alabama’s new law, those who conducted themselves “in a manner 
likely to transmit” a sexually transmitted disease faced criminal sanctions. Meanwhile, in 
Nevada, prostitutes who sold their sexual services after learning they tested positive for 
HIV faced charges of attempted murder. Some gay leaders and AIDS advocates opposed 
these laws for a number of reasons.102 They suspected that these laws would be 
selectively used against certain populations. Nan D. Hunter, the lawyer who headed the 
ACLU’s AIDS Projects, reported that these laws would be “a setup for selective 
enforcement against prostitutes and homeless people.”103 Since these laws impacted 
mostly people of color, HIV criminalization laws became another means of regulating 
interracial sexual contact. Being that prostitutes of color with AIDS allegedly poisoned 
and undermined the health of the nation and its economic prosperity, their removal from 
everyday social relations was deemed socially justified.  
HIV criminalization laws—neoliberal manifestations of bygone miscegenation 
laws—were intended to confine sexual relations within racial lines, ensuring racial purity. 
Public health officials and law enforcement authorities had mostly enforced individual 
quarantine orders against male and female prostitutes, most of them homeless and the 
                                                
102 Quarantine, however, was not a viable option given the characteristics of AIDS. Civil liberties activists, 
gay leaders, and AIDS advocates argued that although AIDS was not easily transmitted, its carrier 
remained infectious for life; there was no cure. Under quarantine laws, PWAs would have had to be 
confined for the entirety of their lives. Critics claimed that quarantine, and its sister laws of mandatory 
testing, contact tracing, and criminalization of HIV transmission, would not curb the rates of AIDS. Rather, 
they favored greater AIDS education and more aggressive intervention. In Minneapolis, white gay and 
lesbian elected officials, including Brian Coyle, Allan Spear, and Karen Clark, all endorsed non-compliant 
statues much to the dissatisfaction of sex-positive, queer activists. Tamar Lewin, “Rights of Citizens and 
Society Raise Legal Muddle on AIDS,” New York Times, Oct. 14, 1987. 
103 Ibid.  
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vast majority people of color. On January 2, 1987, the New York Times chronicled the 
arrest of James H. McIntyre, a 28-year-old “homosexual prostitute” with AIDS from 
Jackson, Mississippi. The New York Times described McIntyre as someone who dressed 
in women’s clothes and sought men with whom to have sex.104 On the night of his arrest, 
McIntyre was in the presence of a well-known, “married, white, gray-haired and 
overweight” businessman in the state capital.105 To confirm that no one was truly safe, 
that McIntyre could have even slept with one’s husband, the New York Times divulged 
that McIntyre had been arrested more than 60 times for street prostitution, with his 
clientele being “diverse,” including “married and single men, black and white men, 
young and old.” Like Bridges’ case, authorities in Jackson, Mississippi debated how to 
best address the supposed danger that McIntyre posed. (Also, like Bridges, authorities 
had originally provided McIntyre with a one-way ticket to his hometown in California. 
But he returned.) The police chief was reluctant to keep McIntyre in the all-male 
environment of jail or prison for fear of spreading HIV so he placed him in isolated 
confinement, like Bridges as well.106   If prosecution failed, the state epidemiologist 
vowed to use the state’s quarantine law, “one of the nation’s strongest.”107 After a grand 
                                                
104 In an interview with the St. Petersburg Times, McIntyre, “wrapped in an old fur coat as he sat on his 
dank mattress in the Jackson City Jail,” denied charges leveled against him and questioned his AIDS 
diagnosis. “I've been told that I have the AIDS virus, but not AIDS,” he said. “But I don't feel like I have 
anything.” The NYT’s exposé portrayed McIntyre as someone who lacked awareness over his diagnosis, as 
he did “not seem to understand the implications of the virus he carrier or the need to avoid sexual contact 
with others. Dudley Clendinen, “Dilemma For Southern Prosecutors: Streets or Prison For Aids Carrier?” 
New York Times, Jan. 2, 1987.; Dudley Clendinen, “Southern prosecutors face dilemma on AIDS,” St. 
Petersburg Times, Jan. 4, 1987.  
105 McIntyre was charged with “unnatural intercourse,” a sodomy charge. If convicted for sodomy, a felony 
charge, McIntyre could have faced as much as 10 years in prison. Dudley Clendinen, “Dilemma For 
Southern Prosecutors: Streets or Prison For Aids Carrier?” New York Times, Jan. 2, 1987. 
106 The state’s assistant District Attorney did not believe any workable plan would encourage McIntyre to 
alter his behaviors as “[t]he guy is obviously not going to quit doing what he does.” Ibid.  
107 The state quarantine law in Mississippi read: “The State Department of Health shall have the authority 




jury refused to indict McIntyre on sodomy charges, McIntyre was ordered to not engage 
in sexual relations without informing his prospective partners of his HIV-positive 
status.108 He was also barred from donating blood.109 In spite of the harsh nature of these 
punitive measures, McIntyre’s case was not an isolated instance of public health officials 
and law enforcement authorities collaborating to regulate the movement of prostitutes.110 
                                                                                                                                            
including the authority to establish, maintain and enforce isolation and quarantine, and ... to exercise such 
physical control over property and individuals as the department may find necessary for the protection of 
the public health.” Although the state epidemiologist, Dr. Ed Thompson, insisted that the quarantine law 
was one of the strongest in the country, he believed the quarantine process to be cumbersome and 
ineffective, as it was not designed to regulate adult sexual activity. Instead, Thompson advised that 
McIntyre be prosecuted and imprisoned for having broken the state’s sodomy law. Thompson warned the 
public, “Having sex with any prostitute, especially a male prostitute, is taking your life in your hands.” 
When speaking on ways to address prostitutes with AIDS, Thompson cited the case of Fabian Bridges. 
Thompson pointed out that the problem of this infected male prostitute was resolved when Bridges died of 
AIDS. Dudley Clendinen, “Southern prosecutors face dilemma on AIDS,” St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 4, 
1987; Dudley Clendinen, “World’s oldest profession meets man’s latest terror,” Chicago Tribune, Jan. 12, 
1987: 16. 
108 White gay leaders in Jackson, Mississippi, were likewise unsympathetic to McIntyre. The New York 
Times interviewed Eddie Sandifer, executive director of the Mississippi Gay Alliance who accused 
McIntyre of “selling death.” Sandifer seized the opportunity to criticize gay men who continued to be 
sexually promiscuous even as they carried the AIDS virus. Sandifer disclosed that these gay men would 
seek out the Gay Alliance for resources, yet he and other staff members would see “these people going to 
the bars and the bookstores every night picking up tricks.” For Sandifer, the differences between McIntyre 
and other gay men were minute. He explained, “I don’t think that what this guy in jail was doing is any 
worse than what a lot of other people are doing. The only difference is that he is getting paid for it.” Like 
Coyle, Sandifer attributed the spread of HIV to “irresponsible” gay male sexuality. Dudley Clendinen, 
“Dilemma For Southern Prosecutors: Streets or Prison For Aids Carrier?” New York Times, Jan. 2, 1987. 
109 Fear of AIDS-contaminated blood similarly swept throughout the country. In Los Angeles, Edward 
Joseph Markowski, a “homosexual prostitute with AIDS,” was charged with attempted murder for selling 
his “AIDS-tainted blood.” In Minneapolis, an inmate who tested positive for HIV bit two guards. In June of 
1987, he was convicted of assault with two deadly weapons—his mouth and his teeth. “The Debate: 
Stopping AIDS; We need medical laws to fight AIDS,” USA Today, Jul. 6, 1987. 
110 In Florida, authorities invoked the state’s 1986 quarantine law to confine a sexually active 14-year-old 
boy with AIDS. On June 5, 1987, a court ordered the boy be isolated in a state mental hospital in 
Pensacola, Florida. However, soon after, the Florida Health Department withdrew its order, citing it had 
made a mistake. In July of 1987, Wendy Blankenship, a 19-year-old sex worker with AIDS was sentenced 
to a year in jail, the maximum sentence for violating probation terms imposed after an earlier conviction for 
lewd and lascivious behavior. In its October 14, 1987 issue, the New York Times presented the story of 
Stephanie Smith, an African American drug user and sex worker in Fresno, California, to illustrate the 
“hardest questions” facing state legislators between respecting the civil liberties of PWHAs and protecting 
the public health. The New York Times reported that people in Smith’s drug treatment program shunned her 
after learning she was HIV-positive. Believing there was no point in fighting her drug addiction if she was 
dying of AIDS, Smith abandoned treatment. The New York Times interviewed a health official counseling 
Smith who tracked her down to the streets. Upon learning that Smith “wasn’t taking precautions 
and…wasn’t cleaning her needles,” the health official phoned the police who arrested Smith as she 




To the extent that HIV contaminated the middle-class nuclear family ideal and 
transgressed upon the already crumbling boundaries of race and nationality, HIV 
criminalization laws were harnessed to secure the social and sexual banishment of 
prostitutes of color from the public sphere. In Minnesota, state health officials were 
similarly confronted with cases of non-compliant prostitutes with AIDS. In one case, 
state health officials learned of the prostitute’s “high-risk” behaviors only after her death. 
In the fall of 1986, Phyllis Olson, a Native American “gay prostitute,” was found 
murdered on a footbridge in downtown Minneapolis. The Star Tribune published that 
Olson had tested positive for HIV, after the Minneapolis Police Department “leaked” the 
information.111 Because Olson worked as a “straight prostitute,” her case greatly alarmed 
the public. Olson “passed” as a woman and her clients were primarily heterosexual, white 
married men. The local press explicitly linked her case to that of Bridges to show the 
imminent danger that sex workers posed for white Americans. In an article on her death, 
the Star Tribune wrote, “City and health officials have been looking for legal ways to get 
transient AIDS cases off the streets since the publicized case of the late Fabian Bridges, a 
                                                                                                                                            
treatment program, and was subsequently imprisoned for violating probation. The health official confessed 
to the New York Times that she worried Smith would continue to engage in sex work upon her release: 
“California needs to decide what we’re going to do with these people. There’s talk about quarantine, but 
you quarantine someone until they’re no longer infectious and AIDS last for life. And where are they going 
to put her? She doesn’t even have a place to live.” Smith’s case not only symbolized deeper anxieties about 
how to best approach the AIDS crisis, as an illness requiring compassion or as a threat demanding 
punishment. It also underscored how public health officials and policymakers lacked an awareness of the 
link between structural racism, material inequality, drug abuse and the spread of the AIDS virus. What 
Smith desperately needed was shelter and a steady of source of income, an awareness that officials could 
not glean without an intersectional lens. Tamar Lewin, “Rights of Citizens and Society Raise Legal Muddle 
on AIDS,” New York Times, Oct. 14, 1987. 
111 While disclosing information about Olson’s activities on the night of her death and Olson’s prostitution 
arrests, homicide detectives reportedly revealed to the press that Olson had tested positive for HIV 
antibodies. Detectives hoped that by disclosing Olson’s HIV status, people who had information about her 
death would come forward. Local daily newspapers and television stations emphasized Olson’s HIV status 
in their reporting. Some of the stories even speculated whether Olson might have been engaging in 
prostitution and unsafe sex on the night she was killed, therefore, suggesting the necessity of her death. Jim 
Schroeder, “HIV press leak sought,” Equal Time, Oct. 29, 1986. 
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gay outcall service worker who said he had infected hundreds of customers with AIDS in 
Cleveland.” Bridges, however, never worked as a “gay outcall service worker” and he 
never admitted to having sex with more than six men while being an AIDS carrier. 
Nonetheless, by tying Bridges’ case to that of Olson’s, the Tribune exaggerated the 
danger that sex workers posed for their clients. The Tribune did not focus on Olson’s 
death to investigate who killed her, but to generate support for laws that criminalized 
carrying and transmitting HIV.112  
Before Olson’s murder, the Minnesota Department of Health had been aware of 
two instances of prostitutes with AIDS: Rea Robinson and Stan Borrman.113 Both of 
                                                
112 Julie Gravelle and Kevin Diaz, “Transient found slain had tested positive for AIDS,” Minneapolis Star 
and Tribune, Sep. 24, 1986. 
113 Although bisexual men who sought the services of sex workers were the links between prostitutes and 
suburbia, authorities relegated blame almost entirely onto prostitutes of color. The case of Minneapolis 
Men, an escort service, shows us how health officials and law enforcement prioritized the safety of white, 
heterosexual suburban families to the detriment of prostitutes of color. On March 26, 1986, a week after its 
initial broadcasting the Fabian Bridges story, WCCO-TV broke the story of a second alleged prostitute. 
This time around, the male prostitute in question was local; he worked for the escort agency, Minneapolis 
Men. Stan Borrman, a 29-year-old white male prostitute who had been carrying the virus for at least two 
years, contacted WCCO about practicing unsafe sex with his clients while knowing he carried the AIDS 
virus. Borrman recounted that over the previous seven years he might have exposed as many as 1,000 men, 
most of them bisexual married men from suburban Minnesota. Borrman’s revelations prompted widespread 
panic that “organized prostitution” was transmitting HIV to unsuspecting white women and children. 
However, unlike Robinson, the Minnesota Department of Health helped Borrman enter a drug treatment 
program and offered him immunity from prosecution in return for his cooperation in criminal investigations 
against the escort agency. On the basis of Borrman’s revelations, the state sought a permanent injunction 
against the escort agency. Also, the morning after WCCO’s interview with Borrman, Minnesota’s 
Commissioner of Health, Sister Mary Madonna Ashton, called an emergency press conference, a rare event 
in and of itself. Ashton urged Borrman’s contacts, and “all men who may have had sexual contacts with 
male prostitutes” since 1977 “to receive appropriate counseling and be tested immediately.” For those who 
tested positive, Ashton pleaded that they “take steps to inform their wives or other sexual contacts” so that 
they too could be counseled and tested. Ashton was primarily concerned that male prostitutes were 
spreading the virus to women and children. At the press conference, she declared, “If we have a ring of 
prostitutes and there is even one and possibly more of them who have been infecting a sizable group of 
bisexual and gay men in our city, there's the potential of the infection spreading to wives, to mothers, to 
children." However, for all her concern, Ashton stopped short of promoting safer sex practices. During the 
televised press conference, Ashton did not even mention the word “gay.” She also refused to address 
questions pertaining to the effectiveness of condoms in preventing the spread of HIV. It was also only after 
the scandal became public that public health officials implemented a wide scale safer sex campaign. 
Officials, however, geared this wide scale safer sex campaign to a relatively low-risk population. Upon 
learning that male prostitutes, such as Borrman, were potentially spreading the virus to bisexual men, the 




these cases ignited a firestorm of public scorn and legal surveillance, and sanctioned 
expressions of racism and classism as medically sound. Because people of color and 
sexual minorities were regarded as the culprits of the epidemic, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
revived outdated methods for controlling sexuality. In these methods, public health and 
law enforcement collaborated in the sanitation, both literally and figuratively, of the 
public sphere and the body politic of deviant sexual expression.  
In the spring of 1986, Rea Robinson, a 28-year-old African-American woman 
from Minneapolis with a history of drug abuse, was arrested on charges of prostitution. 
Her arrest might not have made the local news had the Minneapolis Police Department 
not “leaked” to the Star Tribune that Robinson had tested positive for HIV three months 
prior to her arrest. Although Osterholm, chief epidemiologist for the Minnesota 
Department of Health, insisted that female-to-male transmission of the AIDS virus could 
occur but “the evidence would suggest it extremely difficult,” authorities believed 
Robinson was an AIDS risk. Because of her presumed public health risk, bail was set at 
$3,000, three times what prosecutors had requested. Perhaps hoping to deter would-be 
customers, a judge even ordered that the MPD release a photograph of Johnson to the 
                                                                                                                                            
convince people to undergo HIV-testing. Not surprisingly, some AIDS advocates were distressed about the 
MDH allocating such funding to interventions for heterosexuals when gay men, who continued to be the 
most impacted by the disease in the Twin Cities, received less attention. For some, like Tim Campbell, 
editor of the GLC Voice, having a Catholic nun running a public health department in the wake of the 
greatest health crisis facing gay men and IV-drug users was incommensurable. Campbell had accused the 
then-governor of Minnesota with appointing Ashton “as a favor to his Catholic supporters.” J.C. Ritter, 
“Stan Borrman on: prostitution, AIDS and the Health Department,” Equal Time, May 28, 1986.; Tim 
Campbell, “AFRAIDS in Minnesota,” New York Native, May 26, 1986.; “AIDS Takes Scary Suburban 
Twist,” Minnesota Law Journal 1, no. 3, (1986).; J.C. Ritter, “Escort service closed; safe sex debated,” 
Equal Time, Apr. 2, 1986.; Kevin Diaz and Bruce Benidt, “Police and others question role of prostitution in 
AIDS,” Star Tribune, Mar. 28, 1986: 01B.; Lewis Cope, “Male prostitute with AIDS virus had 1,000 sex 
partners in Cities, he says,” Star Tribune, Mar. 27, 1986: 1A. 
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local press.114 The Star Tribune went even further by publishing Robinson’s home 
address. When Robinson was released from the Hennepin County Jail, Lt. Lyle 
Goodspeed, head of the vice unit of the MPD, attempted to assuage public concerns when 
he informed the Star Tribune that he did not think Robinson’s release from jail would be 
cause for alarm: “I don’t think she’ll be on the street…I think it’s more interested in other 
kinds of work. If she is on the street, we’ll be watching her closely [emphasis added].”115 
The literal dehumanization of Robinson in these accounts encapsulates attempts by media 
and policymakers to deter respectable whites from sexual relations with the likes of 
Robinson. By way of the loathsome contagion imbued upon Robinson and other 
prostitutes of color, HIV criminalization laws were also devised to corral wayward white 
men, in order to impress upon them practices of domestic discipline that bolstered 
compulsory heterosexual family life in the United States.  
With this in mind, authorities issued Robinson a restraining order demanding that 
she provide the Minnesota Department of Health with the names of anyone she may have 
placed at risk because of intravenous drug use or sexual intercourse, and prohibiting her 
from engaging in prostitution. As part of her conditional plea, Robinson was to meet 
periodically with health officials to undergo counseling and education on the 
transmission of HIV.116 However, on September 18, 1987, Robinson, who had just been 
                                                
114 Bill McAuliffe, “Woman considered to be AIDS risk is released after prostitution arrest,” Minneapolis 
Star and Tribune, Apr. 2, 1986. 
115 Ibid.  
116 In a memorandum filed with the court explaining the basis for the restraining order, the MDH stated that 
Robinson had agreed to voluntarily cooperate with health officials to undergo counseling and education 
about the transmission of HIV. She had also agreed to refrain from behavior that could cause risk to others. 
However, according to the MDH, Robinson did not comply with these demands. The memo read: “To date, 
in spite of repeated and ultimately false representations, [Robinson] has done absolutely nothing to 
evidence a scintilla of awareness of her potential health threat, a willingness to be instructed as to 




evicted from her south Minneapolis apartment, was arrested in the early morning on 
charges of loitering to commit prostitution. The prosecutor in Robinson’s contempt of 
court charges, in explaining how Robinson’s case was different from the average 
prostitution misdemeanor case, told the Star Tribune, “It is akin to someone walking 
down the streets carrying a bomb [emphasis added].”117 Robinson was sentenced to an 
18-month prison term for violating terms of her probation on past convictions of theft and 
forgery by loitering with intent to commit prostitution.118 A few months after her release 
in the spring of 1989, Robinson relapsed. She was arrested on a possession of drug 
paraphernalia, loitering with the intent to solicit prostitution, and outstanding traffic 
warrants.119 Her arrests rehashed public concerns that Robinson was actively spreading 
the virus to unsuspecting customers and their families. A deputy chief of the MPD told 
                                                                                                                                            
prostitution or unsafe sexual or needle-sharing behavior or an indication of alerting those whom she may 
have infected from seeking appropriate medical intervention.” The memo insisted that the restraining order 
was necessary for Minnesota Commissioner of Health Sister Mary Madonna Ashton to perform her duties. 
Without the restraining order, Ashton would be unable to investigate the occurrence of suspected cases or 
carriers of reportable disease, identify those at risk from the disease and counsel them to prevent further 
spread of the AIDS virus. The memo did not outline what measures would be taken to ensure the health of 
Robinson. Instead, the memo characterized Robinson as someone who lacked a basic awareness of the 
disease she carried. By describing her as such, the MDH not only garnered support for quarantine and other 
punitive measures, it also infantilized Robinson who required state intervention. That intervention, 
however, was born out of a demand to circumscribe her mobility so as to safeguard public safety, not out of 
a desire to meet Robinson’s emotional, housing, and medical needs. Given her non-compliance, the MDH 
was able to cast Robinson as an immediate, imminent, and present danger to the public of the Twin Cities. 
Margaret Zack, “Prostitute who allegedly has AIDS virus ordered not to put others at risk,” Star Tribune, 
Aug 9, 1986. 
117 During her court appearance on contempt of court charges, Robinson’s attorney pleaded that Robinson 
was depressed and suicidal and required help for narcotics dependency. He requested that Robinson be 
placed in a locked psychiatric ward of the Hennepin County Medical Center. However, doctors at the 
medical center determined that Robinson was not “psychotic” and, as such, was not in need of medical 
care. Robinson was subsequently ordered to Hennepin County Jail. Given death threats leveled against her 
and the inability of jail authorities to properly treat someone in Robinson’s condition, Robinson’s attorney 
told the Star Tribune that he worried Robinson would be treated like “a leper in ancient Rome” in jail. 
“Minneapolis/Judge to hear prostitution case of prostitute who may carry AIDS virus,” Star Tribune, Sep. 
25, 1987. 
118 The judge in the case re-issued the order preventing her from working as a prostitute and required that 
she contact the MDH once a month.  “Minneapolis/Order’s ramifications pondered,” Star Tribune, Dec. 1, 
1987: 3B. 




the Star Tribune, “It is frustrating. She is committing an act of violence as surely as if she 
took a gun and shot someone…She is not only knowingly infecting her customers, but 
wives and girlfriends and untold other innocent victims [emphasis added].”120 Arrests 
against Robinson continued despite her claims that she was no longer engaging in sex 
work. 121 Robinson’s case illustrates how public health officials and law enforcement 
authorities collaborated to explain the supposed predilection to vice by prostitutes of 
color as something predetermined by culture, not a manifestation of economic need or 
chemical dependency. When health authorities, police, and policymakers viewed 
prostitutes of color soliciting white married men, their presence was considered 
particularly dangerous as they agonized that prostitutes of color would transmit the virus 
to white male clients and their unsuspecting families. The response by media, public 
health, and the overall general public to prostitutes of color with AIDS as objects of fear 
is noteworthy in that it posits a typified image of the black body operating in threatening 
ways according to historically perceived patterns.  
In Savage Portrayals: Race, Media, and the Central Park Jogger Story, media 
scholar Natalie P. Byfield looks at how in the era of colorblindness, the mainstream rape 
coverage of the Central Park jogger upheld white male dominance while further 
                                                
120 Ibid.  
121 On May 16, 1991, Robinson was arrested for loitering with the intent to commit prostitution. This was 
her 16th such arrest since 1976. At a court appearance a week later, Robinson’s public defender maintained 
that Robinson had not committed a crime and that she no longer engaged in sex work. Her public defender 
accused police investigators and news reporters of hounding Robinson to the point that she “cannot go out 
on the street without being arrested.” Authorities disagreed. They countered that Robinson was back 
working the streets. Deputy City Attorney Mitchell Rothman told the Star Tribune that the city wanted 
Robinson off the streets “as long as we can.” He elaborated, “We are very concerned about the possibility 
that AIDS or any other infectious disease is being communicated, particularly when the possibility of the 
infection is arising as a result of prostitution.” As a result, police investigators closely monitored Robinson. 




marginalizing low-income black and Latino males through the demonization of the 
alleged attackers. In 1989, members of the media, elements of the criminal justice system 
in New York City, and some portions of the political establishment wrongfully accused 
and convicted a group of black and Latino male teens of sexually assaulting a white 
female jogger in Central Park. As Byfield shows, the rape of Trisha Meili, a twenty-
eight-year old investment banker working in Manhattan’s financial district, revived fears 
of black and Latino men preying on white women and participating in new random acts 
of violence called “wilding.” Through auto-ethnography and content analysis of the 
words and terms used in newspaper coverage of the rape, the trials, and beyond, Byfield 
emphasizes the role of media in reanimating deep-seated ideas that associate people of 
color with social pathology and sexual transgression. Byfield cites Hector Bonilla-Silva 
who argues that the end of the Jim Crow era in 1965 shepherded a more understated form 
of the same attitudes directed against people of color; he dubs this phenomenon “color-
blind racism.”122 Byfield elaborates upon Bonilla-Silva’s point by noting that media 
coverage of the Central Park jogger’s rape, considering its widespread usage of the terms 
“wilding” and “savage,” reworked biological explanations of earlier periods for a race-
neutral frame. Byfield concludes that the case serves as a stark reminder of how new 
discourses about racial groups rooted in color-blind racism make it feasible to recycle 
racist tropes from the past while minimizing the existence of racially disparate life 
                                                
122 Bonilla-Silva explains that since the post-civil rights era, we have experienced the breakdown of 
discourses that refer to genetics in attributing specific traits to particular individuals and groups. In lieu of 
these eugenic discourses, we have experienced the birth of discourses that explain racially disparate life 
outcomes as a result of culture, market forces, or personal choice. Bonilla-Silva contends that these race-
neutral explanations, at the heart of color-blind racism, disregard discrimination and the material harm it 
occasions. Simply put, because these race-neutral explanations inform laws, policies, and practices, race-
neutrality actually conditions and intensifies racially disparate life outcomes. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, 
Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006).  
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outcomes as having little, if any, relevance to the historical and material foundations of 
racial inequality in the United States.123 During the HIV/AIDS epidemic, we witnessed 
the ideological recycling of racist tropes from the past that cast the racialized poor as 
sexually dangerous to the moral and social order of the country.  
The connections between white racism and the fear of racialized sexuality have 
long been researched. In denying full citizenship status and rights to people of color, the 
state has long referenced what it has deemed to be abnormal and deviant sexual behavior. 
Speaking in regards to African-Americans, political scientist Cathy J. Cohen historicizes 
this process of racialization, “Whether it is denying enslaved Africans the right to marry 
or forcing the sterilization of black women or limiting the financial support women could 
receive from the state, sex and the constructed image of an untamed black sexuality has 
continuously been a lynchpin for policies of deprivation and dehumanization targeting 
African Americans.”124 Cohen’s point is that a white supremacist state constructs black 
communities as sexually deviant, dangerous, and irresponsible to justify their continued 
oppression and secondary status.  
Key to the construction of racialized sexual deviance has been the development of 
contemporary mass media.125 Because media has supported the transformation of the 
                                                
123 Byfield connects the Central Park jogger case to the ongoing moral panic of the 1980s that focused on 
crime and drug abuse in black and Latino communities. This moral panic, which I discuss in further detail 
in chapter five, identified young black and Latino males as the new “folk devils.” Byfield argues that this 
moral panic contributed to the sensationalized coverage of the case in that it made it possible to persuade 
the public to accept the image of young black and Latino males as hyperdeviant. Natalie P. Byfield, Savage 
Portrayals: Race, Media, and the Central Park Jogger Story (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 
2014).  
124 Cathy J. Cohen, “Black Sexuality, Indigenous Moral Panics, and Respectability,” in Moral Panics, Sex 
Panics: Fear the Fight over Sexual Rights, ed. Gilbert Herdt, (New York: New York University Press, 
2009), 119.   
125 As the connective tissue in society, the media has played an important role in laying the foundation for 
contemporary racial hierarchies and representations. From the 1800s, with the advent of the Penny Press, 




meanings associated with racial categories, we can treat the development of the 
contemporary modern mass media as a historically situated racial project.126 With the 
consolidation of racial categories came the policing of racial boundaries. Central to 
maintaining racial borders—a social order with elite white men at the top—were 
restrictions against interracial sexual relations.127 Extensive scholarship has confirmed 
that racism has been at the foundation of sexual violence in the United States.128 For 
                                                                                                                                            
classified as “white” in the United States. Through the stories they covered about race, such as the nation’s 
westward expansion and removal of Native Americans from their land, the media united readers 
discursively and philosophically on issues of race. Such coverage was used to forge group loyalty among 
whites and, therefore, represented a form of nationalism in the theory of Benedict Anderson who argued 
that the development of shared identities occurs discursively. These shared identities were achieved 
through the media’s deployment of “common totems,” including the white male as the symbolic head of 
white racial group classification. At the same time, the media, in all its white, black, and alternative press 
formulations, developed hegemonic and counter-hegemonic constructions of black identity. The 
mainstream media actively differentiated Europeans who were not owners of large tracts of land and who 
were not in possession of enough capital to be independent merchants or businesspeople from blacks with 
whom they shared much in common from a class or social status perspective. This differentiation was 
accomplished to separate the lower and higher strata of people in hopes of reducing the likelihood of 
systemic revolt. The mainstream media used the interests of the symbolic head to distinguish the privileges 
accorded one group in relation to another—white to black, white to Native American, men to women. As 
such, “With these interests grounded in the definitions of white racial group classification, a common 
identity could be forged between the non-elite and the elite European descendants.” Byfield, Savage 
Portrayals, 66.   
126 According to Omi and Winant, the theory of racial formation asserts that racial classifications are both 
structural and representational concepts. To substantiate their claim, they cite the ways in which race has 
been used in the history and development of capitalism, the European conquest of the New World, 
colonialism, and slavery. During these periods, societies organized themselves around their understandings 
of race. In the process, racial categories were “created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” Omi and 
Winant refer to “historically situated racial projects” as the race-based social movements, policies, state 
actions, collective actions, and individual interactions used in the process of racial formation. Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1990s, (New York: 
Routledge, 1994), 55.  
127 By protecting against the emergence of a group of “mixed race” people who could challenge the 
traditional racial, class, and labor order, laws against miscegenation were developed and implemented to 
safeguard against the disruption of racial and class hierarchies. Due to these legal and extralegal social 
practices, elite white males occupied a position of sexual dominance over all others. These white men 
legislated sexual boundaries for others that did not apply to them. In fact, so normal was their sexual 
freedom that when they engaged in rape, it was not considered as such. According to Angela Y. Davis, the 
consequences of these legal and extralegal social practices against interracial sex were drastic for all 
women, but black women were more severely punished since these practices institutionalized the rape of 
black women. Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race, and Class (New York: Random House Inc., 1983). 
128 During slavery, black women were subjected to sexual violence with impunity when the sexual 
domination of the master over his female slaves was framed in terms of property rights. Slavery denied 
black women any rights over their bodies. Legally, black women’s status as property prevented them from 




instance, under Jim Crow’s system of racial apartheid, any and all sexual contact between 
the races, particularly between black men and white women, was considered illegal, 
illicit, and socially repugnant.129 White Southerners argued that the practice of lynching, 
or open public murders of individuals suspected of crime conceived and carried out by a 
mob, was necessary to protect white women from black rapists who could allegedly only 
be controlled by fear.130 Although the dominant culture explained lynching as the result 
                                                                                                                                            
white. To justify the rape of black women after the Civil War, society concocted the cultural myth of the 
“oversexed” black woman. This cultural myth posited that white men could rape black women at will and 
simply blame their actions on the supposed sexual appetite of black women. As late as the 1970s, black 
women who were raped were less likely to have their sexual assault viewed as an act worthy of legal 
consequence. And yet, despite white men’s ability to rape black women at will, American courts, from 
before the birth of the nation, have vehemently defended anti-miscegenation laws, outlawing marriage or 
sexual relations between different races, until the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional in 1967. (The 
last anti-miscegenation law was not struck down until 2000. Yet, more than 40% of Alabama voters cast 
their ballot in favor of keeping the law in the state constitution.) In the period after the Civil War, during 
Reconstruction when political institutions and representative government became inaccessible and 
unaccountable to black Americans, black men had to contend with trumped up charges of their so-called 
biological propensity to rape white women. The black male, Angela Davis argues, had become embedded 
in the American cultural imaginary as sexually dangerous. Given their supposed prodigious sexual talents 
that enticed white women, black men endangered the ascendancy of white supremacy. Byfield, Savage 
Portrayals.; Davis, Women, Race, and Class.; Kristin Bumiller, In An Abusive State: How Neoliberalism 
Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2008).; Alan J. Lizotte, “The Uniqueness of Rape: Reporting Assaultive Violence to the Police,” Crime and 
Delinquency 31, (1985): 169-190.; Somini Sengupta, “Marry at Will,” The New York Times, Nov. 12, 2000. 
129 Society looked down upon white female and black male sexual liaisons because these disrupted the 
system of racial oppression, a social order with elite white men at the top. Even if the sexual contact was 
consensual, it usually fell within the Jim Crow definition of rape. Gunnar Myrdal wrote in An America 
Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, that “the broad Southern definition of 
rape…include[d] all sexual relations between Negro men and white women.” Gunnar Myrdal, An American 
Dilemma, rev. ed. (1944; repr.,Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 561-562. 
130 In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the lynching of black people in the South and Border States 
became an institutionalized method employed by whites to terrorize blacks and to maintain white 
supremacy.130 Of the thousands of lynchings of black men documented by the Tuskegee Institute from 1882 
to 1968, about 1 in 4 were triggered by the alleged assault of a white woman. Lynchings transpired 
primarily in smaller towns and isolated rural communities in the South. Here, whites were poor, mostly 
illiterate, and lacked community recreation. Those who comprised mobs were often small landholders, 
tenant farmers, and common laborers. Because their economic status was similar to that of black people, 
these poor whites saw black men as economic competitors. For that reason, they bitterly resented black 
progress. Lynchings, therefore, were part of those attacks that arose out of economic competition that black 
businesses posed. According to Gibson, “Their starved emotions made the raising of a mob a quick and 
simple process, and racial antagonism made the killing of Negros a type of local amusement which broke 
the monotony of rural life.” In other words, poverty, economic and social fear of black people, a low level 
of education, and the isolation and dullness of everyday life in rural and small towns underlined the 
popularity of lunching by the lower strata of Southern white society. Even though most participants of 




of black men committing rape against white women, it is likely that this post-Civil War 
development was the result of fear at the economic competition black men posed as 
freedmen.131 In spite of the real motives behind lynchings—fear of economic 
competition—the Southern press spread cultural myths of black sexual excess to gain 
sympathy from northerners and, by extension, the freedom to do as they liked with 
blacks, primarily justifying Jim Crow segregation.132 By the turn of the 20th century, 
mainstream media circulated dominant ideas of the period, anchored in theories of 
biological determinism that characterized blacks as “immoral, depraved, unable to govern 
themselves, akin to animals, and a weaker species” primed for extinction.133 Although 
there was fear and loathing for all blacks, the public readily consumed the image of the 
                                                                                                                                            
If anything, they generally condoned the illegal activity. In fact, many Southern politicians and officials 
supported “lynch law” and rose to prominence on a platform of racial prejudice. Robert A. Gibson, “The 
Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the United States, 1880-1950,” Yale-New Haven Teachers 
Institute, Themes in Twentieth Century American Culture 2 (1979).; Myrdal, An American Dilemma.; 
“Lynchings: By State and Race, 1882-1968,” University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, accessed 
Feb. 12, 2016. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingsstate.html. 
131 The black female publisher and editor, Ida B. Wells, challenged the construction of the black male as a 
threat to white society and to white women. In 1892, Wells published Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All 
Its Phases to draw attention to lynchings occurring because black men had allegedly raped white women. 
Wells discovered that black men were being falsely accused of rape as justification for lynchings that were 
being used to subvert the growing demands by blacks for equality during Reconstruction. Rather than a 
reflection of actual black crime, lynching expressed a white American fear of black social and economic 
advancement. Ida B. Wells, Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases (1892; repr. CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2013). 
132 The biographer of Ida B. Wells, Mia Bay, writes, “With the end of Reconstruction, white Southerners 
campaigned for segregation and black disenfranchisement by questioning not only the racial character of 
black people, but their gender characteristics—often construing black sexuality as a racial threat to the 
white race.” Together the lynching of black men and the rape of black women functioned as economic and 
political weapons against the black community. At the same time, these mechanisms ensured that black 
men and women would be defined outside the ideological purview of proper manhood and womanhood. 
Mia Bay, To Tell The Truth Freely: The Life of Ida B. Wells (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 74.; Abby 
Ferber, White Man Falling: Race, Gender, and White Supremacy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1998.)   
133 During this time, media were saturated with negative representations of black men. The D.W. Griffith 
film Birth of a Nation illustrates how the bourgeoning film industry participated in the dissemination of 
negative images against black men. The film, released in 1915, is lauded as a piece of landmark cinema for 
the groundbreaking techniques it employed. The film is also infamously remembered for its overt racist 
depictions. Contrary to actual historical events, the film’s plot depicts southern whites as victims suffering 
at the hands of lecherous blacks during Reconstruction. Blacks protested the film’s release. The NAACP, 
then only a six-year-old organization, spearheaded protests in Los Angeles and New York City in an 
unsuccessful bid to prevent the release of the film. Byfield, Savage Portrayals.  
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black male as a “brute” and a “rapist.”134 This fear of racial miscegenation and economic 
competition haunts the contemporary recycling of such overdetermined images of 
racialized sexual deviance in an era of neoliberalism. 
In his investigation of the impact of racial ideology on the criminal trial of the 
policemen who beat Rodney King and on the media coverage of the subsequent Los 
Angeles uprising in 1992, critical race theorist Robert Gooding-Williams identifies the 
ways in which racial ideology characterized black bodies as destructive to the American 
social order. He interprets how those representations serve as allegories for the 
sociopolitical status of African-Americans in the United States. He argues that the 
“interpreted” images, or representations with narrative significance, of black people 
mobilized by American jurors, lawyers, and media pundits were used to prop up and re-
stabilize a white American social order in a moment of crisis. The black presence in 
                                                
134 Three notable examples from the first half of the 20th century that illuminate how American society’s 
approach to sexual violence has historically victimized black men can be traced to the cases of boxer Jack 
Johnson, the Scottsboro boys, and Emmett Till. In 1908, black boxer Jack Johnson beat a white opponent to 
clench the world heavyweight title. Not surprisingly, media and society reacted with much disdain. Fueling 
this hatred even more was the fact that Johnson often traveled with white women, some of whom were 
prostitutes. Perhaps the pinnacle of Johnson’s disruption of racial boundaries came when he married a 
white woman. Authorities employed the newly legislated Mann Act of 1910, which banned crossing state 
lines with white women for the purposes of prostitution, to bring Johnson down, no such protections were 
afforded to non-white women. In 1913, Johnson was tried and convicted for violating the law. The case of 
the Scottsboro boys emerged from a 1931 incident in which nine black boys traveling as “hoboes” on a 
freight train in Alabama became ensnared in a fight with young white males. While the white males 
accused the black boys of assault, two white women traveling on the train charged the boys with rape. 
Although one of the women later retracted the charges, the black boys were time and again convicted in a 
number of trials and retrials, with the majority of the boys serving long prison sentences. In the case of 
Emmett Till, we similarly witness how black male sexuality had been presented as a danger specifically to 
white women. Emmett Till was a fourteen-year-old Chicago boy visiting family in Money, Mississippi, in 
the summer of 1955. It is said that he whistled at a white woman. In retribution, a group of white men 
abducted Till from his uncle’s home in the early morning hours. They brutally beat him. They shot him in 
the head. And they threw his body in a river. Till’s mother held an open-casket public funeral in Chicago to 
underscore the cruel treatment her son experienced. After a public outcry, his killers were tried, but later 
acquitted. These three cases confirm that black males experience patriarchy in vastly different ways than 
white men. Elaborating upon this point, Byfield deduces, “Under white male patriarchy, black males have 
never shared in the power and privilege assigned to the male gender. They had no power over white 
women, only over black women; thus, interactions with white women represented a boundary transgression 
that could easily be denoted as rape or equated with rape when no actual rape had occurred.” Byfield, 
Savage Portrayals, 72.  
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American social and political life, therefore, constitutes “a useful, convenient, and 
sometimes welcome means for propping up and stabilizing the patriarchal and capitalist 
social order that is the foundation of [America as a political] community.”135 Gooding-
Williams’ point is that the black presence in the United States serves as a foil in the 
consolidation of white American identity and practices. In his close reading of the 
Rodney King trial and L.A. uprising, Gooding-Williams concludes that the defense and 
media’s recycling of the image of the black male as a wild and chaos-bearing animal 
allegorically declared that blackness comprised the antithesis of a white American social 
order.136      
 In the words of Gooding-Williams, the depictions of Bridges and Robinson were 
also those of “interpreted images;” they hold narrative meaning for their historical 
specificity. As products of AIDS moral panic, these images harken to white fears of a 
rampant and uncontrolled racialized sexuality disrupting a socially acceptable moral 
order, one with strict racial boundaries of respectable sexual relations. The purpose of 
these images, then, is more than merely incite fear in white Americans. The ideological 
                                                
135 Robert Gooding-Williams, Look, a Negro! Philosophical Essays on Race, Culture, and Politics (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 6.  
136 In regards to the Rodney King trial, Gooding-Williams conducts a close reading of the defense 
attorneys’ rhetorical strategy. The attorneys pleaded with the jurors to “see” the events from the eyes of the 
accused police officers. Gooding-Williams observes that the testimony from King’s assailants persistently 
referred to King as a “bear,” emitting animal-like groans. In the eyes of police, Gooding-Williams notes, 
King’s black body became that of a wild “Hulk-like” animal whose every gesture endangered the very 
existence of civilized society. Given this rendition of King, the defense attorneys depicted the white 
policemen not as attacking King, but rather as incapacitating him for the purpose of safeguarding civil 
society from the mayhem that an untamed animal wreaks. Gooding-Williams concludes that “the plot of the 
story the police and lawyers told assigned the white bodies appearing in the tape the function of protecting 
the fort of civilization against the willful attack of a chaos-bearing animal. The same plot assigned the 
tape’s protagonist the role of a destructive animal who gives his all to attack the fort.” By casting King in 
the role of a wild animal whose every movement threatened civilization, the defense attorneys recycled 
interpreted images of black bodies appearing in European and American representations of African 
“others” as uncivilized beasts. The cultural legacy of these images, in turn, conditioned a context in which 
the jurors could “see” King as a threat, not a victim. Simply put, King personified an uncivilized chaos that 
needed to be crushed to reinstate law and order. Ibid., 10.  
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work these images are mobilized to enact is that of reinforcing heteropatriarchy among 
white Americans by pointing to the dangers of deviating from monogamy and marriage. 
For its role in the dissemination of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, we can characterize the 
mainstream media as a racial project that promoted the transformation of the meanings 
associated with racial categories. As a technology of power, the mainstream media 
produced and disseminated a number of negative images of PWHAs in the form of 
caricature and stereotype. Like lynching, and the anti-black discourse from which it 
originated, HIV criminalization laws similarly proceed from a white public fear of racial 
progress. These laws became an institutionalized method used by whites to terrorize 
people of color and reassert white supremacy, especially as neoliberalism redefined 
categories of privilege and marginality in the 1980s. HIV criminalization laws, as such, 
do not reflect a newfound epidemiological risk. Rather, they express a white middle-class 
fear of racial degeneration amid concerns of economic decline.  
The fact that these interpreted images of Bridges and Robinson belong to a 
cultural legacy we have inherited from the past undermines the reliability of using “moral 
panic” as a concept to describe the role of racialized sexuality in structuring the response 
to HIV/AIDS. A moral panic assumes that the individuals, groups, or event defined as 
threats to the integrity of the nation-state operate in a vacuum. That is, moral panic theory 
posits that social phenomena are discrete and independent of other events, situations, and 
people. This theory, thus, proves particularly limiting when describing HIV/AIDS as a 
moral panic since mainstream media and the political establishment recycled past and 
ongoing images and messages of racialized sexuality as immoral. The HIV/AIDS 
epidemic was not so much a moral panic as it was the latest confirmation of structural 
 
 285 
violence against bodies of color in the United States. According to this vein of thought, 
the images of Bridges and Robinson were recycled representations of archetypes 
continuously deployed throughout economic crises to prop-up and restabilize a white 
American social and political order.  
With that said, although “moral panic” as a concept is limited, we should be 
cautious of outright repudiating it. A “moral panic” is useful to the extent that it provides 
us with the language to connect individual—inflated—fears to structural agendas. In the 
case of HIV/AIDS, the concept of moral panic allows us to decipher the ways in which 
the fear associated with the epidemic was symbolic of deeper economic concerns 
pertaining to the dwindling dominance of white supremacy. At the same time, we need to 
look beyond the analytical frame of “moral panic” to consider how the social phenomena 
it purports to describe are ongoing and in fact constitutive of permanently circulating 
cultural scripts of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Understanding that the relationship 
between moral panics and their targets is not defined in a simple one-to-one fashion 
enables us to link the state’s response to HIV/AIDS, its treatment of drug abuse, and its 
management of urban poverty in central cities in the 1980s in relation to one another. In 
chapter six, I connect the HIV/AIDS epidemic to the ongoing moral panic of the 1980s 
that focused on gang-related crime and drug abuse in black and Latinx communities. As I 
argue there, panics of racialized urban poverty manifested in the figures of the “fatherless 
gang member” and the “crack-addicted single mother” during the war on drugs facilitated 
the retrenchment of welfare social services and the expansion of punitive state measures 





 From the early days of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, racism and homophobia 
pervaded the response to the crisis, including the criminalization and prosecution of HIV 
transmission in the United States. Although the existence and enforcement of such HIV 
criminalization measures ran counter to scientific evidence about routes of transmission, 
prosecutors defended such measures as providing just punishment for behavior that could 
transmit the virus. Some queer activists alleged that these measures could backfire by 
undermining efforts to curb the flow of the epidemic. They contended that such measures 
discouraged those at risk from accessing care and also created a powerful disincentive for 
PWHAs to disclose their status to sexual partners. If HIV criminalization did not produce 
positive health outcomes for individuals or populations, it certainly contributed to 
cultivating social stigma. These laws, aided by “hysterical” media coverage such as that 
by WCCO and PBS, reinforced negative stereotypes of PWHAs as toxic, highly 
infectious, and dangerous. By mere virtue of their diagnosis, these people had to be 
controlled and confined lest they endanger “the general population.” HIV criminalization, 
therefore, promoted many manifestations of illegal discrimination against PWHAs. 
Discrimination was intensified when those subjected to these measures were poor, people 
of color, which was oftentimes the norm, as evidenced by Bridges and Robinson.137  
                                                
137 The legal obligation to disclose one’s HIV status was codified in the original Ryan White Care Act 
passed in 1990. That legislation required states to demonstrate an ability to prosecute potential exposure 
and transmission in order to be eligible for Ryan White funding. This was a recommendation from 
Reagan’s AIDS commission report. Many states considered their then-existing assault and public health 
statutes adequate to meet the requirements of the Ryan White Care Act. Nonetheless, 32 states added HIV-
specific laws to their criminal codes. Although this requirement was dropped from the 2000 renewal of the 
Ryan White Care Act, the criminalization statutes it prompted continue to be enforced. On the other hand, 
the ethical obligation of people with HIV to disclose health factors that put others at risk was codified in the 
Denver Principles, the historic 1983 manifesto that launched the people with AIDS movement. Sean Strub, 
“Criminalization 101,” POZ, Nov. 3, 2010.  
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Despite the disproportionate criminalization of poor, people of color with 
HIV/AIDS, white gay leaders and black and Latinx leaders seldom came to their rescue. 
Although the case of Bridges offered an opportunity to discuss how crosscutting political, 
social, and economic factors shaped people’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, white gay 
leaders and AIDS advocates focused their critique of the Frontline episode on the 
representational implications of Bridges. As I discussed above, the Frontline episode did 
not so much as address the role of the government or the medical establishment in 
enabling the pandemic spread of HIV/AIDS. It also did not correct the various instances 
of misinformation communicated by public health and law officials. In spite of all these 
opportunities for critique, gay leaders and AIDS advocates focused on emphasizing how 
Bridges was not like most cases of PHWAs. Their response to the Frontline episode 
reflects a process of secondary marginalization. Under secondary marginalization, 
community elites, given their position of relative power, take on the role of internal 
regulators. In an effort to portray the larger community as representative of dominant 
norms and values—racialized norms of sexual hygiene—community elites highlighted 
those members believed to be positive and in alignment with said characteristics. At the 
same time, they participated in the stigmatization and policing of group members 
regarded as engaging in behaviors thought to be deviant, destructive, and dangerous. Gay 
community activists, in conjunction with the mainstream media and public health 
officials, used moral panic discourses that were racialized to make the racialized poor the 
center of the panic around the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Vis-à-vis the alleged nonnormative 
genders and sexualities of poor, people of color, white gay leaders were able to vouch for 
the worthiness of PWHAs and gay men for citizenship, benefits, and protections.  
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The cases of Bridges and Robinson allude to the ways in which outlaw sexualities 
share a commonality that is made evident via the state regulation to which they are 
subjected. Their shared form of sexual regulation was one of the ways in which 
prostitutes of color and white gay men were connected. In spite of the opportunity for 
coalition building, white gay leaders adamantly refused to be considered in relation to sex 
workers. They worried that the general public and the political establishment would 
regard Bridges as emblematic of all PWHAs and gay men. This association, they 
proclaimed, would threaten the hard-won access, mobility, and respectability of 
community elites. At stake was the passage of even more restrictive legislation, including 
non-compliant ordinances and quarantine orders, and a heightened risk for anti-gay 
violence. As such, gay leaders and AIDS advocates purposely distanced Bridges from the 
larger community of PWHAs and gay men. However, by failing to articulate how 
Bridges’ life choices were systematically constrained by structural racism and material 
inequality, gay leaders and AIDS advocates “privatized” Bridges’ AIDS diagnosis as the 
product of his allegedly irresponsible decisions and pathological desires. To that extent, 
they inadvertently upheld the very same media-generated images and messages of 
PWHAs and gay men that they had labored to dispel, that gay men were personally 
responsible for contracting and spreading HIV/AIDS.  
None of these early media representations addressed the epidemic’s public 
dimension or acknowledged the social factors that facilitated and perpetuated the crisis. 
What these stories did focus upon were examples that enforced the public perception that 
HIV/AIDS was the result of personal shortcomings, not state neglect. Although scholars, 
and gay leaders and AIDS advocates attributed the media’s early portrayal of HIV/AIDS 
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to homophobia, I argue that anti-homosexual discourse told only part of the story. Fears 
of racialized sexuality also shaped AIDS moral panic. Since people of color and sexual 
minorities were regarded as the culprits of the epidemic, mainstream media and the 
political establishment recycled racist tropes that cast people of color as sexually 
dangerous to the moral and social order of the country.  
These discourses that centered on racialized sexual immorality helped public 
health officials and law enforcement with securing passage of HIV criminalization 
measures, designed to constrain the movement of sex workers of color with HIV/AIDS. 
In the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, racial interpretations of health and morality were 
recalibrated into cultural expression and social policy, with devastating consequences for 
the racialized poor. Inasmuch as cross-racial intimacies undermined the norms of white 
American society, they posed a threat to the country’s prosperity and vitality. If cross-
racial sexual intimacy enabled the incurable disease of HIV to proliferate, then health 
authorities had to halt those intimacies to ensure the health of individual white American 
families and to protect the mythos of respectable Minnesotan society through HIV 
criminalization laws. Racial violence was key to safeguarding a discourse and practice of 
“Minnesota Nice.” HIV criminalization laws illustrate how spatial power is inherent to 
the historical and ongoing terrors witnessed by the racialized poor. Legacies of 
segregation spatialize racial difference by perpetuating and refashioning the modes in 
which the racialized poor are allowed to inhabit space.138 These laws, however, were also 
mobilized on behalf of those wayward white men who accessed the services of 
                                                
138 bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 1990).  
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prostitutes. These laws were meant to remind those men of the virtues of compulsory 
heterosexual family life.   
Furthermore, these discourses, I argue, were reflective of deeper anxieties spurred 
by shifts in political economy brought about by neoliberalism. The media-orchestrated 
HIV criminalization of prostitutes of color with AIDS served as a powerful symbol that 
unified white Americans as a group in the wake of neoliberalism’s ascendancy. 
Criminalizing prostitutes of color with AIDS was the secret antidote to the symptoms of 
white injury. Bridges was meaningful to the extent that he served as a focal point around 
which white gay leaders mobilized against. White gay leaders organized against Bridges, 
and others like him, to fulfill the interests and investments of a homonationalism that 
petitioned the state for access into the cultural, political, and economic social fabric of the 
nation. By distancing themselves from Bridges, gay community activists held Bridges as 
an instructive moral lesson for other gay men to observe. Simply, not to be poor and 
black. Precisely, the moral panic of HIV/AIDS was both a sexual and a racial project and 
the basis of white normative recovery, all disguised within the parameters of public 
health in an allegedly colorblind society. At the same time, these discourses that 
criminalized Bridges and Robinson’s sexuality paved the way for the neoliberal 
restructuring of urban public spaces. Moral panics, in particular those revolving around 
race and sexuality, were and remain central to the implementation of neoliberal policies 
and practices.  
HIV criminalization laws, because they promoted personal responsibility and 
relied on real or imagined others at the margins of society, redirected attention away from 
the structural dimensions of the epidemic and from the state’s role in abetting the 
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epidemic. That is why, the overwhelming focus on white victimization during the AIDS 
crisis by the media and policymakers displaced much needed attention from how avenues 
of infection were reflective of the material conditions of everyday life. Although poor, 
people of color disproportionately suffered the brunt of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, they 
were also the most likely to be criminalized for its transmission and the least likely to 
secure medical care. As the cases of Bridges and Robison illustrate, discrimination and 
socio-economic factors linked to race engendered additional challenges to accessing 
quality health care, housing, and education necessary for HIV treatment and prevention. 
Yet, white gay leaders and AIDS advocates were unable to address the needs of these 
multiply positioned PWHAs due to their inability to employ an intersectional approach. 
To effectively address issues surrounding HIV/AIDS in marginalized communities we 
need an intersectional approach. In general, an intersectional analysis sheds light on how 
overlapping discourses and structures of race, class, and gender intersect in a multitude of 
ways to create unique social locations that both privilege and oppress individuals and 
populations. Critical race theorist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw points out that an 
approach that focuses solely on race or gender without equally considering how theses 
multiple axes of oppression and privilege are complexly interlocking can result in 
promoting oppression in other venues of lived experience.139  
In the context of HIV/AIDS, we need a strategy that challenges and defeats HIV 
criminalization in collaboration with campaigns that fight racism, homophobia, and 
sexism. Speaking in regards to communities of color, Cohen insists it is “misguided” to 
speak of AIDS in disadvantaged communities without also broadening our lens of 
                                                
139 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241-99.  
 
 292 
analysis to engage social justice politics including the redistribution of material resources 
and the curtailment of the prison-industrial complex which has come largely at the 
expense of black and Latinx communities. Cohen elaborates, “If activists do not pay 
attention to some of the larger trends and structural contexts in which crisis and panic 
take hold, then we may win certain battles, even one day finding a cure for AIDS, 
without truly liberating affected communities, and in particular communities of color, 
from their secondary status in society.”140 Cohen reminds us that sexual rights in 
communities of color will never truly materialize unless we participate in a mass 
movement that involves a commitment to unpacking how the interlocking positionalities 
of race, class, gender, and sexuality shape people’s experiences with HIV/AIDS and fuel 
its criminalization in vastly different ways.  
Not only has neoliberalism abstracted the role of the state in conditioning 
inequality, it has also expanded the regulation of sexual identities and practices through 
new forms of legal surveillance of the public sphere. Some of these novel legal 
technologies of surveillance include public sex laws and anti-cruising ordinances which 
refined modes of medical, social work, and housing interventions into the private sphere. 
I turn to this subject next in chapters four and five where I examine the regulation of 
commercial sex establishments and public sexual cultures, respectively, as an extension 




                                                




And the Bathhouse Played On: The Politics of Public Health in the Regulation of 
Commercial Sex Establishments   
Introduction.  
In the early morning hours of May 16, 1987, Dick Brown, a 60-year-old gay 
Minneapolis resident and a former bathhouse patron whom the Star Tribune called a “gay 
activist,” marched towards the 315 Health Club, one of the largest and busiest bathhouses 
in operation between Chicago and the West Coast. Holding a sign that read, “AIDS Kills, 
Avoid Gay Bathhouses,” Brown stood outside the last remaining bathhouse in 
Minneapolis to “call attention to the danger” of the premises (Figure 4.1). For Brown, 
bathhouses were among the primary culprits in the spread of HIV because these 
establishments provided patrons— “vulnerable” sex addicts—with opportunities to 
engage in casual anonymous sex. Despite these so-called dangers, Brown deduced that 
some gay leaders and AIDS advocates— “professional gays”—were leading a 
“propaganda campaign” to defend the 315 Health Club. For that reason, Brown deemed it 
a personal responsibility to publicize the dangers the bathhouse allegedly posed.1    
                                                
1 Although Brown vowed to continue picketing, he complained, “I don’t enjoy this. I have a very pleasant 
life, a good job, [I have] other things to do with my time. But I can’t believe the gay community is being 
this irresponsible.” Brown accused gay leaders and AIDS advocates of “not handling [the bathhouse issue] 
honestly.” Brown told Equal Time that his picketing had deterred two or three prospective customers from 
entering the premises. After about a month of picketing by himself in the spring of 1987, the picket line 
doubled to include Clint Heim, a former employee of the bathhouse who worked there intermittently for 
eight years. Brown mentioned that others supported his efforts, though they were unwilling to back him up 
publicly out of fear of being exposed as “gay.” Brown expanded picketing to Friday nights as well as 
Saturday nights because these were the business’ heaviest traffic period. Bill McAuliffe, “Pickets take their 
AIDS message to bathhouse,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jun. 13, 1987.; John Ritter, “Dick Brown 




 As the death toll due to AIDS climbed in cities throughout the country, 
commercial sex establishments, like the 315 Health Club in Minneapolis, became the 
target of attack for a number of reasons. For one, anti-pornography campaigns had 
famously argued that erotic  
 
Figure 4.1: Dick Brown protests outside the 315 Health Club.  Bill McAuliffle, “Pickets take 
their AIDS message to bathhouse,” Star Tribune, Jun. 06, 1987.  
bookstores and X-rated theaters promoted a culture of sexual violence against women. 
Second, health officials hypothesized that these establishments accommodated a sexual 
promiscuity among gay and bisexual men that facilitated the spread of the virus to white, 
suburban families. Third, perhaps most important, urban policymakers feared that the 
presence of commercial sex establishments deterred future economic investment in the 
downtown core of central cities. Given these concerns, central cities used the HIV/AIDS 
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epidemic to limit, close, or evict businesses that sold sexually explicit material or that 
furnished public sexual cultures.2 
Commercial sex establishments proliferated in central cities, in part, as a result of 
urban planning policies and practices. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Americans became 
immersed in the countercultural movement, central cities lost significant amounts of 
residents to the booming, predominantly white, suburbs. For instance, the U.S. census 
reported that Minneapolis and St. Paul had a respective population of 520,000 and 
320,000 residents in the 1950s. By 1980, these numbers had dropped exponentially by 
150,000 and 40,000, respectively. In the wake of white flight, with downtown businesses 
often following people to the suburbs, cities were left with empty, commercial corridors. 
The decline of uses for these office buildings, shopping arcades, and entertainment 
districts welcomed businesses that were previously economically and socially excluded. 
In addition, the advent of home video technology in the 1970s expedited this process by 
impacting the theater industry so much so that it proved difficult to fill up larger 
theatrical spaces in downtown districts. Eventually, several of these small theaters were 
converted into X-rated theaters. With this development, all repairs on these properties 
halted. Businesses such as erotic bookstores and X-rated theaters opened in these 
abandoned office, shopping, and theater structures, fueling a new urban economy 
centered on sex.3  
These shifts in the political economy of central cities in conjunction with 
landmark censorship cases in the 1960s and 1970s powered the production and 
                                                
2 Stewart Van Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves: A History of Queer Minnesota (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2012).  
3 Samuel R. Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (New York: New York University Press, 1999).  
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consumption of pornography in the United States. At the same time, the Stonewall Riots 
drove gender and sexual nonnormative identities and practices out into the public sphere. 
With the introduction of “the pill,” women were enabled to explore their sexuality outside 
the constraints of reproduction. In this context of sexual freedoms, the number of 
establishments such as bathhouses and backroom bars catering to gay men boomed in all 
major cities of the United States. These establishments, what Michel Foucault called 
“laboratories of sexual experimentation,” operated for the purpose of casual sex.4 For the 
first time for most gay men, sex became readily available. Going from a period in time 
when dancing with someone of the same-sex was a crime to a moment in time when 
endless sexual opportunity abounded, gay men not only had more sexual partners, they 
also explored an assortment of sexual practices. For many gay men in the 1970s, sex was 
a political act. In spite of these developments, as the United States moved into a post-
industrial, service-oriented economy, the rise of economic and moral conservatism 
brought with it a newfound focus on the regulation of gender and sexuality. Anita 
Bryant’s crusade in Florida and the Briggs Initiative in California were two of numerous 
conservative offensives mounted against the gay community in the 1970s. By the 1980s, 
the New Right was successful in mobilizing a national trend towards tougher laws 
controlling commercial sex establishments.5 
                                                
4 In referring to commercial sex establishments in New York City and San Francisco as “laboratories of 
sexual experimentation,” Foucault explained that these establishments were “the counterpart of the 
medieval courts where strict rules of proprietary courtship were defined.” According to Foucault, in the 
midst of an oversaturation of sex, variations are obligatory to heighten the enjoyment of the act. Michel 
Foucault, “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: Foucault and Homosexuality,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 298.  
5 Minnesota considered adopting laws and strategies aimed at reducing the practices associated with these 
businesses, including prostitution, “high risk” anonymous sex, and crime. Several of these tactics had been 
successfully implemented in other parts of the country. Legislators in Norfolk, Virginia and Dallas and 




The less permissive atmosphere regarding sex along with increased public 
concern about AIDS, crime, and urban blight resulted in the passage of draconian anti-
sex laws. Whereas a single tactic might have proven ineffective on its own, attacks on 
commercial sex establishments via multiple channels including zoning, obscenity laws, 
and health regulations proved far more successful.6 As one of the most vilified 
institutions in the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, bathhouses were subjected to a 
number of these varied strategies to ensure their closure. Unlike other commercial sex 
establishments that catered to a predominantly gay male clientele—bars, bookstores, 
gyms, and restaurants—bathhouses, historian David Serlin notes, became “contested 
sites” within LGBT politics and urban politics more broadly during the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.7 While some gay leaders celebrated bathhouses as institutions of sexual 
liberation, other within the community demonized them as breeding grounds for 
promiscuity and sexually transmitted diseases. In the end, the latter opinion won out and 
bathhouses became perceived as anathema to public health concerns and the larger 
itineraries of gay social incorporation.   
Bathhouses were particularly dangerous to the moral fabric of the nation because 
they undermined the hallmark of American society: white, domestic, heterosexual 
relations. Bathhouses made the attention to social distinction irrelevant, bringing men 
from all walks of life together in the shared pursuit of libidinal pleasure. The social 
                                                                                                                                            
closing some and rendering others more difficult to open. In Dallas, a 1986 zoning law combined with a 
state obscenity statute to close one bookstore and to prevent several new ones from operating. In Houston, 
health reports that showed people contracting STDs in private-viewing booths in bookstores caused that 
city to pass an open-door ordinance in 1985. 
6 Zoning is a technology enacted by cities and municipalities to enforce land use. Historically, it has been 
one of the most effective ways of upholding residential segregation.  
7 David Serlin, “Bathhouses,” in The Encyclopedia of American Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
History in America, ed. Marc Stein (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004).  
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setting of bathhouses supported fraternizing without consideration for the distinction of 
race or class. This communally-acted upon vice, in turn, reproduced alternatives to the 
prized intimacy of the white, middle-class suburban home. Writing in regards to opium 
dens in the late-1800s, historian Nayan Shah recounts that health officials feared the role 
of such establishments in transmitting syphilis and leprosy between Chinese immigrants 
and white residents. Inasmuch as white men—and, at times, white women—visited 
opium dens, health officials agonized that these establishments rendered possible sexual 
relations and social intimacies across race and class lines. Specifically, health officials 
were engrossed as to whether men and women who smoked opium experienced a 
lowered state of inhibition, one that made them willing to experiment with immoral 
sexuality and moral turpitude. Unlike saloons, where patrons remained standing or 
sitting, in the opium dens, smokers lay side-by-side in the bunks, a practice that enabled a 
unique form of intimacy that, in turn, subverted the social emphasis placed upon race and 
class. Shah’s insightful analysis informs us of the ways in which opium dens, and other 
such establishments like brothels and gambling houses, encouraged a “queer domesticity” 
among patrons that ran counter to the respectable domesticity lauded by white politicians 
as necessary for national power and the racial order.8 In a similar fashion, the social 
relations and spaces of bathhouses in the 1980s violated the racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene—domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability—professed by the New 
Right as crucial to the re-stabilization of white supremacy. The homosocial, homoerotic, 
and homosexual relations among men that cut across racial and class lines in bathhouses 
destabilized normative heterosexual marriage by providing a slew of alternatives to white 
                                                
8 Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001).  
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heteropatriarchy. It was within this context of grave danger to the national order of race, 
class, and sexuality that policymakers implemented a number of ordinances designed to 
deter white, married men from venturing into bathhouses.  
 In this chapter, I discuss how urban renewal imperatives collaborated with public 
health concerns to shape the decision-making of white gay leaders in support of closing 
Minneapolis’s last remaining bathhouse. I show that the regulation of commercial sex 
establishments, disguised under the veneer of HIV-prevention, facilitated the neoliberal 
formation of a racialized and classed politics of sexual respectability, what historian Lisa 
Duggan calls homonormativity, that converged with wider agendas and policies 
encompassing the “cleaning up” and policing of public spaces including city parks, low-
income neighborhoods, and vice districts. I, thus, aim to rearticulate homonormativity as 
a project of white racial formation anchored to the neoliberalization of urban space. This 
homonormativity, I reveal, demanded the simultaneous domestication of white gay male 
sexuality and the criminalization of racialized sexuality. I am interested in noting how the 
City Council of Minneapolis and the Minnesota Department of Health through zoning 
ordinances and health regulations contributed to bringing an unruly group of male 
homosexuals under the fold of white supremacy and neoliberal capitalism. To do so, I 
focus on the regulation of one physical space which anchored the gay district in 
Minneapolis to the north: the 315 Health Club. Chapter five looks at the regulation of 
another physical space, Loring Park, a public park known for cruising among men, which 
anchored the gay district in Minneapolis to the south. Both of these sites became symbols 
for what prevented white gay men from entering white normativity: their sexual 
practices.   
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 By mapping out the intimately-connected nature between the politics of 
homonormativity and the gentrification of central cities in the United States, I build upon 
the work of Natalia Molina and Nayan Shah who treat the institution and discourse of 
public health as a site of racialization, determining who has access to social membership.9 
I argue that private real estate discourses and practices transformed public health 
representations of white gay men as sexually aberrant subjects during the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic into neoliberal model minority citizens in the creative class economy. 
Nonetheless, since these assimilation strategies privileged racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene, including marriage and family, LGBT claims for citizenship and cultural 
belonging have come to largely depend upon the performance of a homonormative 
domestic privacy that ignores the material needs of those most marginalized and that 
repudiates the political underpinnings of places and practices such as bathhouses and 
public sex. This chapter brings to light the changing nature of the relationship between 
public health, urban space, city politics, and sexual communities by showing how white 
gay leaders used the HIV/AIDS epidemic to enhance their whiteness. These leaders, who 
locally included Brian Coyle, Dick Brown, and Allan Spear and who nationally included 
Randy Shilts, Michael Callen, and Larry Kramer, became popular by linking public 
discourses that linked HIV-prevention to gay civil rights.   
 In this chapter, I first outline the position of gay constituencies for and against a 
policy of bathhouse closure. Next, through the case of farm activist, Dick Hanson and his 
                                                
9 Gentrification is a term coined by Ruth Glass in 1962 to describe the urban phenomena of displacement 
experienced by lower-class residents in cities and neighborhoods, replaced through an influx of middle- and 
upper class people. For a more detailed discussion of gentrification, see the introduction to this dissertation. 
For a discussion on the racialization of public health see: Nayan Shan, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and 
Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).; Natalia Molina, 
Fit to be Citizens: Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2006).  
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partner, I discuss how some white gay leaders and public health officials in Minneapolis 
deemed bathhouses as threats to a bourgeoning homonormative agenda centered on 
domesticity and privacy. I then present the ways that this particular gay constituency 
sought to shutter the 315 Health Club. I follow this by unpacking how the misleading 
claims by Randy Shilts in And the Band Played On influenced a number of white gay 
leaders and public health officials in Minneapolis to come out in support for a policy of 
bathhouse closure. The spatial regulation of such sites like the 315 Health Club and 
Loring Park attests to how white gay leaders relied on morality and respectability as 
criteria to appraise community-based membership. On the other hand, this strategy also 
underscores how these same leaders sought to render the presence of nonnormativity and 
its conditions of possibility illegible. By choosing to become valuable members of 
society through such a method, gay community activists validated the state’s 
exclusionary and increasingly violent methodology for assigning social value. In reaction 
against America’s stigmatization of gay men during the HIV/AIDS epidemic, some gay 
community stakeholders embraced the most racist, patriarchal and homophobic aspects of 
American culture that cast gay men and the racialized poor as being responsible for the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
“AIDS Kills, Avoid Gay Bathhouses.” 
As one of the most vocal opponents of Minneapolis’s bathhouse, Dick Brown, a 
60-year-old gay resident and former bathhouse patron, found it his personal mission to 
bring awareness to the supposed dangers that bathhouses posed for the public. Brown and 
others like him believed that state regulation of sexuality—not condoms—served as the 
best form of HIV-prevention. He rejected the notion that commercial sex establishments 
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could ever be conducive to HIV-prevention or celebratory of sexual difference. Instead, 
he urged the City of Minneapolis to enforce regulations that prohibited any type of sexual 
conduct in semi-public spaces including bathhouses, erotic bookstores, and public 
parks.10 The unwillingness of city officials, along with that by gay leaders and health 
officials, Brown argued, to recognize the inherent dangers of bathhouses enabled 
supposedly irresponsible patrons to continue to endanger the lives of innocent others. For 
their unwillingness to support the closure of the 315 Health Club, Brown accused gay 
leaders and AIDS advocates of a “militant cover-up.”11  These “gay militants” harmed the 
gay male community through their tactics towards “sexual liberation.”12 In particular, 
Brown charged openly gay Minneapolis City Council Member, Brian Coyle, and Jim St. 
George, chairperson of the Minnesota AIDS Project, of being “willing to send thousands 
of gay and bisexual men each month into an environment that poses the highest risk of 
spreading AIDS of any place in the state.” For Brown, Coyle and St. George were 
“whitewashing this 24-hour sex center as a ‘safe’ place because condoms [were] 
                                                
10 In addition to picketing, Brown frequently wrote to editors of local newspapers, both gay and straight, to 
express his viewpoints and to openly condemn the actions of city officials. He even established the DLM 
Memorial Fund, “a private fund set up to give truthful information on the spread of AIDS in our 
Community.” Brown mailed literature, pamphlets, and newspaper clippings to city officials, admonishing 
them to regulate the bathhouse. Brown pleaded with city officials that closing the 315 Health Club would 
eliminate “a high risk environment for the spread of the deadly AIDS virus in our community” and would 
instead encourage so-called sexually compulsive men to simply go home. “A Moral Obligation,” DLM 
Memorial Fund Memo, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota 
History Center.  
11 In an interview with Equal Time in December of 1986, Brown publicly wondered why gay leaders and 
AIDS advocates defended the bathhouse. According to Brown, “The baths are not only a lethal place for 
the spread of AIDS but I also fail to understand gay politicians who defend the baths. Is that how they think 
of ourselves, as primarily desperate and stupid queens whose true environment is a whorehouse?” John 
Ritter, “The bathhouse and AIDS question,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986. 
12 Brown added that these “misguided” gay leaders defended the bathhouse in an effort to preserve their 
power base, “a controllable gay ghetto of bathhouse and gay bars, in central downtown.” Brown’s response 
to Engstrom,” Dec. 28, 1987, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota 
History Center.; Dick Brown, “Reader questions keeping bathhouse open,” Equal Time, Feb. 4, 1987. 
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distributed.”13 And, since “gullible” gay men were “so used to being victims, so 
vulnerable to manipulation,” Brown argued, they were willful participants in this “con 
game,” allowing themselves “to be marched right into the gas chamber at 315 First 
Avenue North” (Figure 4.2).14 
 
Figure 4.2: Brown is seen here protesting outside the 315 Health Club. John Ritter, 
“Dick Brown continues solo campaign to close bathhouse,” Equal Time, May 27, 
1987. 
                                                
13 In response to attending a meeting to urge that the bathhouse be closed as a high-risk center for the 
spread of AIDS, Brown penned a letter to the Star Tribune in which questioned the claim among gay 
leaders and AIDS advocates that bathhouses promoted safer sex practices. Brown underscored that “AIDS 
is spread by sexual conduct [with or without condoms]. It kills all its victims, most of whom are gay men. I 
cannot conceive of a more lethal place for the spread of AIDS than a public sex center.” Brown added, 
“That many gay leaders support the baths doesn’t say much for them. They are treating the AIDS epidemic 
as a political issue, not a public-health crisis.” “Letters from readers,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Dec. 
6, 1986. 
14 In an op-ed published in Equal Time, a gay and lesbian-themed local newspaper, in February of 1987, 
Brown provided three key reasons as to why the bathhouse was one of the most dangerous places in the 
state. First, Brown claimed that “AIDS victims and AIDS virus carriers” purposely cruised the baths, 
stalking their next victim. Second, because many patrons were supposedly under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs, they were particularly vulnerable to spontaneous unsafe sex. (In a community bulletin 
announcing that Brown and Heim would expand their picketing of the 315 Health Club to include Friday 
nights in addition to Saturday nights, the Twin Cities Gaze seized the opportunity to castigate those who 
continued to frequent the bathhouse despite the mounting cases of AIDS. The newspaper substantiated 
Brown’s perception that those who frequented the bathhouse did so under a drug- and alcohol-induced 
spell: “Many bathhouse customers head for the baths late at night after getting high on liquor and/or drugs. 
The state health department estimates that 30,000 Minnesotans are now infected with the AIDS virus…Yet 
that bathhouse remains open, a convenient and lethal exchange for promiscuous sex and the spread of 
disease.”) And third, the large steam room on the premises offered “a good cover” for orgies. “FYI,” Twin 
Cities Gaze, 1987.; Dick Brown, “Reader questions keeping bathhouse open,” Equal Time, Feb. 4, 1987.; 
“Letters: Dick Brown responds,” Equal Time, Jun. 10, 1987. 
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Despite Brown’s best efforts, city and state health officials along with gay leaders 
were not initially preoccupied with closing the bathhouse. In the summer of 1986, State 
Health Commissioner Sister Mary Madonna Ashton expressed little indication that any 
effort was underway to close the 315 Health Club since staff from the Minnesota AIDS 
Project actively provided education to employees and clients. Responding to a call from 
Brown to close the bathhouse, Ashton revealed that “the situation” continued to be 
monitored but that legal efforts to shut the bathhouse required extensive manpower and 
resources.15 The bathhouse’s management distributed free condoms, handled out safer 
sex information, and scheduled safer sex workshops. For this reason, management 
considered the bathhouse as “one of the gay community’s most responsible elements in 
AIDS prevention efforts.” Precisely because the bathhouse attracted the high-risk group 
of men who have sex with other men, management characterized the bathhouse as a 
vehicle for safer sex information—a safe space for gay and bisexual men to congregate 
away from disease and anti-gay hate violence on the street.16   
Echoing Ashton’s stance was Coyle, who in December of 1986, told Equal Time 
that he did not perceive the bathhouse as “a huge problem” since management was 
actively “creating an environment with fewer opportunities for unsafe sex.” By then, 
Coyle had met with the mayor and city health officials, all of whom agreed that they did 
                                                
15 Ashton looked to other cities in listing possible ways of encouraging “educational messages regarding 
AIDS risk reduction” at bathhouses. She predicted that the “physical environment of the bathhouse [could] 
be modified (such as increased lighting and removal of doors) to discourage high risk activity.” John Ritter, 
“The bathhouse and AIDS question,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986.  
16 In a December 1986 interview with Equal Time, Kostrzab assured that the 315 Health Club was making a 
responsible effort to provide AIDS education to a particular group of sexually active gay and bisexual men. 
He said, “We are very serious in our concerns about AIDS and our role in changing the sexual practices of 
our community. We are a vital part of that community.” Mark Brunswick, “Manager says bathhouse is 
misunderstood,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jun. 17, 1987.; John Ritter, “The bathhouse and AIDS 
question,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986.  
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not want to become “sex police” as long as management and staff continued with 
educational efforts. Although Coyle acknowledged that unsafe sex practices took place at 
the 315 Health Club, he did not believe that these behaviors took place to such a degree 
that they outweighed the benefits reaped by most patrons who took advantage of safer sex 
education.17 
 One of Brown’s most formidable foes was the Minnesota AIDS Project (MAP), 
the state’s largest and best known AIDS education and service provider. MAP corrected 
Brown that unsafe sex practices spread AIDS, not commercial sex establishments. In an 
interview with Equal Time, Jim St. George, chairperson of MAP, admitted, “No one 
would say unsafe sex does not happen [at the 315 Health Club]. But it is the activity, not 
the location that counts.” There was, thus, “no logical reason” for closing the bathhouse 
as long as safer sex continued to be disseminated inside the premises.18 MAP vehemently 
defended the continued operation of commercial sex establishments, claiming that risk-
reduction efforts in places like the 315 Health Club reached a group of men—many white 
gay or bisexual men who were either closeted, married, or engaged only in anonymous 
                                                
17 Coyle told Equal Time, “I’m not naive—there may be high-risk behavior going on there.” But, Coyle 
reminded the public that, according to AIDS educators, bathhouses distributed “more materials and 
condoms than any other place in that particular high-risk district.” Ultimately, patrons were responsible for 
the decisions they made in regards to sex. As Coyle admitted, “I would hope [patrons are] practicing safer 
sex [at the bathhouse] as they would at home, but what they do in a semi-private place is their business.” 
For Coyle, the 315 Health Club, as “a semi-private place,” laid outside the purview of the state. As a result, 
he did not believe that closing the bathhouse would serve a public health benefit. If anything, closing the 
bathhouse would only achieve a political end. Coyle told Equal Time that he believed closing gay 
bathhouses merely lulled city officials into thinking they had done something meaningful in the fight 
against AIDS when, in fact, it was an “easy answer” resulting from generalized anxiety. Coyle even 
suggested that the closings of the well-known St. Mark’s and Mineshaft in New York City were scapegoats 
fort the city. Bill McAuliffe, “Pickets take their AIDS message to bathhouse,” Minneapolis Star and 
Tribune, Jun. 13, 1987. 




sex— that otherwise might not have been reached.19 MAP proposed that closing the 
bathhouse would only hamper outreach education. Eric Engstrom, executive director of 
MAP, added that a policy of closure was “counterproductive” since it would not stop men 
from engaging in “anonymous sexual encounters.”20 It would most likely drive patrons to 
environments such as parks and public restrooms where they would be less likely to 
access safer sex education and where they would likely expose themselves to a greater 
risk of violent assault.21   
 In response to a letter by Brown in December of 1987 attacking MAP for its 
stance on the bathhouse, Engstrom defended the non-profit’s position, arguing that it 
promoted a range of practices that fell under the umbrella of safer sex including 
abstinence, condom use, and monogamy.22 Engstrom discounted Brown’s accusations by 
                                                
19 The Minnesota Alliance Against AIDS (MAAA), a non-profit “committed to ending the transmission of 
AIDS while respecting the rights and dignity of individuals,” agreed with MAP that the bathhouse reached 
a group of men who otherwise might have not been able to access HIV-prevention. In a statement outlining 
its stance against bathhouse closure, MAAA wrote: “Many closeted gays or bisexuals, such as suburban 
married men, have no other contact with the gay community and do not read gay newspapers. The only safe 
sex education these men receive is at the bathhouses.” MAAA underscored: “Closing the bathhouses would 
isolate these men from any access to safe sex education and thereby promote the spread of AIDS” 
(emphasis added). 
20 Stoney Bowden, a long-time gay activist and a member of the Minnesota AIDS Project board of 
directors, told Equal Time that any spread of AIDS that closing the bathhouse would have entailed would 
simply “go underground” as the “gay community will find more innovative ways of having sex 
anonymously.” John Ritter, “315 Health Club closes prior to ordinance,” Equal Time, Apr. 13, 1988. 
21 “Community Warning: Coyle Comes Out for Closing the Bathhouses,” Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse 
Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.; John Ritter, “New ordinance may close 
bathhouse,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
22 In the summer of 1987, the board of directors for MAP unanimously endorsed a position of non-closure 
towards the 315 Health Club. In a statement explaining its position reprinted in Equal Time, MAP begins 
by contextualizing the nature of the debate: “In recent weeks…individuals, officials and private citizens 
have urged the closing of gay men’s private bath houses as a matter of public health policy relative to 
AIDS.” MAP acknowledged that opponents opposed the bathhouse on the grounds it was the “breeding 
grounds” of AIDS in that it provided patrons, who were “careless, reckless, [and] promiscuous,” with 
access to “anonymous and serial sex, sometimes involving more than one partner simultaneously.” MAP 
debunked these claims. First, MAP emphasized that “it is not where you have sex that is the key vector [in 
transmission], nor even the type of sex (anal, oral, etc.) but whether it is safe sex or not (e.g., use of 
condoms).” MAP observed that one could engage in “unsafe sex” at a five-star hotel, yet partake in “safe 
sex” at a 4 dollar a night bathhouse. Although MAP recognized that bathhouses did provide an environment 




reporting success for MAP’s safer sex campaigns. Between 1984 and 1987, the rate of 
sexually transmitted diseases in gay and bisexual men in Minneapolis had declined by 81 
percent. Not one to miss an opportunity to fire back, Brown penned a response to 
Engstrom, accusing MAP of actually “being a primary factor in the spread of AIDS 
among gay men in Minnesota” by promoting casual sex through its HIV-prevention 
campaigns including the “Play It Safe” ad campaign which stressed “the fun as usual 
theme.”23 Even though MAP and others defended the continued operation of the 
bathhouse on the grounds that it promoted safer sex practices, Brown questioned the 
efficacy of condoms as “safe.” Brown argued that in the context of drugs and alcohol 
condoms had high failure rates. He stipulated that some gay leaders were thus misleading 
gay men through the promotion of safer sex. Brown explained to the press, “No way in 
the world can you promise a cruising gay guy safe sex. I don’t care how many rubbers he 
uses.”24 Brown concluded, “God knows what the failure rates [of condoms are] when 
used in a promiscuous and drug and liquor affected environment like the gay bathhouse 
where each week approximately 500 men, from the Upper Midwest and Canada, 
sodomize each other.” 25 For Brown, the only “safe” form of sex for gay men was either 
abstinence or outright monogamy.  
                                                                                                                                            
relationships in the privacy of a small room after the selection of a partner.” Therefore, rather than being 
“breeding grounds” for AIDS, the 315 Health Club operated as “a vehicle for education of a hard to reach 
group of gay and bisexual men, as well as [an] opportunity for the dissemination of condoms and on-site 
safe sex seminars, talks, videos, etc.” Closing the bathhouse, MAP predicted, would “only drive gay sex 
underground rendering it more difficult to reach high risk groups with AIDS prevention education.” 
“Letters: Bath House Closing Statement,” Equal Time, Jun. 24, 1987. 
23 In response to Coyle and St. George’s claims that the bathhouse fulfilled “educational” needs by 
promoting safer sex practices, Brown asked: “Why doesn’t the gay bars distribute this information?” Dick 
Brown, “Reader questions keeping bathhouse open,” Equal Time, Feb. 4, 1987. 
24 Bill McAuliffe, “Pickets take their AIDS message to bathhouse,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jun. 13, 
1987. 
25 Brown’s response to Engstrom,” Dec. 28, 1987, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle 
Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
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Brown’s opposition to condom usage was made loud and clear in a “public 
service ad” he paid to appear in the April 15, 1987, issue of Equal Time (Figure 4.3). The 
ad featured a stock image of a nameless, stern-looking, shirtless Aboriginal male—arms 
crossed—with a piece of fabric covering his lower body. On top of the image, Brown 
mocked: “Trust me. I do safe sex with everybody.” Below the image, Brown explained: 
“Safe sex is a slogan, not a guarantee” and “Multiple sexual contacts and anonymous 
bathhouse partners increase your risk of getting AIDS.” The symbolic valence of such an 
image is rich. Brown’s use of an Aboriginal image to critique the efficacy of safer sex 
and condemn bathhouse patrons alludes to how Brown and white gay leaders used the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic to enhance their whiteness. Brown’s racialized and temporalized 
image conveys the primitive “Other” to the white heteronormative norm of domesticity, 
intimacy, privacy, and respectability. Brown used a racist teleology that posited that 
condoms were so easy to use that allegedly less advanced races could also use them. 
Herein is where the fable of the tale lies: sex with condoms must not have been that safe 
if less advanced people were able to partake in such a practice with ease. Brown’s 
mobilization of a racist telos conveys how white gay leaders made sense of the 





Figure 4.3: Dick Brown's HIV-prevention ad appearing in the April 15, 1987 edition of 
Equal Time.  
 Besides his incendiary tone, Brown’s position was unpopular among those in 
positions of power within the local gay community because they maintained that 
commercial sex establishments operated as vital sites in the dissemination of safer sex 
education. Albeit, the tide of popular opinion among white gay leaders, public health 
officials, and city officials began to turn with the announcement that a beloved Minnesota 
farm activist, Dick Hanson, was diagnosed with the virus. What cemented this shift in 
popular opinion against the bathhouse was the revelation that Hanson might have 
contracted the virus at the 315 Health Club. Brown’s obsession with closing the 315 
Health Club was not so much different than Coyle’s effort to reframe white gay men as 
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worthy beneficiaries of citizen rights, benefits, and protections. Both Brown and Coyle 
sought to circumvent the devaluing processes of homosexuality by pointing to other signs 
of value among some white gay men such as morality and respectability, in short, their 
adherence to racialized norms of sexual hygiene. Their investments underscore that 
gender and sexual norms were central to white gay leaders’ efforts to secure their position 
within white heteronormativity.  
The Universal White Family.  
 From early in the epidemic, the mainstream press latched on to the narrative that 
those with HIV/AIDS had contracted the disease through sexual excesses or moral 
failings. These representations of gay men dying because of their supposed deviant 
sexual desires and practices served to inculcate in gay men a bourgeoning culture and 
politics of homonormativity in which domesticity and privacy were the antidotes to 
disease. The discourse of personal responsibility that emerged from a politics of 
homonormativity, nonetheless, obscured the government and medical establishment’s 
role in abetting the epidemic.  
 News accounts of people with HIV/AIDS (PWHA), both in the mainstream and 
gay press, did not necessarily offer sound medical advice. Instead, they often dovetailed 
into moral anecdotes that sought to tutor wayward white gay men on the significance of 
adhering to racialized norms of sexual hygiene. In the December 12, 1984 issue of Equal 
Time, the editors published a profile on Bill Runyon, a thirty-something white gay man 
with AIDS. Although Runyon was one of the first documented cases of HIV/AIDS in 
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Minnesota, the story did not focus on strategies to minimize the transmission of HIV.26 
On the contrary, the story centered on Runyon’s sexual behaviors and how those directly 
contributed to his infection. In the story, Runyon admitted to regretting the nature of his 
sex life. His relationship with his lover was not monogamous and the two participated in 
“three-ways.” Runyon lamented, “If I had to do it over, I’d have fewer sex partners than I 
had and I’d exchange a lot less bodily fluids.” For Runyon, the gay cultural institution of 
the bar, instead of providing an emotional support network during the AIDS crisis, 
actually facilitated his “promiscuous” lifestyle: “I was caught up in the bar scene and it 
was always easy for me to trick. I thought it was something attractive gay men did—go to 
bars, socialized, pick up tricks.” Runyon’s statements gave further credence to arguments 
made by more conservative strands of the gay community that bars and bathhouses were 
accessories to the infection of countless gay men. The fact that the article was titled, 
“Profile: Bill Runyon, helping others fight AIDS” (emphasis added), suggests that editors 
did indeed seek to spread safer sex messages.27 But, since the article made no mention of 
condom use or other such preventive measures, we can deduce that editors sought to use 
Runyon himself as a warning to other gay men of the dangers of unregulated gay male 
sexuality.  
 Likewise, in its July 10, 1985 issue, Equal Time published the story of Howard 
Backer, a 24-year-old “lonely and scared” white gay man dying of AIDS at the Hennepin 
County Medical Center. Once again editors used the story of a PWHA to more ardently 
                                                
26 By December of 1984, there had been 25 cases of AIDS diagnosed in Minnesota, with 14 of these 
resulting in death. J.C. Ritter, “Profile: Bill Runyon, helping others fight AIDS,” Equal Times, Dec. 12, 1984.  
 
27 In the same issue of Equal Time, the editors also published a column on “how to make monogamy work 
for you.” Among some of the listed advice included a recommendation to only socialize with other couples, 
the assumption being perhaps that single gay men could come between one’s relationship. J.C. Ritter, 
“Profile: Bill Runyon, helping others fight AIDS,” Equal Time, Dec. 12, 1984. 
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condemn commercial sex establishments and to call attention to the dangers of sexual 
promiscuity. From its opening lines, the story claimed that Backer’s AIDS diagnosis was 
the result of his promiscuous sex life. His father was abusive and so at the age of 12, 
Backer cruised bars, bathrooms, and parks. Thereafter, Backer “floated” around the 
country, working as a “gay houseboy” then as a sex worker. If Backer did not meet 
someone at the bars, he allegedly ventured off to erotic bookstores and cruised until 
daybreak. He would stay all weekend at the bathhouses and use the same “germ-filled jar 
of lube” for months. Interviewed as he lay in a hospital bed, a “reflective, almost 
remorseful” Backer recalled, “I never took care of myself like I should have. I was 
sexually addicted. I couldn’t stop. I liked the sleazy side of being gay—bathhouses, 
bookstores, [and] parks. I slept around every night. I could sleep with 10 different men in 
a night at the baths. And it wasn’t always clean.” That Backer was “far from the typical 
person with AIDS in Minnesota” was not only encapsulated in the article’s title (“Not a 
typical MN AIDS case”) but also in the narrative itself. Equal Time diligently worked to 
differentiate Backer from other PWHAs in the state. Without any evidence, Equal Time 
matter-of-fact claimed that the other PWHAs were older, “more settled, less 
promiscuous.” The story also pointed out that Backer was incapable of developing a 
long-term, monogamous relationship. The story quoted Backer: “I always wanted a lover 
and never found one. Five times with one guy [having sex] was like a relationship. I 
never knew what a relationship was like. I never thought about getting AIDS. I was 
having too much fun to stop having sex. I never knew what a clean lifestyle was.” As 
though the story’s morale was not clear enough, the story ends by drawing attention to 
gay men who continued to risk their lives and that of “innocent others” at bathhouses. 
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Backer admonished, “Gay men don’t care. They’re lonely. They need a fix. Sex is as 
good as a drink. You go to the baths and there are still 100 men there on a Saturday night 
having sleazy, sloppy sex. No matter how many guys die of AIDS there will always be 
those addicts who can’t stop.”28  
 Runyon and Backer’s stories suggest that white gay men were similarly subjected 
to demonizing discourses that reprimanded their sexual desires and practices in much the 
same way people of color—Fabian Bridges and Rea Robinson— discussed in chapter 
three. With that said, there is a sharp difference between these two scenarios. Runyon and 
Backer’s stories in Equal Time included the “solution” to white gay men’s plight with 
HIV/AIDS: homonormativity. That is, white gay men were salvageable; sexuality was 
something they could overcome to reap the benefits of their whiteness and maleness. All 
they had to do was come into monogamous, long-term relationships. People of color, like 
Bridges and Robinson, could not be redeemed. For them, their sexual deviance was 
printed on their face. Sexual deviance for them was assumed to be racially inherent.  
The one obstacle stopping white gay men from reaping the privileges of white 
patriarchy was the bathhouse. Commercial sex establishments, as havens for “sleazy, 
sloppy sex,” represented the very antithesis to white gay men achieving middle-class 
respectability. This connection between commercial sexual establishments and anti-
homonormativity was clearly articulated in the Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative series 
first appearing in the June 21, 1987 issue of the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, the 
                                                
28 For Backer, bathhouses, though key players, were not the only culprits in the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
According to him, sexual addiction figured largely in the number of gay men that contracted the virus. 
Backer’s comments elucidate the proliferation of a medicalized discourse of sexual addiction mobilized to 
explain the spread of HIV/AIDS. The rhetoric of sexual addiction distracted from a much-needed anti-racist 
and materialist critique of the epidemic’s cultural, political, and social dimensions that, in fact, allowed the 
virus to proceed unabated throughout already marginalized populations. J.C. Ritter, “Not a typical MN 
AIDS case,” Equal Time, Jul. 10, 1985. 
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daily newspaper of St. Paul, titled, “AIDS in the Heartland.”29 Even though “AIDS in the 
Heartland,” employed a number of tropes that mainstream media used when covering the 
epidemic, such as emphasizing the lack of hope for PWHAs—they all die—the 
investigative series, like the stories on Runyon and Backer, offered a guide on what white 
gay men should and should not do to safeguard against HIV/AIDS.   
 In the first installment to this investigative series, reporter Jacqui Banaszynski 
chronicled the life of “AIDS victim,” Dick Hanson with his partner of five years, Bert 
Henningson. Hanson, described as a devout church congregant, was a well-known liberal 
activist involved in the “radical farm movement” and anti-war protests in Minnesota.30 
Henningson, on the other hand, was a professor of international trade at the University of 
Minnesota, Morris. With Henningson by his side, Hanson had homesteaded his family’s 
century old-family farm in Glenwood, Minnesota, northeast of Minneapolis. The series 
framed Hanson’s diagnosis as having brought the threat of AIDS home to rural 
Minnesota. Yet, the series never used Hanson to instill fear in white Minnesotans, unlike 
with Bridges and Robinson. Quite the opposite, the series used Hanson to elicit public 
sympathy. “AIDS in the Heartland” was part of a bourgeoning genre of AIDS 
commentary in which white gay men returned home from large, urban metropolises to 
                                                
29 Jacqui Banaszynski of the St. Paul Pioneer Press won the Pulitzer Prize for feature writing for her series 
about the life and death of an “AIDS victim” in a Minnesota farm community. “Pioneer Press Dispatch 
wins journalism award; Miami Herald gets three,” Star Tribune, Mar. 29, 1988: 8B. 
30 Hanson had fought against farm foreclosures and a then-proposed West Central power line that would 
have witnessed the construction of a high-voltage power line snaking its way through western Minnesota. 
Hanson even ran for U.S. Congress in 1984. He was a lobbyist for the National Farmers Organization, a 
member of the Civil Liberties Union, National Organization of Women, and the Rainbow Coalition. He 
was also a DFL leader, elected to the Democratic National Committee in 1980 and served two terms. “Farm 
Activist, Democratic Leader Dick Hanson Dies of AIDS at 37,” Twin Cities Gaze, Jul. 30, 1987.; Jacqui 
Banaszynski, “AIDS in the Heartland,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Jun. 21, 1987. 
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live out their final months with their families in rural and suburban towns across the 
United States.31 
Prior to the first installment, the managing editor for the Pioneer Press, Mark 
Nadler, prefaced Hanson’s story by explaining the editorial staff’s decision to publish 
such a series. What made Hanson’s story “compelling” was that it was “a testament to the 
faith and courage and good humor of a man who awakens each day to the certain 
knowledge of his approaching death.” Besides seeking to teach its readers about “living 
and dying” with dignity, the Pioneer Press hoped to humanize the disease for 
Minnesotans.32 Unlike producers of the Frontline episode discussed in chapter three who 
were unable to portray Bridges as a “victim,” the editorial staff of the Pioneer Press 
successfully highlighted those traits of Hanson that enabled him to serve as a mirror 
                                                
31 In its November 2, 1987 issue, the New York Times featured a story on Dean Lechner, a gay white man 
with AIDS who had returned to Waseca, “a quiet place of 8,000 people in the farm country of southern 
Minnesota,” to die in the presence of his family. The story opened with the claim that “AIDS strikes most 
often in big cities, but many of its victims have come from small towns like Waseca.” With this assertion, 
the New York Times obscured the experience of IV-drug users of color and gay or bisexual men of color, 
most of who hailed from urban locations due to racist real estate and federal housing policies. In so doing, 
the “AIDS victim” that the New York Times assumed as universal was a gay white man. Confirming this 
claim further is the New York Times historicizing the Great Gay Migration of the 1970s as a conditioning 
factor of the epidemic. The story described, “Often just out of college, many young people had left for New 
York or Chicago or San Francisco, ambitious and bursting with notions about life in a glamorous 
metropolis. For gay men, there loomed all this and more: the promise of tolerance in the city, a chance to 
live out loud a way of life that had been unspeakable back home.” However, particularly because of this 
concentration of gay men in the city, HIV/AIDS spread much more easily. The New York Times added that 
“their dreams have been mocked by AIDS. And they returned to their small towns, not in triumph over 
successes in the city but instead to die,” oftentimes returning “to Mom, because her arms are usually open, 
even as so many doors are slamming.” Although the story rightfully challenged the characterization of 
small towns as bastions of homophobia, it simultaneously upheld the notion of the city as dangerous, 
diseased, and deviant. For the New York Times, HIV/AIDS traveled in one direction: from the racially 
aberrant city to the pristine white suburb and rural town. The New York Times failed to observe how the 
freedom of movement afforded to gay white men and white lesbians was largely denied to queers of color 
who still had to contend with discriminatory housing policies that prevented them from moving into “gay 
ghettos.” Dirk Johnson, “Coming Home, With AIDS, to a small town,” New York Times, Nov. 2, 1987. 
32 Writing about the importance of supplying a human face to the AIDS epidemic, Nadler explained, “We 
tend to write about the AIDS epidemic in terms of numerical milestones: the 200th case, the 100th death. As 
the numbers grow, the victims become cases rather than people; distanced from the names and faces, the 
rest of us grow immune to the horror.” Mark Nadler, “The human story behind AIDS statistics,” St. Paul 




image for white Minnesotans. The Pioneer Press facilitated public identification with 
Hanson, a white gay man, by underscoring his heteronormative familial relations.  
 In rendering Hanson’s live grievable, Nadler underscored how Hanson was 
different from the rest of AIDS cases. This strategy underscored that Hanson was not a 
particularly special case; he was neither the first celebrity nor the first schoolchild 
infected with the virus— but Hanson was “one of us—a native Minnesotan, a farmer, a 
political activist, someone’s son and brother and uncle.” Nadler expressed, “We tend to 
write about the prevalence of AIDS among drug users and homosexuals with 
promiscuous lifestyles who prefer to die in the anonymity of large cities.” Hanson and 
Henningson, Nadler concluded, were different because they “live[d] together as a 
committed couple with a deep relationship.” Nadler pointed out that Hanson, in his final 
months, had chosen to literally return home to the soil that saw his birth, the rural 
community of Glenwood, Minnesota. Unlike Bridges and Robinson, Hanson was “one of 
us” because he was not a promiscuous homosexual dying in the big city. Nadler 
emphasized Hanson’s roots to Minnesota as a way of prodding readers’ sympathy and 
acceptance of Hanson. He also highlighted Hanson’s family ties to an imaginary, 
universal, white heteropatriarchal family arrangement. Hanson’s social value was 
reproduced and passed on through his familial relations. Nadler concluded his preface by 
urging readers to set aside their personal biases—that is, homophobia—and instead focus 
on the universality of Hanson’s plight: his Midwestern whiteness. Nadler pleaded with 
readers: “Whatever you may think of his politics or sexual orientation, it is impossible to 
read his story and think of him as anything other than a decent, sensitive man determined 
to make some sense of the tragedy that has befallen him and thousands of others. His is 
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the great tragedy of our times, and his is a story worth telling” (emphasis added).33 As 
“one of us,” Hanson’s live was grievable; with the exception of his homosexuality, 
Hanson embodied the racial, class, and gender characteristics necessary to elicit public 
sympathy from white Minnesotans. Hanson was a victim—AIDS had befallen him—
unlike Bridges and Robison who were portrayed as predators.  
 Throughout the investigative series, Hanson’s relationship with Henningson was 
front and central. No such mention was made of the economic, political, and social 
factors that allowed HIV/AIDS to proliferate in the first place.34 By focusing upon 
Hanson’s relationship with Henningson, Banaszynski sought to debunk some of the 
stereotypes and myths associated with HIV/AIDS and those who carried the virus. In 
emphasizing the “just-like-thou” nature of Hanson and Henningson, Banaszynski related: 
“They are farmers who have milked cows, slopped hogs and baled hay like everyone else. 
Their politics and sexual orientation may disturb some. But their voices and values are 
most familiar, and perhaps better understood, than those of their urban counterparts” 
(emphasis added). According to Banaszynski’s assessment, the two men were farmers 
who just happened to be gay, unlike their “urban counterparts,” with all the racial 
connotations such a term entails (Figure 4.4).  
Portraying Hanson and Henningson as embodying the homosexual equivalent to 
heteronormativity, Banaszynski described that upon celebrating five years together, 
Hanson and  
                                                
33 Ibid.  
34 In fact, the investigative series failed to correct misinformation expressed by Hanson’s family. A week 
before Hanson’s death in the summer of 1987, his brother visited him at the family’s farm. His brother’s 
wife “had forbidden [his brother] any close contact with [Hanson], worried he would carry the virus home 
to their five children.” Banaszynski, however, did not so much as mention that public health officials had 





Figure 4.4: In an ode to the famous “American Gothic” painting, Dick Hanson and Bert 
Henningson are photographed standing outside their farm in Glenwood, Minnesota. Jacqui 
Banaszynski, “AIDS in the Heartland,” St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, Jun. 21, 1987. 
Henningson celebrated together with “a gathering of friends and an exchange of rings.” A 
friend even observed that the two had “figured out things many married couples never 
come close to figuring out.” Banaszynski’s emphasis on Hanson’s relationship with 
Henningson implied that companionship was the key antidote to the disease. Alluding to 
the series’ focus on Hanson’s relationship with Henningson, Banaszynski argued that the 
statistics on HIV/AIDS did not say anything in regards to “the powerful bond between 
two people who pledged for better or worse and meant it.” The one roadblock, however, 
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that could come between that bond was AIDS.35 More concretely, commercial sex 
establishments, because they supposedly facilitated high-risk sex, were responsible for 
disrupting what could have been a lifelong of domestic bliss for Hanson and Henningson. 
Public sex at bathhouses and public parks—anything outside the private realm—
threatened the social membership of white gay men in the cultural, political, and social 
fabric of the nation.36 
 The 315 Health Club, Banaszynski wrote, was ground zero for Hanson and 
Henningson’s infection. Both Hanson and Henningson, Banaszynski described, 
“repressed” their homosexuality well into their 30s. As a result, Hanson spent the early 
1980s exploring his homosexuality, “making up for 15 years of self-denial.” He traveled 
to San Francisco or New York City on “political and sexual junkets.” After coming to 
terms with his homosexuality, Hanson frequently ventured on weekend trips to the Twin 
Cities where he engaged in “anonymous encounters” at the 315 Health Club. 
Banaszynski’s detailed retelling of Hanson’s infection coincides with a larger pattern in 
which mainstream media often externalized the source of the virus to the urban and the 
coastal. Hanson and Backer’s accounts underscore that these men regularly visited large 
urban centers like New York City and San Francisco where they cavorted in commercial 
                                                
35 AIDS was not the only threat facing life-long, monogamous couples like Hanson and Henningson. 
Banaszynski recounts that after Hanson’s death, officials questioned Henningson’s right as “Hanson’s 
partner and legal executor” to handle Hanson’s death. Henningson told Banaszynski, “There seemed to be 
great poles at the time of his death and trying to shove Dick back in the closet again.” Jacqui Banaszynski, 
“AIDS in the Heartland: The Final Chapter,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Aug. 9, 1987. 
36 Perhaps because of Hanson’s seemingly “safe” nature, Hanson became one of the state’s most visible 
PWHAs. Hanson and Henningson were frequently interviewed for local news stories and often spoke at 
AIDS education seminars in churches and schools throughout the state. On May 5, 1987, Hanson even 
addressed the state Senate’s special informational meeting on AIDS. More than 250 people listened as 
Hanson told 45 of the state’s 67 senators, “My name is Dick Hanson and I have AIDS. But I am more than 
a statistic; I am a human being. I love and need to be loved, I live with hope and don’t take it away from 
me.” “Dick Hanson Obituary,” Box 14, Folder: AIDS, March-Aug. 1987, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center.  
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sex establishments. These stories confirmed the notion that AIDS originated outside 
Middle America. To further authenticate the direct association between foreignness and 
disease, Hanson and Backer’s accounts harnessed preexisting medicalized discourses of 
urban spaces that were thoroughly racialized. White Minnesotans were, thus, reassured 
that HIV was a foreign malady that remained spatially segregated. Inasmuch as the 
source of that contagion remained relegated to large urban centers with significant 
populations of people of color, accounts like that of Hanson and Backer cemented the 
linkage between race and space.37  
Even though Hanson’s relationship with Henningson was front and central in both 
Pioneer Press installments, Banaszynski devoted a substantial amount of discussion to 
Hanson and Henningson’s sexual practices to consider how these might have directly 
contributed to them acquiring the virus, with the narrative at times reading more like a 
safari travelogue. In an interview with Banaszynski, Hanson confessed, “I can point to an 
awful lot of anonymous, unsafe sex [at commercial sex establishments]. The likelihood is 
I got AIDS because of being much more sexually active.” Hanson acknowledged that it 
was “just easier to have sex when [he] went to the Cities for the weekend” since being 
“on the farm was not good for developing long-term relationships.”38 In his sexual 
escapades to the Cities, Hanson came across men from neighboring states and all walks 
                                                
37 Minneapolis occupied an indeterminate role in this scenario. At times, it was made to appear as urban 
like New York City and San Francisco to highlight its supposed cosmopolitanism. But, in other instances, it 
was made to appear as the heartland to reassert its moral superiority over predominantly black and Latinx 
large urban centers. This flexibility indexes the particularity of Minneapolis. For a deeper analysis of the 
interconnections between race, space, and public health, see: Natalia Molina, Fit to be Citizens: Public 
Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006).  
38 Hanson also cited his family as a reason to why he could not become involved in a long-term, 
monogamous relationship. He told Banaszynski, “And what would my family think if I brought home 
someone important to me? So I put a big blame, if there is any, on society’s pressures that we had to be 
anonymous and closeted.” Jacqui Banaszynski, “AIDS in the Heartland: The Final Chapter,” St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, Aug. 9, 1987. 
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of life. Hanson recalled, “There were a lot of people from Wisconsin, Iowa, the Dakotas 
doing the same thing. They were farmers, businessmen, teachers, [and] priests. We just 
had an awful lot in common, living in an environment that wasn’t acceptable to us being 
ourselves.” Hanson stipulated that men visited commercial sex establishments out of 
shame and out of an inability to come into long-term, monogamous relationships with 
other men. Banaszynski’s intimate account of Hanson and Henningson was meant to 
encourage readers to reflect upon how they themselves might have contributed to a 
context in which these two morally upstanding men could only explore their same-sex 
desires in commercial sex establishments. Banaszynski mobilized the AIDS crisis as a 
mechanism of white liberal reflection in the service of consolidating a discourse and 
practice of “Minnesota Nice.”  
Banaszynski’s account infantilized these men to exorcize them of their sexual 
deviance. Although Hanson admitted to having had “some real special relationships” with 
men at commercial sex establishments, “if they suggested it just be us [Hanson] felt 
trapped, like they were closing in on” him.39 According to this logic, Hanson was not 
sexually developed enough to mature into a monogamous relationship; he had only 
recently “come out” in his 30s. The implication of this line of thinking is that gay men 
who engaged in “anonymous encounters” at bathhouses had not properly undergone 
through a lineal process of sexual development. They were stuck in a stage of perpetual 
sexual immaturity, the stage of the sexual primitive in Brown’s formulation of the 
Aboriginal man. And, per this logic, in the context of a sexually transmitted disease, the 
inability of gay men to come into long-term, monogamous relationships proved fatal. 
                                                
39 Jacqui Banaszynski, “AIDS in the Heartland,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Jun. 21, 1987. 
 
 322 
Under this conceptualization, promiscuity was not a reflection of sexual liberation, but 
rather of arrested development.   
 Although Hanson could have acquired the AIDS virus at a number of different 
locations and under varied circumstances (i.e. one-on-one sex in private), the Pioneer 
Press strongly suggested that the 315 Health Club was the location of Hanson’s 
infection.40 In speculating that Hanson acquired HIV through casual anonymous sex at 
the 315 Health Club, before or even during his relationship with Henningson, 
Banaszynski revealed, “It had been four years since [Hanson] had indulged in casual 
weekend sex at the gay bathhouse in Minneapolis, since he and Henningson committed to 
each other.” Up to that point, Banaszynski recounted, “Sex outside their relationship had 
been limited and ‘safe,’ with no exchange of semen or blood.”41 Banaszynski’s use of 
quotation marks around the word “safe” is significant. It could very well have been an 
indictment against gay leaders for lauding certain sexual practices as more or less risky 
than others. The most likely use of quotation marks around the word “safe” is meant to 
cast doubt on Hanson’s claim that sex outside any monogamous relationship could truly 
be safe, with or without condoms. 
 As the location where Hanson could have acquired HIV, the 315 Health Club 
destroyed that “powerful bond” between these two men—death was imminent. As an 
institution that hampered homonormativity, the bathhouse undermined any and all such 
efforts by white gay men to be included within the body politic of the nation-state as 
                                                
40 Henningson believed Hanson contracted the virus in 1980, before the met at a political convention in 
1982. Henningson, thus, believed he contracted the virus from Hanson. Although the two exchanged 
private vows of commitment, they agreed to an open-relationship, “a not uncommon arrangement among 
gay couples,” according to Banaszynski. Jacqui Banaszynski, “AIDS in the Heartland: The Final Chapter,” 
St. Paul Pioneer Press, Aug. 9, 1987. 
41 Jacqui Banaszynski, “AIDS in the Heartland,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Jun. 21, 1987. 
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citizens. And, since Banaszynski stressed that Hanson’s story was not an unusual instance 
of casual anonymous sex at a bathhouse, the public was compelled to consider how many 
other instances of HIV transmission were traceable back to such an establishment. 
Banaszynski encouraged readers to ponder how many other long-term, monogamous 
relationships among white gay men were similarly preempted. 
As with most stories on PWHAs, Hanson died on July 25, 1987, at the Hennepin 
County Medical Center, with Henningson by his side.42 At a celebration of Hanson’s 
accomplishments soon after he publicly revealed his diagnosis, openly gay State Senator 
Allan Spear applauded Hanson with challenging everyone to fight the battle against the 
spread of HIV. In commemorating Hanson, Spear declared, “Dick Hanson is not a source 
of despair in spite of the times. He characterizes this as a time of hope and not turning 
back. We as a community are more united than ever. The time will come when we can 
live our lives with respect. His determination, courage and hope will bring a justice that 
will prevail.”43 Here, Spear used Hanson and Henningson as the iconic symbol for all gay 
men. Although Spear made no such mention of how Hanson’s AIDS diagnosis would 
bring “justice,” it is possible that Hanson’s diagnosis and subsequent death inspired other 
white gay leaders and public health officials to reconsider their position on commercial 
sex establishments.44 Unlike New York City and San Francisco, local government in 
                                                
42 At the age of 41, Henningson died of AIDS-related complications on May 9, 1988, at a hospital in 
Ortonville, his hometown in western Minnesota where he returned the previous summer to live his final 
months with family. Before his death, Henningson wrote the epitaph for the AIDS memorial quilt that 
carried his and Hanson’s name. It read: “Openly gay and at home on their family farm in rural Minnesota, 
their love ran deep as the prairie soil.” John Ritter, “Bert Henningson—farmer, activist—dies at age 41.” 
Equal Time, May 25, 1988.  
43 “Words of Love Say ‘Thank You’ to Activist Dick Hanson,” Twin Cities Gaze, Oct. 3, 1986.  
44 In an interview with Equal Time after Henningson’s death, Coyle explained how Henningson and 
Hanson had impacted him. “He and [Hanson] loved one another passionately. They taught me a lot about 
gay love and courage.” Ibid.  
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Minneapolis was not initially interested in closing the city’s last remaining bathhouse. 
That changed with Hanson’s death and with the arrival of Randy Shilts to the cities to 
promote his book, And the Band Played On. In view of the fact that bathhouses 
undermined a culture and politics of homonormativity, they were threats to the 
institutions of white supremacy, patriarchy, and neoliberal capitalism.  
The Anti-Bathhouse Ordinance.  
 The controversy surrounding bathhouses received widespread attention in coastal 
cities like New York City and San Francisco. Less has been written about the extent to 
which other localities, like the Twin Cities, attempted to close and/or regulate 
bathhouses. While the bathhouse debate pitied gay leaders and AIDS advocates against 
one another in New York City and San Francisco, the bathhouse debate in Minneapolis 
remained relatively quit—initially. For one, Minneapolis experienced the brunt of the 
epidemic later than did coastal cities. And, most bathhouses in Minneapolis had already 
fallen to urban renewal by the time the HIV/AIDS epidemic hit. However, beginning in 
the summer of 1987, after the death of Dick Hanson, the tide of public opinion against the 
city’s last remaining bathhouse began to shift.  
 At a performance review of the city’s health commissioner, David Lurie, the 
president of the City Council, Alice Rainville, accused Lurie of not doing enough to curb 
the spread of the epidemic. She publicly divulged to the Star Tribune that she had grown 
frustrated with the lack of identifiable results produced by Lurie and his office.45 For that 
                                                
45 Rainville stated, “I questioned [Lurie] about what his division was doing about the epidemic. I’ve been 
asking the question for 18 months. We have charged [Lurie] to deal with this and it looks like we’re finally 
going to get some action.” Rainville added, “My anger has been we have not pursued this. We have been 
intimidated and paralyzed.” Rainville added, “We’re charged with protecting the public health in public 
buildings.” Rob Hotakainen, “Ordinance would battle ‘high-risk’ sex,” Star Tribune, Jan. 20, 1988. 
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reason, Rainville instructed Lurie to review how other cities had resolved the bathhouse 
issue. Rainville might have been encouraged into action not only by Hanson’s death but 
also by Dick Brown’s incessant mailing campaign. Between June and August of 1987, 
Brown mailed several copies of a report titled, “How AIDS was spread in Minnesota,” to 
members of the City Council, including Rainville and Sandra Hilary, chairperson of the 
Public Health and Safety Committee. In those mailings, Brown made several suggestions 
about potential architectural changes to the 315 Health Club.   
Perhaps sensing that the closure of the bathhouse was unlikely given the then-
unpopularity of such a position in the Twin Cities, Brown proposed a compromise that 
consisted of making a number of structural changes to the bathhouse to render it “a less 
hazardous, and lethal environment.” In the memo accompanying the report, Brown asked 
the city to close “the entire third floor area, consisting over 50 private sex rooms.” He 
recommended that the city require “white lighting of 150 watts or more” in the steam 
room, shower rooms, sauna, and whirlpool area. He also suggested that the city require 
the bathhouse to close at midnight “to discourage drug abuse and drug dealing and to 
discourage patronage by late night customers of nearby gay bars who come to the 
bathhouse high on liquor and/or drugs after the bars close.” So adamant was he about the 
relationship between drugs and alcohol with high-risk activity that he proposed no one 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol be admitted. Brown ended the memo by insisting 
that it was the “moral obligation” of health officials and city council members to address 
the threat posed by commercial sex establishments. He pleaded with the city to “pass 
laws as soon as possible to control operations such as bathhouses to prevent the city from 
ever again becoming victimized by bathhouse owners who prey upon the vulnerable 
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without regards for morals, ethics, or the public health and safety of our community.”46 
Failure by the city to pass such an ordinance, Brown predicted, would result in the Twin 
Cities witnessing similar rates of infection as those seen in New York City and San 
Francisco.  
In response to Rainville’s request, Lurie submitted a memorandum on September 
1, 1987, to the Executive Committee of the City Council in which he discussed the 
relationship between commercial sex establishments and AIDS transmission. Up to that 
point, the Minneapolis Department of Health had opted for supporting educational efforts 
in such so-called “high-risk” settings. But, given the course of the epidemic and “the 
implication that high risk behavior may be continuing to occur at significant levels in 
commercial establishments,” Lurie recommended that the city reconsider its stance 
towards commercial sex establishments. He ruled, “based on professional public health 
input,” that “establishments which facilitate high risk behaviors, such as anonymous 
sexual contact, and/or intercourse with multiple partners, are most likely to be 
contributing factors to the transmission of the AIDS virus.” As a result, Lurie 
recommended “consideration of a City policy prohibiting high risk behavior in 
commercial establishments and adoption of progressive enforcement measures to be 
applied to establishments which condone or exist for the purpose of such behavior.” 47 
                                                
46 “A Moral Obligation.” DLM Memorial Fund Memo, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
47 In an August 18, 1987, letter to Hilary, Lurie wrote that in order to legally force the closure of 
commercial sex establishments, there had to be established evidence that patrons were engaging in high-
risk sexual behavior. In that letter, Lurie mentioned that the City Attorney was considering “regulation or 
monitoring” of the bathhouse similar to “the Denver regulation.” Lurie’s reference to the Denver regulation 
referred to a regulation adopted in 1986 in Denver which required bathhouse compliance with structural 
standards, prohibited unsafe sex, enabled health department monitoring, and authorized closure for non-
compliance. In the literature he mailed out that summer, Brown had allegedly made several suggestions 




Lurie’s memorandum outlined the first official action by the City of Minneapolis to 
curtail customer activities at the 315 Health Club.48  
 Upon consultation with the city attorney’s office, Lurie reviewed local 
ordinances, state laws, and legislative action implemented by other jurisdictions, 
including Denver, New York City, and San Francisco.49 In a letter to Hilary on January 
15, 1988, Lurie suggested that the city consider an ordinance similar to that enacted in 
Marion County, Indiana, since it was a “good option” for addressing the public health 
concerns of all those involved while also meeting “legal standards” regarding the privacy 
of those impacted.50 The Marion County ordinance proved appealing to Lurie as a federal 
court had already upheld its constitutionality.51 Four days later, at a meeting of the Public 
                                                                                                                                            
direct confluence between the recommendations made by Brown and the policy changes proposed by Lurie. 
Mark Kasel, “Are Controversies at 315 and River Flats Headed for Negative Outcomes?” Twin Cities Gaze, 
1986.; “Memorandum from David Lurie,” Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, 
The Minnesota History Center.; Tim Campbell, “Politicos eye “progressive measures” against commercial 
sites where AIDS could be spread,” GLC Voice, Sep. 8, 1987. 
48 In an interview with Equal Time, Lurie rejected the notion that his proposal to prohibit high-risk sexual 
behavior in commercial sex establishments was aimed at closing the 315 Health Club. Lurie continued to 
emphasize education as a means of stopping the transmission of AIDS. In the proposal, Lurie did not 
specifically name the bathhouse or the X-rated theaters and adult bookstores. Still, when asked if he 
thought the policy would lead to closing the bathhouse, Lurie replied, “Not necessarily so. The policy 
discourages high risk activities” and a business could continue to operate so long as its activities were 
monitored. John Ritter, “Health commissioner’s proposal on ‘high-risk’ establishments,” Equal Time, Sep. 
16, 1987. 
49 Given the number of constitutional issues related to privacy involved in bathhouse closure, Lurie 
reviewed policies from other municipalities to determine what had been contested and upheld. 
50 “David Lurie Letter to Sandra Hilary,” Jan. 15, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
51 The United States District Court for the southern District of Indiana ruled the Marion County ordinance 
did not impose any restriction on the plaintiff’s right to show whatever films or entertainment he desired to 
offer. The court also found that this ordinance and its accompanying regulations did not “infringe” on the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights. The court determined that the ordinance and its structural regulations 
did not regulate speech based on the content of the entertainment, but rather its secondary effects, for 
instance, multiple sexual encounters that enabled the spread of HIV. The court also ruled that a substantial 
government interest was involved, that the evidence was sufficient to show that the ordinance fulfilled that 
interest, and that the ordinance allowed for “reasonable, alternative avenues of communication.” Clean Up 
Project Letter to Fraser, Jan. 4, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center.  
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Health Advisory Committee, Lurie distributed a copy of a proposed Minneapolis 
ordinance modeled after the Marion County ordinance.52  
  The major focus and emphasis of the ordinance was to prohibit any commercial 
establishment, structure, or premises to operate for the purpose of permitting high-risk 
sexual activity. The ordinance sought to limit anonymous sex by altering the interiors of 
these sex-oriented commercial buildings. It prohibited apertures—gloryholes—in the 
buildings’ partitions, which were designed to facilitate anonymous oral and anal sex 
between people on either side. Additionally, the ordinance required lighting in all booths, 
stalls, or rooms that were used to view movies, and it required that at least one side of 
such areas be open and visible to people in adjacent rooms. Another provision of the 
ordinance made it illegal for commercial buildings to offer private rooms or 
accommodations to patrons unless the business was a “validly operating” hotel, motel, 
apartment complex, condominium or rooming house. Finally, the ordinance conferred 
“full power and authority” to the Office of the Health Commissioner to inspect 
businesses that “may be a site of high-risk sexual conduct.” If these structural changes 
were not taken and businesses continued to enable high-risk sexual activity, health 
officials would then implement a series of enforcement steps.53 First, health officials 
                                                
52 “Public Health Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes,” Jan. 19, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse 
Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
53 Critics of the bathhouse ordinance were most preoccupied with its enforcement, whether it would focus 
on management or patrons. Even Coyle, who came to support the ordinance, was concerned about 
enforcement of the ordinance given the history of police harassment in commercial sex establishments: 
“I’m not eager to have the police or health department using entrapment to build evidence for action.” 
Coyle worried that the ordinance would legally authorize law enforcement authorities with the power to 
harass and arrest gay men. City Council Member Sandra Hilary, Chair of the Public Health and Safety 
Committee, developed an enforcement plan that established a timetable of about 90 days for compliance. 
First, health officials would survey those businesses impacted. They would then issue orders, if any, to 
comply with the ordinance. Hilary assured that enforcement would be aimed at locations and management, 
not patrons. John Ritter, “315 Health Club closes prior to ordinance,” Equal Time, Apr. 13, 1988.; John 
Ritter, “Should the bathhouse be regulated,” Equal Time, Feb. 17, 1988. 
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would send out a notification to the establishment notifying management what had to be 
changed. If these “violations” were not addressed, the establishment would receive a 
formal notice and it would be labeled a “hazardous site.” If non-compliance persisted, the 
Office of the Health Commissioner would move in and close the premises. The city 
attorney, Bob Alfton, estimated that the ordinance would have impacted anywhere from 
12 to 14 businesses.54 
 The ordinance determined that those establishments that did not comply with the 
regulations be labeled “hazardous sites.” Interestingly enough, the federal government 
likewise used this term after World War II to designate neighborhoods that were 
“undesirable,” or predominantly black and/or Latinx. Homes in “hazardous sites” were 
subsequently denied access to federally insured home loans, thus, fueling residential 
segregation and socio-economic disparities. It is noteworthy that the City of Minneapolis 
used this same language to designate commercial sex establishments that were not 
complying with city-mandated public health measures. What this suggests in the latter 
case is that sexual deviance, or non-conformity to prescribed public health norms, was 
articulated through the language of race.55  
 City officials understood the bathhouse as the material manifestation of both racial 
and sexual Otherness. The establishment underscored the difference from and danger to 
white American heterosexual family life. As such, city officials conceived of the 
bathhouse and the public sexual cultures that abutted it as the preeminent sites of 
depravity and disease in Minneapolis, in desperate need of intervention. After the Public 
Health Advisory Committee voted to support the ordinance, Hilary introduced the 
                                                
54 Ibid.  
55 See chapter six for a detailed discussion of postwar race-based federal housing policy.  
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ordinance before the Public Health and Safety Committee. Hilary was frank and direct in 
her stance. She reported to the press: “This is not a discussion for the faint-hearted...but 
this is a problem for all of us. I want to deal with this in a straightforward fashion.”56  
Hilary believed that by not acting on the issue, the City Council was “offering people 
opportunities to die.”57  Though the ordinance could have easily been interpreted as anti-
sex and homophobic, Hilary assured that the ordinance did not stem from a moralistic 
point of view, but from a public health perspective. Since both Hilary and Rainville did 
not believe the “at-risk community” capable of practicing personal responsibility in its 
sexual behaviors, they believed it the duty of the City Council to ensure gay men would 
not acquire, or most likely spread, the deadly virus. 58 
 The ordinance garnered heavy endorsement from city and state officials who were 
swayed by Hilary and Rainville framing the ordinance as an expedient solution—one of 
life and death—to the HIV/AIDS epidemic made by rational-minded people. City 
Council Member Dennis Schulstad, who also sat on the Public Health and Safety 
Committee, estimated that the ordinance would pass ““[p]robably 13-0 with the mayor’s 
signature,” before adding, “Nobody on the council, or the mayor, are in favor of 
pornography or lewd sex acts.” Although Hilary commended the ordinance as public 
health legislation, it is clear from Schulstad’s comments that for some the ordinance did 
in fact fulfill a moralistic agenda. The anti-pornography movement, in particular, heavily 
                                                
56 Rob Hotakainen, “State officials endorse Minneapolis plan to fight AIDS//Proposed ordinance  
seeks to curb ‘high-risk’ sex,” Star Tribune, Jan. 22, 1988. 
57 Rob Hotakainen, “Ordinance would battle ‘high-risk’ sex,” Star Tribune, Jan. 20, 1988. 
58 Ibid.  
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endorsed the anti-bathhouse ordinance.59 The influence of the anti-pornography 
movement was more pronounced in St. Paul’s very own commercial sex establishment 
legislation.60 
 As one of the architects of the ordinance, Hilary predicted the plan would easily 
pass the City Council. In an interview with the Star Tribune, Hilary invalidated the 
opposition by insisting, “The phone has not been ringing off the hook on this.”61 At a 
hearing for the ordinance, Hilary sighed, “We’ve been very sensitive to people’s feelings. 
We’ve been overly sensitive. But reasonable people are coming to the same conclusion, 
no matter who they are.”62 For Hilary and Rainville, this was not a gay rights issue. 
Instead, this was a robust approach in the fight against AIDS. Their success in framing 
                                                
59 Although anti-pornography lesbian-feminists had previously been at the forefront of the campaign to shut 
down commercial sex establishments in the Twin Cities, by 1988, the anti-pornography movement in the 
Twin Cities had been largely taken over by religious conservatives as lesbian-feminists had abandoned the 
anti-pornography movement due to legal setbacks. The latest incarnation of the anti-pornography 
movement did support a policy of architectural changes to commercial sex establishments as HIV-
prevention. On January 4, 1988, Robert P. Heinrich, Director of the Clean Up Project, the Minnesota 
Clearinghouse to Eliminate Pornography, penned a lengthy letter to the mayor, the city council, the city 
attorney, and the city health commissioner of Minneapolis. The letter conveyed the group’s utmost support 
for the regulation of commercial sex establishments to halt the spread of HIV. Heinrich described how 
other cities throughout the country had similarly enacted health ordinances designed to decrease the spread 
of HIV “by establishing minimal, structural standards in commercial premises.” Treating bathhouses as 
“incubators for the dreaded disease AIDS,” Heinrich urged every “governmental entity that has within its 
power and authority some means to slow this terrible epidemic must in conscience study these means, pass 
ordinances and establish regulations that will save lives.” He pleaded with policymakers to consider the 
innocent lives that would be lost to the disease if the ordinance were not passed: “Do not be lost in First 
Amendment smokescreen that selfish individuals raise to protect their evil enterprises. Please act to protect 
all the members of society, even those yet unborn from this terrible killer, AIDS.” Clean Up Project Letter 
to Fraser, Jan. 4, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota 
History Center.  
60 In the summer of 1987, the St. Paul City Council passed a similar ordinance making it illegal to have 
doors on private movie booths at X-rated theaters. The city council hoped that by passing such legislation 
they would curb sexual activity that took place in the booths. The measure, which was approved 
unanimously, required all viewing areas in movie arcades to be visible from a main aisle by prohibiting the 
use of doors, walls, or curtains that obstruct the view into the booths where films were displayed. The 
ordinance was patterned after a similar measure in Newport, Virginia that had been upheld in federal court 
as a valid restriction of freedom of speech. If a building were not up to code, police, building inspectors, 
and the city’s licensing division could refuse to issue licenses to such businesses. Chris Ison, “St. Paul bans 
doors on sex film booths,” Star Tribune, Jul. 2, 1987. 
61 Rob Hotakainen, “Law to reduce spread of AIDS passes hurdle,” Star Tribune, Mar. 22, 1988. 
62 Rob Hotakainen, “Coyle in dilemma on vote to curb high-risk sex,” Star Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988. 
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the ordinance as such was reiterated in public support.63  
 On the same day that Hilary introduced the ordinance to the Public Safety and 
Health Committee, Minnesota’s top-ranking health official, Health Commissioner Sister 
Mary Madonna Ashton, endorsed the controversial Minneapolis plan with written 
testimony. In the letter, Ashton proclaimed that the ordinance would reduce the number 
of Minnesotans who became infected with the virus by eliminating opportunities for “at-
risk people” to engage in “high-risk” sex with multiple partners.64 At the time city and 
health officials considered the ordinance, the Twin Cities region had 87 percent of the 
state’s AIDS cases. Minneapolis alone accounted for 53 percent of the 307 cases reported 
to the state by January 18, 1988. Health officials were not the only ones to mobilize in 
support of the ordinance. Dean Severson, a Minneapolis Police Department vice officer, 
filed an affidavit with the Public Safety and Health Committee in which he claimed to 
have made hundreds of arrests from 1982 to 1988 in erotic bookstores and saunas for 
indecent conduct and prostitution. Severson recounted witnessing men masturbating and 
engaging in fellatio and unprotected anal intercourse with strangers.65 
 Originally, the ordinance defined “high risk sexual conduct” as fellatio and anal 
intercourse. However, City Council Member and future Mayor of Minneapolis, Sharon 
Sayles Belton, a black woman, perhaps with the case of Rea Robinson in mind, asked that 
the definition be expanded to include vaginal intercourse to prevent female prostitutes 
                                                
63 At a hearing before the Committee, a concerned resident applauded the committee for considering the 
plan: “It’s about time somebody stood up and did something. It involves human lives...When people are 
dying, everything possible should be done.” Rob Hotakainen, “Law to reduce spread of AIDS passes 
hurdle,” Star Tribune, Mar. 22, 1988. 
64 She concluded the letter by reiterating that state health officials, including Mike Moen, Head of the 
Minnesota Department of Health, and Mike Osterholm, State Epidemiologist, “fully support[ed] your effort 
in this regard.” 
65 Rob Hotakainen, “State officials endorse Minneapolis plan to fight AIDS//Proposed ordinance  
seeks to curb ‘high-risk’ sex,” Star Tribune, Jan. 22, 1988. 
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from spreading the disease. Wording was subsequently changed to include “vaginal 
intercourse with persons who engage in sexual acts in exchange for money.” The 
inclusion of vaginal intercourse and fellatio, relatively low-risk sexual acts, suggests that 
the aim of the ordinance may have been more than mere HIV-prevention. After all, at the 
time, only two percent of Minnesota’s total cases of AIDS were attributed to heterosexual 
transmission.66 
 On February 6, 1988, the Public Health Advisory Committee voted in favor of the 
proposed anti-bathhouse ordinance.67 Several weeks later, on March 21, 1988, the Public 
Health and Safety Committee passed the controversial measure. Although no 
representatives from the 315 Health Club or the adult entertainment industry spoke at the 
committee hearing, a portion of the audience characterized the ordinance as a political 
measure, not a health matter. Critics accused the ordinance of being anti-gay and of being 
part of a politically expedient moral campaign to rid the city of commercial sex 
establishments, not AIDS.  
The bathhouse ordinance sparked widespread debate among gay men in the Twin 
Cities. Some gay men shouted their opposition to the ordinance insisting that the 315 
Health Club, which distributed free information on safer sex, was the only educational 
outlet for some men who had sex with other men, namely bisexual married men. They 
argued that approving the ordinance, therefore, would actually promote the spread of 
HIV/AIDS by eliminating those educational efforts. Critics also opposed the ordinance 
                                                
66 Lewis Cope, “State’s 155 cases fewer than 1 percent of U.S. total,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jan. 
18, 1987. 
67 The committee endorsed the ordinance “as one limited approach to preventing AIDS.” It encouraged “the 
continuation and expansion of other broader based education and risk-reduction activities as well.” “Public 
Health Advisory Committee March Meeting Minutes,” Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
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on the grounds that it rid the built environment of identifiably gay spaces. (The 315 
Health Club anchored the gay district of Minneapolis to the north.) At the first public 
hearing on the bathhouse ordinance, Robert Halfhill of the Minnesota Alliance Against 
AIDS testified against the plan by accusing the Public Health Advisory Committee, 
“What are you going to close down next?” Likewise, the Twin Cities Gaze suggested the 
possibility of a domino effect whereby other gay (and lesbian) community institutions 
would be targeted for closure including adult bookstores, massage parlors, and even the 
YMCA.68 
As one of the most vocal opponents of the ordinance, Tim Campbell, editor-in-
chief of the local bi-weekly publication, the GLC Voice, expressed what he perceived to 
have been the true motives of the ordinance.69 At the hearing, Campbell contended, “It’s 
an ordinance against gay sex. It’s an ordinance about morality, not about health or high-
risk sex. It’s an ordinance to close down bookstores and our bathhouse under the guise of 
getting at high-risk sex.”70 Campbell pointed out that the bathhouse ordinance made no 
                                                
68 Coyle rejected “the whole alarmist view” that the bathhouse ordinance would lead to a crackdown on gay 
public life including gay bars. Rob Hotakainen, “Coyle in dilemma on vote to curb high-risk sex,” Star 
Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988.; “MPLS. Health Commissioner Begins Anti-Tubs Campaign,” Twin Cities Gaze, 
1988.  
69 In its May 19, 1986 issue, the GLC Voice printed a letter penned by a disgruntled reader that accused 
Campbell and the GLC Voice of facilitating the spread of AIDS by defending the 315 Health Club. The 
letter writer claimed, “The Memorial Day Vigil Service [for people with AIDS] should be held right in 
front of [the 315 Health Club] or any [erotic] bookstore.” The letter writer insisted that what “we need is 
help in stopping out of control sexual addiction and that means you, me, all of us.” Campbell responded to 
the letter by defending the GLC Voice as “probably Minnesota’s most viable tool [in] fighting the spread of 
AIDS.” He argued that the newspaper was “more helpful than the MN Health Department with all its waste 
and MAP with all its slowness.” As far as the bathhouse, Campbell emphasized that the “315 also does a lot 
of educating about condoms and AIDS. People who are going to practice unsafe sex will do so inevitable. 
315 helps persuade people not to practice unsafe sex and provides condoms for people.” “Letters: Campbell 
will be sorry!” GLC Voice, May 19, 1986.  
70 Campbell relied on a wide array of arguments, strategies, and vocabularies to defeat ordinance. He 
testified before the City Council’s Public Health and Safety Committee that the “homophobic” and 
“politically opportune” plan would eliminate 65 to 70 jobs in the commercial sex establishments. Finally, 
Campbell publicly re-imagined the buildings housing these commercial sex establishments as symbols of 




such mention of places like single bars where heterosexuals met and arranged sexual 
liaisons.71 Campbell urged the plan be rejected, and if it were approved, that fellatio be 
excluded because of its low-risk nature. He disputed the ordinance’s claims by professing 
that the spread of AIDS among gay men in the Twin Cities had “virtually stopped.” 
Health officials affirmed the opposite maintaining the continued threat of AIDS. By 
March of 1988, Minnesota had witnessed 332 cases of AIDS, half of which had resulted 
in death. The Minnesota Health Department predicted the state would experience 1,350 to 
1,850 cases by the end of 1990.72 
 Many gay men in the Twin Cities wrote letters to gay leaders and the gay press to 
express their opinions on the ordinance. In a letter to Brian Coyle, a local gay male 
resident defended the bathhouse as a safe space where men were more compelled to 
practice safer sex given the messages that circulated throughout the premises. The letter 
writer exclaimed that if the bathhouse were closed “many patrons may choose to take 
partners home, where the chances of transmission (anal intercourse in bed!) are 
greater!”73 Echoing these sentiments was one of the managers of the 315 Health Club, 
                                                                                                                                            
York, and San Francisco. Rob Hotakainen, “Law to reduce spread of AIDS passes hurdle,” Star Tribune, 
Mar. 22, 1988.; Rob Hotakainen, “State officials endorse Minneapolis plan to fight AIDS//Proposed 
ordinance seeks to curb ‘high-risk’ sex,” Star Tribune, Jan. 22, 1988. 
71 MAAA echoed Campbell’s characterization of the bathhouse ordinance as anti-gay. In a statement, 
MAAA pointed to “the homophobia implicit in ignoring heterosexual saunas” since “straights can spread 
AIDS too.” “Community Warning: Coyle Comes Out for Closing the Bathhouses,” Box 11, Folder: 
Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.; Tim Campbell, “Politicos eye 
“progressive measures” against commercial sites where AIDS could be spread,” GLC Voice, Sep. 8, 1987. 
72 Rob Hotakainen, “Law to reduce spread of AIDS passes hurdle,” Star Tribune, Mar. 22, 1988. 
73 In another letter to Coyle, a local gay male resident offered a materialist critique of the ordinance. He 
claimed that the ordinance unfairly targeted working-class gay men who could not afford to rent VHS 
copies of pornographic films and view them in private. The resident wrote, “If you’re rich (not you 
personally, of course) you just rent a movie to play on your sophisticated (expensive) equipment. If you’re 
poor and want to view an erotic movie you must go to a bookstore. To lean on bookstores, to make the 
experience less pleasant than it already is, affects only certain people. People who can’t afford much 
alternative.” The resident pointed out that the type of privacy the ordinance promoted was class restrictive 




Martin Kostrzab who believed that the more sexually active clientele of the bathhouse 
was more likely to follow safer sex practices at the premises than gay men who brought 
someone home from a bar once a month. This latter group of individuals, he argued, 
assumed there was less risk for transmission because of fewer contacts. Another manager 
of the 315 Health Club, Ron DeSilva, also reiterated that closing the bathhouse would 
have forced “sex out on the streets” where men could not be as easily reached.74 In a 
lengthy statement opposing efforts to close bathhouses, the executive committee of the 
Minnesota AIDS Project agreed with Silva.75 
 Although a majority of gay men in the Twin Cities opposed the ordinance, at least 
those who wrote letters to the gay press and to Coyle, a number of other gay men 
endorsed it. In the November 12, 1986, edition of Equal Time, editors published a letter 
from a Milwaukee gay man who claimed to have observed unsafe sex during a visit to a 
Minneapolis erotic bookstore. The gay man opened his letter by outlandishly reminding 
                                                                                                                                            
Coyle, suggesting that Coyle’s class positionality prevented him from understanding the experiences of 
working-class gay men who frequented the bathhouse or erotic bookstores. “Letters to Coyle Opposing 
Bathhouse Ordinance,” Jan. 21, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center.  
74 DeSilva argued that out in the parks or the bars, men would be confronted with a heightened risk for 
violence and where, under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, they could be less likely to practice safer 
sex. For these reasons, DeSilva defended the bathhouse as playing an important role in educating men on 
safer sex practices. DeSilva recognized that sex went on at the bathhouse. He told Equal Time, 
“Newspapers have been misleading in suggesting that you catch AIDS simply by having sex,” before 
adding, “We’re not going to stop people from having sex. You have to be a fool to think you can. But we 
can educate on how to have sex. Criticism has focused on bathhouses and it shouldn’t be.” 
75 The Minnesota AIDS Project statement on bathhouses was prompted by a bill passed by the U.S. House 
of Representatives authorizing the U.S. Surgeon General with the power to close massage parlors 
bathhouses. The House measure was tied to a $189.7 million appropriations bill for research and other 
activities. Eric Engstrom, executive director of MAP, called the move “grandstanding on the part of 
politicians” since the Surgeon General already possessed the power to act in a health emergency. The MAP 
statement on bathhouses read: “We look upon closing of the bathhouses as counterproductive. We look 
upon the bathhouses as a logic place to air some of our educational programs toward a group of sexually-
active individuals who otherwise might be difficult to reach. We strongly feel that the primary method for 
reduction of the spread of AIDS should be through an educational program. Methods that could lead to the 
education of the spread of AIDS need to be discussed.” J.C. Ritter, “Goal at 315 Health Club is building 
new social image,” Equal Time, Oct. 30, 1985. 
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readers of the severity of the disease: “This may come as a surprise to the people of 
Minneapolis, but there is an AIDS epidemic in this country” with “as many as 3,000,000 
people infected…including some in Minneapolis.” Despite the seriousness of the 
epidemic, the letter writer revealed that he witnessed “hordes of people still having sex 
with multiple partners in your bookstores…I noticed one young man who entered at least 
four cubicles to have sex with their occupants.” The letter writer then proceeded to post a 
number of rhetorical questions of gay men in Minneapolis: “Do the people of 
Minneapolis know that you can get AIDS from oral sex, as well as anal sex? Do the 
people of Minneapolis care enough about their fellow human beings to do the responsible 
thing and be tested for the AIDS virus? Why are some people so selfish and self-centered 
that they are unwilling to control their sexual habits?” The letter writer concluded his 
letter by demanding that “health officials in Minneapolis and elsewhere need to close 
down these sexual play pens as deadly health hazards.”76 
 In response, an employee from one of the erotic bookstores in Minneapolis wrote a 
letter to the gay man from Milwaukee. The employee opened his letter by pointing out 
that erotic bookstores also operated in Milwaukee; these were not particular to 
Minneapolis. Although the employee admitted that there were parts of his job he did not 
like (“I do see guys who come in and sleaze around and stay for hours”), he emphasized 
that these people were in the minority. The vast majority, he argued, were men who 
“come in, who ‘play around’ but have the brains to practice safe or at least semi-safe sex, 
using condoms and discretion and common sense.” The employee then proceeded to list 
the reasons why seemingly “normal” people visited erotic bookstores. The majority was 
                                                
76 “Letters: Visitor shocked by behavior,” Equal Time, Nov. 12, 1986. 
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“lonely and frustrated and scared. They are people who can’t find a partner.” Patrons 
watched movies or perused through magazines and left. According to the employee, 
“They don’t mess around with anyone; they’re too smart or too scared to do that.” 
Inasmuch as erotic bookstores provided patrons with “an alternative to loneliness or 
death,” these establishments were instrumental in the fight against HIV/AIDS. He added, 
“Today gay men have very few choices. If you’re lucky you find a steady partner. If you 
can’t, you practice safely with whomever.” According to this employee’s insight, only 
those who were single and lonely came to the bookstore, to release penned-up sexual 
tension. The employee defended bookstores, claiming that they were “the only alternative 
to safe partner sex. More people will be harmed by closing the bookstores than there will 
be in keeping them open.”77 Still, the employee ended his letter in a similar fashion to 
how the Milwaukee gay man ended his: by stigmatizing promiscuous gay men. 
“Meanwhile for the fools and sleaze puppies who are fucking their way to an early 
grave—stay the hell out of the bookstores and get your ass to one of the clinics. Then go 
home and stay there until you realize that your dick is attached to your brain.”78 In his 
defense of commercial sex establishments, the employee characterized erotic bookstores 
as safe alternatives for gay men who were unable to come into long-term, monogamous 
relationships. He did not consider whether patrons frequented these establishments for the 
mere purpose of sexual gratification, regardless of their relationship status. Failing to 
consider alternatives, the employee upheld long-term, monogamous relationships as the 
standard to which all gay men should aspire. The employee regarded domesticity and 
                                                
77 The employee also stressed that the bookstore carried “all gay monthlies,” which included the latest 
developments in AIDS research, and safer sex videos.  
78 “Letters: Another view on bookstores,” Equal Time, Nov. 26, 1986.  
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privacy as “cures” to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In fact, a number of gay men believed that 
legally recognizing same-sex couples would help reduce HIV/AIDS since gay men would 
be compelled to date, settle down, and marry. 
 Those gay men who believed a culture and politics of homonormativity immunized 
against HIV/AIDS sought to disaggregate sexuality from gay identity.79 In the December 
16, 1987 issue of Equal Time, editors published an op-ed from a gay male couple. 
Although the gay couple believed that the bathhouse ought to have been closed, they 
disagreed with Dick Brown’s “scapegoating” of gay men as somehow being “just plain 
responsible for the development of the disease.” For the gay couple, Brown’s accusations 
reduced “the identity of gay men to little more than homosexual animals in the minds of 
many.” This scapegoating, they pondered, reflected a pattern of “trash[ing] gays yet 
deny[ing] [them] legal recognition and societal support for maintaining healthy same-sex 
relationships.” The gay couple forged a connection between domestic partnerships and 
HIV-prevention efforts. They applauded that public health officials were “perhaps 
beginning to realize that encouraging stable or monogamous gay relationships is a 
significant aspect of AIDS prevention.” The gay couple insisted that homophobia, as 
                                                
79 Coyle received another letter of support for the bathhouse ordinance from a local gay male resident who 
suggested that gay men’s defense of the bathhouse was reflective of their sexual immaturity and 
unwillingness to form long-term, monogamous relationships. For this letter writer, the bathhouse was 
“destructive to the emotional and physical health of gay men long before AIDS.” He recounted his own 
experience visiting a bathhouse in the early 1970s, when he was “severely closeted and deeply involved in 
an anti-gay church.” Instead of affirming his same-sex desires, the bathhouse “served to reinforce [his] 
personal homophobia” because all he knew of “gay life” were the baths: “Men using each other like so 
many Kleenex—held close to your body and then tossed into the trash.” The letter writer likened 
bathhouses not as hallmarks of sexual liberation but as markers of gay men’s oppression by a “non-gay 
society” that denied them their “right to form lasting, mature relationships.” This society had “forced most 
gay men to be so deeply closeted, so afraid to be discovered, that the only way to express their sexuality 
was in the most anonymous and degrading manner, using each other like so much meat.”79 The notion of 
gay men’s sexual immaturity was important for those who favored the closing of the 315 Health Club. 
They believed that gay men defended the bathhouse because they were sexually immature, unable to form 
long-term, monogamous relationships. “Richard Notch Letter to Coyle,” Mar. 7, 1988, Box 11, Folder: 
Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
 
 340 
manifested in “discrimination, lack of civil rights protection, labeling sex and by 
inference gays as criminals,” had rendered AIDS a major epidemic with it now putting 
“the mainstream heterosexual population” at increasing risk. The solution to curbing 
AIDS, the gay couple concluded, consisted of conferring gay men and lesbians with 
access to domestic-partnership rights. They explained, “Gay and lesbian rights, and 
public health, are now inseparable. If society is to be healthy, respect for gays and 
lesbians and our equal rights must be affirmed. It’s the only course that works, for all.”80    
The conviction that closing bathhouses would encourage gay men to come into 
long-term, monogamous relationships proliferated among a number of white gay leaders 
and AIDS advocates throughout the country. Andy Humm, spokesperson for the 
Coalition of Lesbian and Gay Rights, used the controversy surrounding bathhouse 
closures to redirect attention towards the importance of domestic partner ordinances. If 
the government legally recognized same-sex relationships, Humm hypothesized, then gay 
men would be less likely to engage in casual anonymous sex. Critiquing New York 
Governor Andrew Cuomo’s guidelines on AIDS, Humm accused Cuomo of not “once 
mention[ing] the fact that we need to pass a comprehensive gay rights bill. In other 
words, if you’re going to solve this crisis, you need to embrace gay people as responsible 
citizens.” Humm proposed that passing domestic partner ordinances would provide gay 
men with an opportunity to be responsible citizens in the fight against AIDS. He 
prompted the state to “legalize relationships between gay people” since there “are gay 
people who would like to do that.” Humm argued that “the state would have an interest in 
encouraging that at this point” since “[o]bviously, more stable relationships are less likely 
                                                




to involve a transfer of whatever it is that causes AIDS.”81 Although Coyle initially 
opposed any efforts to regulate the bathhouse on the grounds that the establishment 
disseminated safer sex education, Hanson’s death, his diagnosis with HIV, and the 
publication of Randy Shilts’ And the Band Played On forced Coyle to reconsider his 
position in regards to the 315 Health Club.  
“I now favor closing the bathhouse.” 
 On February 9, 1988, the Gay and Lesbian Community Action Council 
(GLCAC), in cooperation with the Minnesota Alliance Against AIDS and the Gay and 
Lesbian Freedom Pac, convened a community forum titled, “Bathhouses, Sexual 
Freedom and the Law,” at the Hennepin County Government Center. GLCAC organized 
the forum in hopes of “providing balanced and responsible information about [the] very 
complex and controversial issue” of commercial sex establishments and AIDS.82 As 
expected, Brown spoke in support of the city’s health department-authored ordinance. In 
critiquing queer activists for defending the bathhouse, Brown declared, “What scares me 
more is the gay establishment, not the straight community.” Brown described the 
bathhouse as a place where “over 600 men per week” went to “look for a quick fix,” 
before adding, “If the bathhouse were closed, many men would be home.” But, the 
greatest surprise for many gay men in the audience that night came when Coyle came out 
in support of closing the bathhouse after reading Shilts’ book.  
                                                
81 “Health or Homophobia: Responses to the Bathhouse Guidelines,” New York Native, Nov. 11-17, 1985.  
82 In addition to Brown and Coyle, panelists included Eric Shambach of MAAA, Dr. Frank Rhame of the 
University of Minnesota’s HIV Clinic, and Carrie Orth of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union. “Gay and 
Lesbian Community Action Council’s Invitation to AIDS Forum,” Feb. 2, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse 
Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
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At the forum, comprised of about fifty white gay men, Coyle announced his 
support for the proposed anti-bathhouse ordinance. In his opening remarks, Coyle 
confessed, “I now favor closing the bathhouse.” He admitted that he had previously been 
a staunch supporter of the bathhouse on account that MAP distributed condoms there, the 
bathhouse’s management had closed the orgy room and removed the gloryholes, and 
“there was only one bathhouse in town, a few bookstores, and…these were not central to 
Minneapolis gay life.” Coyle admitted that he initially believed most gay men practiced 
safer sex there. He worried that if bathhouse patrons were forced into parks, beaches, and 
other isolated public settings, they would be at greater risk for violent assault. And, last, 
Coyle deduced that regulating the bathhouse would set a precedent for the continued 
regulation of gay male sexuality including the possibility of further intruding into the 
private bedroom. Despite all these reasons, Coyle declared that he changed his mind due 
to information he had received from local gay men and local medical professionals 
relating to unsafe sex practices occurring at the 315 Health Club. He insisted it was his 
“responsibility” to “speak the truth” as he saw it. 
 The “disturbing things” that changed Coyle’s position included that gay men who 
frequented the bathhouse and bookstores had confessed to him that “despite years of 
education, many are using the privacy of the booths and stalls to have high-risk sex.” He 
claimed that a majority of the calls and letters he received from local gay men supported 
city action regulating the bathhouse. Coyle also disclosed hearing stories of sexual 
addiction and lack of self-esteem. He called it a “tragedy” that gay men were supposedly 
unable to relate to others intimately except via anonymous sex in bookstores and 
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bathhouses.83 Coyle told the crowd that the local medical establishment had substantiated 
these concerns. At the forum, Coyle read a letter from a prominent gay physician, Dr. 
Scott Strickland from Park Nicollet Medical Center. Strickland admitted that although he 
too had previously opposed any regulation of commercial sex establishments, his 
professional involvement with patients who continued to be exposed to the virus at these 
facilities forced him to come out in support of regulation.84 In addition to Strickland, 
Coyle received letters from a number of mental health professionals in support of the 
ordinance on the grounds that commercial sex establishments enabled “sexual addiction” 
among gay men.85 One therapist, who worked with several gay men that struggled with 
“compulsive sexual behavior,” wrote that two of his clients had tested positive for HIV 
after frequenting the bathhouse and numerous erotic bookstores. He recounted that both 
his clients were “chemically dependent” and “both describe[d] a similar cyclical pattern 
which begins with loneliness, feelings of deprivation, and eventuates to drinking and 
dangerous sex at the business that profit from these abusive activities.” For that reason, 
                                                
83 John Ritter, “315 Health Club closes prior to ordinance,” Equal Time, Apr. 13, 1988. 
84 In the letter, Strickland wrote: “I have always been opposed to such an ordinance (regulating or closing 
bathhouses, saunas, and bookstores) in the past. Unfortunately, I am continuing to be involved with new 
HIV infected people who are being infected through contacts in these facilities. I am writing you this letter 
in qualified support for further regulation.” “Dr. Strickland’s Letter to Coyle,” Jan. 20, 1988, Box 11, 
Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
85 A psychologist revealed that a number of his patients continued to engage in “unsafe sex” despite being 
diagnosed with HIV. The psychologist wrote being “alarmed about the small number of gay men who are 
struggling with sexual addiction” yet “continue to have compulsive unsafe sex, even when they may be 
carrying the virus.” The ordinance, the psychologist argued, could deter such compulsive behavior. He 
concluded, “Although we cannot control their behavior, the ordinance could slow this behavior.” 
Meanwhile, a substance abuse counselor also penned a letter to Coyle expressing his support for Coyle’s 
stand against “book stores with peep holes.” The counselor openly questioned whether gay men could 
demand greater funding for HIV-prevention yet continue to support establishments that supposedly 
facilitated the transmission of the virus. The counselor wrote, “We don’t retain any credibility when we 
support the promiscuous places where AIDS is spread and yet cry ‘foul’ when the straight community 
won’t give more money for AIDS education, research, etc.” The counselor concluded his letter by warning 
of the dangers of gay men’s supposed unwillingness to regulate commercial sex establishments. He wrote, 
“Denial and the refusal of some gays to reasonably deal with the issues will not further gay rights.” “Olson 
Letter to Coyle,” Mar. 30, 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center.   
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the therapist expressed being “horrified” that “so-called [gay] leaders” had identified the 
bathhouse “a responsible community organization,” when “[n]othing could be further 
from the truth.” Although the therapist admitted that closing the bathhouse and regulating 
erotic bookstores was not a “magic bullet,” he hoped that the ordinance would send a 
“powerful signal about dangerous sexual practices and could be useful for gay men who 
are struggling to change their sexual behavior.”86  
 Some gay leaders who endorsed the bathhouse ordinance repeatedly insisted that 
it would help stem sexual addiction among gay men. Although it is quite possible that a 
number of gay men did experience the clinical symptoms associated with sexually 
compulsive behavior, the truth of the matter is that the way opponents of the bathhouse 
used “sexual addiction” here masked co-occurring social conditions that rendered some 
individuals at a higher risk for HIV/AIDS. For instance, in a letter to the public appearing 
in Equal Time, Stoney Bowden, a long-time gay activist and a member of the Minnesota 
AIDS Project board of directors, questioned the repeated usage of “sexual addiction” as 
justification for the bathhouse ordinance. Bowden interjected that although there are 
“clear definitions and criteria of any addiction,” having “sex more than three or four 
times a week with differing people or patronizing a bathhouse does not an addict make.” 
Bowden strove to differentiate between HIV-prevention campaigns that were sex-positive 
with “the neopuritanical antisex agenda for the 80s.” Central to differentiating between 
these two axes was refusing to label unpopular sexual practices “sexual addiction” merely 
because they involved casual anonymous partners.  
                                                
86 “Gregg Riley Letter to Brian Coyle,” Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The 
Minnesota History Center.  
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 The problem with using sexual addiction to make sense of why some gay men 
defended commercial sex establishments is that it reinforced racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene—domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability—as solutions to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Bowden outright questioned, “What do we say to our gay single 
men, get a lover or become a eunuch?” Bowden objected that “the notion that healthy sex 
is that which occurs in an emotionally meaningful relationship to the exclusion of 
recreation sex with different partners” was “a narrow value judgment” unsupported by 
mental health professionals or research. For Bowden, anonymous sex was not 
synonymous with unsafe sex or sexual addiction. He reiterated that “unsafe sex is not an 
issue of geography” or where it takes place since one “can have unsafe sex in their 
bedroom [with one partner] and safe sex in a bookstore cubicle” with anonymous 
partners or with several partners. What was desperately needed to combat AIDS, Bowden 
argued, was an awareness of co-factors that facilitated unsafe sex such as chemical 
dependency, depression, “true sexual addiction,” and a lack of funds for AIDS education 
and research.87 That is why, Bowden called for a citywide task force to study strategies 
for dealing with unsafe sexual behavior brought upon by chemical dependency. Coyle 
agreed to facilitate discussion into issues of mental health and chemical dependency 
among gay men, but he refused to back down from the ordinance.  
 Up to the bathhouse forum, Brown and Coyle had been at public odds with each 
other over the ordinance. At the forum, however, both men explicitly cited Randy Shilts’ 
And the Band Played On to demand that the bathhouse be closed. In his speech that night, 
Coyle encouraged those in attendance to read Shilts’ book so as to gain a different 
                                                
87 “Letters: Term “sexual addiction” should be used with care!” Equal Time, Apr. 27, 1988. 
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perspective on the bathhouse issue. Coyle asked of the audience, “How can Minnesota, 
which still has a relatively low rate of exposure to the AIDS virus (as did San Francisco 
initially) ignore the surveys that Shilts book presents?”88 That night, Coyle referenced a 
series of questionnaires from San Francisco that allegedly showed that although gay men 
knew of risk factors, 62 percent continued to engage in “high risk” sex. These 
questionnaires concluded that gay men who visited bathhouses were less likely to have 
altered their behavior.89 Throughout the night, Coyle referenced Shilts’ account of AIDS 
in San Francisco to warn of what could happen in Minneapolis if the bathhouse ordinance 
were not passed. In both cities, Coyle observed, “some brave individuals” asked, “what 
are we doing to ourselves” and decried “the commercialization of depersonalized sex.” 
Coyle added that these individuals in both cities courageously took on the baths as 
“Russian roulette parlors” and “dens for publicly licensed murder.” But, as Coyle 
interjected, “gay liberationists” accused these “brave” individuals of being “sexual 
Nazis” for trying to rid both cities of a culture of sexual freedom that had taken at least a 
decade to cultivate. In San Francisco, Coyle concluded, the outcome of these 
disagreements was well known. Citing Shilts, Coyle mentioned that “everybody agreed 
the baths should have been closed sooner, they agreed health education should have been 
more direct and more timely.” Nevertheless, Coyle shouted, “By the time everyone 
                                                
88 “Bathhouses, Sexual Freedom and the Law,” Jul. 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. 
Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.; Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, 
and the AIDS Epidemic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). 
89 Coyle stated a year after this questionnaire another survey showed that 68 percent of bathhouse patrons 
agreed they used “anonymous sex as a way of relieving tension.” Another 62 percent of bathhouse patrons, 
Coyle stated, agreed with the following statement: “Sometimes I get so frustrated that I have sex I know I 
shouldn’t be having.” Coyle added that San Francisco health officials found that 1 in 12 bathhouse patrons 
were already in the early stages of AIDS. According to these officials, any bathhouse patron having three 
contacts in one visit had a 25 percent probability of having sex with these bathhouse patrons already in the 
early stages of AIDS. “Bathhouses, Sexual Freedom and the Law,” Jul. 1988, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse 
Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
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agreed to all this…it was too late. Instead, people died. Tens of thousands of them.”90  
 Brown and Coyle were the only panelists at the community forum to speak in 
favor of the ordinance. Everyone else, including the audience, spoke against it, claiming 
that the ordinance was designed to oppress gay men. Eric Shambach of MAAA called the 
ordinance an example of “blatant bigotry.” Meanwhile, Carrie Orth, Director of the 
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, explained that the ordinance fell into a category the 
MCLU labeled “morally motivated private purpose” legislation since it was fueled by 
moral assumptions about proper sexuality. She also claimed that the ordinance violated 
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment. Robert Halfhill of MAAA, who 
characterized the ordinance as a “reflection of homophobia in the straight and gay 
community,” warned that if the bathhouse were closed, “gay men will resort to shrubs 
and trees for sex.”91 Halfhill recommended that the time had come to replace Coyle on 
the City Council since he was unwilling to listen to his gay constituents. 
                                                
90 In his speech, Coyle also paraphrased playwright and activist Larry Kramer. According to Coyle, Kramer 
long maintained, “gay men knew precisely what they needed to do…to avoid contracting the AIDS virus.” 
Thus, the problem was not whether gay men were aware of this information but rather what they chose to 
do with it. Coyle pleaded with those in attendance that they consider shifting their perspective on the issue 
by thinking about the innocent lives impacted by the irresponsibility of a few. “AIDS cannot be fought 
effectively if we continue to think in terms of the old days and ways or pit civil liberties vs. public health, 
human rights against human life. The U.S. Constitution might be construed to allow the right to commit 
suicide, but the ramifications of places like bathhouses and bookstores do not end with their patrons. These 
people go to other places, pick up and infect others. The Constitution does not grant the right to take other 
people with you.” Ibid.  
91 Halfhill told the audience at the community forum, “We’re going to have to face up to the fact that we’re 
going to have to change our representatives. Like suites of clothes, they may be OK when we first get them, 
but over time they wear out.” At the forum, MAAA presented a sample resolution to be introduced at 
precinct caucuses opposing the ordinance and “condemning” elected officials who supported the ordinance. 
The resolution read, “The probability of transmission of AIDS depends on the kind of sex engaged in and 
not the place where the sexual activity occurs, i.e. penetrative sex without a condom is dangerous even in a 
private home where as non-penetrative sex or penetrative sex with a condom is safe anywhere.” In a memo 
denouncing Coyle’s support for the closure of the 315 Health Club, MAAA stressed that the “gay 
community” would “not tolerate any such stand by our representatives and that such a position is 
incompatible with our continued support.” MAAA promised that any attempts to shutter the bathhouse 
would be resisted by any means whatsoever including demonstrations and civil disobedience.  John Ritter, 




The panelists pointed out that there was no concrete evidence confirming that the 
ordinance would reduce HIV transmission here or even that closing bathhouses in San 
Francisco reduced rates there.92 Campbell shot back at Coyle arguing that sexual 
behavior among gay men at the bathhouse had significantly changed with more men 
practicing safer sex.93 He referenced Minneapolis Health Department records indicating 
venereal disease tests administered at the bathhouse showed no cases of syphilis between 
January of 1985 and February of 1988, and only one case of gonorrhea in February of 
1986.94 Given these patterns, Campbell deduced that the spread of AIDS among gay men 
had come to a halt in Minneapolis. Minnesota epidemiologist, Mike Osterholm, who 
supported the bathhouse ordinance, countered that a decrease in STDs was irrelevant to 
the spread of HIV since most STDs were bacterial and HIV was a virus.95  
                                                                                                                                            
puts Coyle on spot,” Star Tribune, 1988.  
92 In addition to the panelists, a dozen or more audience members expressed their opposition to the 
ordinance during the night’s Q&A. A gay male audience member revealed that he visited the bathhouse 
because it offered a safe space away from anti-gay violence. Another gay male audience member 
commented that the “real problem of gays is the need for therapy in dealing with societal stigmatization and 
rejection” that led directly to “compulsive high risk sex.” Coyle admonished audience members stating “not 
everything is done to oppose gays.” For most gay men, the bathhouse ordinance was really about gay men’s 
right to express their sexually without state interference. MAAA was particularly concerned that the 
bathhouse ordinance would set a precedent where it would be easier to implement penalties against gay 
men for having sex with each other under the guise of HIV-prevention. Viewed in light of Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the bathhouse ordinance was but another policy aimed at curtailing gay men’s sexual freedoms. 
Ibid.  
93 See Woods and Binson for a literature review of research studies from the 1980s examining the 
relationship of AIDS and bathhouses. The overall consensus was that bathhouses likely did not contribute 
to the spread of HIV.   
94 Mike Jeffries, a safe sex educator for MAP assigned to bars, bookstores, and the bathhouse, agreed with 
Campbell’s assessment. Jeffries reported that gay men had made significant changes in their sexual 
practices, “There’s been a 180-degree turnaround in the level of protection used.” Jeffries cited surveys 
showing a high level of awareness among gay men, including many discontinuing anal intercourse, and 
most reporting using condoms. As evidence, Jeffries pointed to the drop in total gonorrhea found at the 315 
test site. There had not been a single case in the previous two years, compared to epidemic numbers in the 
late 1970s. John Ritter, “New ordinance may close bathhouse,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
95 Campbell saved his critique of Coyle for an op-ed appearing in the GLC Voice soon after the community 
forum. In the op-ed, Campbell lashed out against Coyle for pulling “the most clearly offensive stunt of his 
career.” According to Campbell, Coyle “deliberately and publicly stomped” on “strong, convincing, 
objective data from non-gay health officials” that suggested gay men had altered their sexual behaviors. 




Evident that night was that momentum against the 315 Health Club was spurred 
by Shilts’ much-publicized AIDS book and subsequent local visit. Prior to Coyle’s 
turnaround, Brown often cited Shilts’ authoritative account of the early history of the 
AIDS epidemic as a reason why the City of Minneapolis ought to have regulated its own 
commercial sex establishments. In response to a letter written by Engstrom defending 
MAP’s stance on bathhouses, Brown communicated that he was “STUNNED that gay 
leaders here in Minnesota have learned nothing from the holocaust in San Francisco 
where gay bathhouses served as the ‘amplification system’ for the spread of AIDS in that 
city.” Brown quoted Shilts who had written, “Bathhouses guaranteed the spread of AIDS 
among gay men…Common sense dictated that bathhouses be closed down. Common 
sense, however, rarely carried much weight in regards to AIDS policy.”96 One of the 
biggest takeaways from Shilts’ book is that bathhouses were the places in San Francisco 
where the disease was most easily spread in its early days.97 Shilts blamed the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in part on the culture of public sex to proliferate in the wake of gay liberation in 
the 1970s.  
 In November of 1987, as part of his 11th stop on a 17-city national promotional 
tour, Shilts sat down with the St. Paul Pioneer Press to discuss his book. Shilts, a feisty, 
                                                                                                                                            
proceeded to attribute Coyle’s motives behind the bathhouse closure as stemming from his “guilt ridden 
imagination.” He characterized Coyle as “a gay bearing false witness against gays to enhance his own 
imagined credibility with straights. It is lying. It is abuse of gay credentials. It is treason.” Campbell 
demanded that Coyle come forward with “specific verifiable data about transmission or to recant his false 
claims, quickly, completely, and publicly.” Tim Campbell, “Coyle should retract false witness,” GLC 
Voice, Feb. 15, 1988.; Louis Porter III, “Bathhouses proposal puts Coyle on spot,” Star Tribune,1988.; Tim 
Campbell, “Minneapolis discusses new laws supposedly for AIDS,” GLC Voice, Feb. 1, 1988. 
96 “Brown’s response to Engstrom,” Dec. 28, 1987, Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle 
Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
97 Even before the 1987 publication of And the Band Played On, Shilts had openly condemned bathhouses. 
For instance, in a 1984 essay for the New York Native, Shilts described bathhouses as “unprecedented in 
that they were businesses created solely for the purpose of quick multiple sexual acts, often accomplished 
without speaking so much as one word.” Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the 
Politics of Public Health (New York: Free Press, 1989), 29-30.  
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fast-talking 36-year-old who began covering gay health issues for the San Francisco 
Chronicle in 1981, insisted that equally significant to making the New York Times best-
seller list was that his book had prompted Coyle to endorse the closing of the 315 Health 
Club.98 In explaining his change of heart, Coyle confessed to the Pioneer Press, “The 
Shilts book has helped me reconsider whether I’ve been too soft and liberal about the 
bathhouse. If they can close it legally, they won’t get any fight from me.” Coyle 
elaborated that he changed his position because “I’ve been listening to my community” 
and realized that “the majority of gays” shared this position. Coyle added, “I believe there 
still are a significant percentage of my gay brothers having unsafe sex.” For Coyle, 
commercial sex establishments facilitated those unsafe sexual practices. “No other place 
(than the bathhouse or bookstores) can a person have unsafe sexual contact several times 
in one night. Seven years into this epidemic we cannot look the other way.”99 Shilts 
gloated that Coyle’s about-face on bathhouses was the type of direct and life-saving 
impact he had hoped for his epic AIDS history published in October of 1987.100 Shilts 
                                                
98 A native of Aurora, Illinois, Shilts was a self-described hippie who hitchhiked around the country before 
settling down for college at the liberal University of Oregon. It was there, during the peak of the gay 
liberation movement in the early 1970s that Shilts decided to open up about his homosexuality. Shilts told 
the Pioneer Press, “I didn’t want to live a terror-stricken life in the closet. It was not a political statement 
[coming out] for me, but asserting my dignity as a human being.” Since then, his journalistic and political 
interests reflected his sexuality. In the 1970s, Shilts worked for The Advocate, a national gay-oriented 
magazine, before being hired by the San Francisco Chronicle, after another gay reported who covered gay 
politics suffered a heart attack. The Chronicle was the only major metropolitan daily in America with a 
reporter assigned to a “gay beat.” It was then, in 1981, that doctors in San Francisco and New York City 
began to see mysterious cases of “gay cancer.” Shilts used his “first-hand knowledge of the drug parties 
and the all-night anonymous sexual orgies that marked fast-lane gay life” to identify Patient Zero. Shilts 
covered the AIDS epidemic in part because of his personal connection to the story. More than any other 
journalist at the time, Shilts had better sources to many of the people engaged in the fight against the 
epidemic. Jacqui Banaszynski, “Reporter calls account of AIDS a ‘mission’,” St. Paul Pioneer Press, Nov. 
10, 1987. 
99 John Ritter, “New ordinance may close bathhouse,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
100 Shilts’s reporting for the San Francisco Chronicle helped establish the national perception that San 
Francisco was at the center of the AIDS epidemic. Originally, Shilts had been hesitant of writing about the 
AIDS epidemic. According to Kinsella, the Harvey Milk Democratic Club encouraged Shilts to write about 




told the Pioneer Press: “I had a real mission to tell this story. I wanted to say, ‘Don’t 
make the same mistakes we did or you’ll be going to funerals every day.’”101 
One of the assertions that convinced Coyle to support the closing of the 315 
Health Club was Shilts’ contention that bathhouses were the major place in which the 
virus was spread among gay men.102 Central to this argument was Shilts’ skillfully-
framed suggestion that Gaetan Dugas, a dashing, vain, and unabashedly promiscuous 
French-Canadian flight attendant for Air Canada, was America’s very first person with 
AIDS. Identified as “Patient Zero,” Dugas was described as a “Typhoid Mary” who 
boasted more than 2,000 lifetime sex partners including 40 of the first 248 AIDS patients 
in America. Although Dugas died in March of 1984, Shilts scandalously revived him in 
his 1987 book. In spite of a lack of substantial proof, Shilts implied that Dugas was 
responsible for the entry of the virus into the United States and its subsequent spread 
from coast to coast. Since Dugas allegedly continued to patronize bathhouses despite 
being diagnosed with an infectious disease, Shilts emphasized that these establishments 
                                                                                                                                            
years, sexual liberation had been a mainstay of the club’s platform. By the 1980s, however, the club 
embraced Milk’s more “pragmatic” politics. The club summoned for gay men to abandon promiscuous, 
unsafe sex. Throughout 1983 and 1984, as Shilts incorporated the club’s plea in his journalism, Shilts 
purposefully tried to get his stories on the consequences of promiscuous sex to be published on Fridays, 
before gay men went out to the bars and bathhouses. Speaking about wanting to frighten gay men into 
avoiding unsafe sexual behavior, Shilts was reported as saying: “I wanted everyone to have the fear of God 
in them.” James Kinsella, Covering the Plague: AIDS and the American Media (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1989), 173. 
101 Shilts’ 600-page book was translated to an HBO film in 1993. The film adaptation garnered primarily 
favorable reviews from critics, winning a Primetime Emmy Award for Outstanding Made for Television 
Movie.  
102 By focusing on bathhouses and other venues of public sex, Shilts suggested that these were the primary 
sites of infection. Shilts’s emphasis on the geography of sex similarly discounted attention on how 
particular sexual practices—that is, what one did or did not do—contributed to transmission. Although 
bathhouses received the bulk of attention, a more overriding factor was anal intercourse without a 
prophylaxis. Closing the bathhouses, therefore, propagated a false sense of security for those gay men who 
prided themselves for not visiting commercial sex establishments.  
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provided Dugas with countless opportunities to spread HIV.103 Shilts prefaced his 
demonization of Dugas by underscoring that he was “no more representative of people 
with AIDS than Richard Speck [a serial killer] is representative of the typical male 
heterosexual.” He elaborated, “There are others who are infected and who behaved 
responsibly and heroically” (emphasis added).104 As he exploited Dugas, Shilts also used 
him to assert the moral superiority of those PWHAs who were “responsible” in their 
sexual practices.  
During his stop in the Twin Cities, Shilts credited Minnesota with being “an oasis 
of sanity in dealing with AIDS,” but he railed against the continued operation of the 315 
Health Club. He informed the local press, “In 1983, supporting the bathhouses was a 
measure of denial against AIDS. In 1987, it’s insanity and political cowardice.” Although 
Shilts applauded gay men in the Midwest for being more sexually conservative and 
credited this conservatism with protecting gay men in Minneapolis from HIV, he called 
for gay sexual freedoms to be cordoned off in order to halt the spread of the virus. By 
celebrating the alleged sexual conservatism of gay men in the Midwest, Shilts pointed to 
their supposed moral superiority. In so doing, he empowered a white liberal discourse of 
Minnesota Nice that posited Midwestern white gay men as rightful members of an 
imagined universal white family. Because bathhouses encouraged promiscuity, according 
to Shilts, they were sources of transmission and contagion that necessitated closure. 
                                                
103 Prior to the AIDS epidemic, Shilts had been a bathhouse regular and a heavy drinker. He had even 
worked in a Eugene, Oregon bathhouse during college. With the passing of his friend, AIDS activist Gary 
Walsh in February of 1984 due to AIDS-related complications, Shilts stopped drinking and entered 
recovery. Kinsella, Covering the Plague.   
104 Shilts said he first heard a reference to a flight attendant in 1982 in San Francisco in connection with a 
cluster study. Later, he heard references to him in New York City and eventually tracked down the 
steward’s name. Shilts placed ads in a gay weekly in Vancouver, where Dugas had lived, in an effort to 
speak to friends of his. Shilts received responses and eventually interviewed those who knew Dugas. 
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These establishments threatened to corrupt the racial affinities between white gay men 
and Middle America. Despite Shilts swaying Coyle, not all gay men welcomed Shilts’ 
conclusion.105 In the Twin Cities, Morris Floyd, a member of the Minnesota AIDS Task 
Force defended bathhouses as educational forums teaching gay and bisexual men about 
safer sex. Critics of Shilts argued that the book was outdated, biased, and did not apply to 
the AIDS epidemic in Minneapolis. They reiterated that closing the 315 Health Club 
would prove ineffective in reducing the transmission of HIV and, if anything, would 
actually constitute a major setback in the gay rights movement. They defended the 
continued operation of bathhouses as necessary since these public sex venues facilitated 
the dissemination of safer sex information not just to gay men, but to those who did not 
identify as “gay” and might not otherwise have been privy to preventive resources. By 
claiming that bathhouse closure would not reach closeted, bisexual white married men, 
those who opposed bathhouse closure called upon the protection of white women and 
children much like right-wing conservative interest groups. 
 Notwithstanding the critiques leveled against Shilts for his stance on bathhouses, 
Shilts was successful in rightfully critiquing the Reagan administration for failing to 
adequately finance AIDS research. Shilts’ book brought home the point that most of 
government, the medical establishment, and media had purposefully failed to act in the 
                                                
105 Among gay men in San Francisco, Shilts became a pariah. The response was quick and harsh from gay 
men who accused him of advancing his own career as journalist by criticizing gay sexual freedoms. He 
could not walk down Castro Street without being shouted at with “gay Uncle Tom” or “sexual fascist.” 
Shilts’s reporting provoked gay men who were already sensitive about their privacy. They feared his 
portrayal of “fast-lane gay lifestyles” would prompt a conservative backlash consisting of quarantines and 
other punitive measures that would push the gay movement “back into the closet.” Publisher and editor of 
the New York Native, an authoritative gay weekly, Charles L. Ortleb called portions of Shilts’ book “the 
biggest crock since Hitler’s diaries.” Jacqui Banaszynski, “Reporter calls account of AIDS a ‘mission’,” St. 
Paul Pioneer Press, Nov. 10, 1987.  
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early years of the epidemic when they should have aggressively combatted the disease.106 
He captured the government’s policy towards the HIV/AIDS epidemic as one defined by 
homophobic indifference and institutional neglect. As well researched as it was, however, 
Shilts’ book occasioned significant consequences for the sexual landscape of 
Minneapolis. Essentially, Shilts’ book and the arguments contained within it endorsed the 
blind implementation of the anti-bathhouse ordinance.  
The 315 Health Club.  
Although the ordinance purported to target all commercial sex establishments, the 
315 Health Club, as one of those supposed “hazardous sites,” was its main target. 
Opening in 1973, the 315 Health Club, or as it was previously known, the Locker Room, 
was a locus of gay male sexuality in the Upper Midwest.107 Located on the fringes of 
downtown Minneapolis in the warehouse district, the bathhouse featured a whirlpool, 
sauna, steam room, film screenings, lounge area, fifty-four sleeping rooms, and a free 
                                                
106 Shilts showed how government institutions failed to respond promptly and sensibly to the nation’s 
number one health crisis. Shilts reported that administration officials told health officials that they did not 
need emergency AIDS funding when work actually stopped due to a lack of resources. (In fact, through the 
Freedom of Information Act, Shilts uncovered that government officials responsible for the health and 
welfare of the nation had been lying to Congress that no increased funding was needed in the fight against 
the AIDS epidemic.) Shilts also held the mainstream press culpable for the spread of the virus. He 
suggested that the failure of the press to report on the epidemic made it possible for Reagan’s 
administration to get away without making budget line recommendations for AIDS research until 1984 and 
for Reagan to avoid giving his first speech devoted entirely to AIDS until 1987, six years into the epidemic, 
after 36,058 people had been infected, with 20,849 of those being fatalities. For Shilts, most gay leaders let 
their gay constituents down by failing to confront the necessity of risk reduction early in the epidemic. The 
heroes, for Shilts, included the San Francisco Chronicle, Larry Kramer, a few gay political aides in 
Washington, D.C., and a handful of researchers and public health officials. The book also received 
widespread praise for its extensive investigating. Shilts obtained information for the book by filing 
Freedom of Information Act requests. John Ritter, “Shilts says book designed to impact election year,” 
Equal Time, Apr. 27, 1988.; John Ritter, “Shilts chronicles AIDS history,” Equal Time, Dec. 16, 1987. 
107 Ron Pesis owned the 315 Health Club. The Pesis family had been involved in the bar business since the 
1950s, owning two other gay bars in downtown Minneapolis, the Saloon and Sutton’s. Pesis opened the 
315 Health Club as a development within Sutton’s. Since it proved so successful, he moved it to a former 
warehouse at 315 First Avenue. There, the bathhouse became “a constant war zone frequented by militant 




venereal disease clinic.108 During its heyday in the 1970s, on a good weekend about 700 
customers from all parts of the Upper Midwest—North and South Dakota, Minnesota, 
Iowa, and Wisconsin—convened at the 315 Health Club with peak hours being after the 
gay bars along Hennepin Ave. closed at 2am.109 Hennepin Avenue in downtown 
Minneapolis anchored a thriving sex economy with various commercial sex 
establishments catering to both heterosexual and homosexual clientele. Anchoring the 
gay district to the north was the 315 Health Club—its name change purported to make it 
more respectable and less conspicuous. A bathhouse patron recalled that before the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, the 315 Health Club was “an orgy—a feast of flesh.”110 In 1980, 
the GLC Voice described the 315 Health Club as “a clean, safe, and private place in 
which to have a sexual encounter with another man.” The newspaper described that the 
bathhouse proved appealing to patrons because it offered anonymity, privacy, and safety: 
“Many of the patrons live in situations where taking a partner home is not feasible. Many 
do not have cars and have difficulty traveling to scattered locations. Others live with their 
parents, in a college dormitory or with straights who would not be accepting of their 
gayness. All have to deal with the fear of being alone with a potential assailant if they go 
off anywhere in a car.”111 Although police raids against bathhouses greatly declined in 
the 1970s throughout the country, the 315 Health Club was constantly raided throughout 
                                                
108 On the third floor, there were 50 5’ by 6’ private rooms, each with a bed and a mirror extended the full 
length of the wall. Patrons, who had the option of paying the $10 annual membership, could rent the private 
rooms for up to eight hours for $10 to $12.  
109 The 315 Health Club was the last remaining bathhouse in town after Big Daddy’s, another bathhouse on 
Hennepin Ave., closed in 1982. The only other bathhouse in the metropolitan area was Vapor’s, a Turkish-
style steam bath in Andover, Minnesota, in operation since 1971. Cheryl Johnson, “Midst a row of 
junkyards, steam bath prospers,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jun. 25, 1987.  
110 Bill McAuliffe, “Pickets take their AIDS message to bathhouse,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Jun. 
13, 1987. 
111 Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves, 145.   
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its existence, finding itself caught between city officials intent on promoting family-
friendly establishments and white gay leaders who distanced themselves from cultures of 
public sex. With the advent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the push towards urban 
renewal by city officials, Hennepin Avenue experienced a significant decay as the hub of 
commercial sex in Minneapolis.  
 Those in positions of authority perceived the 315 Health Club as enabling an 
undesirable mix of illegal behavior, immorality, and urban blight. Police harassment of 
bathhouse patrons was so routine early on that management printed and distributed 
informational pamphlets for patrons to use in the case of a police raid. In June of 1979, 
the vice squad of the Minneapolis Police Department raided the Big Daddy’s Bathhouse 
and conducted two subsequent raids on the 315 Health Club. For the second time in less 
than three months, on February 10, 1980, the vice squad of the MPD raided the 315 
Health Club in what became known as the Great Raid.112 The raid is best remembered for 
the attempt of the vice squad to mount a 12-foot-replica of a penis confiscated as 
                                                
112 Led by Lt. Kenneth Tidgewell, the vice squad officers kicked in doors, tore paneling from the walls, and 
harassed patrons. Under the pretense of searching for juveniles suspected of prostitution, the vice squad 
officers confiscated confidential records from the venereal disease clinic that operated on the premises 
along with the club’s membership list and weekend receipts. The vast majority of the 125 men arrested 
received citations for participating in or operating in a “disorderly house.” Included among those ticketed 
was a member of the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Farmer Labor Party who planned to 
contest the citation: “I would hope that by contesting my ticket that other people might do the same. The 
only disorderly conduct that I witnessed was on the part of the police. They pushed people around, called 
people sissies and fairies, and elbowed their way around.” (Police reportedly threatened men with such 
statements as “I’ll break your balls and cut your dick off if you don’t come out of there.” According to 
eyewitness reports, the men were dragged from their rooms and beat before being arrested.) The day after 
the raid, eighty gay men attended the swearing-in of the new police chief, Anthony Bouza, to protest the 
vice squad raid. Tidgewell and the head of the vice squad were transferred to the robbery and organized 
crime unit. Bouza told the press that he wished for the vice squad to concentrate on “street conditions,” 
including prostitution, gambling, and drugs, rather than on “secluded” places such as bathhouses. Bouza 
confessed that although he was against bathhouses because they were “dirty and disgusting,” he felt the 
vice squad was merely “spinning wheels” concentrating on bathhouse raids, since these resulted in few, if 
any, prosecutions. Dan Daniel, “Second Bathhouse Raid in 3 Months Nets Over 100,” Gay Community 
News (Boston, MA), Mar. 1, 1980. 
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evidence on top a police wagon.113 Raids on commercial sex establishments in the Twin 
Cities persisted well into the mid-1980s. As a result, on February 19, 1985, Ferris 
Alexander, the owner of several Minneapolis erotic bookstores and X-rated theaters, in 
conjunction with Tim Campbell, filed suit in Hennepin County District Court against the 
City of Minneapolis for the alleged police harassment of patrons in violation of the First 
Amendment.114 Due to heavy political pressure, Minneapolis Police Chief Tony Bouza 
ordered vice squad officers to “radically deemphasize” patrols of erotic bookstores and 
X-rated theaters frequented by gay men.115 Given the rampant allegations of police 
harassment of gay customers at commercial sex establishments, the Minneapolis 
Commission on Civil Rights established the Task Force to Investigate the Decoy Unit of 
the Minneapolis Police Department.116 Referencing this history of police raids on 
commercial sex establishments in the Twin Cities, the Minnesota Alliance Against AIDS 
argued that any attempt to close the 315 Health Club as an HIV-prevention measure 
would prove “the culmination of these unprovoked attacks on us, attacks which involved 
many instances of police brutality, and would be the final kick in the face to the Gay 
                                                
113 As a result of these raids against bathhouses, the Minnesota Gay Defense Fund, Inc. was formed in 1981 
to defend those arrested. With a motto that read, “Defending gays arrested without cause,” the group was 
dedicated to helping defend and finance the legal fight of gay men arrested in bathhouse and bookstore 
raids. According to a press release, one of the overarching goals of the Minnesota Gay Defense Fund, Inc., 
was “to get Minneapolis’ indecent conduct law declared unconstitutional” since it was used to target gay 
men. “News Notes,” Gay Community News, Apr. 11, 1981.  
114 Campbell joined the suit because he claimed fear in patronizing the bookstores and theaters due to 
police harassment. The suit claimed that police decoy operations resulted in the false arrest of customers 
under the city’s indecent conduct ordinance. Alexander and Campbell sought an injunction to prevent 
police from making false arrests through enticement. Alexander and Campbell also asked that the suit be 
certified a class action lawsuit on behalf of all gay men in the Twin Cities. Mark Kasel, “Political leaders 
protest vice squad,” Equal Time, Mar. 6, 1985. 
115 Bouza explained to Equal Time, “I succumbed to pressure. I’m willing to admit that I’ve been slow to 
come around to this situation. I think what’s been going on has been more harm than good—people have 
been put through awful mills and lives have been hurt.” Ibid.  
116 The task force collected private testimony throughout the summer of 1985. “Public hearings called on 




Admittedly, the bathhouse faced insurmountable challenges to staying in 
business. Like most remaining bathhouses across the country, the business at 315 First 
Ave. N, had been steadily declining.118 In the wake of AIDS-related concerns, the party 
had all but died down despite disco music continuously playing throughout the mostly 
                                                
117 “Community Warning: Coyle Comes Out for Closing the Bathhouses,” Box 11, Folder: Bathhouse 
Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
118 The HIV/AIDS epidemic created an increasingly inhospitable business climate for commercial sex 
establishments. Beginning in 1984, as it was becoming apparent that HIV was sexually transmitted, 
attention shifted to the places where “high-risk” sex transpired. What went on behind closed doors and 
inside darks rooms at bathhouses came under increasing fire by some city and public health officials 
throughout the country who demanded that they be closed down as public health threats. They insisted that 
wide-open sexual activities practiced at bathhouses, including casual anonymous sex with multiple 
partners, fueled the spread of the virus. As the epicenters of the epidemic and as bastions of commercial sex 
establishments and public sex cultures, New York City and San Francisco were witness to the controversy 
surrounding bathhouses. In 1984, the San Francisco Health Department, with the backing of Mayor Dianne 
Feinstein and the San Francisco Police Department, spearheaded a campaign to shut down the city’s 
bathhouses and sex clubs in hopes of stopping the spread of AIDS by preventing men from engaging in 
“high risk” sexual behaviors. With the support of some gay leaders, Mervyn Silverman, the Director of 
Public Health for the San Francisco Health Department, ordered a ban on “high-risk” sex in the city’s gay 
bathhouses and sex clubs as an emergency measure to stop the spread of HIV. His order demanded that 
employee monitors observe the behavior of patrons and to “expel from the premises any and all patrons 
observed engaging in high risk sexual activity.” It also prohibited renting of private rooms in bathhouses so 
that sexual activity could be monitored. Some of the bathhouses tried to operate within the strict confines of 
the court order. Others felt they could not conduct business under the new rules and simply closed. New 
York City’s history of bathhouse closures is closely intertwined with that of San Francisco. Many of the 
same arguments were articulated in calling for the closure of the baths there. Although David Sencer, the 
city’s commissioner of health, remained firm in insisting that there was no compelling reason to close the 
bathhouses, Governor Mario Cuomo and the State Health Department moved independently to gather 
evidence of promiscuous activity in the baths and focused on the threat of HIV/AIDS to the wives and 
children of bisexual bathhouse patrons. On November 7, 1985, a court order mandated the closure of the 
Mineshaft, a cruisy gay men’s bar with a backroom. Soon after, the city closed down the famed St. Mark’s 
Baths, which had served the gay community for decades, citing health risks outlined by regulations issued 
by the New York State Public Health Council. Developed in response to the AIDS crisis, these regulations 
provided that no establishment would make its facilities available for the purpose of “high risk” sexual 
activities.; For an analysis of bathhouse closures in San Francisco and New York City, see: Allan Berubé, 
“History of Gay Bathhouses,” in Policing Public Sex: Queer Politics and the Future of AIDS Activism, eds. 
Dangerous Bedfellows (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1996).; William J. Woods and Diane Binson, 
Gay Bathhouses and Public Health Policy (New York: Harrington Park Press, 2003). For a history of gay 
bathhouses, see: David Serlin, “Bathhouses,” in The Encyclopedia of American Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
and Transgender History in America, ed. Marc Stein (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004).; George 
Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 
(New York: Basic Books, 1994).; Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the Politics 
of Public Health (New York: Free Press, 1989). 
 
 359 
empty club. A busy night yielded ten men or so.119 As a result of these challenges to 
staying in business, management at the 315 Health Club implemented a number of 
changes to ward off accusations of social irresponsibility. In an interview with Equal 
Time, Ron DeSilva, one of the managers of the 315 Health Club, commented that he 
hoped to change the “sleazy” image of bathhouses by providing a greater variety of 
services. DeSilva’s goal was to transform the 315 Health Club into a clean and enjoyable 
place to relax, exercise, and meet other gay men, “not just a place for sex” but “for 
socializing and meeting people…a place for gay men to gather, a place to relax.” DeSilva 
foresaw changing public perception of the bathhouse by remodeling the premises and 
adding a number of new services. Part of the plan entailed the recent opening of the 
“country’s biggest steam room.” With about 500 square feet, the steam room had a 
fountain, ample seating room, and a maze of passageways.120 Management also 
remodeled the television viewing area for “more comfortable seating and greater 
capacity.”121 Another improvement to the premises was the construction of a daylight-
moonlight lounge overlooking First Avenue. DeSilva indicated that this lounge was to 
provide patrons with the first natural lighting at the bathhouse, enabling customers to see 
weather changes outside and not feel “so underground.” Reflective of the fitness craze of 
the 1980s, DeSilva even hoped to bring a weight trainer. DeSilva’s plan to remodel the 
bathhouse illustrates the allegorical deployment of “cleanliness.” Because PWHAs were 
believed to have engaged in unsafe sex or IV-drug use, they were perceived as “dirty” 
and “contaminated.” And, since the bathhouse was associated with AIDS, DeSilva hoped 
                                                
119 Kate Parry, “Only gay bathhouse in Minneapolis shuts down,” Star Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988. 
120 The steam room, however, did not stay open for long. Management subsequently closed it down as an 
HIV-prevention effort. 
121 On weekends, films included such features as “Gone With The Wind,” instead of X-rated ones. 
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to sanitize its image by physically remodeling it and commercializing the services 
provided there.122 We, thus, witness how the bathhouse’s management mobilized 
architectural design to convey a sense of “moral cleanliness” among its patronage.  
Management downplayed the prevalence of sex on the premises in hopes of 
changing the public perception of the establishment. One of the managers, Martin 
Kostrzab, disputed accusations that the bathhouse’s steam room, sauna, and whirlpool 
were used for sex. Kostrzab, who referred to the bathhouse as a “private health club for 
gay men,” asserted that the bathhouse had “very specific rules and regulations regarding 
sexual activities in the public areas” of the bathhouse (Figure 4.5).123 What patrons did in 
the privacy of their rented room, however, was their business, or so Kostrzab argued. 
Although management recognized that “[i]nformation and condoms are the best weapons 
available” against AIDS, by downplaying the prevalence of sex on the premises, 
management inadvertently contributed to a culture of silence that worked against the 
safer sex goals of the establishment.124 Whether or not management truly believed that 
                                                
122 Despite DeSilva’s best efforts to improve the facilities and to transform the social atmosphere in the 
bathhouse to encourage safer sex practices among patrons, he was fired in late November of 1985, 
prompted by the opening and subsequent closing of an “orgy room.” After the management shakeup, the 
bathhouse remained with only 3 out of 13 employees after most of the crow was fired or walked out in 
protest. The new manager of the bathhouse, Rick Adams, told Equal Time that he did not “know anything 
about orgy rooms. As far as unlit places, this whole place is that way.” Adams acknowledged that the 
practice of handing out free condoms with towels had been temporarily discontinued but assured that free 
condoms were still available upon request. Adams explained, “Handing out rubber is promoting sex and a 
lot of people aren’t coming here for sex.” This decision was part of an effort to change the bathhouse’s 
reputation in light of the AIDS crisis. Adams charged that DeSilva was “fired or whatever” because “there 
was no change” at the bathhouse. Adams elaborated, “We’re changing. We’re phasing out queen disco and 
phasing in some country and jazz. We’re phasing out black paint and darkness. It’s a thing of the past. J.C. 
Ritter, “DeSilva fired from 315 health club,” Equal Time, Dec. 18, 1985. 
123 These regulations were implemented after the Vice Squad Unit of the Minneapolis Police Department 
ordered public sex rooms at the bathhouses removed in 1983. “Urgent! News Release,” Box 11, Folder: 
Bathhouse Ordinance, Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center. 
124 Kostrzab pointed out that more gay men frequented “adult bookstores, public rest rooms, Loring Park, 
and the river flats, all far less suitable locations for safer sexual encounters,” than frequented the 315 Health 
Club. Kostrzab professed that management and staff at the bathhouse were “very serious in our concerns 




sex was not the reason why patrons visited the bathhouse, what is certain is that 
management actively tried to encourage patrons to practice safer sex.  
By 1986, management shut down the “orgy rooms” to prevent group sex and 
boarded up the “gloryholes” to prevent anonymous sex. Management also distributed a 
free condom, paid in part by the Minnesota AIDS Project, with every towel to each 
patron.125 In fact, more condoms  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Martin Kostrzab, manager of the 315 Health Club, stands at the entrance to the 
bathhouse. Mark Brunswick, “Manager says bathhouse is misunderstood,” Star Tribune, 
Jun. 17, 1987. 
were distributed at the 315 Health Club, up to 600 per weekend in the winter of 1986, 
than at any other location.126 In a five-month period in late 1987, more than 16,000 
                                                                                                                                            
bathhouse offered “excellent health club facilities and vital educational and prevention services.” That men 
happened to have sex on the premises was not central the establishment’s identity. Kostrzab recognized that 
gay men, even in light of AIDS, would not stop expressing their sexuality. For that reason, the bathhouse 
offered “a vitally needed, safer environment for that expression of who we are.” John Ritter, “The 
bathhouse and AIDS question,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986.  
125 MAP worked closely with management of the bathhouse to disseminate information on HIV-prevention 
including offering the counseling services of a staff person for two nights a week. 
126 Because patrons were admitted into the establishment through the second floor—which was dark and 




condoms were distributed at the bathhouse, or an average of 2-3 condoms per 
customer.127 Management prominently plastered “safer sex” posters on its walls and 
made brochures readily available.128 Posters of muscular men in various stages of undress 
reminded patrons of the benefits of safer sex. A bathhouse patron commented that one 
could not turn a corner of the bathhouse without “seeing a poster that tells you to use a 
condom.”129 In addition to the wide-scale condom distribution campaign, management 
expanded free testing for venereal disease at its Body Shop Clinic from two nights a 
week to four.130 Management circulated warnings throughout the entire three-story 
“innocuous building.” Although on the first-floor, management posted hand-lettered 
warnings informing customers that parked cars near the bathhouse were being vandalized 
and cautioning customers against going home with strangers in light of the recent string 
of homicides against gay men, the overarching focus pertained to AIDS.131 Management 
responded to AIDS-related concerns with a spatial approach that assumed changes to the 
built environment would impart, or “fix,” behavioral changes upon gay men.  
                                                                                                                                            
filled with informational pamphlets on safer sex. The literature encouraged patrons to partake in safer sex 
acts considered less risky in transmitting the AIDS virus and it likewise reminded patrons that condoms 
were freely distributed. 
127 John Ritter, “New ordinance may close bathhouse,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
128 In addition to distributing informational pamphlets produced by various health departments, 
management handed out a newspaper and a wallet-sized card indicating AIDS hot line phone numbers.   
129 Martin Kostrzab, manager of the 315 Health Club, insisted that high-risk, unprotected sexual behaviors 
had been largely eliminated at the bathhouse and that condom usage among patrons was very high. He 
explained that the bathhouse ordinance “doesn’t take into account the fact that men who come here are very 
careful about their sexual behavior. I don’t know of anyone who doesn’t use a condom. Ninety-nine percent 
use a condom always. It’s only common sense. You have to be a raving idiot not to protect yourself.” John 
Ritter, “New ordinance may close bathhouse,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
130 The service, which was staffed by two nurses, was available to all patrons and to any other persons 
wishing to be admitted for testing. In an interview with Equal Time, Kostrzab celebrated, “Clinic records 
indicate a drastic reduction in the incidence of venereal disease. We attribute much of this reduction to our 
educational efforts and the resulting changes in sexual practices of our community.” John Ritter, “The 
bathhouse and AIDS question,” Equal Time, Dec. 17, 1986. 




Despite management’s best campaigning to promote the bathhouse as one of the 
strongest elements in the local fight against AIDS, business continued to decline at the 
bathhouse as concerns about AIDS intensified. The bathhouse quietly closed its doors on 
March 28, 1988, four days before the City Council was scheduled to vote on the 
ordinance that would have dramatically altered its operations and would have eventually 
forced it to close.132 In addition to dwindling clientele, the prospect of legally fighting the 
city over building regulations was a factor in closing the business. The owner of the 
bathhouse, Ron Pesis, a heterosexual male with a history of sex business involvement in 
Minneapolis, sold the building to BSR Properties. Given the bathhouse’s location in the 
“trendy redevelopment area” of the warehouse district, the property management planned 
on converting the building’s first floor into an upscale restaurant and the upper floors into 
studio lofts, which could be designed as working spaces, living spaces, or both.133 
Even with the closing of the 315 Health Club, the City Council proceeded with 
the anti-bathhouse ordinance.134 On April 1, 1988, the City Council of Minneapolis voted 
in favor of the bathhouse ordinance and with it outlawed heterosexual and homosexual 
sex outside the private bedroom. In a setback to his gay constituents, Coyle voted for the 
ordinance. On the eve of the vote, in an interview with the Star Tribune, Coyle 
                                                
132 “Deaths,” Equal Time, Oct. 12, 1988.  
133 “Restaurant may go into building that housed last gay bathhouse,” Star Tribune, Mar. 31, 1988; Kate 
Parry, “Only gay bathhouse in Minneapolis shuts down,” Star Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988. 
134 On March 21, 1988, the bathhouse ordinance won unanimous support from the City Council’s Public 
Health and Safety Committee. It then went to the full 13-member City Council for an April 1st vote. 
Despite the closing of the bathhouse, the City Council pressed on. Perhaps part of the reason the City 
Council carried on with its efforts is that the erotic bookstores and X-rated theaters remained in operation. 
Coyle acknowledged that though “unsafe anal penetration” took place in the bathhouse, lower-risk sex such 
as mutual masturbation and fellatio was more prominent in the bookstores and theaters. If the ordinance 
was truly designed to fight AIDS, as Hilary and Rainville professed, using it to regulate lower-risk sex in 
bookstores and theaters appeared illogical and ineffective. The inconsistence between purpose and action 
suggests that the ordinance was designed to fight much more than AIDS. Rob Hotakainen, “Coyle in 
dilemma on vote to curb high-risk sex,” Star Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988. 
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acknowledged that differing opinions should be expected among gay men.135 As the first 
openly gay City Council Member, Coyle might have felt pressure to vote according to the 
desires of most gay men. The problem was that there was not even a general consensus 
among gay men. Coyle attributed these differing opinions to the various stages of denial 
and fear in which gay men were caught, grappling with the AIDS epidemic and coming 
to terms with their same-sex desires. For Coyle, the bathhouse ordinance symbolized a 
step towards social acceptance for gay men and lesbians. Coyle boasted, “I have a lot of 
confidence that the gay community is out. It’s here to stay out,” before adding, “We’re 
maturing as a community. Our way of life is more at stake if we go on wearing blinders.” 
To Coyle, those who opposed the ordinance were oblivious to the teleological 
development of gay male subjectivity. For anti-bathhouse activists, like Coyle, sexual 
promiscuity was the result of arrested development. That is, these gay men were stuck in 
the first stages of grieving—emotionally unable or selfishly unwilling to give up casual 
anonymous sex. As such, they literally endangered the livelihood of the community by 
failing to mature away from the sexual excesses of steamy bathhouses and sweaty dance 
floors. That individuals could disagree with the ordinance because they simply enjoyed 
casual sex was something Coyle did not publicly consider. Likewise, Coyle and others 
overlooked the ramifications of the ordinance on those gay men without the race and 
class privilege to access the private sphere.136  
                                                
135 In that same interview, Coyle, who unbeknownst to the public was HIV-positive, confessed to the Star 
Tribune the emotional toll the looming vote was inflicting on him: “For me, this is not easy. I have some 
people who won’t speak to me. This is one of the tougher issues because it’s so emotionally laden and 
passionate. It deals with the stuff of life and death…I’ve been taking flak for it for months.” Rob 
Hotakainen, “Coyle in dilemma on vote to curb high-risk sex,” Star Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988. 
136 Coyle was not the only one who paid attention to the internal disagreements among gay men in the Twin 
Cities. Rainville believed the ordinance would pass, in large part, due to “the clear and broad rift in the gay 




In that same interview with the Star Tribune, Coyle chided opponents of the 
ordinance, “Wake up. The ‘70s are over. Unlimited anonymous sex was never all that big 
in Minneapolis, but its days are over.” Coyle’s words strategically distanced the local gay 
community in Minneapolis from those in the gay meccas of New York City and San 
Francisco. He differentiated, “Unlike San Francisco, Minneapolis has never been terribly 
dependent on these practices.” Coyle called upon geographic dualisms to define and 
imagine the Midwest as separate from urban locales on the East and West Coasts—not 
just physically, but morally. Coyle re-appropriated a trope that had been previously 
employed to cast gay men in the Upper Midwest as provincial to re-assert the moral 
superiority of local white gay men as more mature and more responsible.137 Coyle 
believed that gay men in the Twin Cities were more sexually responsible. He then used 
this so-called sexual responsibility to assert the moral superiority of gay men in the Twin 
Cities vis-à-vis the sexual irresponsibility of cosmopolitan gay men.  
In response to Coyle’s vote for the ordinance, a number of his gay constituents 
conveyed a sense of betrayal.138 In a letter to Coyle appearing in Equal Time, a local gay 
                                                                                                                                            
the City Council could only take action with a split or disagreement. It was this precise turn of events that 
assured Rainville the ordinance would pass. Rob Hotakainen, “Coyle in dilemma on vote to curb high-risk 
sex,” Star Tribune, Mar. 30, 1988. 
137 Interestingly enough, Kostrzab, who defended the bathhouse in the fight against AIDS, similarly argued 
that the comparison between San Francisco and Minneapolis in regards to attitudes about sex was incorrect. 
He argued that only a small percentage of gay men in the Twin Cities accessed the bathhouse, compared to 
the heavy foot traffic of bathhouses in San Francisco before health officials shuttered these establishments. 
He explained, “In San Francisco, sexual encounters were casualized like eating lunch. We’ve never had 
that. This is the Midwest. We’ve never had that kind of open sexual behavior.” John Ritter, “New 
ordinance may close bathhouse,” Equal Time, Jan. 20, 1988. 
138 Campbell, Alexander, and a third man identified as “John Doe” challenged the anti-bathhouse ordinance 
as an unconstitutional infringement of their First Amendment rights. On March 2, 1990, the Eight U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Minneapolis officials could force commercial sex establishments to 
remove doors from booths where sexually explicit movies and live entertainment were viewed, as part of an 
effort to halt the spread of AIDS. The three-judge Circuit Court agreed with a District Court that ruled that 
the ordinance furthered a legitimate city interest in halting the spread of AIDS, and placed reasonable limits 




male resident compared Coyle’s endorsement of the bathhouse ordinance to Judas’s 
betrayal of Jesus. The letter read, “We of the gay community know how Jesus felt when 
his ‘friend’ let him down, as you have done with us. He sold out for thirty pieces of 
silver. How many straight votes have you sold us out for?”139 The letter writer reiterated 
what others had argued, that those who had unsafe sex in the bathhouse would still do so 
outside the bathhouse. He also drew attention to “not HOW many sex partners people 
have, but what they DO with those partners that counts.” The letter writer likened the 
bathhouse ordinance as the latest attempt to regulate gay male sexuality: “No one’s going 
to stop us from having sex. That’s been tried and has failed for two thousand years. All 
you have done with Friday’s vote is to throw us into highly dangerous circumstances 
engendering queer-bashing and police harassment.” The letter writer vowed to actively 
work for Coyle’s defeat in the next election. He concluded, “In your place, perhaps we 
can find a straight who’ll sell out to us for some gay votes.”140 
Conclusion.  
Key to Coyle’s endorsement of the bathhouse ordinance was Shilts’ assertion that 
Patient Zero—Gaetan Dugas, an allegedly promiscuous flight attendant from Canada—
was America’s first person diagnosed with HIV who then went on to infect men from 
coast to coast in bathhouses. The story of Dugas was sensational if not outright wrong. 
                                                                                                                                            
the city’s ban on booth doors fulfilled a legitimate purpose and did not, in fact, deprive booth owners or 
users of their rights. Writing for the Circuit Court’s decision, Judge John Gibson declared: “We are 
satisfied that the city’s interests in public health, specifically fighting the spread of the AIDS virus, would 
not be achieved as effectively without this ordinance.” Gibson added, “Alexander can provide, and 
Campbell and Doe can watch, except in closed booths, videos or live dancing whenever and wherever they 
desire.” Gibson also pointed out that although Alexander had “a First Amendment right to display his 
videos and dancers,” he did not have “a guaranteed right to make a profit.” Paul Gustafson, “Circuit Court 
upholds ban on doors in sex-oriented bookstore booths,” Star Tribune, Mar. 3, 1990. 
139 “Letters: April Fool’s Day and the bathhouse,” Equal Time, April 13, 1988. 
140 Ibid.  
 
 367 
Since there were various ports of entry for the virus to the United States, it is not accurate 
to ascribe responsibility onto a single person. Moreover, researchers have identified the 
virus in the country in blood samples as early as 1969.141 In his history of gay male flight 
attendants, Plane Queer, historian Phil Tiemeyer confirms long-standing assertions by 
scholars and AIDS advocates that Dugas was not the first American with AIDS. In an 
interview with Tiemeyer, Michael Denneny, Shilts’s editor, confirmed that Shilts 
manipulated the Patient Zero narrative to garner media publicity for the book and to save 
it from obscurity.142 The ensuing media circus was tremendous. As Dugas became 
headline news across the Western world, Shilts became a celebrity and earned upwards of 
one million dollars. Although Shilts was provided with numerous opportunities in news 
interviews to downplay the veracity of the claim that Dugas was Patient Zero, he 
reinforced the salacious details surrounding Patient Zero.143  
                                                
141 Donald G. McNeil, Jr, “HIV Arrived in the U.S. Long Before ‘Patient Zero’,” The New York Times, Oct. 
26, 2016.  
142 Shilts had shopped the book at several publishers only to be rejected. Even when he secured a publisher, 
media outlets refused to publicize or review the book. Publishing a book on AIDS in the mid-1980s that 
openly denounced the Reagan administration was not only an unpopular endeavor but also an unprofitable 
feat. Denneny, hence, believed that without the media attention devoted to Dugas, the book would have 
been a failure. As a favor, a friend of Denneny’s in the publishing industry agreed to read the manuscript 
over a summer weekend to offer his advice on how to best promote the book. Denneny’s friend encouraged 
Denneny to promote the book by appealing to reporters’ worst sensibilities through the Patient Zero 
narrative. Denneny had to convince Shilts that promoting the book via the Patient Zero angle was the 
appropriate course of action. Eventually, Shilts agreed and with this decision the Patient Zero narrative 
provided Shilts with a national and international media platform to chastise the Reagan administration. Phil 
Tiemeyer, Plane Queer: Labor, Sexuality, and AIDS in the History of Male Flight Attendants (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2013).  
143 The scientific evidence to confirm the claim that Dugas was America’s first person diagnosed with 
AIDS did not exist. As a result, Shilts resorted to “artful writing and outright misrepresentations.” To 
bolster his claim, Shilts heavily relied upon a cluster study conducted by the CDC. In the study, Dugas was 
designed the index case with an “0.” Researchers selected one person as the index case to show the 
importance of sexual connections between men diagnosed with AIDS. As the arbitrary hub of the study, 
Dugas’ sexual activity, therefore, stood at the center of the study. However, researchers could have very 
well gone with another man as the index case and, in turn, his sexual activity would have been central to 
the study. Although the evidence confirming Dugas as America’s first case of AIDS was clearly lacking, 
what was not lacking was evidence of Dugas’ plentiful sex life and his unwillingness to alter his behavior 
even after his diagnosis. Shilts’s analysis, therefore, supported what the CDC had already claimed that 




 The political consequences of Denneny and Shilts’s decision to exploit Dugas as 
Patient Zero were substantial. Ironically enough, as white gay leaders worked to overturn 
public perception that gay male sexuality was compulsive, deadly, and immoral in hopes 
of supporting prevention, research, and health care for PWHAs, Shilts’s book 
inadvertently confirmed for much of the American public that AIDS was a disease born 
of gay immorality, not institutional neglect. Tiemeyer explains, “Shilts’s account of 
Patient Zero reinforced for the public that men who engaged in anal sex and cavorted in 
bathhouses not only were immortal but also invited plague-like diseases on themselves 
and the rest of society.” According to Tiemeyer, Shilts presented social conservatives 
with the ultimate political gift: “a revolting story of a beautiful, promiscuous, foreign, gay 
male flight attendant so hedonistic that he introduced a killer [African] virus into North 
America and then recklessly spread it from coast to coast” including the American 
heartland. The ease with which the myth of Patient Zero became the origins story of 
AIDS in America underscores society’s deep unease with the post-Stonewall sexual 
freedoms of gay men. The public opprobrium against gay promiscuity that Shilts’s book 
aroused was materially consequential as witnessed in the passage of laws and restrictions 
designed to curtail the movement of PWHAs, especially those against sex workers of 
color, like those I discuss in chapter three.144 Moreover, as a foreigner, Dugas symbolized 
                                                                                                                                            
Although Shilts never outright claims that Dugas was the first, through “the omission of key facts, 
misconstrual of CDC data, and colorful embellishments,” he leads the reader to think this to be the case. 
Shilts openly referred to Dugas as “the Quebecois version of Typhoid Mary.” According to Tiemeyer, by 
embracing her legacy as that of Dugas, Shilts implied that Dugas played a similar role, that he was a 
foreigner who brought an African disease to the United States before spreading it from coast to coast. Ibid., 
174.  
144 As a result of Shilts’s Patient Zero narrative, conservatives used AIDS as a barrier against gay civil 
rights. The release of And the Band Played On coincided with an intensified outbreak in America’s cultural 
battle over AIDS. In an effort to eliminate PWHAs from the public sphere, conservatives enacted de facto 




all immigrants who deserved to be denied entry into the United States. Thus, Patient Zero 
provided Shilts and white gay leaders with a foil—a foreign one at that— on whom they 
could assert their morality and respectability. 
 The anti-bathhouse ordinance in Minneapolis epitomizes the complex nature of 
the relationship between commercial sex establishments and the state. Although at times 
police departments tolerated gay bathhouses as pragmatic solutions to the problem of 
controlling sex in public places, by the 1980s gay bathhouses once again entered the 
watchful eye of governmental institutions. In the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
attacks on gay bathhouses made use of the rhetoric of sin, disease, and crime to justify the 
banishment of homosexuality away from the public’s eye. The state’s regulation of gay 
bathhouses showcases the state’s prerogative in establishing the parameters of private and 
public spheres. Because sodomy remained illegal throughout the country in the 1980s, it 
was not entitled to the same protections afforded to heterosexual relations. Sodomy and 
other so-called acts against nature, therefore, were public and, by extension, vulnerable to 
the regulation of city agencies. At face value, it may appear as though the goals of these 
urban campaigns against commercial sex establishments were largely to protect public 
morals, health, and safety. However, the anti-bathhouse ordinance in Minneapolis also 
confirms that city governments used the panic associated with the HIV/AIDS epidemic to 
pass laws designed to curtail public sexual cultures and boost private real estate 
investment, a point I turn to in the next chapter.  
                                                                                                                                            
Sen. Jesse Helms forbidding immigrants with HIV from seeking citizenship. At the same time, several 
states implemented legislation to jail those with HIV/AIDS who purposely spread the disease, as I discuss 
in chapter three. Other states passed laws authorizing medical quarantines for “non-compliant” AIDS 
carriers. Weeks after the release of Shilts’s book, Helms and Congressman William Dannemeyer, a 
conservative Republican, sponsored a new law designed to cut off federal funding to AIDS groups whose 
materials openly promoted homosexuality. According to Tiemeyer, “The law’s passage marked for the first 
time that AIDS policy had been used as a punitive tool against homosexuality itself.” Ibid., 169.  
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 The anti-bathhouse ordinance in Minneapolis and the crackdown on commercial 
sex establishments across the United States in wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic reiterates 
the crucial role that racialized norms of sexual hygiene play in marginalized communities 
petitioning the state for social membership. White gay leaders emphasized their 
adherence to norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space so as to vouch for the moral 
fitness of gay men for citizenship.  This process of relational valuing made use of 
racialized sexuality and public cultures but only as the antithesis of a bourgeoning racial 
formation of homonormativity anchored in private property. In the next chapter, I 
continue my analysis of the spatial regulation of gay male sexuality by looking at a 
proposed anti-cruising sex law in Minneapolis designed to limit public sexual cultures. 
Whereas the anti-bathhouse ordinance delimited the physical spaces where gay men 
could congregate for public sex, the anti-cruising ordinance instituted an apparatus of 
neighborhood surveillance that used a discourse of “safety” to sanitize the public sphere 




Cruising the Neoliberal Terrain: AIDS Evictions, Gay Gentrification, and Domestic 
Partnerships 
Introduction.   
By 1989, the City Council of Minneapolis had, under the guise of HIV-
prevention, aired out the sweaty steam from the city’s bathhouse and nearly forced the 
city’s erotic bookstores and X-rated theaters out of business. Gay leaders believed that 
closing and/or regulating commercial sex establishments would further compel gay men 
into long-term, monogamous relationships, which they heralded as another safety 
mechanism in the fight against both HIV/AIDS and anti-gay hate violence. However, in 
promoting homonormativity as a cure for these public social ills, leaders endorsed the 
criminalization of public sexual cultures all the while priming blighted urban spaces for 
redevelopment. As the centerpiece of public sexual cultures in Minneapolis, Loring Park 
was targeted for regulation.   
Large public parks, like Loring Park, became popular sites for cruising for sex 
among men after World War II. At the height of gay liberation in the 1970s, cruising for 
sex in public fulfilled a number of libidinal and social needs. To ensure the anonymity of 
participants, cruising—the walking or driving about a location in search of an 
anonymous, casual, and one-time sex partner—often occurs under the cover of darkness. 
Public parks became particularly appealing to heterosexual-identified men since these 
venues were often located on the urban fringes away from home. And, unlike bathhouses, 
public parks did not require the collection of patrons’ personal information. In 
Minneapolis, Loring Park became the epicenter of Minneapolis’s gay residential 
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community immediately following the destruction of the Gateway District in the 1960s, 
the city’s then-red light district located just north of downtown along the Mississippi 
River.1 The neighborhood became popular among gay men due to its abundant cruising 
areas in the park, its close proximity to the city’s gay bars in downtown Minneapolis, and 
its affordable housing.2 The park itself became a hub of male sexual activity given its 
geographic centrality, the darkness of its pathways, and the lush foliage that contributed 
to its anonymity. These very same factors that made Loring Park appealing to men 
searching for casual sex, nonetheless, also made it dangerous. As I discuss in chapter two, 
a number of gay men killed in the 1980s met their assailants at the park and police often 
cracked down on public sex there through entrapment techniques.  
The status of Loring Park as the city’s “gayborhood” was short-lived. It too 
suffered a similar fate to the Gateway District. As Loring Park underwent large 
demolition projects, it transformed into an upscale address that witnessed the decimation 
of gay public spaces. From 1977 to 1980, large sections of the neighborhood were 
bulldozed to make way for the campus of the Minneapolis Community and Technical 
College, the Loring Greenway, and Interstate-94.3 As a result of this urban renewal, 
community centers, restaurants, bookstores, coffeehouses, and political collectives that 
once provided services to gay men and lesbians in Loring Park vanished. In turn, the 
demise of Loring Park’s gay public spaces, in general, and its public sexual cultures, in 
                                                
1 The 315 Health Club anchored the city’s gay district to the north while Loring Park anchored it to the 
south.  
2 Stewart Van Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves: A History of Queer Minnesota (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2012), 233.  
3 The Loring Greenway is a landscaped pedestrian walkway used by thousands of people every day as they 
commute between Minneapolis’s downtown and the residential areas surrounding Loring Park.  
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particular, bolstered gay domestic arrangements.4 The project of urban renewal, through 
the decimation of gay public spaces in Loring Park, played an active role in pushing 
white gay men into domestic arrangements and, by extension, rendering “private” gay 
male sexuality. This process, I show, was not only dependent upon the demonization of 
public sexual cultures but hinged on subjecting racialized sexuality to further state 
surveillance. 
In this chapter, I first discuss a proposed anti-cruising ordinance designed to crack 
down on public sexual cultures in and around Loring Park. I focus on how some white 
gay residents of Loring Park endorsed the ordinance as a vehicle towards gentrification 
and sexual normativity. AIDS moral panic afforded white gay leaders with a conduit 
through which they could push for the eradication of public sexual cultures and the 
spaces that incubated such practices. On the other end, queer activists mobilized against 
the ordinance by tying the crackdown on public sexual cultures to mounting moral and 
economic conservatism. Next, I discuss how gay leaders introduced a domestic-partners’ 
ordinance to symbolically legislate the civic inclusion of white, middle-class same-sex 
households. I emphasize that leaders mounted the legislative proposal to disperse 
citizenship rights, benefits, and protections for white, middle-class same-sex households 
in relation to the curtailment of public sexual cultures. This strategy, I argue, facilitated 
the gentrification of urban spaces by treating domestic space as the locus of gay male 
demands on the state for citizenship. I finish this chapter by underscoring the spatiality of 
homonormativity vis-à-vis urban renewal practices and AIDS evictions.  
                                                
4 As I discuss in the conclusion to this dissertation, the first-ring suburbs of Minneapolis, in particular 
Golden Valley, became ideal choices, in the 1990s, for gay men and lesbians comprising the middle- and 




Because the policies and practices associated with gentrification were so central 
to the eradication of public sexual cultures, white gay leaders embraced the notion that 
the gentrification of popular cruising zones would curtail rates of HIV transmission. 
According to this logic, the more gentrified a neighborhood, the safer it became in terms 
of AIDS. City officials with their own global cityhood aspirations favored this approach 
since they were able to hide behind the veneer of public health all the while issuing 
mandates that criminalized identities and practices unsavory to capital accumulation and 
anathema to domestic bliss. With the mantle of public health in tow, city officials faced 
little if any opposition, except from an unruly group of socially-frowned upon queer 
activists whom other white gay leaders simply discarded as being unwilling to give up the 
immaturity of casual sex with anonymous partners. 
Anti-Cruising Ordinance.  
 In the middle of a tough re-election campaign in 1989, Barbara Carlson, a City 
Council Member, proposed an ordinance meant to end late-night traffic around Loring 
Park by authorizing law enforcement agencies with the power to crack down on public 
sex acts.5 In cold northern climates like Minnesota, automobile cruising is a popular 
public sexual practice. Under Carlson’s proposed ordinance, the City Council of 
Minneapolis would have been allowed to establish “no-cruising” zones. The ordinance 
also allowed police to stop motorists who drove through a control point twice and present 
them a verbal warning. On the third pass, an officer would have issued a citation with a 
                                                
5 The GLC Voice suggested that Carlson’s anti-cruising ordinance may have been strategic in light that 
many gay men and lesbians favored another candidate for Carlson’s 7th Ward seat, in a hotly contested 
council race. The 7th Ward stretched from Lake Calhoun through Kenwood and Loring Park to include 
downtown Minneapolis. Many gay male residents lived within its borders.   
 
 375 
fine up to $200 and/or arrested the driver.6 Carlson claimed to have been responding to 
complaints from her constituents who reported that late night cruising by men searching 
for male prostitutes disturbed the neighborhood, generated criminal activity, and 
damaged the area’s reputation. Adamant that the anti-cruising ordinance was not 
targeting gay men, Carlson underscored that the ordinance was intended to preserve the 
neighborhood’s public safety. The ordinance, nevertheless, made no distinction between 
cruising among gay men where no money was exchanged and gay prostitution where 
money was exchanged.7 All manifestations of gay male sexuality in public were, thus, 
cast with a suspicious eye and open to police intervention. To that extent, the anti-
cruising ordinance tailored the physical landscape of Loring Park to the cultural values of 
racialized norms of sexual hygiene—domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability—
which, in turn, were central to the proliferation of gentrification schemes.  
At a neighborhood meeting on September 14, 1989, a boisterous crowd of more 
than one hundred heard and expressed opinions about the ordinance. Supporters of the 
ordinance—a number of white gay male residents— insisted that the problem was not 
sexual orientation, but rather “quality of life.”8 A gay male resident of Loring Park 
                                                
6 Carlson modeled the anti-cruising ordinance after a similar one passed in Anoka, Minnesota, to stop 
cruising by teenage drivers during certain nighttime hours. The law provided a model for arresting someone 
who had driven three times past a watch point in a redlined area. David Anger, “Carlson targets Loring 
cruising after complaints,” Equal Time, Sep. 13, 1989. 
7 Although the ordinance was aimed at curbing “male prostitution” in the Loring Park area, the Star 
Tribune reported that the ordinance could also have been used to crack down on female prostitution and 
drug trafficking anywhere in the city. Neal Gendler, “Cruising law gets mixed reviews,” Star Tribune, Sep. 
15, 1989. 
8 The meeting was attended by “two reporters, two police officers, men, women, whites, blacks, gays, 
straights, young, elderly, the dapper, the disheveled.” Peter Ginder, representative from the city attorney’s 
office, opened the meeting by discussing the definition of “cruising” as outlined by the ordinance: 
“Cruising is the operation of a motor vehicle which passes the traffic control point three or more times 
between the hours of 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. in a no cruising zone.” The ordinance did provide exemptions, 
although these did not apply to residents. The ordinance did not apply to “taxicabs, buses, authorized 




asserted that his own sexual orientation was irrelevant. What mattered, he claimed, was 
that as a resident of Loring Park he had the right to be free from “dangerous” people in 
doorways and from all-night noise, including “Madonna blasting from car radios.”9 
Although supporters of the ordinance deemed it a legitimate effort to provide relief to a 
frustrated neighborhood, opponents protested that the ordinance amounted to nothing but 
a homophobic overreaction that infringed on people’s right to free movement.  
At the meeting, opponents peppered the night with shouts of “Move to the 
suburbs.”10 They openly questioned the protocol through which police would determine 
who was and was not a resident of Loring Park. In response, an officer from the 
Minneapolis Police Department’s SAFE (Safety is for Everyone) unit assured the 
audience, “The police are not out to get the residents. Prostitutes and people cruising do 
not live in the area.” After some in the crowd became upset that they might have been 
forced to prove they lived in the neighborhood, the officer assured the crowd that officers 
working in the area tended to know who lived there, and that the ordinance would not be 
applied every night; occasional enforcement would have delivered the message. This 
exchange between supporters and opponents to the ordinance emblematizes the 
                                                                                                                                            
immediate laughter and applause from the audience at the community forum. Herbert Morgan, “Cruising 
law hotly debated,” The Surveyor, Oct. 1989.  
9 Neal Gendler, “Cruising law gets mixed reviews,” Star Tribune, Sep. 15, 1989. 
10 Opponents took jabs at Carlson several times during the three-hour session with one of them shouting: 
“When did you discover the gay community?” To this accusation, Carlson angrily replied, “This for me is 
not a gay issue. This is an issue of public safety. I have been involved in the gay community and have had 
gay friends for about 25 years!” The Star Tribune described gay men’s criticism of Carlson “ironic” since 
“she has long been considered an advocate of gay causes.” The Tribune reported that when Carlson had 
announced in February of 1989 that she would not seek re-election (only to change her mind), Coyle 
described her as the “second-best friend” gay men and lesbians had on the council, “if not coequal to me.” 
The Tribune described gay men and lesbians as a “potent political force,” however they lacked that 
“citywide, make-or-break power” because they were unable to pass a domestic-partnership ordinance due 
to internal divisions and homophobia from conservative politicians. The Tribune observed that the split 
among gay men and lesbians in the Seventh Ward council race revealed that gay men and lesbians did not 
all think or vote in a bloc, even on what might have been considered gay issues. Dennis J. McGrath, “Gays, 
lesbians wielding political influence,” Star Tribune, Oct. 3, 1989. 
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discursive centrality of “safety” in justifying the surveillance of such public urban spaces 
as Loring Park under neoliberalism. Safety, in turn, masked deeper racial anxieties that 
lay at the forefront of who was and was not a rightful resident of Loring Park.  
Anticrime neighborhood initiatives in Loring Park essentially merged with 
mainstream LGBT antiviolence efforts, both of which functioned in the service of 
gentrification. In Safe Space, historian Christina B. Hanhardt shows that safe street 
patrols in the 1970s in San Francisco and New York City publicized antigay street 
violence in order to bolster arguments for designated gay neighborhoods. These safe 
street patrols, much like white gay male residents of Loring Park, demanded police 
protection and promoted identity-affirming practices that asserted and protected the safe 
space of their neighborhood. Nonetheless, because safe street activists understood antigay 
violence and, by extension, homophobia as rooted in racial difference and poverty, 
Hanhardt indicates that the identity that came to be protected as “gay” reflected the race, 
class, and gender particularities of the neighborhood itself: white, gay, and male.11 
Hanhardt’s analysis underscores that calls for safe space by gay residents—articulated via 
a single-issue framework—tend to neatly align with patterns of gentrification that consist 
of the cleanup of poor, people of color. Although race was hardly, if ever, explicitly 
stated by gay male residents of Loring Park who embraced the anti-cruising ordinance, 
what remains certain is that if police understood “gay” as an identity that cohered around 
particular racial and class norms, then queers of color who congregated in the 
neighborhood—out of a desire to partake in the social and libidinal pleasures of gay 
                                                
11 Christina B. Hanhardt, Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2013).  
 
 378 
communal life—would have likely been subjected to the regimes of surveillance 
propagated by the anti-cruising ordinance.  
The majority of queer activists who protested the city’s anti-bathhouse ordinance 
(and the public sex law discussed in chapter one) similarly opposed the anti-cruising 
ordinance. Contrary to media reports, opponents maintained that cruising in Loring Park 
did not involve the exchange of money. Instead, they argued that cruising served to 
expand social contacts beyond the confines of gay bars and public health campaigns 
against commercial sex establishments. Cruising, they argued, was not alcohol or drug 
centered and it attracted men from all walks of life including those who did not identify 
as “gay.” One of these queer activists penned a letter to the GLC Voice to express his 
disapproval of the Carlson-sponsored ordinance. Eric Shambach likened the ordinance’s 
restriction on movement to the Group Areas Act of South Africa, which was 
implemented to constrain the bodily movement of blacks in designated neighborhoods 
and townships.12 Even though Shambach rightfully pointed out that the anti-cruising 
ordinance was intended to restrict bodily movement, by comparing white gay men in 
Minneapolis to blacks in South Africa, he failed to note that the anti-cruising ordinance in 
Minneapolis would have likely targeted poor, people of color, including blacks and 
Native Americans—both heterosexual and queer—more so than white gay men who were 
more fully able to “pass” as residents in a neighborhood with a large concentration of 
white gay male residents.  
                                                
12 Shambach indicated that the ordinance would have bestowed even greater power to a police department 
that had recently killed an elderly black couple in their home during a drug raid gone awry. Moreover, 
because Carlson had bypassed the “tiresome details of democracy,” Shambach claimed that Carlson ought 
to have renamed Minneapolis into “New Johannesburg.”  “Letters: Rename Minneapolis New 
Johannesburg,” GLC Voice, Sep. 5, 1989. 
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The proposed criminalization of public sexual cultures in Loring Park mobilized a 
group of queer activists, like Shambach, to form a direct-action group called FAGS 
(Friends Against Gay Suppression).13 As an offshoot of the local ACT-UP chapter, FAGS 
promoted the concept of “outrageous activism” or “a blend of direct political action, gay-
guerilla street theater, protest marches, and civil disobedience.” FAGS was a grassroots 
organization that worked to undermine the perception that public sex was equivalent to 
unsafe sex and to re-signify commercial sex establishments as crucial to providing 
HIV/AIDS education and prevention, especially for men who had sex with other men 
without identifying as “gay.” Given its ideological investments and strategies of 
mobilization, FAGS repudiated any sort of collusion with a culture and politics of 
middle-class respectability. Because it opposed the eradication of public sexual cultures 
and commercial sex establishments, FAGS operated in opposition to gentrification 
schemes. FAGS also organized voter registrations and sponsored rallies against Carlson 
including one particularly noteworthy protest outside her home.  
In the early morning hours of Sunday, October 1, 1989—after bars closed—
members of FAGS staged a “cruise-in” outside Carlson’s home to protest her proposed 
anti-cruising ordinance. Members of FAGS had distributed handbills at gay bars two days 
in advance encouraging patrons, “Cruise around Barbie’s house.”14 Many protesters wore 
pearls and dressed in black to imitate Carlson’s trademark wardrobe. A number of them 
                                                
13 Five local gay activists founded FAGS on the September 17, 1989. Co-founder of the group, Dean 
Amundson, described the group as being “gay activism what ACT-UP is to AIDS activism.” FAGS 
promoted the concept of “outrageous activism” or “a blend of direct political action, gay-guerilla street 
theater, protest marches, and civil disobedience.” Its first event was a community forum held to discuss 
ways of stopping Carlson’s proposed anti-cruising ordinance. “Gay Activists Form Political Action 
Group,” Twin Cities GAZE, Oct. 5, 1989. 
14 The flyers also gave out Carlson’s phone number and encouraged people to voice their disapproval of the 
ordinance. Gregor W. Pinney, “Council shelves anticruising ordinance,” Star Tribune, Oct. 3, 1989. 
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carried defaced Carlson campaign posters. About 40 to 80 protesters had gathered. As the 
protesters walked up to Carlson’s home, they found one of the streets to Carlson’s 
neighborhood blocked off with traffic pylons. Under the lens of television cameras, an 
angered Tim Campbell, editor of the GLC Voice and a frequent critic of Carlson, grabbed 
one of the rubber cones and slammed it repeatedly against Carlson’s front door.15 Clad in 
pajamas, and pearls, Carlson soon appeared to give a television interview. Behind her, in 
full view of the television cameras, Campbell scuffled with Carlson’s husband before 
being wrestled to the ground by one of Carlson’s neighbors.16 Even though some 
members of FAGS expressed anger at Campbell’s pylon knocking incident, one member 
of FAGS, Wolfgang Wolf, declared the cruise-in a rousing success.17 The next day, the 
anti-cruising ordinance was the lead item on all four of the city’s television news 
programs.18  
                                                
15 Campbell told the Star Tribune that his actions stemmed from “an unpremeditated rage” as this was “a 
very serious issue for members of the gay community that some of those in the straight world cannot take 
seriously.” “Campbell, Carlson file complaints with police over scuffling incident,” Star Tribune, Oct. 04, 
1989. 
16 Although police were called, no one was arrested. Both Carlson and Campbell filed complaints against 
each other with the police. Carlson’s complaint alleged damage to property, disorderly conduct and theft, 
with stolen items including four political lawn signs. Ibid. 
17 In an interview with the Star Tribune, Campbell said he had little patience for those who did not like his 
style. Campbell explained, ‘They’re trying to get by on being polite. That’s the survival technique of the 
majority of gays. Don’t confront, be polite…Faggots aren’t supposed to get angry.” Campbell confessed 
that he would have liked to speak in reasonable tones all the time, but when he did that, people stopped 
listening. He said, “When I present well-thought-out written statements, I am ignored. So what would you 
do to make your point? Look at black civil rights. Until the Black Panthers came along, it was a bunch of 
liberal lip service.” There were more important matters than being seen as reasonable and acceptable. He 
critiqued “the acceptable” record of Coyle. Campbell argued that Coyle was “acceptable to a lot of people,” 
but he could never settle for being like Coyle. Robert Jacobson, “FAGS Protest Carlson’s Proposed Anti-
Cruising Ordinance,” Twin Cities GAZE, Oct. 05, 1989.; Doug Grow, “You can call Campbell gadfly, but 
not a spokesperson,” Star Tribune, Oct. 3, 1989. 
18 The encounter between Carlson and Campbell was so unpleasant that Coyle, who opposed the ordinance, 
told City Pages he had tried staying out of the confrontation because “I don’t want to get in the middle of a 
bitch fight between two queens.” After the pylon incident, Carlson told City Pages that Campbell had 
“finally gone over the edge,” before adding that if one were to meet Campbell and think he was 
representative of all gay men, then “all of your worst homophobic beliefs would have come true.” Robert 
W. Peterson, “A Bruising Over Cruising in Minneapolis,” Dec. 5, 1989.  
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Not everyone agreed with FAGS’s defense of Campbell.19 In fact, Campbell’s 
tactics became a point of contention among many white gay men in the Twin Cities who 
were embarrassed over his actions. The editors of Twin Cities Gaze published a number 
of letters from readers who openly criticized Campbell’s scuffling with Carlson’s 
husband. One local gay man apologized to Carlson for Campbell’s actions on behalf on 
the entire local gay community: “As a member of the Twin Cities Gay Community, I 
would like to apologize for the unconscionable behavior of Mr. Tim Campbell regarding 
your proposed ‘anti-cruising’ ordinance in Loring Park.” He added that while Campbell 
himself and the media treated Campbell as a spokesperson for “our community, nothing 
could be farther from the truth. What Mr. Campbell is doing is grand-standing and 
making a general nuisance of himself, and giving all of us a bad name.”20 Campbell’s 
critics found his style of headline grabbing and confrontational tactics incommensurate to 
garnering mainstream respect. He openly talked of sex, supported cruising, and defended 
commercial sex establishments. In response to his critics who believed that Campbell’s 
blunt message would not sit well with the general public, Campbell insisted he had a 
                                                
19 Campbell told the Star Tribune that concern about traffic and noise problems during early morning hours 
in the Loring Park neighborhood were exaggerated. After the closure of the 315 Health Club, Campbell 
claimed that erotic bookstores, X-rated theaters, and public parks and beaches where gay men gathered 
were coming under increased scrutiny. Because the anti-cruising ordinance targeted public sex in Loring 
Park—one of the last ways through which gay men socialized with one another—Campbell argued that the 
ordinance was nothing more but another attack on gay men. He observed that there had been a steady 
stream of such attacks in recent years, many of them masquerading as protecting gay men from HIV/AIDS. 
Campbell demanded that “straight people who go to bed at 9 p.m. should be able to dictate about a world 
they know nothing about.” He called the ordinance “probably the most anti-gay law since the McCarthy 
era” because it “allows the police to control and slow traffic in a gay neighborhood.” And he predicted that 
this law would become “a basis for gay bashing” since it criminalized gay movement. Mark Brunswick, 
“Gay protests against Barbara Carlson get rowdy,” Star Tribune, Oct. 2, 1989.; Robert Jacobson, “FAGS 
Protest Carlson’s Proposed Anti-Cruising Ordinance,” Twin Cities GAZE, Oct. 05, 1989. 
20 Another letter writer recognized that even though Campbell had previously “done good for the 
community,” Campbell’s recent actions in regards to the anti-cruising ordinance were “harming the image 
of the gay and lesbian community.” The letter writer insisted that Campbell ought to have been defending 
the ordinance since cruising did pose a disturbance to Loring Park and ought to have been stopped. “Letters 
to the Editor,” Twin Cities Gaze, 1989. 
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responsibility to openly discuss gay sex even when others did not wish to speak of it. In 
an interview with the press, Campbell explained, “Some people would like to see the gay 
rights movement as a civil rights movement rather than as part of the sexual revolution. 
In reality, the vast majority of people still have to go through their private sexual 
revolution before they’re ready to deal with civil rights.” For Campbell, any attempt at 
gay civil rights necessitated an open and frank discussion about one’s right to sexual 
expression. Any attempt at gay civil rights would prove fruitless if gay men did not first 
possess a right to unfettered sexual expression. Campbell accused moderate gays, 
including Coyle, of wanting “to render gay men eunuchs and asexual beings” in the eyes 
of heterosexuals.” He exhorted, “Admitting that we have sex is not admitting that we are 
obsessed by it.”21  
The anti-cruising ordinance, Campbell argued, amounted to an effort by city 
officials—in conjunction with white gay leaders and private developers—to gentrify 
Loring Park. He explained that the ordinance appealed mostly to “landlords in a 
neighborhood where the struggle between the rich, white and mostly straight absentee 
landlord is pitied against the gay renter and his life style.” In an op-ed published in the 
GLC Voice, Campbell explained that gay men had been responsible for rendering the 
neighborhood livable only now to be driven away by a wave of “yuppie” residents: 
“Before the return of the gentry to the inner city, gays were considered the most desirable 
of the folks of modest income who were interested in living in the Loring area. Now, the 
landlords hope they can rent to the yuppie gentry and overt signs of gay lifestyles have to 
                                                
21 Robert W. Peterson, “A Bruising Over Cruising in Minneapolis,” City Pages, Dec. 5, 1989.  
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go.”22 Campbell’s comments suggest that the anti-cruising ordinance was designed to rid 
the public sphere of overt expressions of gay male sexuality in order to enable 
gentrification. Campbell, however, failed to note that some white gay male residents of 
Loring Park themselves—the racially and economically privileged contingent—were 
poised as beneficiaries of this wave of gentrification. That is, gentrification—by 
eliminating spaces of public sex—would have also restructured the cultural and social 
practices of white gay men in Loring Park, away from dissident forms of sexual 
expression towards respectable embodiments of gay domesticity.  
While Campbell challenged the homonormalizing imperatives of gentrification, 
others actively embraced these impulses so as to disaggregate “sexuality” from gay 
identity. In a letter to the editor of the Twin Cities Gaze, Joe K. and Pete S., a gay couple, 
defended the anti-cruising ordinance from accusations that it amounted to anti-gay 
legislation. The couple wrote: “As homosexuals, we do not condone nor support 
prostitution any more than does the heterosexual population.” In defending the ordinance 
as pro-gay, the couple hoped to distance gay male sexuality from the practices of casual 
anonymous sex and prostitution. The couple argued that gay “prostitutes in Loring Park 
are no more or no less part of our community than are prostitutes in heterosexual society 
a part of that society.”23 They endeavored to convince the public that same-sex couples 
were, for the most part, just like heterosexual couples. The couple even claimed that “one 
of our greatest tasks in today’s society is to show the majority that our lifestyle is no 
different than that of heterosexuals.” The couple acknowledged that although “many 
                                                
22 Tim Campbell, “So what’s the big deal about cruising in Loring Park?” GLC Voice, Oct. 16, 1989. 
23 The couple also echoed the sentiment of others who argued that Campbell was not a representative of the 
gay and lesbian community and, as such, his actions ought not “to influence [the city’s] efforts to clean up 
the city.” “Letters to the Editor,” Twin Cities Gaze, 1989.  
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people perceive gay people as being sexually out of control” and having no “values and 
morals around sexuality,” “we seek the same compassion, caring, tenderness and 
commitment that heterosexual people seek.” The couple concluded that there was a large 
percentage of gay men who were “unheard” and “unseen” by the general public since 
“we fit in with them. We share their basic values. We have careers. Many of us share 
meaningful relationships with a large number of heterosexuals. We believe that we are 
the majority in the gay community.”24 Here, the gay couple endorsed the anti-cruising 
ordinance—the criminalization of public sex—so as to emphasize white gay men’s 
legibility within a raced heteronormative rubric of sexuality.   
 Two days after the traffic pylon incident at Carlson’s home, on October 2, 1989, the 
Public Health and Safety Committee of the Minneapolis City Council discussed the anti-
cruising ordinance. In attendance were several members of FAGS who wore masks of 
Carlson. A mustached protester wore a lavender dress and a set of pearls (Figure 5.1). 
Also present were gay residents of Loring Park who asked the committee to endorse the 
ordinance in order to deter late-night traffic, drugs, prostitution, and blaring car radios. 
Worried that Campbell’s actions would be seen as representative of “the gay 
community,” Dick Brown, an outspoken critic of public sexual cultures, conveyed his 
support for the ordinance by denouncing FAGS: “Some of the gay fanatics are so 
concerned about gay rights they don’t have any respect for anyone else’s rights.”25 The 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Brown stated that Campbell represented “some radical edge,” before adding, “It’s not even radical. He 
represents the bar crowd, nothing more. I think Campbell has done more damage to gay causes than 
any…conservatives could.”  Brown believed that there might have been a time for Campbell’s tactics, but 
that time had already passed. In some parts of the country, the law now recognized the civil rights of gay 
men and lesbians. There were libraries and bars and churches where gay men and lesbians could 




Star Tribune described the meeting as a public hearing that at times “rose to thoughtful 
debate on domestic tranquility vs. civil liberties,” however, “in the end, it descended into 
chaos, with gay activists shouting at Minneapolis City Council members and one member 
walking out after asking police to file charges.”26 Committee members shelved the 
ordinance since they worried about its enforcement and Carlson’s political motives.27 The 
committee pushed the measure to just before the November  
                                                
26 Gay activist Wolfgang Wolf loudly demanded that the committee read a letter from the MCLU and 
another protester Rick Simon, shouted, “The rich are taking over the city, and the poor can go to hell.” 
Gregor W. Pinney, “Council shelves anticruising ordinance,” Star Tribune, Oct. 3, 1989.  
27 In an op-ed, the Star Tribune applauded the Public Health and Safety Committee for postponing the anti-
cruising ordinance after that year’s November election.  Although Carlson insisted that her concern was 
late-night traffic around Loring Park associated with cruising for male prostitutes, the Tribune described the 
matter as having “inflated into a political football in Carlson’s reelection campaign.” Once the election had 
passed, the council would take a second look at the ordinance. However, even then, the Tribune predicted 
that the council would find the ordinance to be “sorely lacking.” The Tribune concluded, “We sympathize 
with Loring Park residents, as we do with people in other neighborhoods suffering from noisy late-night 
traffic and extensive illegal activity. But laws that punish people simply for being in an area aren’t the way 
to address the problem, especially when better alternatives are available.” Campbell, however, disagreed 
with the Tribune’s assessment that the anti-cruising ordinance was not a “homophobic overreaction” given 
Carlson’s “demonstrable lack of bias against gays.” Campbell argued that Carlson’s proposed ordinance 
was anti-gay because “it is a frontal attack on an age old social custom distinctively associated with the gay 
community.”  The ordinance, Campbell argued, also “redlines Minneapolis’s most obvious gay 
neighborhood…for special traffic control and for special observation due to the proposition that people will 
have criminal intent.” Campbell also pointed out that cruising in Loring Park did not involve the exchange 
of money as the mainstream media reported. The ordinance was also anti-gay for Campbell because it 
unfairly singled out prostitution and drug-dealing in Loring Park when such activities when undisturbed in 
other areas of the city. If the ordinance were merely about safeguarding quality-of-life including traffic and 
noise Campbell wondered why areas around the Metrodome where “obnoxiously straight” and “rowdy 
redneck” sports fans were not targeted for regulation despite the presumed presence of prostitutes, cocaine, 
and gambling. Tim Campbell, “So what’s the big deal about cruising Loring Park?” GLC Voice, Oct. 16, 




Figure 5.1: Members of FAGS protest by wearing Barbara Carlson's masks and 
signature pearls at the anti-cruising ordinance. Dennis J. McGrath, “Gays, lesbians 
wielding political influence,” Star Tribune, Oct. 03, 1989. 
election. Like the anti-bathhouse ordinance before it, the anti-cruising ordinance 
underscored the role of public sexual cultures as a negative referent in defining a 
bourgeoning homonormative culture and politics.28 
 Those gay men who endorsed the anti-cruising ordinance defended it by re-
narrating it as a form of HIV-prevention. They maintained that the gentrification of 
Loring Park would help curb rates of HIV-transmission by reducing the spaces where gay 
men went to have sex. This sentiment was expressed on a computer-based bulletin board 
system coordinated by the Twin Cities Gaze. The author of “Message #9” reframed the 
ordinance as HIV-prevention when he scolded married men who cruised for sex in 
                                                
28 As the meeting was adjourned, chair Sandra Hillary closed by saying that if such a “cruise-in” event had 
occurred at her home, she would have had everyone arrested. Campbell angrily and vocally denounced 
Hillary’s statement, causing a disruption: “I am angry. I was angry. I said it in an angry way. We should get 
in touch with our anger...My behavior contributed to our victory” of tabling the ordinance. He concluded, 
“We won. The community should be applauding.” However, Coyle believed that Campbell’s actions at the 
demonstration outside Carlson’s home and in the meeting at City Hall were damaging. Coyle said, “This 
will catalyze sympathy votes for [Carlson] and for the ordinance. Robert Jacobson, “FAGS Protest 
Carlson’s Proposed Anti-Cruising Ordinance,” Twin Cities GAZE, Oct. 5, 1989. 
 
 387 
Loring Park and then returned home to their wives and children. He admonished these 
men: “From a public health point of view, I think it is time that the city took action to 
discourage the hustlers and their customers (mostly married men), who meet the hustlers 
and take home God-knows-what diseases to their unsuspecting wives.” According to the 
author, it was “hustler activity with married men” that posed a “continuing weak link” in 
the city’s attempt to curb the rates of HIV/AIDS.29 As the analysis of the author of 
“Message #9” attests, the anti-cruising ordinance touched on anxieties of transmission to 
white, suburban families—a concern that was racially coded through the figure of the 
prostitute of color with AIDS. Therefore, the anti-cruising ordinance, like the anti-
bathhouse ordinance before it, functioned within an arsenal of public health policies in 
response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. By weakening diverse queer subcultural 
experiences, these policies contributed to the material consolidation of gentrification in 
central cities across the United States in the 1980s.  
Other gay men elaborated upon this public health danger associated with cruising 
by challenging the notion that cruising was “a part of the gay lifestyle which needs to be 
protected like some ancient ritual.”30 Still others defended the ordinance out of a belief 
                                                
29 The author of “Message #10” similarly supported the ordinance and discounted accusations that the 
ordinance was anti-gay. He commented, “I don’t see why the gay world is objecting to the ordinance. 
Cruising for anonamous [sic] sex is not really acceptable in the straight world, and with all that things you 
can catch now, should not be accepted as a right or need for the gay world...it’s not ‘out’ gays, but people 
who need to accept themselves and join the gay world as a person who shouldn’t have to hide or be 
embarrassed about their sexuality.” For this gay man, those who cruised for anonymous sex did so not 
because they were attuned to their sexual desires but rather because they were unreceptive of them. 
According to this logic, to be a proud gay man entailed adhering to a life of privacy, not public sex. “GAZE 
BBS Members Comment on Anti-Cruise Proposal, Campbell-Carlson Incidents,” Twin Cities GAZE, Oct. 
5, 1989. 
30 Jean Taylor, a gay male resident of Loring Park, wrote to Equal Time to discount Campbell’s defense of 
cruising. He focused on the concerns of property owners and residents of Loring Park. According to Taylor, 
residents of Loring Park were “subjected to traffic jams in front of their homes at 1:00 a.m.,” were 
propositioned for sex when they stepped out their front door, and were also confronted with “prostitutes 




that existing laws and practices were inappropriate to solving the problem. Gordon Huser, 
a gay male resident of Loring Park, told Equal Time that since police were too 
preoccupied with crime in north Minneapolis, an area of the city inhabited primarily by 
blacks and Hmong refugees, a “noise or loitering with intent to prostitute complaint is a 
low priority in a weekend in such a large and problematic precinct.” For that reason, 
Huser justified the anti-cruising ordinance—the expansion of police powers to surveil 
and to stop suspected outsiders—as a means of protecting white gay male residents of 
Loring Park. Huser prioritized safety not necessarily from corporeal violence but from 
violations to gay residential “quality of life.”31  
 Not all gay residents agreed that the anti-cruising ordinance was in the best interest 
of gay men. In a letter titled, “We need militants,” Robert Halfhill, a queer activist, 
offered an impassioned defense of FAGS and Campbell’s tactics, reminding gay men of 
the importance of confrontational politics in times of increasing economic and moral 
                                                                                                                                            
supposedly aimed at protecting residents, both gay and straight, by bolstering quality-of-life violations, 
Taylor recalibrated the ordinance as “pro-gay” in that it “protects the rights of gay men” by “stopping the 
midnight traffic which has become the bane of an entire neighborhood.” If any attack was being leveled 
against gay men, Taylor suggested, it was Campbell’s “outrageous” behavior that “played out the true 
homophobe’s view of ‘homosexuals’” as “a group who only knows anonymous sex in dark and public 
places.” “Letters,” Equal Times, 1989. 
31 In his letter to Equal Time, Huser stressed that “the nightly invasion of nonresidents to our 
neighborhood” not only contributed to “all night traffic jams,” but also created problems associated with 
prostitution (emphasis added). In describing the secondary effects of cruising, Huser reported: “Residents 
are propositioned by prostitutes and johns when walking through their neighborhood, awakened late at 
night by loud car radios and fights between people in the street, verbally and physically harassed by 
prostitutes gathered outside buildings, and the entries to our buildings are used for toilets, sex and drugs.” 
Although Huser identified as gay, he emphasized that as “a member of a larger community” of Loring Park 
residents, he “deserve[d] respect for, and safety in, my neighborhood.” For Huser, Loring Park was a gay 
neighborhood not because of the cruising that transpired there but because of the large number of gay men 
who resided there: “If the Loring neighborhood is a ‘gay neighborhood,’ it is so because a large number of 
gays and lesbians live and work here, not because it’s a great place to pick up a trick.” Huser minimized 
gay men’s sexuality as he simultaneously bolstered their domestic arrangements. Huser asserted, 
“Residents of other neighborhoods, whether renters and home owners, would not accept these problems in 
their neighborhoods. Members of the Loring neighborhood deserve an end to these problems in theirs.” 
“Letters: Loring residents need residence,” Equal Time, 1989. 
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conservatism.32 He contended that the infatuation with gay men’s sex lives was a 
reflection of society’s “erotophobia,” or the fear of sexuality. Halfhill clarified, “In an 
erotophobic society, there is a constant pull towards outlawing all but the reproductive 
forms of sex and by buying into this puritanism, gays are helping to reinforce the roots of 
homophobia.” Halfhill’s position here is that anti-sex legislation, like the anti-cruising 
ordinance, was rooted in the same discourses and practices that propagated homophobic 
rhetoric. He celebrated FAGS and Campbell’s tactics for bringing to the forefront the 
implications of such legislation on all those who did not adhere to normative scripts of 
gender and sexuality, including those dissident expressions of gay male sexuality.33  
 Halfhill’s statements were further substantiated by Richard Osborne, another queer 
activist, who likewise critiqued the ethos of middle-class respectability that saturated the 
defense of the anti-cruising ordinance. In a letter titled, “A word to the ‘holier-than-
thou’,” Osborne critiqued those who sought to eradicate “Loring Park’s decades-long 
function as a place where gay people can socialize and find consenting sex partners 
without fear of harassment by homophobes, whether they carry sticks or badges.” Here, 
Osborne reiterated the limitations of police cooperation given that police officers were a 
large purveyor of violence against gay men. Osborne added that those gay men who 
supported the ordinance did so out of “the self-righteous claim that the ‘majority’ of gay 
people are ‘decent’ and ‘moral’ and ‘no different from [nongay] people.” These gay men 
were “chagrined,” Osborne argued, that “other (presumably nongay) people” would 
                                                
32 Halfhill compared the tactics employed by FAGS and Campbell as being reflective of those used by 
suffragist, labor, antiwar, and civil rights groups. He also reminded gay men that a marginalized group had 
never achieved its goals without “massive demonstrations, militant civil disobedience and even more 
extreme actions.” “Letters: We Need Militants,” Equal Times, 1989.  
33 Ibid.   
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“perceive gays as being, in the words of one writer, ‘sexually out of control…[and] 
without values and morals about sexuality.” Osborne reminded these gay men that 
sodomy, whether in public at Loring Park or in a long-term, monogamous relationship in 
a private bedroom, remained illegal in Minnesota:   
  Well, I have news for these holier-than-thou people: you are just as much a 
criminal as your brother who picks up a hustler or has sex under the bridge at 
Loring Pond. You might think that because you limit your sex life to ‘doing it’ in 
your bedroom with your monogamous lover you are going to be seen as OK in the 
eyes of nongay society; you are wrong. Even if the ass that you fuck or the pussy 
that you lick is that of a faithful, lifelong lover and even if you confine it to the 
privacy of your home, you are guilty of the crime of Sodomy, and that’s a gross 
misdemeanor, while Prostitution and so-called Indecent Conduct are only 
misdemeanors. You are worse crooks than those whom you so smugly cast stones! 
Osborne contended that gay men who supported the ordinance must have assumed that if 
they simply mimicked the movements of heteronormativity, they would garner respect 
from the general public and the government. However, Osborne disputed this facile 
thinking by emphasizing that those gay men who condemned the practices of others as 
morally corrupt partook in the same act of sodomy, a practice that remained illegal 
despite its public or private manifestation.34  
  As a result of FAGS and Campbell’s grassroots activism, Carlson’s anti-cruising 
ordinance as well as her bid for City Council were defeated. Although the anti-cruising 
ordinance did not make it pass the City Council’s Public Health and Safety Committee, 
                                                
34 “Letters: A word to the ‘holier-than-thou’,” Equal Time, 1989.  
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the neighborhood’s citizens group, Citizens for a Loring Park Community (CLPC), 
implemented a community-based policing program designed to reduce noise and improve 
“safety.” The main tenets of the original ordinance—criminalization and surveillance—
were carried over into the community-based policing program. As part of the plan, two 
police officers were assigned with patrolling the Loring Park neighborhood, on foot and 
via squad car, on late-night weekend hours.35 CLPC’s reliance upon a discourse of safety 
nurtured a neoliberal urban context in Loring Park in which certain spaces could be 
reclaimed and marketed for young, urban professional constituencies. This spatial 
transformation of Loring Park enabled the incursion of private capital in the area and, in 
the process, displaced those who could not or would not abide by the logic of 
neoliberalism.  
 At the same time, since gay men’s claims on the state for social membership were 
increasingly tied to space, LGBT politics would come to be inseparable from property 
politics. For this reason, public sexual cultures would also come to take on added 
subversive meaning. The actions coordinated by FAGS, as well as the written dissent 
expressed by Halfhill and Osborne, make clear the transgressive potentiality of public sex 
in an increasingly privatized urban terrain. These queer activists believed that cruising 
                                                
35 Concerns over gay safety were also central to the policing of the Loring Park neighborhood. The vice 
president of the CLPC and chair of its Committee to Reduce Noise and Improve Safety, Ken Darling, told 
the Twin Cities Gaze that Loring Park was becoming “unlivable” on some late weekend nights: “The noise 
can make it hard to sleep and all the street and pedestrian traffic can be intimidating to some residents, Gay 
and straight.” Darling, who is gay, stressed that it was important that the police involved be “sensitive” to 
the concerns and lifestyles of gay people. He explained, “Our goal all along was to involve community 
members, particularly Gay men, in any increased police activity, to ensure that the police were responding 
to our needs, not that we were reacting to their actions.” Although Darling insisted that CLPC did not wish 
to inhibit the movement of motorists or to discourage people from visiting Loring Park, he insisted that 
visitors had “to realize that [Loring Park] is a densely populated, residential area, and they have to keep the 
noise down.” Darling was optimistic that the police presence would also make the neighborhood safer from 
“bashing” of men suspected of being gay, a major concern of gay male residents. The program began in 
June of 1990, just in time for that month’s Pride celebration. “Loring Park Protection Program Successfully 
Unites Citizens, Police In Cooperative Effort,” Twin Cities Gaze, Jun. 27, 1991.  
 
 392 
was instrumental to queering public spaces and thus, necessary, in disrupting the spatial 
accumulation of private capital as ordained by gentrification and naturalized by 
homonormativity.  
 Queer transgressions of public space via public sex serve an important means of 
articulating a political opposition to the compulsions of heteronormativity and, more 
recently, homonormativity—both arbitrary sexual arrangements that gained prominence 
in the 1980s as the state slashed social welfare services and transferred the onus of 
responsibility for remedying social ills onto private individuals. By upsetting 
expectations of what is considered “normal” in public space, the queering of public space 
challenges dominant ideologies of not only normative sexuality but also of private 
property—a distinction that has become increasingly unclear in the wake of 
neoliberalism. In light of such developments, visible performances of queer identities and 
queer practices of land-use help destabilize the liberal-private distinction of space, 
puncturing through the ideological armor of private property.  
 In the West, deep-rooted taboos about sex that takes place in the wrong time and 
place abound. These taboos are enforced through lewdness statutes, obscenity laws, and 
zoning ordinances that determine public sex to be an offense against public decency. 
Norbert Elias argues that in order to make sense of the contemporary ways people are 
socially expected to behave in public, we need to first interrogate the “civilizing process.” 
Notions of appropriate public behavior originated during the nadir of European 
imperialism as people internalized the importance of distinguishing themselves from 
newly “discovered” primitive societies. Ignoring these notions of bodily comportment in 
public was equivalent to being perceived as nothing more than an animal. To avoid such 
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character designations, people consciously modified their behavior in public by 
embracing “civilized” ways of being. This civilizing process consisted of appointing the 
private sphere of the home as the designated place of sex.36 With the rise of industrial 
capitalism, the growing awareness of private property also shaped people’s impressions 
of sex as something intimate, personal, and private.37  
 The distinction between the personal and the public is wholly artificial. Yet, we 
treat this distinction as natural, in part because private property prescribes it as such. 
Private property, in turn, constitutes and delimits the fluidity between gender and sexual 
categories. In Tearoom Trade, sociologist Laud Humphreys examined impersonal same-
sex encounters in “tearooms” or men’s restrooms at public parks and roadside truck 
stops. Although controversial in nature and unethical in its methodology, Humphreys’ 
study is important because it reveals the political potentialities of public sex to highlight 
the inherent malleability of the liberal public-private distinction of space.38 Humphreys 
showed that public bathrooms were appealing to men in search of sex with other men 
because these venues offered a degree of impersonality. Due to their gender segregated 
nature, like bathhouses, public restrooms provided spaces off-limits to women where men 
                                                
36 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1994).  
37 Phil Hubbard, Cities and Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
38 Upon its publication, Humphreys’ study proved controversial for a number of reasons. For one, 
Humphreys practiced a lack of disclosure. He used covert observation methods that many critics deemed 
unethical. He also revealed a surprisingly high degree of sexual activity in tearooms with the majority of 
participants not necessarily identifying as homosexuals. Humphreys confirmed that 54 percent of his 
subjects were outwardly heterosexual men with unsuspecting wives and children at home. In an effort to 
conceal their deviation from social norms, these outwardly heterosexual men put on a “breastplate of 
righteousness” that consisted of social and political conservatism. Despite the unethical implications of 
Humphreys’ methodology, Tearoom Trade was unprecedented in exposing the discourses and practices of 
this particular subculture of cruising. Humphreys concluded that such encounters were harmless and posed 
no danger of harassment to straight men given the various social cues designed by participants to sift out 
those who might be offended by such encounters. Laud Humphreys, Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in 
Public Places (London: Duckworth Overlook, 1970).  
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had a valued excuse to expose themselves. In short, tearooms, since they offered the 
advantages of both public and private settings, were liminal spaces with certain 
transgressive and erotic properties.39 Tearooms enabled men to participate in the political 
act of public sex. Humphrey’s study reminds us of the transgressive potentiality of public 
sex to operate as a modality of action in which the body communicates sensually and 
emotively with others to effect transformative political attitudes in the use of space. 
Political to the extent that it can disrupt the compulsory demands of private sexual 
conformity, public sex simultaneously refutes the capitalist demands and exclusionary 
tenets of private property.  
 We can apply Humphrey’s study to cruising in Loring Park as a reflection of the 
ways in which queer activists rejected the principles of a bourgeoning homonormativity, 
one that equated morality and respectability with private property. On the other hand, 
despite the emancipatory potential of public sex, other white gay leaders in Minneapolis 
encouraged gay men to practice a form of gender, sexual, and spatial self-surveillance in 
hopes that it might portray them and the larger gay community respectable, and, by 
extension, worthy of rights in the eyes of the state. This strategy reflects how white gay 
leaders repudiated public sex through the simultaneous dispersal of rights—the promise 
of marriage being one of those rights.  
Domestic-Partners Registry.  
 As one of the most outspoken gay leaders in Minneapolis, Brian Coyle remained 
largely quiet in regards to Carlson’s anti-cruising ordinance. Although he opposed it, 
Coyle disagreed with Campbell that cruising in Loring Park was a “gay institution” that 




had to be preserved. In an interview with the local Minneapolis publication, City Pages, 
Coyle declared that the days of anonymous cruising for sex in any public park were over: 
“To romanticize [cruising] as [Campbell] did, as some kind of legacy of the gay 
culture—I don’t buy that.”40 What Coyle had been doing instead was seeking support for 
his proposed domestic-partners ordinance. A domestic-partners ordinance had been as 
much a personal ordeal for Coyle as it had been a public policy aspiration. He had been 
pushing for such an ordinance since he joined the City Council in 1983.41  
 In January of 1991, at the urging of Coyle, the City of Minneapolis adopted a plan 
that allowed its single employees to use sick leave or bereavement leave if their live-in 
partners became ill or died. The ordinance also allowed couples, whether they were 
employed by the city or not, to register their relationships with the city clerk for a $6 
filling fee, a symbolic gesture without practical implications. Coyle explained to the Star 
Tribune that the ordinance was “a form of acknowledgement of [gay and lesbian] 
relationship[s] and says the city of Minneapolis believes these forms of family have 
value” (emphasis added).42 Coyle considered the institution of marriage serving as an 
arbiter of normativity and social value for gay men. His ordinance, however, fell short of 
the original proposal, which would have also extended health and dental insurance to the 
                                                
40 Robert W. Peterson, “A Bruising Over Cruising in Minneapolis,” City Pages, Dec. 5, 1989. 
41 In 1989, Carlson attempted to push through a domestic-partners ordinance as part of her re-election bid 
as she simultaneously attempted to push for a ban on cruising in Loring Park. Carlson’s bid was challenged 
by Coyle who accused Carlson of jumping the gun on him for political gain in a tight race against an 
incumbent. According to the GLC Voice, Carlson had opposed domestic partner legislation over the 
previous four years. The previous talk of a domestic partners bill was in 1985 when the primary advocate of 
such legislation was interestingly enough Richard Osborne, the DFL-appointed gay attorney on the 
Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights. Osborne passed a draft of domestic partners legislation to his 
successor, Tim Cole. However, Cole revealed that the subcommittee within the commission never agreed 
on a working draft for such legislation in Minneapolis. Tim Campbell, “Barbara Carlson courts gays and 
bigots,” GLC Voice, Sep. 5, 1989. 
42 Neal Gendler, “Compromise on domestic partners,” Star Tribune Jan. 8, 1991: 3B. 
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“domestic partners” of gay men, lesbians, and unmarried heterosexuals who worked for 
the city.43 When it became apparent that that the council could not muster the necessary 
votes needed to pass the original measure, Coyle mustered a compromise that allowed the 
ordinance to be passed.44 By approving the ordinance, the City Council expanded the 
traditional definition of “immediate family” to include unmarried couples, heterosexual 
or homosexual, who shared a household.45   
 The timing of the ordinance was not without relevance. Several months after its 
passage, on April 23, 1991, in a letter to his colleagues on the City Council and the 
general public, Coyle announced he was diagnosed with AIDS in 1986, shortly after he 
was overwhelmingly elected to a second term on the council (Figure 5.2). Coyle 
disclosed, “For most people, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is something 
far away, but for me it has been a daily reality for nearly a decade and I have decided to 
come out publicly as an HIV-infected person in order to educate people and to improve 
my chances of survival.”46 Coyle stressed that he probably contracted the virus through 
                                                
43 By 1990, a few cities, including Seattle and Berkeley, California, already provided such benefits. 
Berkeley was the first municipality in the nation to have passed a domestic partners ordinance in 1984.  
44 There was opposition to the original ordinance from those who worried about extending the city’s 
insurance coverage. There was also opposition hailing from gay men and lesbians who believed that Coyle 
should have led an effort to expand the ordinance to all employers, not just the city. During the three-hour 
debate, Coyle told the council that he had tried to deny his sexual orientation between the ages of 8 and 25, 
and that he had dated several women, in hopes that it would somehow change him. However, he considered 
the domestic partners ordinance an affirming move by the City of Minneapolis. He explained, “I think the 
passage of the domestic partners ordinance says to the gay and lesbian community that you deserve the 
same respect and consideration as everyone else.”  
Jon Jeter, “Minneapolis council appears likely to pass domestic-partner ordinance,” Star Tribune, Jan. 15, 
1991: 8K. 
45 A few gay rights activists who attended the City Council’s Health, Environment, and Human 
Development Committee hearing held signs that read: “We are Family 2,” and “Love Chooses its own 
Family.” Jon Jeter, “Minneapolis council appears likely to pass domestic-partner ordinance,” Star Tribune, 
Jan. 15, 1991: 8K. 
46 Coyle added that in writing the letter, “I am taking a risk that people will write me off politically or 
actually fear working beside me. But being honest is now as important to me as being effective, which I 
have been during all these years of secretly living with the virus.” Coyle had only told a few friends of his 




unprotected sex with a former lover. After serving more than eight years on the 
Minneapolis City Council, Coyle, 47, passed away on August 23, 1991, of heart failure 
and complications related to AIDS.47 Coyle’s column-long obituary in the Star Tribune 
remembered him for being “the architect of a plan to provide sick and bereavement to the 
unmarried domestic partners of gay, lesbian, and heterosexual city workers.”48 In 1993, 
Sharon Sayles Belton, a close friend of Coyle’s who had by then become the first woman 
and African-American mayor of Minneapolis, authored a domestic-partners ordinance 
that expanded Coyle’s ordinance to include his initial mission of providing the domestic 
partners of city employees with health coverage benefits. After Coyle’s death of AIDS, 
his name was frequently invoked in the emotional debate surrounding the domestic-
partners ordinance.49 By helping to shut down the 315 Health Club in 1988 and helping to 
establish one of the country’s first domestic-partners ordinance registry in 1991, Coyle 
helped the city “monitor, document, and interrupt public sexual acts, even as [the city] 
extended new medical, vacation, and retirement benefits to those able to legally prove 
they lived in committed, domestic, monogamous relationships.”50 Perhaps given 
                                                                                                                                            
speak out,” Star Tribune, Apr. 24, 1991: 1A. 
47 Like Coyle, Shilts also passed away due to AIDS-related complications in 1994. 
48 Lou Gelfand, “Readers ask, ‘Isn’t an obituary written to honor the deceased?’” Star Tribune, Oct. 12, 
1997: 33.A. 
49 With a vote of 10-3, the ordinance passed the City Council on August 27, 1993. Sayles Belton told the 
Star Tribune, “A large part of our interest and commitment was not only raised by the issue, but the energy 
and commitment [Coyle] brought to it.” However, the ordinance was challenged in a suit by a north side 
Minneapolis resident who was backed by the Minnesota Family Council, previously known as the Berean 
League. The resident argued that the city’s domestic partners ordinance violated the state’s public policy 
“favoring marriage of heterosexual couples.” On June 3, 1994, a Hennepin County district judge agreed 
with the resident, ruling that the City of Minneapolis had no authority under Minnesota law to extend 
health benefits to the partners of gay and lesbian public employees. The judge claimed, “Redefining family 
relationships is not a proper subject for municipal regulation.” Kevin Diaz, “Ruling puts struggle for gay-
partner rights back to square one,” Star Tribune, Jun. 13, 1994: 1A.    
50 Ryan Patrick Murphy and Alex T. Urquhart, “Sexuality in the Headlines: Intimate Upheavals as Histories 
of the Twin Cities,” in Queer Twin Cities: Twin Cities GLBT Oral History Project, ed. Kevin P. Murphy et 
al. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 107.  
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awareness of his own mortality, Coyle was inspired to enact legislation that 
simultaneously lessened the physical spaces available for gay men to have sex as it also 
broadened the ideological parameters of domestic space to include gay male sexuality. 
For doing so, Coyle played a significant role in the gentrification of urban spaces in 
Minneapolis by mobilizing a legal apparatus that criminalized public sexual cultures in 
exchange for the political enfranchisement of white gay men.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: A constituent comforts Coyle after revealing his AIDS diagnosis. Kurt 
Chandler, “Coyle puts AIDS back in public eye,” Star Tribune, Apr. 25, 1991. 
  
 Coyle’s death due to AIDS-related complications was impactful on a number of 
levels. Unlike Campbell, Coyle was largely regarded as the chosen spokesperson for the 
local gay community. This is partly because Coyle’s views were more acceptable to the 
dominant group. Mainstream media, city politicians, police, and the general public were 
far more comfortable with Coyle’s platform which called for the inclusion of gay men 
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and lesbians within the cultural, political, and social fabric of the nation. Given his level 
of authority, Coyle was able to fashion the foundational structures of the local gay 
community to consist of domestic consumerism, middle-class respectability, and private 
property. Whereas Coyle bolstered the universality of marriage, Campbell fought for a 
gay male sexual subculture distinct from heterosexual culture. Campbell’s politics were, 
thus, situated in closer proximity to those of the gay liberation movement: freedom of 
sexual expression, critique of heterosexism, state accountability, and social justice. And 
yet Campbell and others like him including members from FAGS were not equally 
recognized as “gay leaders” in the same vein as Coyle. By being too radical in their 
critique of heteronormativity, Campbell and members of FAGS were deemed too 
threatening to the status quo. What Coyle offered the dominant culture was a palatable 
leader who condemned the “irresponsible” actions of his own constituents and abstracted 
the apparatuses of state domination, especially in regards to HIV/AIDS. As such, Coyle’s 
demands for gay social membership remained encased within the sheath of neoliberal 
capitalism. Although Campbell and Coyle differed on what they perceived as the ultimate 
goal of gay politics, both men largely overlooked an intersectional, multi-issue, feminist 
approach to gay liberation. For instance, Campbell, who endorsed an unfettered sexual 
expression for gay men, remained largely immune to an understanding of how the anti-
bathhouse and anti-cruising ordinance would have likely conspired with racism and 
classism to impact the unique ways queers of color experienced their sexuality within 
these regimes of surveillance. Partly for this reason, Campbell participated in the overt 
demonization of Bridges and other sex workers of color accused of harboring HIV.  
 As Coyle’s actions above attest, the legislative proposal to link the curtailment of 
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public sexual cultures to the distribution of domestic partner benefits is reflective of the 
inability or unwillingness of some white gay leaders to address the structural factors 
propelling the HIV/AIDS epidemic: a lack of affordable healthcare, a lack of access to 
sex-positive education, poverty, and a mounting culture of moral conservatism coupled 
with a historical distrust of state agents and institutions by racial and sexual minorities. 
Instead, by legally delimiting the spaces available to public sexual cultures, some gay 
leaders—with the backing of city officials and public health officials—applied a 
neoliberal spatial fix as a cosmetic solution to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. By a neoliberal 
spatial fix, I am referring to the urban process through which state agents and institutions 
seek to redevelop the built environment to elicit a desired behavioral change out of 
specific populations, all the while generating profit for private real estate interests 
through gentrification schemes. With this neoliberal spatial fix, the relationship between 
AIDS and gentrification was and remains hardly if ever broached by mainstream media, 
social scientists, politicians, and the general population. This is a significant oversight. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic, much like U.S. gentrification in late capitalism, is a social 
phenomenon—that is, a mechanical process—directly born out of specific policies and 
practices. And, like gentrification, the HIV/AIDS epidemic employs cultural discourses 
that hide its conditions of possibility in favor of sublimating these onto narratives of 
personal responsibility. In short, both gentrification and the HIV/AIDS epidemic have 
proliferated unabated in the United States by avoiding any semblance of institutional 
accountability.  
 The regulation of public cultures of sex, and the public urban spaces that anchored 
those cultures, such as Loring Park, operated as more than mere HIV-prevention. These 
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policies and practices were part of a concerted attempt to usher in urban renewal in 
downtown Minneapolis. Central to this physical effort of capital turnover was pushing 
white gay male sexuality into the private sphere to untangle it from the stigma associated 
with racialized sexuality. A discourse and practice of Minnesota Nice ideologically 
subsidized a regional iteration of gentrification, one that underlined the domestication of 
gay male and lesbian sexuality as it criminalized racialized sexuality.  
Urban Renewal.  
 The anti-bathhouse ordinance, along with the proposed anti-cruising ordinance, 
achieved more than mere HIV-prevention. These policies were part and parcel of a plan 
by city officials to orchestrate the urban renewal of the downtown district, an area 
deemed blighted by sex businesses. Once these sex businesses were removed, city 
officials could actively encourage private developers to re-invest in the declined urban 
area. The campaign to remove sex businesses from city centers coincides with a 
revanchist city politics. According to geographer Neil Smith, a revanchist city politics is 
concerned with the removal of potential threats to property- and consumer-fueled 
gentrification. Under neoliberalism, commercial sex establishments are for the most part 
imagined as being incompatible with the cultivation of a leisure and profitable 
entertainment and residential district. Inasmuch as commercial sex establishments are 
perceived as sure signs of economic disinvestment, city officials employ exclusionary 
metaphors that convey reclaiming inner-cities from the alleged morally corrupt influences 
of pornography and casual sex with anonymous partners.51 
                                                




 Besides perceiving commercial sex establishments as obstacles to capital 
accumulation, civic leaders have also regarded them as threats to the urban order. 
According to geographer Phil Hubbard, commercial sex establishments transgress many 
of the divides that structure dominant modes of social intelligibility in the West: 
moral/immoral; high/low; public/private. By shattering the divide between domestic 
space and the public sphere, along with the behaviors deemed acceptable within those 
spaces, commercial sex establishments endanger the white, heterosexual, patriarchal 
family-unit as the organizational foundation of the sexual system in the West. Men could 
explore their sexuality with other men; women could enact a sexual agency historically 
denied to them in the private home. In light of the ability of commercial sex 
establishments to undermine white heteropatriarchy and the public/private divide of 
space, authorities have sought to contain the transgressive potential of such 
establishments by confining them to areas outside “ordered, monogamous 
heterosexuality.”52 In Minneapolis, city officials depicted the purchase and exchange of 
sexual services and materials as a threat to the urban moral order.  
In the fall of 1988, approximately six months after the closing of the 315 Health 
Club, members of the City Council held a press conference to announce the renovation of 
Hennepin Avenue’s infamous Block E, home to a number of shoddy storefronts that 
anchored the city’s red-light district in the 1980s. The press conference included a mock 
demolition with council members literally smashing the windows of X-rated businesses 
as fireworks and exploding balloons dotted the sky. In the shadows of newly erected 
metallic skyscrapers, Minneapolis’s Block E, lined with dirty low-rise buildings and 
                                                
52 Hubbard, Cities and Sexualities.   
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considered by some as one of the “rowdiest” places in the city, had comprised the 
epicenter of the city’s red-light district for more than a decade. Due to its sexually 
transgressive nature, Block E had also served an important function for gay men. 
Grounded by the Gay 90s complex to the north and the Saloon to the south, these two gay 
bars served as anchors of other erotic spaces and practices understood as crucial to 
nurturing gay male sexuality outside the home. As the thoroughfare of downtown 
Minneapolis, Hennepin Avenue, once the city’s booming theatre district, had become 
synonymous with the gay public sphere. In nurturing a homosexual consciousness, 
Hennepin Avenue’s Block E was influential in forging a collective sense of community 
outside the privatized bounds of compulsory heterosexuality.53 
 One of the most prominent tenants of Block E was the Adonis Theater, an X-rated 
theater that screened both straight and gay pornographic films to audiences, drawing 
theatergoers who cruised for sexual partners. Opening in the fall of 1975, the Adonis 
instantly became a sensation among gay men and a target of the Minneapolis Vice Squad; 
within eight months of operation, it was raided five times. Other tenants of the block 
included Shinders, an erotic bookstore, that occupied two corners. Block E was also 
home to flop hotels, a bar named Moby Dick’s, and an avant-garde art gallery. Perhaps 
the most reputable business on the block was the restaurant called Gary’s, which was one 
of Minnesota’s first gay-owned eateries. The rich diversity of the tenants is what made 
the block exciting, lively, and spirited for many a patron.54 But, long before commercial 
sex establishments became the targets of health officials in the wake of the HIV/AIDS 
                                                
53 Van Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves.  




epidemic, anti-pornography feminists targeted these public sex venues for closure. These 
anti-pornographic debates, in turn, help explain the divergent political campaigns of gay 
men and lesbians at this time. 
 By the 1980s, despite becoming more accessible due to the development of new 
technologies, pornography and commercial sex also became highly contested. Anti-
pornography feminists were a vocal stakeholder in discussions over commercial sex. In 
1983, the feminist writer Andrea Dworkin and the feminist legal scholar Catherine 
MacKinnon joined forces in drafting an anti-pornography ordinance in Minneapolis. The 
anti-pornography feminist movement demanded that sexual content be regulated and/or 
suppressed because it represented the gendered exploitation of women. This position 
reflected the movement’s interpretation of sexuality as dangerous because its practices, in 
a male-dominated society, produced, reproduced, and sustained male supremacy and 
violence against women. The Dworkin-MacKinnon ordinance infamously claimed that 
since pornography violated women’s civil rights, women had the right to sue the 
producers and distributors of pornography in civil court.55 The Minneapolis City Council 
passed the ordinance—twice. However, Mayor Donald Fraser vetoed the ordinance both 
times explaining that “the remedy sought through the ordinance is neither appropriate nor 
enforceable within our cherished and constitutionally protected right of free speech.”56 
Fraser denounced the ordinance for being so broad and vague as to render legally 
actionable any non-violent material that was not pornographic in the traditional sense. 
                                                
55 The ordinance deemed legally actionable any sexually explicit material that depicted women as 
commodities, as enjoying pain, humiliation, and/or rape, as reducible to body parts, as portrayed in 
“postures of sexual submission,” as whores by nature, or as having sex with animals. “Minneapolis council 
passes strict anti-pornography bill,” The San Diego Union, Dec. 31, 1983. 
56 “Minneapolis porn law is vetoed,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 6, 1984. 
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The lesbian feminist approach pornography differed from other approaches to 
pornography that called for its suppression on the grounds that it allegedly defied 
community standards of decency and risked pulling women into immorality. Despite 
these ideological differences, anti-pornography feminists mobilized alongside religious 
groups and neo-conservative family advocates.  
Queer activists in the Twin Cities were among the fiercest opponents of the anti-
pornography ordinance.57 They were weary of expanding the state’s regulatory apparatus 
and they were rightfully concerned that the ordinance would justify the violent 
harassment and policing of commercial sex establishments which gay men frequented to 
meet one another.58 Gay men who defended the social benefits of commercial sex 
                                                
57 At the public hearings on the proposed ordinance, gay men expressed their opposition to the ordinance on 
the grounds that it was anti-gay. They accused lesbian feminists of endorsing vice squad arrests and raids of 
commercial sex establishments. Campbell was one of the most vocal opponents, both in print and at the 
hearings. He was bothered by the ordinance’s broad definition of pornography, which he labeled “blatantly 
sexist, un-American, [and] fascist.” He even accused proponents of the ordinance of “gay bashing.” In 
print, Campbell editorialized on the benefits of sexually explicit material. He characterized pornography as 
“good,” claiming that “the objectification of the sexual model is a healthy part of sexual experience.” In 
addition to emphasizing the positive attributes of pornography, Campbell called into question assumptions 
that pornography rigidly represented the complete sexual subordination of women. He maintained that 
“most people [were] quite capable of being sexually submissive in one situation, sexually aggressive in 
another, and capable of exercising the same flexibility in other walks of life.” That flexibility to interpret 
the varied meanings and uses of pornography, Campbell argued, was the primary difference between the 
experiences of gay men and lesbians. Paul Brest and Ann Vandenberg, “Politics, Feminism and the 
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis,” Stanford Law Review 39, no. 3 (1987): 
607-61.; For more information on the anti-pornography movement in the Twin Cities, see: Pamela Butler, 
“Sex and the Cities: Re-Evaluating 1980s Feminist Politics in Minneapolis and St. Paul,” in Queer Twin 
Cities: Twin Cities GLBT Oral History Project, ed. Kevin P. Murphy et al. (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2010).; Georgina Hickey, “The Geography of Pornography: Neighborhood Feminism 
and the Battle Against ‘Dirty Bookstores’ in Minneapolis.” Frontiers: A Journal of Women’s Studies 32, 
no. 1 (2001): 125-151. 
58 A gay male witness at the public hearings prophesized that the ordinance would give local law 
enforcement the go-ahead to arrest and arrest those gay men engaging in consensual sex at commercial sex 
establishments. He spoke that the current “movement against pornographic bookstores has had a terrible 
effect on the gay community,” leading to police brutality. Another witness similarly underscored the 
consequences of the ordinance on gay men. This witness discussed the importance of erotic bookstores and 
X-rated theaters as meeting places for gay men “to be sexual together.” The witness explained that gay men 
“have had to develop signals in order to recognize each other and cultivate places where we can feel 
relatively safe. Adult bookstores have come to be part of that picture. So I do not take lightly that such 




establishments grew suspicious of lesbian feminist collusion with the state in the 
regulation of gay male sexuality and public sexual cultures. As the arrests of gay men and 
the raids against these establishments increased, tensions between gay men and lesbian 
feminists escalated. Given the vast ideological disagreements over the harms of 
pornography, lesbian feminists and gay men in the Twin Cities grew further apart in their 
shared sense of community, leading to the division of the annual Pride festivities in 1982 
in what infamously became known as the “Big Split.”59 For their part, lesbian feminists 
accused gay men of unexamined misogyny, especially in regards to the treatment of 
Anita Bryant, a critique that carried on to gay men’s treatment of Barbara Carlson.     
 In spite of being spared from the anti-pornography ordinance, commercial sex 
establishments, especially those along Hennepin Avenue, were subjected to a spike in 
police crackdowns. In an op-ed published in Gay Community News, queer activist Robert 
Halfhill wrote that between 1980 and 1984, Minneapolis police arrested nearly 3,500 gay 
men in commercial sex establishments.60 That a disproportionate number of gay men 
were targeted for arrest was also noted by an April 27, 1983, article by City Pages titled, 
“The High Price of Vice.” In that exposé, the author revealed that the Minneapolis vice 
squad had made nearly 7,000 arrests in the first three years of Police Chief Bouza’s 
                                                                                                                                            
comments are telling on several fronts. First, the witness made a case for these meeting places in a city that 
lacked a clearly definable “gayborhood.” Second, the witness gestured to the ways in which safety here, for 
women at least, could hinge upon further state-sanctioned violence against gay men who refused to 
conform to socially acceptable forms of sexual expression. According to the witness, the ordinance 
punished gay men, along with sex workers and their clients, for not only being unable or unwilling to 
participate in heteronormativity, but also by failing to engage in heterosexuality in its proper place: the 
private bedroom. Ibid.  
59 Van Cleave, Land of 10,000 Loves.  
60 According to Halfhill, when local gay male activists met with Minneapolis Police Chief Bouza in 1980 to 
protest these arrests, Bouza confessed that he was being encouraged to crack down on vice from “the other 
side.” Halfhill and other gay male activists took this reference to mean lesbians.  
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administration and that about a third of those arrested were gay men.61 Halfhill and others 
tied the increase in raids to efforts by a city commission to locate a new site for the 
Minneapolis Convention Center. Initially, the commission proposed an L-shaped mega 
block to host the new center, situating Block E between the mega block and a recently 
developed shopping arcade.62 Eventually, the city voted against the proposal and, instead, 
opted to expand the convention center’s existing site south of downtown Minneapolis. 
Although this move preserved the gay downtown district, it eradicated low-income 
housing south of downtown Minneapolis.  
 Even with the city not enacting the anti-pornography ordinance, it still went after 
commercial sex establishments through a zoning ordinance.63 In February of 1986, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a similar anti-pornography ordinance in 
                                                
61 City Pages estimated that average of 2.1 arrests of gay men per day. Halfhill noted that if the arrests 
began on October 15, 1979, three months before Bouza took office, as claimed in the December 14, 1979, 
issue of the MCGLR Lesbian/Gay Newsbriefs, then multiplying the number of days from that date to the 
time Halfhill penned his op-ed by 2.1 would have yielded 3,450 arrests of gay men. Robert Halfhill, 
“Speaking Out; On Anti-Porn Efforts and Gay Male Separatism,” Gay Community News, May 26, 1984: 5.; 
Dick Dahl, “The High Price of Vice,” City Pages, Apr. 27, 1983.  
62 For Campbell, the proposal was reflective of crooked political dealings: “It seems self-evident that the 
abuse of power of arrest to favor special interests in the commercial marketplace is graft…It is one thing to 
try to ‘clean up crime on Hennepin Avenue’ so that it is safe but quite another to pretend like we are 
making an avenue safe by arresting the most harmless creatures there.” Tim Campbell, “Appearance of 
Graft Taints Operations,” GLC Voice, Dec. 17, 1984: 1.   
63 In the wake of the 1973 decision in Miller v. California, obscenity laws became more challenging to 
apply to sexually explicit materials. According to Brest and Vandenberg, in an effort to protect non-
obscene material from overzealous officials, courts constrained censors “with strict procedural 
requirements that [made] civil and criminal actions to suppress pornography very expensive and time-
consuming.” Given these legal roadblocks, adult businesses and pornographers slipped through existing 
obscenity laws. Because city officials could no longer ban adult businesses outright under obscenity laws, 
cities began implementing zoning laws to sequester the sale of pornography to nonresidential areas. The 
City of Minneapolis was one such locale that implemented zoning laws as an alternative legal approach to 
the regulation of the adult entertainment industry. In 1977, neighborhood residents in south Minneapolis 
pressured the Minneapolis City Council to enact a zoning ordinance, inspired by a Detroit ordinance, that 
outlawed the operation of erotic bookstores and X-rated theaters within five hundred feet of a church, a 
school, a residential area, or another “adult-entertainment business.” Designed to prevent “the blighting or 
the downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood,” the Minneapolis zoning ordinance, however, was more 
restrictive than that of Detroit’s. Ferris Alexander immediately filed suit in federal court, claiming that the 
zoning ordinance would have forced most of his businesses—five theaters and six bookstores—to move or 
shut down. A federal district court blocked the enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that it violated 
the First Amendment. Brest and Vandenberg, “Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution.”  
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Indianapolis, it upheld a zoning ordinance out of Renton, Washington that banned the 
operation of commercial sex establishments in residential neighborhoods.64 Despite the 
previous Minneapolis zoning ordinance being struck down in 1977 for being too 
expansive, the City of Minneapolis revisited zoning as a strategy to constrain the location 
of commercial sex establishments. In 1986, Minneapolis passed a zoning ordinance, 
modeled after the one in Renton, Washington. The Minneapolis ordinance confined all 
adult businesses to the outskirts of downtown, near the warehouse district. The ordinance 
went into effect on December of 1988. But, its passage was not without opposition, in 
particular from Minnesota’s most notorious porn kingpin, Ferris Alexander, who filed 
suit against the city of Minneapolis. In March of 1991, a federal appeals court ruled that 
the constitutional rights of Alexander were not violated when Minneapolis passed its 
zoning ordinance. The court found that the city was not required by the First Amendment 
to find sites for Alexander’s businesses; the city was only prohibited from denying 
Alexander “a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city.” 
It confirmed that there were at least 120 “block faces”—or sides of a city block—in 
which an adult theater owner could potentially be located in the downtown area. The 
court stipulated, “That Alexander could not secure property meeting his economic or 
commercial criteria does not render (the ordinance) invalid.”65   
In addition to zoning, the City of Minneapolis collaborated with federal agents to 
prosecute Alexander on the grounds of obscenity, tax evasion, and money laundering. As 
                                                
64 For the most part, zoning ordinances prohibited adult businesses from operating in close proximity to 
residential neighborhoods or areas where children could congregate including schools, parks, daycare 
centers, and places of worship. City officials argued that adult businesses caused negative secondary effects 
including increased crime and decreased property values. For that reason, city officials justified restricting 
adult businesses to areas zoned for industrial use including factories, office buildings, and warehouses.  
65 Donna Halvorsen, “Court says zoning law didn’t violate Alexander’s rights//Rules excluding sex-film 
theaters from most of city ok.” Star Tribune, Mar. 19, 1991. 
 
 409 
part of a probe into alleged interstate transportation and distribution of obscene material 
by Alexander, on May 10, 1988, federal agents raided 23 bookstores, video outlets, and 
theaters throughout the state of Minnesota.66 The government’s search of Alexander’s 
businesses yielded a 41-count indictment in which he was accused of engaging in 
racketing by selling pornographic materials, concealing his identity, and hiding profits 
from the IRS. On May 23, 1990, Alexander was found guilty of 25 counts of 
racketeering, obscenity, and tax fraud.67 The Alexander racketeering-obscenity verdict is 
noteworthy because it was the first time in Minnesota and the second time in the United 
States that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) had been used 
to combat pornography. Although Congress initially passed RICO to battle organized 
crime, RICO empowered federal agents to seize the assets of a person convicted of two or 
more obscenity offenses.68    
                                                
66 The FBI and IRS investigation of Alexander in Minnesota was part of a nationwide crackdown on 
interstate trafficking of obscene material spurred by a 1987 directive by the Meese Commission, which 
examined obscenity and child pornography laws. The 27 search warrants authorized federal agents to 
obtain three copies of all the materials that had been previously bought and considered obscene under 
federal law. By the end of the day, the FBI and IRS collected about 15 cartons of obscene material, and 
business records. Agents seized works with such titles as Leather Sleaze, Payment in Pain, and High 
School Memories. These films contained depictions of bondage, spanking, and homosexuality. The daylong 
operation involved about 125 federal agents and local police officers. Kevin Diaz, “Alexander is focus of 
23 porn raids,” Star Tribune, May 11, 1988.  
67 On May 25, 1990, a federal judge ruled that Alexander’s properties plus his wholesale and distribution 
company had been used for criminal activities in violation of federal law and were, thus, subject to 
forfeiture to the government. The judge authorized prosecutors to padlock Alexander’s businesses, 
estimated to be worth several million dollars. With Alexander’s possessions legally forfeited to the 
government, federal agents subsequently destroyed the entirety of the material stored at the warehouse. 
Over 100,000 books, films, and magazines valued at $9 million were burned. In addition to having his 
assists seized, Alexander was fined $200,000 and was sentenced to a six-year prison term for the 
racketeering conviction. Matthew Hutchinson, “Supreme Court hears porn case arguments,” Star Tribune, 
Jan. 13, 1993.; Margaret Zack, “Alexander’s properties are subject to forfeiture,” Star Tribune, May 26, 
1990.  
68 In January of 1993, the case against Alexander reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Alexander’s lawyer 
asked the justices to declare provisions of RICO unconstitutional. His lawyer argued that the government 
had overstepped its legal authority when it destroyed $9 million in books, magazines, and videos from 
Alexander’s adult businesses. Alexander’s lawyer established that the destruction of Alexander’s property 
for convictions on only seven counts of obscenity violated the eighth amendment protection against cruel 




With Alexander’s prosecution, spaces that accommodated public sexual cultures 
and that served as meeting places for gay men were eradicated, if not, severely curtailed. 
By 1988, commercial sex establishments on Block E stood empty as the structures 
awaited to be demolished. In an effort to lure new private development, the City Council 
of Minneapolis endorsed the clearance and urban renewal of Block E. However, for 
thirteen years, Block E faded away as a surface-level parking lot. And, then in 2001, 
private developers erected on the ruins of Minneapolis’s public sexual cultures a large 
luxury hotel, a movie theater, and a shopping complex. Within a decade of its grand 
reopening, the chains housed within Block E closed, one after the other.  
As the anti-bathhouse ordinance and the redevelopment of Block E in 
Minneapolis reflect, the targets of urban renewal in the 1980s often included public 
sexual cultures and the establishments that facilitated their existence. The success of 
Minneapolis in cleaning up its commercial sex establishments and public sexual cultures 
is mirrored in similar efforts to clean up areas of such land use in San Francisco and New 
York City. In “The Miracle Mile: South Market and Gay Male Leather, 1962-1997,” 
Gayle Rubin investigates the effects of urban redevelopment on San Francisco 
commercial sex establishments. Rubin argues that police action, urban renewal, and 
public health all conspired to substantially impact San Francisco’s gay and sexual 
geographies. The effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic were particularly evident in the gay 
male leather community in the South of Market neighborhood. Between 1966 and 1982, 
                                                                                                                                            
Court did not rule in Alexander’s favor. In July of 1993, the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment 
did not protect Alexander against the government destroying more than 100,000 books, films, and 
magazines or from seizing his financial assets under an obscenity offense. Justice Anthony Kennedy 
dissented in the majority’s opinion noting that the threat lied not just to “smut” peddlers. He warned, “Any 
bookstore or press enterprise could be forfeited as punishment for even a single obscenity conviction.” 
“Don’t forfeit free speech,” USA Today, Jul. 2, 1993. 
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Rubin writes that there was “a period of triumphant expansion” in the gay male leather 
community in South of Market. However, by the middle-1980s, the neighborhood and 
community were “devastated” as the HIV/AIDS epidemic brought “a tsunami of 
mortality to gay men in San Francisco, and the South of Market appeared to bear the 
brunt of its fury.”69 Yet, unlike the Castro, the impacts of HIV/AIDS in the leather 
community in South of Market, as much as they were from AIDS itself, were also the 
result of a geographic competition for the region that had long preceded the epidemic, 
and from public policy decisions surrounding disease control. The conversion to a 
straighter, more respectable, and more expensive South of Market was already underway 
before AIDS struck.70 Nonetheless, public policy decisions about disease control and 
commercial sex establishments spurred by the HIV/AIDS epidemic intensified that 
process of urban renewal in South of Market. With the destruction of the South of Market 
neighborhood, the gay male leather community that once flourished in that space was 
likewise pushed away. Rubin’s analysis informs us how the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
provided city officials and private developers with an opportunity, if not excuse, to 
bulldoze the infrastructure of public sexual cultures in cities across the United States.  
Just at the Federal Drug Administration approved new life-sustaining medications 
for people with HIV/AIDS, the mid-1990s witnessed the recycling of these moral and 
                                                
69 Gayle S. Rubin, “The Miracle Mile: South Market and Gay Male Leather, 1962-1997,” in Reclaiming 
San Francisco: History, Politics, and Culture, ed. James Brook, et. al. (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 
1998), 259.  
70 Rubin reveals that gay nightlife was drawn to the South of Market neighborhood because of its vacant 
buildings, both commercial and residential, that made rent relatively cheap there. Street life was often 
minimal in the neighborhood. When businesses closed, the streets were empty and parking was readily 
available. The lack of nighttime activity offered a semblance of privacy in which demonized forms of 
sexual identities and practices could prosper. These factors, Rubin contends, were crucial for gay men in 
search of public spaces to call their own. With the advent of urban renewal, however, police attention 
towards this area of San Francisco enabled its “clean up,” readying the space for private real estate 
development and, by extension, pushing gay men away from the area. Ibid.  
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public health campaigns against commercial sex establishments in what became known 
as the “second wave” of anti-public sex crusades. The drive against adult businesses 
corresponded with corporate interests in real estate development to gentrify vice districts 
into tourist destinations and high-income residential districts. Commercial sex 
establishments were at odds with the image neoliberal cities wanted to project. This set of 
dynamics was clearly articulated in 1995 when Mayor Rudolph Giuliani of New York 
City initiated a campaign to disperse sex businesses in the Times Square area to the city 
fringes. He requested that the City Council approve amendments to the city’s Zoning 
Resolutions to “encourage the development of desirable residential, commercial and 
manufacturing areas with appropriate groupings of compatible and related uses and thus 
to promote and to protect public health, safety and general welfare.” The new law defined 
adult establishments as “objectionable non-conforming uses which are detrimental to the 
character of the districts in which (they) are located.”71 The resolution, not unlike that 
zoning ordinance passed in Minneapolis, forbade “X-rated businesses” from operating 
within 500 feet of residential districts, schools, houses of worship, or each other. Under 
that ordinance, only 28 of the then-177 commercial sex establishments were allowed to 
remain in operation at their current location. The rest had one year to change the nature of 
their business, or to relocate to sites approved by the city’s planning commission. The 
commission approved mostly industrial and manufacturing zones outside the borough of 
Manhattan. Although there was mixed evidence that the presence of adult establishments 
negatively impacted on property values in the Times Square district or that it promoted 
significant criminal activity, the area was reinvented as the family-friendly entertainment 
                                                




zone of the 42nd Street Business Improvement District. The Walt Disney Corporation was 
a key investor in the area’s reinvention.72 
The zoning ordinance in New York City illustrates how private real estate 
interests help dictate the contours around normative and deviant displays of sexuality. 
According to historian David Serlin, the large gentrification projects aimed at vice 
districts in New York City were not so much about “quality-of-life,” improving 
neighborhoods, or protecting children from commercial sexuality, as they were about 
maximizing “quantity of income from real estate investment.” Although Giuliani justified 
cuts to educational, municipal, and social services throughout the city as fiscal austerity, 
he devoted a significant amount of the city’s budget to transforming empty office 
buildings in downtown Manhattan into luxury high-rise condominiums, family-friendly 
entertainment zones, and high-end shopping districts. Given shared economic and 
political imperatives, city government worked alongside finance and real estate industries 
to enact a campaign against commercial sex establishments. Serlin explains, “From the 
standpoint of multibillion-dollar real estate development, especially in Times Square, the 
closing of clubs, theaters, and shops is an economic wet dream of unparalleled erotic 
appeal.”73 Serlin’s analysis clarifies how the rezoning of commercial sex worked in the 
service of private corporate developers’ interests.74 
                                                
72 David Serlin, ‘The Twilight (Zone) of Commercial Sex,” in Policing Public Sex: Queer Politics and the 
Future of AIDS Activism, ed. Dangerous Bedfellows (Boston: South End Press, 1996), 48.  
73 Ibid., 48. 
74 One of the major stakeholders of the gentrification of New York City’s Times Square was the Walt 
Disney Corporation with its foray into musical theater on Broadway. Another prominent player was the 
Times Square Business Improvement District (BID). Both entities supported the zoning ordinance. In light 
of cuts to social services, BIDs have come to usurp the role of state urban governance. Nonetheless, as 
private entities, corporate interests shape BIDs. By functioning in the service of real estate interests, BIDs 
recalibrate the nature of commercial and residential relationships in both large cities and small 




Although the zoning ordinance in New York City drew protests from a number of 
political organizations, legal funds, and grassroots activists, Giuliani’s efforts were 
strengthened by a group of gay and lesbian journalists who argued that commercial sex 
establishments were responsible for rising HIV infections.75 This collective of anti-
bathhouse gay and lesbian activists in New York City formed the Gay and Lesbian HIV 
Prevention Activists (GALHPA) to warn what it determined was a “second wave” of 
HIV infections brought about by public sexual cultures and commercial sex 
establishments.76 Owing to the fact that GALHPA attributed an increase in HIV 
infections to new public sex venues, it proposed eliminating public sex altogether as the 
only way to curb such transmission. GALHPA, thus, propagated the belief that regulation 
in and of itself served a legitimate prevention strategy.  
Central to its mission of regulating commercial sex establishments, GALHPA 
forged a connection between public sex and HIV-transmission by circulating rhetoric that 
associated public sex with anonymity and promiscuity. GALHPA’s actions concurred 
                                                                                                                                            
attacks against the poor, the homeless, and the racialized deviant. According to Serlin, BIDs accrue 
legitimacy by convincing residents and tenants “to believe that corporate muscle, backed by investment 
capital, will not only protect property values, but also rid their spaces of unsavory social elements.” Simply 
put, BIDs help determine the parameters of both public and private space. They also identify the 
populations lucky enough to access such privacy. Ibid., 49.  
75 In explaining the support of some gay leaders to the zoning ordinance, Serlin writes that “upwardly 
mobile gay people” tend to be more invested in “the service industries and corporate sectors” than they are 
not committed to “the political and economic struggles of their less affluent gay brothers and sisters.” 
Serlin argues that for these affluent gay people, their interests are symbolized and mediated by property—
the property that imparts authority only to those who can afford it, maintain it, and ultimately protect is 
from anyone who deviates from the sanitized, monogamous bourgeois homosexual norm sanctioned by 
local or federal governments.” Ibid., 51 
76 In particular, GALHPA formed in response to the opening of the West Side Club, the first new gay 
bathhouse to open in New York City since the large-scale closing of bathhouses in the mid-1980s. 
Members of GALHPA included Gabriel Rotello, Duncan Osborne, Jonathan Capeheart, Amy Pagnozzi, 
and Michelangelo Signorile. As independent journalists, tabloid columnists, and best-selling authors, 
members of GALHPA enjoyed high profiles that rendered them influential in the public sphere. As such, 
mainstream media ascribed authority and legitimacy to GALHPA as the single voice of AIDS activism. 
Alison Reddick, “Dangerous Practices: Ideological Uses of the ‘Second Wave’,” in Policing Public Sex: 




with those of journalist Randy Shilts’s flawed account of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
bolstered the notion among moral conservatives that HIV/AIDS was the result of gay 
men’s supposed careless and hedonistic sexual impulses. The notion that public sex 
amounts to unsafe sex, argues Alison Reddick, is without merit.77 According to Reddick, 
the pressure to engage in unprotected anal intercourse is perhaps greater in long-term, 
monogamous relationships than at commercial sex establishments since sex without 
condoms is symbolic of mutual trust and commitment, a sentiment that was expressed by 
a number of queer activists during the anti-bathhouse and anti-cruising public hearings. 
Reddick elaborates that the conflation of public with unsafe hinges upon a “sex-negative 
and fundamentally homophobic position that equates the spread of HIV with a sexual 
lifestyle instead of specific sexual practices.”78 I would add that equating public sex with 
unsafe also displaces attention away from the role of the government and the medical 
establishment in allowing the epidemic to proliferate. Embracing a policy of regulation as 
a prevention strategy not only normalizes the fictitious connection between public and 
unsafe, but it also displaces attention away from implementing safer sex education 
towards an approach primarily concerned with eliminating non-monogamy. This 
approach—regulation as prevention— is not an effective public health measure because it 
largely obfuscates the specific sexual practices that do, in fact, contribute to HIV-
transmission. It also fails to take into account how closing commercial sex establishments 
would negatively impact those without access to sexual privacy, namely queers of color. 
                                                
77 GALHPA also argued that HIV transmission leveled off in the mid-1980s among gay men as a result of 
bathhouse closures. However, Reddick discounts this claim, suggesting that the combine result of ELISA, 
the first reliable test for HIV antibodies, and safer sex education program had a greater impact on reducing 
rates of infection. Ibid.  
78 Ibid., 93.  
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By focusing on ridding gay men of non-monogamy, anti-bathhouse activists were heavily 
invested in publicizing an image of normative gay male sexuality. To do so, activists 
relied on moral panic discourses that were racialized to differentiate white gay men from 
poor, people of color, what I call racialized norms of sexual hygiene. Celebrating 
racialized norms of sexual hygiene as the criteria upon which to measure someone’s 
moral fitness for social membership enabled white gay leaders to vouch for the morality 
and respectability (read: normativity) of white gay men. Although public sex is not 
necessarily any less safe than monogamous or private sex, GALPHA—much like Coyle 
in the 1980s—succeeded in normalizing private, monogamous sex as the new standard of 
white gay male sexuality. As a result, GALHPA helped spread discourses and practices 
that privatized white gay male sexuality and, by extension, gentrified New York City. 
With the gentrification of central cities and the demise of public sexual cultures, 
the communities that abounded in commercial sex establishments were likewise 
eradicated. The loss of such cultures witnessed the eradication of channels for social 
critique against the shifts in the political economy of central cities in the United States. 
Likewise, it minimized the venues through which one could destabilize the fictitious 
divide between heterosexuality and same-sex desire. Such is the subject of Samuel R. 
Delany’s Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, in which he looks at aspects of New 
York City affected by the Times Square Development Project of the mid-1990s that I 
discussed above. That project consisted of the demolition of several businesses, including 
more than half-a-dozen X-rated movie theaters, and the construction of massive office 
towers, entertainment centers, and shopping arcades. The consequences of this “violent 
reconfiguration” of the city’s landscape, Delany proposes, entailed “a legal and moral 
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remapping of [the city’s] own discursive structures, changing laws about sex, health and 
zoning.” In particular, Delany laments the loss of complex and interlocking systems of 
interracial and interclass communication. He describes patrons of such establishments as 
“incredibly heterogeneous— white, black, Hispanic, Asian, Indian, Native American, and 
a variety of Pacific Islanders.” In his visits to these establishments, Delany came across 
“playwrights, carpenters, opera singers, telephone repair men, stockbrokers, guys on 
welfare, guys with trust funds, guys on crutches, on walkers, in wheelchairs, teachers, 
warehouse workers, male nurses, fancy chefs, guys who worked at Dunkin Donuts, guys 
who gave out flyers on street corners, guys who drove garbage trucks, and guys who 
washed windows on the Empire State Building.” All these patrons, Delany argues, 
comprised a community that was racially and socio-economically diverse, beneficial to 
the public in the wake of moral campaigns and private real estate efforts to regulate 
commercial sex establishments.79 Moreover, since a number of patrons that frequented 
these establishments were heterosexually identified men, the X-rated theaters enabled 
sexual experimentation among patrons in ways that challenged the 
heterosexual/homosexual binary.80 Whether or not the X-rated theaters created or merely 
                                                
79 In describing patrons of X-rated theaters as comprising a community, Delany recounts a return visit to 
the Variety, one particular X-rated theater on Forty-Second Street, after being abroad for a number of years, 
Delany writes: “I noticed a dozen or so patrons were men I’d seen there regularly three, five, ten years 
before. The place seemed almost a kind of family, with a neighborhood feel.” Contrary to the vernacular of 
moral campaigns to regulate commercial sex establishments, Delany never thought of these establishments 
that “showed straight porn and encouraged gay sex in the audience” as dangerous precisely because of the 
community that repeat attendees had forged: “Come back six times in five weeks, and you recognized a 
third of the faces you saw, and they recognized you. After another six visits, you had a few passing 
acquaintances.” Samuel R. Delany, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999), 20, 33.  
80 Delany recounts how a number of straight patrons allowed gay men to perform sexual acts on them yet 
these men did not necessarily identify as “gay.” In fact, a number of them were married or had girlfriends. 
One particular example is Gary, a lanky, likeable handyman with a brown ponytail who worked at a 
Catholic church. Delany writes that although Gary had “a regular girlfriend,” her “overall sexual appetites 




exposed already-existing same-sex desires within patrons is up for debate. What is clear 
is that these establishments did provide men with countless opportunities in which they 
could explore their sexual desires with other men in an environment where identity did 
not cohere around behavioral practices and where “healthy” sex did not find itself 
confined to the private bedroom.  
Although these connections were formed at porn houses, for Delany these were 
still significant relationships that lasted years. The most important aspect of these 
relationships, Delany writes, is that mutual pleasure was exchanged. They were founded 
on the shared goal of pleasure—not on the coherence of identity.81 They were also 
intimate in that they hinged upon a mutual level of trust in one another. Therefore, 
contrary to the claims made by anti-bathhouse activists—GALPHA, Coyle, Brown, 
Shilts—Delany’s experiences at commercial sex establishments shows us that patrons 
were, in fact, capable of nurturing long-term, relationships with others. Patrons did not 
visit these establishments out of shame or an unwillingness to embrace one’s same-sex 
desires, but out of a desire to participate in a community shaped by the pursuit of sexual 
                                                                                                                                            
with Arly, who had lost his leg at five after his crazed, drunken father flung him under an oncoming 
subway. Arly also played the drums in his mother’s Columbian Pentecostal church. After meeting in the 
balcony of the Cameo Theater, the two men hit it off so well that soon they were going to each other’s 
apartments. Arly even helped Delany tend to his mother who had suffered a stroke that left her partially 
paralyzed. Once when Arly was over at Delany’s apartment, Arly reached out and pulled Delany to him 
and, with their eyes closed, the two kissed for ten or fifteen uninterrupted minutes. When the two stopped 
kissing, Arly confessed, “Now—I ain’t never done that before! I mean with a guy. First I was trying to 
pretend like your beard was pussy hair or something. But I didn’t even really have to do that!” In the 
summer of 1993, after several years without seeing each other, Delany ran into Arly and his wife, 
suggesting that Arly did not necessarily subscribe to any one set of sexual identity or practice. Ibid., 36 
81 Speaking in regards to these relationships, Delany explains, “Most were affable but brief because, 
beyond pleasure, these were people you had little in common with. Yet what greater field and force than 
pleasure can human beings share? More than half were single encounters. But some lasted over weeks; 
others for months; still others went on a couple of years. And enough endured a decade or more to give 
them their own flavor, form, and characteristic aspects. You learned something about these people…and 
they learned something about you. The relationships were not (necessarily) consecutive. They braided. 
They interwove. They were simultaneous…These relationships did not annoy or in any way distress the 
man I was living with—because they had their limits. They were not the central relationships of my life. 
They made that central relationship richer, however, by relieving it of many anxieties.” Ibid., 56-57. 
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pleasure. Delany’s account brings to light how public sex is a social process with the 
potential to sidestep racial and class cleavages with benefits for all involved.82 Given the 
social justice benefits attached to this form of sexual intimacy, Delany argues that, in the 
midst of our current state of capitalism, it is necessary to have interracial and interclass 
institutions that offer the services and fulfill the social functions provided by X-rated 
movie theaters that encourage sex among the audience.83 Since these relationships are 
born out of a shared investment in pleasure and not a shared identity, I add that these 
relationships possess the power to radically destabilize the tendency of neoliberalism to 
co-opt minority social movements, something that came to fruition with the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  
In The Gentrification of the Mind, author Sarah Schulman builds upon Delany to 
propose that gentrification does not only happen to buildings, neighborhoods, and cities, 
but it also happens to ideas, to diversity, and to the mind. Writing about the gentrification 
of New York City in the 1980s amid the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Schulman contends that 
AIDS and gentrification have collaboratively generated a number of epistemological 
shifts in people’s consciousness, leading to a reduced engagement with both political and 
artistic change. While suburbanization homogenized race, class, gender, and sexual 
                                                
82 Delany confesses that what made his sex life healthy between 1975 and 1995 was the presence of 
institutions such as the porn houses, the baths, and the bars. After the closing of these establishments, 
Delany rightfully wondered what that would entail for his sex life: “What kind of leaps am I going to have 
to make now between the acceptable and the unacceptable, between the legal and the illegal, to continue 
having a satisfactory sex life?” Ibid. 
83 Delany argues, “Given the mode of capitalism under which we live, life is at its most rewarding, 
productive, and pleasant when large numbers of people understand, appreciate, and seek out interclass 
contact and communication conducted in a mode of good will.” Delany goes on to explain that because the 
class war erodes social practices through which interclass communication takes place new institutions must 
always be conceived to fulfill those social needs. He proposes that the services of these institutions be 
accessible not just to gay men but also to all men and women, regardless of sexual identity and practice. 
Ibid., 121.  
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particularities into privatized suburban lifestyles, Schulman writes that the city facilitated 
“innovative aesthetics, diverse food traditions, new innovations in arts and entertainment, 
new discoveries in music, ease with mixed-race and mixed religious communities, free 
sexual expression, and political radicalism.”84 For Schulman, it is this dynamic mix of 
different kinds of people creating new ideas together that defines urbanity. In cities, 
people from diverse walks of life with differing points of view come into contact with 
one another. However, gentrification, Schulman argues, sanitizes this cultural diversity 
and replaces urbanity with “racial and class stratification, homogeneity of consumption, 
mass-produced aesthetics, and familial privatization.”85 The gentrification of urban space 
is mirrored in the transformation of homosexuality away from the direct-action politics of 
gay liberation towards a homonormative politics of assimilation and non-redistribution. 
For Schulman, this shift in gay politics is a direct consequence of AIDS which convinced 
gay men into thinking that same-sex identities and practices were to occur in private 
should gay men seek state recognition. Schulman’s point here is that the gentrification of 
vice districts disrupts the diverse queer subcultural experiences and sexual heterogeneity 
that abound within urban spaces and, by extension, the counter-hegemonic cultural 
practices that disrupt the institutions of capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and white 
supremacy. Given the impacts of urban renewal on racial, class, gender, and sexual 
experiences, it is important to nurture the types of institutions that Delany and Schulman 
celebrate for enabling interracial and cross-class contact.   
 
                                                
84 Sarah Schulman, The Gentrification of the Mind: Witness to a Lost Imagination (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2013), 25.  
85 Ibid., 27-28. 
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Conclusion.   
 The relationship between AIDS and gentrification has hardly been recognized. 
Perhaps, it is because the trauma of AIDS still lingers or, more likely, because engaging 
the relationship between the epidemic and the urban revitalization of central cities stirs up 
questions about accountability that those in power are still unwilling to answer. This is a 
significant omission, particularly in the literature of urban politics, as cities and 
neighborhoods with high rates of AIDS-related deaths also witnessed profound 
gentrification. According to Schulman, the high rate of deaths from AIDS was one of a 
number of determining factors in the rapid spread of key neighborhoods in Manhattan.86 
For every leaseholder that died of AIDS, his apartment went to market rate. These 
apartments were subsequently subjected to dramatic increases in rent. This real estate 
conversion, in turn, accelerated the gentrification of neighborhoods, a process that was 
already underway before the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Since PWHAs had no protections, 
their surviving partners or roommates were barred from inheriting the leases. 
 Because the trajectory of the HIV/AIDS epidemic interweaves with patterns of 
urban change in the last thirty years in the United States, it is imperative that we examine 
both phenomena in relation to one another. How did one create the conditions of 
                                                
86 Some of the most gentrified neighborhoods in Manhattan included East Village, West Village, Lower 
Eastside, Harlem, and Chelsea. According to the National Research Council’s 1993 report on the social 
impact of AIDS, Manhattan’s highest rates of infection were in Chelsea (1,802 per 100,000), Lower 
Eastside East Village (1,434 per 100,000), Greenwich Village (1,175 per 100,000), and Harlem (722 per 
100,000). As part of the process of gentrification, the racial and class demographics of these neighborhoods 
changed along with increased property values. Schulman reports that by 2008, 22 percent of Harlem’s 
residents were white. (In 1988, Manhattan was 47 percent white. By 2009, it was 57 percent white.) 
Meanwhile, by 2009, the average household income in Chelsea was $176,312. The median housing sales 
price in the West Village in 2010 was $1,962,500, despite the crash of the credit markets. While 
foreclosures pervaded the housing market across the country, East Village had one of the lowest 
foreclosure rates in New York City. This is not to suggest that AIDS was the sole determinant factor in the 
gentrification of neighborhoods in San Francisco or New York City. Gentrification was already underway 
in these cities in the late 1970s when AIDS hit in 1981. However, AIDS did intensify the process of urban 
revitalization in these places. Ibid.  
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possibility for the other? As is evident from this chapter, AIDS has immensely and 
unquestionably contributed to the decimation of public sexual cultures while it has 
simultaneously powered through the gentrification of vice districts. The gentrification of 
vice districts and neighborhoods primarily inhabited by white gay men, in turn, 
contributed to the rise in the politics and culture of homonormativity. By normalizing the 
practices of consumerism, domesticity, and privacy, homonormativity bolstered the social 
infrastructure of gentrification. The gentrification of AIDS confirmed that domestic space 
would be the medium through which white gay men could vouch for their normativity 
and hence petition the state for their inclusion within the economic, political, and social 
fabric of the nation. After all, it was via private living arrangements that the courts first 
legally recognized middle-class, white same-sex couples.  
 In 1985, Michael Brown, a 31-year-old white gay man, filed a landmark suit 
claiming that he was entitled to the same lease renewal rights as a heterosexual surviving 
spouse under a New York state policy regulating rent-controlled apartments. Brown and 
his partner, Robert Hayes, shared a $161-a-month one-bedroom apartment in the Chelsea 
section of the city since 1977. However, because only Hayes’ name was on the lease, 
when he died of AIDS in 1985, the landlord refused to renew the lease for Brown, whom 
he characterized as “at most a roommate.” The landlord demanded that Brown pay the 
fair market value of the apartment of $1,000 a month if he so desired to remain in the 
apartment. In response, Brown filed suit, contending that the city’s Rent Stabilization 
Law provided renewal of a lease not only to a legally married spouse, but also to a 
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“surviving gay life partner.” In justifying that he was entitled to paying the rent-
controlled amount, Brown proclaimed, “We lived as do spouses.”87 
In support of Brown’s pending court motion, the Chelsea AIDS Committee 
(CAC) organized a rally of about 150 people, both gay and straight, outside Brown’s 
Chelsea apartment. Chanting “Stop AIDS evictions,” supporters insisted that Brown had 
a right to a lease renewal because of the spousal relationship he maintained with Hayes. 
In an interview with Newsday, a community activist and Chelsea resident at the rally 
underscored the far-reaching implications of Brown’s petition: “Underlying this is that 
lesbian and gay people really want to be treated as any other people.” Another organizer 
from CAC described to Newsday the pervasiveness of such “AIDS evictions” by 
commenting that “all over New York City people are being evicted from their apartments 
because their lovers or…partners have died of AIDS. And we’re going to say to 
landlords, you’re not going to evict our family members anymore.”88 Despite this mass 
mobilization on behalf of Brown, Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Helen Freedman 
ruled in December of 1985 that although she was sympathetic to Brown’s “unfortunate 
plight,” the law stated that only the named tenant had a right to a lease renewal. In 
response, the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal issued an “emergency” 
bulletin requiring that renewal leases be automatically offered to both surviving 
“immediate” family members living in the apartment and “non-immediate” family 
members, such as siblings, nephews, uncles, and in-laws.89 Brown’s attorney appealed 
Freedman’s decision under the emergency order protecting spouses and family members 
                                                
87 “Briefs: New York gay man seeks spousal rights,” GLC Voice, Feb. 3, 1986.; “Roomer or Mate?” 
Newsday, Jan. 4, 1986: 6.   
88 Jack Sirica, “150 Rally Against Eviction,” Newsday, Mar. 30, 1986: 3. 
89 Dennis Hevesi, “Partner of Gay Tenant Has Rent Rights: Judge,” Newsday, Apr. 22, 1986: 2. 
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of deceased tenants from eviction. Brown’s attorney declared to the press, “Our argument 
here is that Michael Brown is in the same position as a widow or widower. The only 
thing he doesn’t have is the marriage certificate.”90 Brown’s attorney did not argue that 
Brown should have maintained paying the rent-controlled amount by mere virtue of 
having lived in the apartment for eight years. Instead, he privileged Brown’s conjugal 
relationship with Hayes within the domestic sphere. This legal approach proved 
successful. 
In the spring of 1986, Freedman reversed her previous decision and ruled that 
Brown, as the “life partner” of Hayes had the same right as a family member to remain in 
the couple’s rented apartment.91 In a statement to the press, Brown’s attorney lauded the 
court’s decision: “I think the decision is a very well-reasoned one…It finds in the context 
of housing that gay life partners are entitled to the same rights as family members.” By 
determining that apartments be offered to same-sex partners of deceased leaseholders, 
even if their name did not appear on the lease, Freedman’s ruling conceived of 
homosexual “life partners” as having the same rights as certain family members, 
especially in regards to apartment leases. To that end, Freedman’s ruling was one of the 
first instances in American legal history that the courts recognized same-sex relationships 
as equal to heterosexual ones. It is important to note, however, that this recognition was 
                                                
90 Jack Sirica, “The Quiet Mourning After AIDS Deaths,” Newsday, Feb. 16, 1986: 6. 
91 Barry Adkins, “Judge Rules ‘Gay Life Partners’ Are Family Members,” New York Native, May 5, 1986, 
8.; “Homosexual Partner Wins Rent-Law Case,” New York Times, Apr. 22, 1986: B3.; “Letters: Surviving 
lover wins lease,” Equal Time, May 18, 1986.  
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contingent upon framing white gay men as rightful inhabitants of a domestic sphere; it 
was not the culmination of a newfound tolerance by the state.92  
Brown’s case epitomizes how the homonormalization of white, middle-class 
same-sex households in the United States is intimately tied to the social and spatial 
restructuring of U.S. cities. The privatizing imperatives of U.S. LGBT politics (i.e., 
marriage as a solution to HIV/AIDS) has rendered LGBT political mobilizations 
inseparable from private property politics under neoliberalism (i.e., gentrification). This 
process underscores that norms of domestic space are central to the articulation of social 
value enacted by marginalized groups in their campaign towards cultural, political, and 
social inclusion.  
Speaking about the prominence of gay marriage in the wake of AIDS, Schulman 
argues that before the epidemic, gay marriage was considered “preposterous.” This is 
because the gay liberation movement promoted a defense of a community-based culture 
and a rejection of privatized family units on a reproductive model. With the 
                                                
92 Freedman’s ruling would be short-lived. In the spring of 1987, the Appellate Division of the New York 
Supreme Court struck down Freedman’s ruling by arguing that the regulations issued by the Division of 
Housing and Urban Renewal that allowed the transfer of leases on rent-stabilized apartments to non-
immediate family members were illegal. Still, many other similar cases emerged in which the death of a 
leaseholder due to AIDS-related complications triggered the eviction process for his partner. Another high-
profile case of “AIDS eviction” is that of Everett Quinton and his partner Charles Ludlum, founder of the 
Ridiculous Theatrical Company in New York City. When Ludlum died of AIDS-related complications in 
1987, Quinton, who served as artistic director for the theater company, received news from his landlord that 
he was being evicted from the Greenwich Village apartment the couple had shared for 11 years. Since 
Quinton’s name was not on the lease, the landlord argued that Quinto had to vacate the premises. In 
response, Quinton waged a court battle to stop his eviction from the $334-a-month, rent-stabilized 
apartment. On May 21, 1988, about 75 people, including tenants and members of community groups, 
rallied in Sheridan Square in Manhattan to protest Quinton’s eviction. Quinton told Newsday that the 
eviction was “really unfair” and that it came at time when he was still grieving. He warned, “This could 
happen to anyone—straight people are in the same boat. Landlords can throw you into the street if your 
name isn’t on the lease.” Then-State Senate Minority Leader Mandred Ohrenstein told Newsday that the 
law governing apartment rentals was ambiguous. As a result, Ohrenstein co-sponsored a bill that would 
prevent the eviction of the surviving member of a long-term cohabitating relationship, even if that person 
had not signed the lease. He hoped the law would apply to both “traditional” and “nontraditional” 
relationships. Joseph W. Queen, “Survivor Faces Eviction Fight,” Newsday, May 22, 1988: 17. 
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homogenization of cities, nevertheless, and the unexamined trauma of AIDS, 
homosexuality shifted away from its radical underpinnings into one aligned with 
dominant cultural, social, and political structures. Through the ideological expansion of 
domesticity and privacy to include long-term, monogamous same-sex couples, gay 
marriage leaves the model of compulsory heterosexism, white supremacy, and private 
property intact. In the context of AIDS and a dwindling public sphere, gay marriage 
proved a somewhat appealing solution to the epidemic for some white gay leaders. Gay 
marriage offered gay men a stability long denied to them. Schulman stipulates, “The 
trauma of AIDS—a trauma that has yet to be defined or understood, for which no has 
been made accountable—has produced a gentrification of the mind for gay people. We 
have been streamlining into a highly gendered, privatized family/marriage structure en 
masse.” 93 In spite of the stability it may afford some, gay marriage was and remains a 
non-threatening solution. It does not so much as question material conditions or explain 
how some men are at greater structural risk for HIV given lack of health care and access 
to sex-positive HIV-prevention. Precisely because it does not address the structural 
vulnerabilities that engendered the HIV/AIDS epidemic, gay marriage as a solution to 
AIDS assumes that those infected with the virus did so out of a moral failing, out of an 
inability to stop having casual, anonymous sex. Left immune to critique are the 
government and the medical establishment. By accessing dominant values, gay men 
replace their own cultural distinction and community-based structure with a reification of 
the very same institutions and cultural practices that left them vulnerable to AIDS in the 
first place.  
                                                
93 Schulman, The Gentrification of the Mind, 155. 
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Policies of closure towards bathhouses and campaigns to crack down on public 
sex at parks in the mid-1980s illuminate that the law has been used to condition 
normative expressions of white gay male sexuality and to simultaneously criminalize 
non-normative sexual cultures, both heterosexual and queer. In Minneapolis, in an effort 
to minimize anonymous sex and promote sexual privacy among white gay men, the City 
Council passed an anti-bathhouse ordinance that outlawed gloryholes and required 
lighting in all private booths at erotic bookstores and X-rated theaters. This public health 
initiative extended well beyond the reach of HIV-prevention to include the urban 
redevelopment of downtown Minneapolis into a second-tier Global City through the 
domestication of gay male sexuality and the criminalization of racialized sexuality. 
Although this public health initiative openly targeted gay men and sex workers of color, 
policymakers and health officials sidestepped accusations of homophobia and racism 
merely by hiding under the veneer of public health discourse, a tactic that city officials 
throughout the country regularly employed. As part of this homonormative shift in gay 
politics, there has been a reliance on the state to police and monitor non-normative 
iterations of gay sexuality. The new gay moralism that advocated for long-term, 
monogamous relationships as a responsible disease prevention strategy provided for a 
shrunken public sphere and laid the foundation for an infrastructure of homonormative 
domestic privacy in line with the neoliberal restructuring of central cities. 
Local anti-bathhouse activists, like Dick Brown and Brian Coyle in Minneapolis, 
insisted that a politics and culture of homonormativity would protect gay men against 
HIV. In pushing for the closure of bathhouses, they conflated the location of sexual 
practices to sexual behavior. According to this line of thinking, those who engaged in 
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sexual activity in public were, by definition, participating in unsafe sex, whether or not 
they used condoms. By sheer nature of its location outside the private room and the 
likelihood that participants did not know one another, public sex with anonymous 
partners was always, already rendered suspect. On the other hand, those who engaged in 
sexual activity in private were, by association, participating in safe sex. The fictitious 
narrative that equated public with unsafe sex was more ideologically driven—a moral 
judgment—than epidemiologically sound. The conflation between public sex and unsafe 
sex helped spread discourses and practices that privatized white gay male sexuality. This 
conflation worked in the interests of state campaigns to gentrify vice districts into tourist 
destinations and high-end residential neighborhoods. As anti-bathhouse activists 
convinced the public of the public health benefits of long-term, monogamous 
relationships and the evils of promiscuity, city officials worked to attract private 
investment into these districts. For these reasons, the campaign to enforce private, 
monogamous sex among white gay men served as an extension of city efforts to gentrify 
vice districts. The anti-bathhouse ordinance in Minneapolis, therefore, suggests that 
gentrification does not only denote the privatization of urban public space; it also entails 
the privatization of sexuality, in general, and the sanitization of dissident sexual identities 
and practices.  
Given the material implications of conflating public sex with unsafe and 
promiscuity, effective HIV-prevention must work to reject that narrative. Queer activists, 
like members of FAGS, disputed the claim that there existed a logical correlation 
between public sex and unsafe sex and promiscuity. In fact, they argued that unsafe sex—
sex without condoms—was more likely in the context of long-term, monogamous 
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relationships between individuals who knew one another than with strangers. They also 
pointed that this conflation between space and the level of risk promotes a false sense of 
security among gay men who did not and do not frequent commercial sex establishments. 
The relationship between the regulation of commercial sex establishments with economic 
and moral conservatism forces us to consider how radical queer politics must disrupt the 
notion that sexually normative identities and practices will somehow delay the spread of 
HIV.94 Circulating a mirage of normative sexuality, all the while demonizing commercial 
sex establishments, will not protect the public from state practices that render some at 
disproportionate risk for HIV.  
Although commercial sex establishments were and remain important to the 
dissemination of HIV-prevention, critics of the regulation of commercial sex 
establishments largely shied away from defending these venues on the simple grounds 
that public sex could fulfill a positive social good. Instead, they focused on how 
commercial sex establishments were important sites in HIV-prevention. But, commercial 
sex establishments were, and remain, more than that. They were also crucial to imagining 
alternatives to then-bourgeoning politics of neoliberal economy policy and 
homonormativity. Serlin writes that commercial sex establishments “for public sex play 
an important role not merely in affirming the right to consume porn or patronize sex 
clubs, but in supporting the construction of an alternative economy that encourages the 
desire for sexual and political liberation.”95 With this alternative economy of sex, 
perhaps, we can envision urban spaces that operate not in the service of private real estate 
                                                
94 Reddick, “Dangerous Practices.”   
95 Serlin, “The Twilight (Zone) of Commercial Sex,” 52.  
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speculation but rather to nurture communities across social cleavages for the purpose of 
dismantling neoliberalism.   
As representations of white gay men shifted from supposed irresponsible sex 
addicts to sexually monogamous citizens, downtown Minneapolis transformed itself from 
a space of vice to the premier location in the Upper Midwest for high-end retail, massive 
office towers, luxury apartment buildings, and countless other cultural amenities as part 
of attracting hordes of young urban professionals. That public health came to exert an 
influence extending far beyond the reaches of health is evident in the role race and 
sexuality played in shaping the reputation of Minneapolis as a clean, liberal, and modern 
city through the sanitation and good health of its body politic. In focusing on 
conservative campaigns against sexual expression, masked under the auspices of HIV-
prevention, I have not only traced the rightward shift in mainstream gay and lesbian 
politics, but I have also gestured to how the domestication of queer sex requires a 
disavowal of public sexual cultures, communities, and practices. AIDS moral panic 
became a way to justify the crackdown of public sexual cultures and the spaces that 
incubated those practices. These public sexual cultures were largely racialized since poor, 
people of color lacked access—both discursively and materially—to the normalizing 
imperatives of domestic space.  
In the next chapter, I continue exploring how notions of racialized and sexual 
deviance have been instrumental in urban change in the United States in the last thirty 
years by examining the normative itineraries of public housing’s privatization in north 
Minneapolis. Just as the HIV/AIDS epidemic powered on, city officials insisted that 
conditions of urban blight were the result of the gender and sexual non-normativity of the 
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racialized poor. To remedy these social ills, policymakers proposed the privatization of 
public housing as a means of generating a cleaner, more livable, and more prosperous 
Minneapolis. In practice, however, that process merely wiped out low-income housing 
for poor and working-class communities as it implanted high-rent offices, luxurious 
hotels, and high-priced restaurants to the benefit of large and politically well-connected 




Chapter Six.  
False Hope: The Spatial Engineering of Heteronormativity via the Neoliberal 
Restructuring of Public Housing 
Introduction.  
 In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
settled several meritorious lawsuits brought against the agency for the residential 
segregation of public housing. The plaintiffs in these lawsuits alleged racial 
discrimination on the part of HUD for negligently and willfully isolating public housing 
in minority- and poverty-concentrated neighborhoods. To settle these claims, HUD 
entered into “consent decrees,” or negotiated settlements, in more than a dozen cases 
nationwide, including the Hollman Consent Decree in Minneapolis. As one of the first 
cities in the country to experience the government’s newfound spatial logic, Minneapolis 
provides us with an ideal case study of the neoliberalization of urban space.  
 Out of an effort to remedy a long history of racial discrimination in federal 
housing policy, these consent decrees conveyed HUD’s newfound policy of 
deconcentration. With deconcentration, housing authorities ordered the demolishment of 
high-rise public housing “projects” and their replacement with lower-density, multi-
racial, mixed-income developments. Housing authorities likewise enacted mobility 
programs to suburban locations. Deconcentration, however, did not achieve its intended 
purpose of residential integration. In fact, deconcentration led to the very same conditions 
housing officials were purported to eradicate: economic isolation.  
Although housing officials lauded deconcentration as the means of undoing the state’s 
racist housing practices, deconcentration incurred greater economic and social hardship 
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on poor, families of color by merely relocating poverty elsewhere for the purpose of 
preparing inner-city neighborhoods for gentrification. And yet, HUD’s overt 
multicultural investments—opening up mixed-income housing and suburban living to 
people of color—enabled housing authorities to execute these covertly racist and 
economically devastating policies with little to no critique or social recourse. These 
policies worked in the service of a white liberal discourse and practice of Minnesota Nice 
which posited that the racialized poor in the region were allegedly afforded greater 
assistance and care because of the liberal, progressive, and tolerant ethic of the Midwest. 
To the extent that they abstracted the role of the state in conditioning the concentration of 
racialized poverty, HUD’s policies and practices in the 1990s reflect neoliberal ideology. 
As I argue, these policies and programs, the Hollman Consent Decree and HOPE-VI, 
avoid a critique of structural racism by displacing the failure of public housing onto the 
non-normative gender and sexual identities and practices of the racialized poor. Housing 
officials often referenced urban blight in relation to the perceived gender deviance and 
sexual non-normativity of the racialized poor. Portraying North Minneapolis as a product 
of the alarming adverse effects of gender deviance and sexual non-normativity allowed 
city officials and housing authorities to convince the public that gentrification was the 
solution to the city’s social woes.  
 When they made sense of public housing’s failure in the 1980s, housing 
authorities did not dwell on the massive budget cuts to HUD. Rather, they zeroed in on 
what they deemed were deviations by poor, people of color to the racialized norms of 
sexual hygiene—domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability—that determine 
social membership in the United States. As a result, housing authorities sought to alter 
 
 434 
people’s non-heteronormative behaviors as part of a neoliberal spatial fix. Given its 
intended goal of behavioral modification, HUD deployed a neoliberal spatial fix to 
remedy material inequality by purely altering the ways in which people occupied space, 
not by addressing the deep-rooted causes behind that inequality. HUD’s new vision of 
urban space registered a strategy that sought to mitigate gender and sexual non-
normativity by simply reconfiguring the built environment in line with the 
neoliberalization of urban space. Concretely, this vision of racial integration unfurled into 
policies promoting mixed-income housing and suburban living, both of which were 
designed to “fix” the racialized poor by instilling upon them new neoliberal 
subjectivities.  
 In this chapter, I examine the complex entanglements between architecture, 
structures of racism, and the institutionalization of racialized norms of sexual hygiene. By 
centering a materialist-critique of deconcentration policy, I reveal that the neoliberal 
restructuring of public housing in the 1990s hinged on gender and sexual non-normativity 
to legitimate privatization. I show that housing authorities attempted to remedy the non-
heteronormativity of the racialized poor through spatial technologies that foisted 
racialized norms of sexual hygiene upon them. I propose treating housing policies and 
practices as a “mode of subjection” in which gender and sexual normativity is imposed 
upon poor, people of color to sidestep having to truly confront structural racism, all the 
while naturalizing the unequal outcomes propagated by capitalist exploitation.  
I begin this chapter by examining city, media, and police accounts of a “racial 
underclass” in Minneapolis beginning in the 1980s. Stories of fatherless street gang 
members and crack-addicted single mothers took form of a narrative that the media 
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dubbed “the Gary Syndrome,” in response to a perceived influx of poor, people of color 
from Gary, Indiana. In particular, I argue that these new stories, which exploited the 
public’s contempt for the racialized poor, operated to garner public support for the 
constitutionally questionable police practices of the war on drugs, and the compulsion 
towards privatization as a solution to the failures of public housing. Next, I look at how 
policymakers instituted a series of Americanization programs out of a belief that 
culturally retraining single mothers of color would undo the economic impoverishment 
confronting these groups. Health and housing authorities operated neighborhood clinics 
and visited homes in a practice that sought to inculcate proper family arrangements. I 
then move to a discussion of the Hollman Consent Decree, outlining how this and other 
neoliberal urban policies professed that a sexually-conjugated racial pathos could be 
contained and pacified through the architectural design codes of New Urbanism and 
defensible space. Health and housing authorities endorsed the claim that living under 
crowded conditions and unsanitary environments contributed to street gangs and drug 
abuse. To remedy such conditions, they encouraged a policy of deconcentrating poverty. 
My analysis not only points to how the racially coded language of public health and 
housing was central to constructing nonwhite populations as a threat to white Americans, 
but it also sheds light on the particular mechanisms through which the sexual meanings 
attached to race have been enforced through space. My chapter, thus, confirms that the 
history of public housing inequality and suburban financial prowess is actually part of the 





The Gary Syndrome.  
 The deconcentration of poverty in north Minneapolis in the late 1980s and early 
1990s took place in the context of a large wave of urban black migration from post-
industrial centers to service-oriented cities in the North and West. Urban migrants of 
color descended upon the Twin Cities in search of higher-paying jobs and to be reunited 
with family members. This migration of poor, people of color—primarily black—
radically transformed those cities culturally, politically, and socially. Compared to other 
cities, Minneapolis and St. Paul progressed at a slower pace towards increasing racial 
diversity. For that reason, the Twin Cities area ranked as one of the nation’s whitest 
metropolises. In 1990, the population of Minneapolis that was black, Hmong, or Native 
American was 21.6 percent. In St. Paul, that number was 17.7 percent. Although the 
Twin Cities remained largely white, pockets of both cities experienced a significant surge 
in non-white populations. Perhaps because the Twin Cities region remained so white, any 
noticeable change in racial demographics was bound to stir up panic of an invading horde 
of minorities.1  
 As a historical moment of economic crisis and physical dislocation, neoliberalism 
buttressed the migration of poor, people of color from the Rust Belt of the Midwest to 
cities in the North and West. Neoliberalism eradicated the blue-collar jobs that the 
racialized poor—street gang members and drug-addicted single mothers—could seek out. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s as factories closed and moved overseas, many central 
cities in the United States experienced a changing economic base. The shift from a 
manufacturing-based economy to one supported by financial, real estate, and insurance 
                                                
1 Paula Klauda, “Racial patchwork slowly emerging,” Star Tribune, Aug. 18, 1991: 1A.  
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services witnessed the reorganization of cities into sites of symbolic production. The new 
service economy, in turn, divided people into those who were skilled and affluent enough 
to participate in symbolic production, and those low-income, unskilled laborers who 
merely supported these white-collar professionals. As jobs in the manufacturing sector of 
the economy vanished, the tax base diminished and the social services that once 
supported these areas disappeared. Out of the ashes of these dwindling economic 
possibilities, street gangs and the informal economy that maintained them arose to attend 
to the needs of these “surplus populations.” Comprised of primarily black, Mexican, and 
Puerto Rican teenagers, these street gangs engaged in interracial gang warfare for “drug 
turf” but also fought against the police and one another. In his book, In Search of 
Respect, urban sociologist Philippe Bourgois establishes a relationship between the 
country’s shift towards a service-oriented economy, high rates of unemployment for 
communities of color living in urban areas, and their participation in the informal 
economy of the drug trade.2 Rather than addressing these economic disparities, 
                                                
2 The war on drugs further established racial and class boundaries by providing the state with a legally 
justifiable means of incarcerating thousands upon thousands of African-Americans and Latinas/os. In The 
New Jim Crow, legal scholar Michelle Alexander argues that the war on drugs was the result of a cultural 
backlash by conservative ruling elites threatened by the economic, political, and social gains of African-
Americans. The war on drugs began with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970, which required that the pharmaceutical industry maintain physical security and strict 
record keeping for certain drugs. It also divides controlled substances into five classes based on their 
supposed medical usefulness and potential for abuse. While the conservative movement of the 1960s and 
1970s—Nixon’s Silent Majority—helped put into action the war on crime, the Reagan administration 
perfected it by bringing crime fighting to the war on drugs. The new conservative movement of the 
1980s—the New Right—foisted upon the country an agenda of law and order and anticrime practices to 
restore moral order—white supremacy—in the United States. These drug war policies became the most 
effective in undoing the gains of the 1960s. Precisely because the war on drugs did not explicitly target any 
one specific population, unlike Jim Crow segregation, it became the means through which right-wing and 
conservative politicians could recuperate a semblance of control and power over the direction of the United 
States. Consequently, in an alleged colorblind society, “crime” and “drugs” became the rallying cry through 
which politicians could legally target communities of color for extraordinary punishment. See: Michelle 
Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 
2010).; Phillipe Bourgois, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio (Cambridge, EN: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).  
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government at the local, state, and federal level orchestrated new criminal punishment 
policies and practices to fight crime. As part of that impetus to restore “law and order,” 
the infamous war on drugs materialized.  
It was in this context of dwindling economic possibilities and heightened policing 
that poor, families of color migrated to the Twin Cities. Urban migrants of color, 
however, encountered little respite from the institutions and symbols of white supremacy 
and capitalism they had been fleeing. What they did find were discriminatory housing 
and employment practices along with a revamped law enforcement apparatus by way of a 
white populace that responded to their presence with anger, fear, and resentment. For all 
the talk of racialized anxiety and white injury, race was hardly, if ever, explicitly 
acknowledged. Instead, mainstream media spoke of an “underclass.” This discourse of a 
racial underclass underpinned the circulation of what the local press dubbed the “Gary 
Syndrome,” a narrative that named the supposed invasion of poor, black people— 
“nomadic thugs”—from post-industrial cities. The City of Gary, Indiana, was only a 
symbol for what policymakers deemed an “alleged criminal migration phenomenon” 
from places such as Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee, Kansas City, and Detroit.3 In an 
article appearing in the biweekly news magazine, Twin Cities Reader, the author 
interviewed a number of police officers in regards to the causes and solutions to the Gary 
Syndrome. By and large, everyone interviewed agreed that there was such a phenomenon 
as a wave of criminal migrants. 
 From property crimes to shoplifting, police officers described these out-of-town 
criminals as being more daring than the homegrown variety, importing with them a 
                                                
3 Jim Leinfelder, “The Gary Syndrome,” Twin Cities Reader, Jan. 27-Feb. 3, 1988. 
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variety of “out-of-state” techniques that rendered crime fighting all the more difficult. 
Police and policymakers argued that criminals flocked to Minneapolis because of “better 
welfare.” To curb the flow of criminals, they actively considered changing welfare 
eligibility requirements to include residency restrictions.4 Although a large swath of 
police and policymakers maintained that there was a factual basis to the Gary Syndrome, 
it was difficult to confirm that poor, people of color from out-of-town were responsible 
for perceived uptakes in crime. Most of the evidence cited to corroborate the existence of 
the Gary Syndrome was anecdotal and based off personal opinion (Figure 6.1).5  
Whether or not there was a factual basis to it, the Gary Syndrome justified the 
state’s withdrawal in the provision of social services towards the poor and it inspired the 
expansion of the criminal punishment system. Since their social practices were 
understood as irresponsible and reckless, the presence of the racialized poor was framed 
as requiring discipline either through the prison-industrial complex and its operating 
system of the war on drugs, or through socially benevolent housing programs. This latter 
approach involved Americanization programs intended to impress upon the racialized 
                                                
4 To help discourage the negative outcomes associated with the Gary Syndrome, Hennepin County 
Commissioners Mark Andrew and Jeff Spartz proposed changing welfare eligibility requirements to 
include residency restrictions. Andrew explained, “I have no objection to a poor person coming here 
because the employment prospects are good. But we’re getting a lot of slimeballs in here.” He added, “If it 
becomes general accepted that you are the community to move to get better welfare, two things happen: 
More people move in than you can support, and you have provided an easy out for those communities that 
haven’t faced up to their own problems.” Ibid.  
5 While factual evidence that verified the Gary Syndrome was non-existent, what did exist were plenty of 
anecdotal evidence. City Council Member Brian Coyle, an openly-gay white man, shared several personal 
experiences, from waiting for public transportation to walking to the store, that confirmed for him the 
existence of the Gary Syndrome. Coyle described, “There seems to be density within certain 
neighborhoods, or at certain intersections, that are being dominated by these folks.” He acknowledged that 
although most urban migrants were motivated by job prospects, others were not. “I still think the majority 
of the people in my neighborhood are coming here for economy opportunity. But at the same time, along 
with that have come relatives and, frankly, some of their children, who already have previous gang 
experience. That is what the police are seeing and so are we as neighbors. It makes it hard to welcome the 
rest of the folks” (emphasis added). Ibid.  
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poor a more normative approximation to racialized norms of sexual hygiene: domesticity, 
intimacy, privacy, and respectability. Policymakers believed that the presence of the 
racialized poor not only constituted an economic and social drain, but also presented a 
threat to the city’s moral health. Charges of poor sexual hygiene confirmed perceptions 
that urban migrants of color were both a material risk to the economic aspirations of the 
city and a metaphorical threat to the health of the city’s body politic. Both of these 
approaches did not consider the structural factors that propelled the migration of the 
racialized poor to Minneapolis. What these approaches did do well was circulate the 
notion that the lived experiences of poor, people of color with racism and poverty were 




 For many in positions of power, crime appeared to be an extension of the 
pathologies associated with the racialized poor. The policing of the racialized poor in 
Minneapolis was, therefore, informed by archetypal and stereotypical gendered and 
sexual representations of communities of color. In an article appearing in City Pages 
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asking city officials for their predictions of the Twin Cities for the 1990s, City Council 
Member Brian Coyle, an openly-gay white man, painted a bleak picture. He foretold that 
because of “single parents having lots of children,” the city would be tasked with 
defining “what is responsible sexual behavior.”6 These alleged deviations by poor, people 
of color from racialized norms of sexual hygiene legitimated for city officials and law 
enforcement agents their bases of inherent suspicion.7  
 Police argued that the presence of out-of-town criminals was most strongly felt in 
gang-related street violence. The media and police attributed gang-related violence to the 
alleged breakdown of the African-American family. In a cover story appearing in the 
May 1990 issue of MPLS-ST. PAUL, a Twin Cities news magazine, author Britt Robson 
                                                
6 City Pages article, Aug. 8, 1989, Box 16, Folder: Newspaper Clippings, 1986-1991, Brian J. Coyle 
Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
7 On July 9, 1986, Coyle held a community forum titled “Coping with Crime and Community Problems” to 
discuss concerns among residents of a perceived increase in crime, a supposed result of black urban 
migration to Minneapolis. In an op-ed announcing the upcoming community forum, Coyle recognized how 
this migratory influx translated to fears of crime committed by black people against white people. Although 
he emphasized that the majority of these concerns were unfounded, Coyle bolstered the notion that single-
headed black female households and racialized poverty did in fact contribute to black crime. Coyle opened 
his op-ed by narrating the story of Joe Lincoln, a white Country Club shopkeeper, who fired off his 
semiautomatic weapon at Tyrone Kennedy, a 19-year-black youth accused of robbery in the southeast 
neighborhood of Whittier. The police and public had praised Lincoln for his “self-sufficient approach to 
maintaining law and order.” Coyle reported that the same weekend of Kennedy’s shooting, a female 
neighbor of his had also been robbed by another black teenager in a home-invasion. Coyle went on to quote 
Ed Koch, Mayor of New York City, who in the New York Times wrote: “We cannot avoid the fact that 
crime in New York City is disproportionately committed by young men who are black… One recent 
estimate suggests that a young black man is 10 times more likely than his white counterparts to commit a 
robbery.” Coyle substantiated Koch’s claims by writing, “Crime reports which daily come across my desk 
clearly illustrate that the reality of street crime in the Sixth Ward of Minneapolis isn’t that different than in 
New York.” The purpose of these anecdotes and comparisons was to bring attention to Minneapolis 
witnessing “the development of a permanent underclass” of black people. Although Coyle recognized 
“government indifference” to this underclass, he still suggested that gender and sexual deviations were 
partly responsible for that propensity to crime by black people. For instance, Coyle mentioned that the 
Minneapolis educational system was experiencing middle-class white flight from public schools due to an 
influx of “pupils from poor, minority, single-parent families” (emphasis added). “Long, hot summers’ in 
the 80s? Coyle calls community forum,” Jul. 1987, Box 16, Folder: Newspaper Clippings, 1986-1991, 
Brian J. Coyle Papers, The Minnesota History Center.  
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reported on the proliferation of street gangs in the Twin Cities area.8 For the story, 
Robson interviewed Jerome Copeland, a former high-ranking member of the Black 
Gangster Disciple Nation, one of then-dominant street gangs in Minneapolis. Copeland 
was no longer a gang member; he had moved on to outreach work with The City, a non-
profit youth-oriented organization based in south Minneapolis. Still, Robson emphasized 
that Copeland, in addition to having been in and out of prison for selling drugs, was not 
originally from the Twin Cities. He hailed from Gary, Indiana. Robson primarily focused 
his article on developing a hypothesis that made sense of street gangs. Taking a cue from 
wider discourses of a racial underclass, Robson attributed gang-related violence to the 




                                                
8 The foreboding tone of the story was set in motion by the editor of the magazine who introduced the story 
by pointing out that street gangs were a part of life in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City, but not 
the “litter-free streets of Minneapolis and St. Paul.” The editor elaborates, “The thought of gangland 
violence in our land of loons, picnics, sunrise jogging and sunset canoeing is as foreign as matzo balls at a 
Scandinavian smorgasbord” (emphasis added). Here, the editor uses metaphor to present a “litter-free” 
Twin Cities as one without street gangs. In so doing, the editor associates the presence of litter or trash—an 
out-of-place, unwanted entity— with the presence of gang members who in the context of this story are 
predominantly black. (Although Robson, the author of the cover story, recognizes that a variety of races are 
represented among street gangs in the Twin Cities, he states that the overwhelming majority of local gang 
members are African-American.) Therefore, the “litter-free” or gang free Twin Cities that the editor of the 
magazine reminisces is one perceived as white, untainted by presence of out-of-place, unwanted black 
people. Brian Anderson, “Gangland, Minn,” MPLS-ST. PAUL, May 1990.  
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 Robson cited Copeland’s childhood upbringing to confirm his hypothesis on the 
breakdown of the African-American family. Copeland joined a street gang after the grisly 
murder of his mother when he was 13-years-old. Copeland’s father was never around 
leaving him orphaned in the public housing projects of Gary, Indiana. As though 
Copeland’s story was not sufficient enough to prove the author’s claims, Robson offered 
up the experiences of another outreach worker who shared a similar childhood upbringing 
as that of Copeland. This outreach worker lamented: “I didn’t have the male image in the 
home, and I don’t know if this made a difference in the way I came out or not. There 
were a lot of things I thought could have been for me but weren’t, so I rejected authority; 
I didn’t let any man get close to me.” Since this outreach worker had no positive male 
role model in his life, he sought to fulfill that role by serving as an outreach worker. 
Although his interest in steering youth of color in a positive direction is laudable, he 
believed that the presence of a male image alone determined whether a youth would join 
a street gang. The outreach worker upheld the notion that a two-parent entity was 
responsible for implanting a firm moral compass and value system in children. Because 
of this investment, he reinforced Robson’s claim that heteronormativity was the solution 
to structural inequalities that compelled youth of color to partake in the informal 
economy.  
 For Robson, the breakdown of the African-American family was the catalyst that 
“created the conditions in which gangs have flourished.” In an ode to Oscar Lewis’s 
infamous “culture of poverty” thesis, Robson elaborated that in the wake of this 
breakdown, “more and more people” have become “enmeshed in an increasingly 
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desperate cycle of poverty and need.”9 Theories that explain black material inequality on 
gender and sexual non-normativity have a long history in the United States. In 1936, 
sociologist Frederic Thrasher—whom Robson profusely cites—argued that street gangs 
were defined by six conditions: inadequate family life, deteriorating neighborhoods, 
ineffective religion, poor education, and lack of recreational facilities. Thrasher 
contended that these factors worked together to deny opportunity and to divest hope from 
marginalized communities.10 Theories of a black subculture of violence once again 
gained prominence in the 1960s around the same time when Sen. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan infamously argued in his report on the “Negro family” that the inability of 
African-Americans to overcome the effects of racism was due to deterioration of the 
African-American family unit, itself a product of the emasculation of the black male by 
the working black female who defied white, middle-class gender norms.11 These theories 
of a black subculture of violence purported to explain the alleged propensity for violence 
among low-income urban black males. One of the most significant of these studies was 
                                                
9 In his mid-1960s ethnographic work of East Harlem, La Vida, anthropologist Oscar Lewis collected 
thousands of pages of life-history accounts from one extended Puerto Rican family in which most of the 
women were sex workers. Out of these accounts and other ethnographic data from Mexico, Lewis 
developed his infamous “culture of poverty” theory. According to Lewis, there existed an intergenerational 
transmission of destructive values and behaviors among his ethnographic participants, what he called 
representative of a “culture of poverty.” Lewis, however, failed to note how political-economic structures 
historically circumscribed the life opportunities of his ethnographic participants. In so doing, Lewis’s work 
validated for many in positions of power their deep-rooted contempt for the racialized poor. Oscar Lewis, 
La Vida (New York: Vintage, 1968).; Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican 
Family (New York: Vintage, 1961).  
10 Frederic Thrasher, The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1929).  
11 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Policy Planning and Research, 1965).   
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conducted by Marvin Wolfgang in which he developed his famed “subculture of 
violence” theory.12  
 If the breakdown of the African-American family engendered a cycle of poverty 
that created the conditions under which street gangs could emerge, then the remedy to 
street gangs lay simply in institutionalizing heteronormativity. With this in mind, Robson 
celebrated the example of Mad Dads, a non-profit organization of men who “offer both a 
role model and a visible force to gang members.” Originating in Omaha, Nebraska, 
members patrolled neighborhoods at night and painted over graffiti during the day.13 The 
Omaha chapter had more than 500 volunteers, with more than half of them being black 
males. One of the founders explained to Robson, “We offer counseling and act as 
surrogate dads. Part of that is intervening in illegal activity…It can take a long time to 
gain trust and present alternatives to these kids, but we have gotten their respect and 
reduced the level of gang activity.” Although the founder recognized that “problems with 
racism and unemployment and no affordable housing” all contributed to the proliferation 
of street gangs, those were not the main concerns of Mad Dads (“someday we’ll get to 
that”). Instead, the founder insisted that “right now the first bite of the apple has got to be 
the family.” The founder did not clarify why the family unit itself ought to have been the 
most pressing matter. It is possible that he felt as though this was the more practical of 
issues to address. Nonetheless, it bolstered Robson’s claim that heteronormativity served 
as the solution to street gangs.14 
                                                
12 Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in 
Criminology (New York: Routledge, 1967).  
13 A chapter of Mad Dads had been founded in Denver and the group had received inquiries from 10 other 
cities including Los Angeles.  
14 Britt Robson, “Mean Streets,” MPLS-ST. PAUL, May 1990. 
 
 446 
 Much of the gang-related crime committed in metropolitan areas in the mid-1980s 
was associated with the spread of crack cocaine.15 As a cheaper form of cocaine, the drug 
spread like wildfire across central cities.16 Even though both the use of powder and crack 
cocaine jumped throughout the country in the 1980s, the media fabricated an association 
of crack cocaine with blacks and Latinx.17 Specifically, media narratives ascribed the 
crack epidemic as the underlying source of gang-related violence, child neglect, and 
welfare abuse. These reports provided the public with images of violent black men and 
uncaring black women who posed not only a threat to their own communities but to the 
entire society. In turn, through these news stories on crack cocaine, policymakers were 
provided with an excuse to justify the mass incarceration of blacks and Latinx. By 
furthering the state’s war on drugs, the media became an important apparatus in 
confirming that gender and sexual non-normativity were at the root of black and Latinx 
people’s socio-economic status. When the Chicago Tribune reported that gang-related 
violence was the leading cause of death among urban black males between 15 and 34, it 
cited analysts and experts that pointed to minority unemployment, immigration patterns, 
                                                
15 The Minneapolis gang unit claimed that the local drug trade had created a spiral of gang-related crime. It 
explained that violence was the result of street gangs vying for “turf” to sell illicit drugs, especially crack 
cocaine. In Minneapolis, street gangs reportedly controlled between 30 and 40 percent of the local drug 
trade. In the case of crack cocaine, 30 to 40 percent of the 1,485 drug arrests in Minneapolis were related to 
crack or cocaine. By 1988, 70 percent of the 2,216 drug arrests were related to crack or cocaine. They were 
also allegedly responsible for more violent incidents in the Twin Cities. Police estimated that gang-related 
killings accounted for more than 40 percent of all 1990 homicides in Minneapolis.  
16 Although the media often reported on the heightened risk that crack cocaine posed for mainstream 
society, the drug was merely an alloy of powder cocaine and baking soda. Named for the “crackling” sound 
it makes when smoked, crack cocaine is derived from powder cocaine by dissolving it in hot water, adding 
baking soda, and then cooling the substance into a hard, smokeable pallet. When the substance is smoked, 
the admixture of baking soda allows the psychoactive effects of cocaine to be instantly released into the 
user’s brain with great efficiency. This compares with the longer-term high that comes with snorting 
powder cocaine. See: Bourgois, In Search of Respect.  
17 Media scholar Natalie P. Byfield explains, “Crack cocaine’s marketability—given its relatively low 
cost—to poor urban kids, and the participation of the unemployed urban poor in the sale of crack through 
low-level street hustling, allowed for an association among drug use, drug-related crimes, and race.” 
Natalie P. Byfield, Savage Portrayals: Race, Media, & the Central Park Jogger Story (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2014), 171.  
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and most importantly a “phenomenal” rise in single-parent families— “with a breakdown 
in values and a sense that the future holds few options”—as the factors driving the 
problem.18 If the breakdown of the African-American family unit was at the heart of 
street gangs, crime, and drugs, then the war on drugs was a battle that would “be won 
ultimately on the battlefield of values,” as the U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburg told 
the Star Tribune.19 The war on drugs provided the media and policymakers with a 
boundless opportunity to criminalize black people as unfit parents and underscore their 
supposed sexual deviance. 
 In a lengthy exposé by the Star Tribune, reporter Paul McEnroe, with a 
photographer in tow, accompanied the city’s narcotics unit on raids of “crack houses.” 
Out of these raids, McEnroe crafted a narrative that conveyed the toll of crack cocaine on 
the “hundreds of children in the Twin Cities” that were “neglected and exposed to 
violence by crack-using parents.” Although McEnroe never explicitly addressed race, he 
did state that according to police 90 percent of the crack houses they raided were 
                                                
18 Rogers Worthington, “Minneapolis enlists gang members’ help City joins new trend to stem violence,” 
Chicago Tribune, Dec. 15, 1991: 29. 
19 The Star Tribune reported on the efforts of the nation’s then-drug control policy director, William 
Bennett, to reduce drug-related gang violence in Washington, D.C. The Tribune interviewed a number of 
experts and policymakers, all of whom cited the disintegration of the black family as the main culprit. 
Patrick O’Malley, an expert on drug abuse at the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Policy, told 
the Tribune, “The basis root problems include a breakdown in family structure and economic status” 
something that law enforcement was “not going to get to the heart of.” The Tribune agreed claiming that 
“drugs and violence seem only the most terrifying symptom of a much larger disease, one that’s most 
prevalent in black inner-city neighborhoods that seem, suddenly, in the midst of social regression.” To 
illustrate that social regression, the Tribune reported that more than half of all black children in 
Minneapolis were born to unwed mothers. In inner-city D.C., and Baltimore, that figure was allegedly as 
high as 70 to 80 percent with nearly 55 percent of all single mothers and their children living in poverty. 
The Tribune catastrophized that these mothers, in turn, used crack at disproportionate rates: “There’s 
growing evidence, too, that many poor, young mothers are involved with drugs. While heroin is an 
addiction affecting mostly men, crack is popular among women. As a result, many single-parent 
households have, in effect, no parents at all. Experts say that the impact on children is devastating.” Among 
the consequences, Education Secretary Lauro Cavazos claimed that these children had “extremely low self-
esteem” and “never really develop” making them “susceptible to peer pressures” such as petty theft and 
drug dealing. Steve Berg, “Bennett’s first target: D.C.’s drug nightmare,” Star Tribune, Apr. 16, 1989: 1A. 
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inhabited by blacks in the north side of Minneapolis. Authorities further claimed that the 
primary caregivers of 73 percent of children living in crack houses were single women, 
giving further shape to the public perception that black women were unfit mothers.20 In 
fact, McEnroe focused his exposé mostly on single black mothers on crack. 
 McEnroe’s story opens with a highly-militarized drug raid by the city’s swat 
team, machine guns and all, on a crack house in north Minneapolis housing a single black 
mother and her children. McEnroe narrates that one of her sons “snitches” on his mother 
by disclosing to the swat team the whereabouts of the drugs, cash, and guns, much to 
verbal chagrin of the young boy’s mother. Harkening back to a white savior narrative, 
one of the raiding police officers informs the young boy that he is being sent to a group 
home because he does not deserve to live under such squalor (Figure 6.3). McEnroe 
describes that the young boy merely plays around with a red plastic assault rifle as his 
mother lays by in handcuffs—the unspoken assumption being here that the young boy 
will eventually grow up to be a gang member, thus perpetuating the cycle of despair. 
Since McEnroe focused on single black mothers on crack, his story contributed to stirring 
up panic surrounding the notion of “crack babies.”  
                                                
20 According to statistics cited by McEnroe, of the 668 children reportedly living in crack houses, 72 
percent were black, 16 percent were white, 8 percent were American Indian, and 4 percent were 
“Other/Unknown.” Of the total children, 14 percent were under one, 23 percent were 1-2 years, 24 percent 
were 3-5 years, 30 percent were 6-12 years, 6 percent were 13-28 years, and 3 percent were unknown. Paul 









 The media-orchestrated “crack epidemic” of the 1980s contributed to poor, black 
women being disproportionately charged for giving birth to infants who tested positive 
for drugs. According to McEnroe, an average of 25 babies a month in 1990 in Hennepin 
County had tested positive for crack cocaine, this in comparison to an average of six 
babies at the start of 1989.21 At Hennepin County Medical Center, the director of “high 
risk” obstetrics even compared the crisis of crack babies to the plagues of the Middle 
Ages. McEnroe further reinforced stereotypes that devalued black motherhood when he 
                                                
21 During the first 11 months of 1988, the Hennepin County Medical Center reported that 122 newborns 




offered the case of a teenage single black mother addicted to crack. In the spring of 1989, 
the mother had given birth to a daughter weighing three pounds and testing positive for 
cocaine. After the mother admitted to abusing alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during her 
pregnancy, the newborn was placed in foster care while the mother underwent treatment. 
In late summer of 1989, upon completion of inpatient treatment, child and family care 
services returned the daughter to the mother. Several months later, however, the mother 
relapsed. During a raid at the “crack house” in which she lived with her daughter, police 
officers reported the following:   
We observed 8-month-old diaperless on a bare mattress...Refrigerator was 
completely empty with exception to some moldy noodle-type material...Officers 
observed in plain view on the dining table a homemade ‘Josie’ crack pipe. Sitting 
next to this Josie was a razor blade...In the immediate area of this Josie, I 
discovered a letter addressed to [the mother] regarding recent release of her 8-
month-old daughter by Child Protection concerning ongoing child 
neglect/abuse...We made special effort to check on the welfare of the child, 
discovering that mother had no means of accessing food, baby’s clothing  
 messed and in a scattered pile. 
The raiding police officers described the mother as being “extremely emaciated with 
bulging eyes and sunken cheeks, consistent with that of hardcore cocaine users.” But, 
their observations also focused on the unhygienic living conditions of the mother and her 
children. Authorities suggested that the unsanitary behaviors of poor, families of color 
helped spread not only disease, but cultural pathology as well. McEnroe’s narration of 
this young black mother addicted to crack cocaine traces the source of urban blight to the 
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deplorable living conditions of the racialized poor—a manifestation of their personal 
habits and cultural proclivities. His analysis also relieves the reader of any empathy 
towards the mother, ensuring application of even harsher policing mechanisms.  
 Throughout the story, McEnroe depicts single black mothers addicted to crack as 
irresponsible, one-dimensional cardboard villains. There is hardly any such focus on 
rehabilitation and the voices of these mothers are ostensibly excluded. Instead, police 
officers and service care workers do all the speaking for these mothers.22 Through these 
rhetorical and stylistics devices, McEnroe demonizes the homes of single black 
mothers— “crack houses”—as deviant and devoid of the moral tutelage necessary to 
protect black children from gang affiliation. McEnroe’s emphasis on protecting young 
black children from harm illustrates how the war on drugs empowered law enforcement 
agents and service care workers to more thoroughly intervene into the lives of pregnant 
black women, denying them any semblance of privacy (Figure 6.4). By characterizing 
“crack babies” as a largely black phenomenon, media, health authorities, civic leaders, 
and law enforcement officials branded black women “unfit” mothers. Crack babies 
became emblematic of the dangerous aspects of black urban migration and the particular 
health crises engendered by the African-American community in north Minneapolis.   
                                                
22 McEnroe interviewed Mike Fisher, the head of the narcotics unit, who claimed that for “a $20 hit, that 
crack parent forgets about everything and the kids mean nothing.” Another raiding police officer described 
to McEnroe that these “crack houses” reminded him of fighting in Vietnam: “Ninety degrees, cockroaches, 
and garbage. Every time we come into one of these places it reminds me of losing a war. The kids never go 
away.” McEnroe described Fisher and other raiding police officers as “cowboys of the narcotics unit” who 
destroyed everything in sight. While he demonized black mothers, McEnroe celebrated white male police 
officers as the saviors of the innocent victims of the crack epidemic: black children. A majority of the 
photographs included in this exposé are quite reflective of this dynamic. They feature white male police 
officers comforting and hugging young black children as their crack-addicted parents hover over in 











 Media images, such as those generated by McEnroe, disparaged black women as 
unfit mothers and further contributed to the historical devaluation of black motherhood. 
These images also validated government policies that intruded into the private lives of 
poor, black families. As legal scholar Dorothy Roberts claims, poor, black women were 
the most directly impacted by the criminal prosecution of drug-addicted mothers of the 
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1980s. Discussions of drug abuse during pregnancy exceedingly took place within the 
demonization of black culture and black spaces. The disproportionate prosecution of 
drug-addicted black mothers in essence punished these women for their reproductive 
choices. Despite the state’s alleged commitment to caring for young black children, 
Roberts reminds us that women of color are the least likely to access appropriate prenatal 
care, the most vulnerable to government monitoring, and the least likely to comply with a 
white, middle-class standard of motherhood. Poor, black women are also more likely to 
experience the full force of prosecutions because they are in closer contact with 
government agencies. They maintain connections with public hospitals, welfare agencies, 
and probation officers. Due to the racist perceptions of health care and service care 
workers, their drug use is more likely to be detected and reported to law enforcement 
authorities.23 Ironically enough, the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers often dissuades 
other pregnant women from soliciting health services, if any are available, since these 
women suspect they might be turned over to government authorities and charged with a 
crime. Although infants born to drug-addicted mothers may experience a number of 
behavioral, developmental, and medical problems associated with the mother’s substance 
abuse, Roberts points out that “the interpretation of cocaine-exposed infants is often 
                                                
23 According to Hennepin County Child Protection Services, there were more than twice as many petitions 
filed for emergency services or temporary removal of children living in crack houses in 1989 than in 1988. 
In 1988, 215 petitions were filed. In 1989, through the end of November, 453 petitions had been filed. Yet 
McEnroe emphasized that only two cases in 1989 resulted in criminal charges. Officers in the Family 
Violence Division of the Minneapolis Police Department told McEnroe that they were too swamped with 
domestic and sexual abuse cases to investigate child endangerment and neglect reports, even when children 
were identified to harbor drugs in their systems. From October 1, 1988, to December 1, 1989, child 
protection workers had identified 672 children as living in homes where crack was used. McEnroe 
lamented that only 140 of them had received ongoing services. The rest of the cases were closed. Sgt. Jim 
Murphy told McEnroe that he and his officers were frustrated with the system. He and others reported cases 
of children testing positive for crack cocaine yet no charges were ever brought. Murphy declared, “I 
wouldn’t let my dogs live like the way these children are treated and yet the system isn’t doing anything to 
punish the people who allow it to happen.” McEnroe, “Violence, despair tarnish hope for new generation.”. 
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clouded by the presence of other fetal risk factors, such as the mother’s use of additional 
drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol and her socioeconomic status.”24 Poor, black mothers 
addicted to crack give birth to babies in a social context of material inequality—factors 
that may also impact the health of the newborn. By solely focusing on the “irresponsible” 
actions of mothers, nonetheless, the state divests itself from “the burden of creating a 
health care system that ensures healthy babies for all its citizens.”25 
 One of the main contentions of media accounts like McEnroe’s and the warnings 
of policymakers is that the despair of drug use would carry over into the next generation 
unless immediate measures were taken to ameliorate the situation. Policymakers warned 
that “[t]ens of millions of taxpayers’ dollars will be spent caring for those abused children 
who become slow learners in school, who won’t be able to hold jobs because of social 
adjustment problems, and who end up in overcrowded prisons.”26 To corroborate these 
claims, McEnroe interviewed a local psychologist who studied emotional and physical 
abuse of children. The psychologist stipulated that because children living in “crack 
cocaine families” would come to develop “severe psychopathologies,” they would “run 
the gamut of criminal behavior. Many will be mentally ill. The possibility of them 
becoming drug users to deal with the emotional and physical neglect they suffered from 
their addicted parents is great.” Similarly, the assistant county attorney for community 
services, the person who determined which children were removed from their homes after 
being exposed to drugs, told McEnroe that unless more punitive measures were taken, 
“these damaged children will grow up to make the same choices as their parents.” He 
                                                
24 Dorothy E. Roberts, “Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the 
Right of Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 104, no. 7 (1991): 1430.  
25 Ibid., 1436.   
26 Paul McEnroe, “The system is fighting a losing battle,” Star Tribune, Jul. 23, 1989: 1A. 
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catastrophized, “What you see now on the street and in the crack homes will look like 
Halloween pranks compared to the problems these kids will bring to the police when they 
grow up.”27 The commentary by these experts and policymakers reveals that many in 
positions of power believed that the “cycle of poverty” would persist unless more 
punitive measures were enacted. By citing these experts and policymakers, McEnroe’s 
objective is to substantiate his argument—not that the system was failing drug-addicted 
parents, but rather that the system required even harsher prosecution of drug-addicted 
parents. Social science scholarship disseminated theories of black and Latinx youth as 
inherently violent to reinforced the transformation of the criminal punishment system into 
an even more punitive mechanism. One of the most notorious of these theories was that 
by sociologist John J. DiIulio Jr. of “the superpredator,” or a category of juvenile 
criminals far deadlier than earlier groups because they were raised in a state of “moral 
poverty.”28 The takeaway from McEnroe’s account, and other media accounts, was quite 
                                                
27 In this same vein, Mayor Fraser warned of the drains on society that drug-exposed children would wreak. 
He told the Star Tribune, “By the year 2000, we will have seen pass through our elementary schools 
children who were born addicted to cocaine or who came from families in which drug abuse is an everyday 
fact of life. We cannot afford to guess about the severity of the outcomes.” The executive director of a local 
head start program agreed with Fraser’s apocalyptic assessment. She longed for a city that was untainted by 
the presence of crime, drugs, and gangs—metaphors for the presence of poor, black people. She told the 
Star Tribune, “It’s frightening. It’s frightening to me. I don’t think people understand what’s happened in 
our city. I can tell you, this isn't the city it was 20 years ago. And if we don't address the problems that are 
confronting the city immediately, this city is going to end up like other cities around the country. Like 
Washington, D.C., where they want to call in the National Guard because they can't control the drugs. Or 
Los Angeles, where the kids have more guns than the police force…I don't want that to happen to my 
beautiful city" (emphasis added). A sense of white injury permeates through the health start directors’ dire 
warnings. Kay Miller, “Let’s not forget the children,” Star Tribune, Jan. 15, 1989: 7SM.  
28 By the late 1980s, social scientists were once again providing conceptualizations of black and Latino 
youth as being innately violent. One of those social scientists was political scientist John J. DiIulio Jr., who 
in 1989, blamed the wretched living conditions of poor people of color in urban areas on “the large 
numbers of chronic and predatory street criminals.” He catastrophized the emergence of “the 
superpredator,” or a category of juvenile criminals far more dangerous than earlier groups because they 
were raised in a state of “moral poverty.” He explained that the “abject of moral poverty that creates 
superpredators begins very early in life in homes where unconditional love is nowhere but unmerciful 
abuse is common.” These youth, DiIulio deduced, were more prone to dangerous crime because they were 




explicit: crime was increasing at an alarming rate—due to a lapse in gender, sexual, and 
domestic space norms—and the government had to intervene.   
  Policymakers primarily addressed racialized poverty through a punitive approach 
as part of the war on drugs. With the assistance of mass media, policymakers convinced 
the American public to embrace the expansion of the criminal punishment system as a 
solution to the problems of crime, drugs, and poverty. As media scholar Natalie P. 
Byfield notes, the American public upheld the symbolic framework generated by 
mainstream media, academics, and policymakers that linked race, crime, and deviations 
from gender and sexual norms to drug abuse. Even though people of all races use and sell 
illicit drugs at similar rates—if there are any differences, white youth are more likely to 
sell and use illicit drugs than people of color—people of color are more likely to be 
arrested and charged for drug dealing and use.29 In spite of these marked differences in 
drug dealing and use by race, blacks were and remain disproportionately prosecuted for 
drug offenses. This punitive approach was perhaps most explicit in the disparate 
sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine possession. Since blacks and Latinx were 
                                                                                                                                            
jobless settings.” Though DiIulio’s hypothesis was farcical, it was influential nonetheless. He spoke before 
Congress and was often interviewed by the national media. His work, thus, had a profound effect on 
policies impacting black and Latino young males living in urban areas. As Byfield observes, DiIulio’s work 
shaped policy by contributing to state and federal authorities’ reliance on incarceration as a means of 
addressing crime. His theory reinforced the transformation of juvenile justice laws and endorsed the use of 
more austere law enforcement procedures including imprisonment in adult facilities by young offenders. 
Between 1992 and 1997, forty-four states enacted new laws on that allowed juveniles to be treated as adults 
in criminal court. Policy makers at the highest levels of government used DiIulio’s research and that of 
other criminologists that forged connections among race, crime, and deviations from gender and sexual 
norms as a rationale for the expansion of the criminal punishment system and the curtailment of social 
welfare provision. Byfield, Savage Portrayals.; John J. DiIulio Jr., “Moral Poverty: The Coming of the 
Super-predators Should Scare Us into Wanting to Get to the Root of Crime a Lot Faster,” Chicago Tribune, 
Dec. 15, 1995: 31.  
29 A 2000 study by the National Institute on Drug Abuse reported that white students used cocaine at seven 
times the rate of black students, used crack cocaine at eight times the rate of black students, and used heroin 
at seven times the rate of black students. Compared to their African American counterparts, white youth 
also experienced about three times the number of drug-related emergency room. See: Alexander, The New 
Jim Crow.  
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primarily understood as the users of crack cocaine, federal laws punished crack offenses 
one hundred times more severely than offenses involving powder cocaine.30 These 
anticrime measures, developed as part of the war on drugs, exponentially increased the 
rate of incarceration in the United States, in particular among black and Latinx men and 
women. With only five percent of the world’s population, the United States has the 
dubious distinction of housing 25 percent of the world’s prison population.31 
 The war on drugs was a rousing success to the extent that it increased mass 
incarceration by mobilizing a punitive approach to crime, drug abuse, and poverty in the 
United States. While public housing budgets were being slashed, the war on drugs 
pumped disproportionately large amounts of funds to law enforcement as opposed to 
treatment.32 Increased policing in the Twin Cities did not necessarily lower crime rates as 
                                                
30 While someone convicted for the sale of five hundred grams of powder cocaine received a five-year 
mandatory sentence, it only took five grams of crack cocaine for someone to warrant the same sentence. In 
November of 1988, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a state law that 
encouraged prison terms for many small-time crack dealers convicted of their first criminal offense. Under 
the law, it only took three grams of crack possession to face heightened sentencing penalties. Hennepin 
County prosecutors defended the law as one of the most important weapons in what they deemed to be a 
weak arsenal of state laws they could use to primarily target crack dealers. These disparate and heightened 
sentencing guidelines illustrate how the war on drugs implemented a number of novel legal instruments to 
incarcerate many small-time drug offenders. Dan Oberdorfer, “Court upholds tough ‘crack’ prison terms,” 
Star Tribune, Nov. 15, 1988. 
31 Black men are admitted to state prison on drug-related offenses at a rate that is more than thirteen times 
higher than white men. In the mid-1980s, when the war on drugs gained full steam, prison admissions for 
African-Americans skyrocketed, nearly quadrupling in three years, and then increasing in 2000 to a level 
more than 26 times the level in 1983. For Latinos, the number of 2000 drug admissions was 22 times the 
number of 1983 admissions. The number of whites admitted for drug offenses in 2000 was eight times the 
number admitted in 1983. Due to these disparate practices, by 2006, one in every 14 black men was behind 
bars, compared to one in every 106 white men. As a result of the war on drugs, the United States has the 
dubious distinction of being the world’s largest incarcerator. The United States incarcerates more people 
than any other country in the world—both in terms of capita and actual people behind bars. From 1970 to 
2005, the U.S. prison population rose by 700 percent, culminating in more than one in 100 American adults 
being behind bars. This rate far outpaces that of the general population growth of 44 percent and the rate of 
crime. Today, there are more people behind bars for nonviolent drug offenses than were incarcerated for all 
crimes, violent or otherwise in 1970. To return to the nation’s incarceration rates of 1970, one out of every 
five currently held prisoners would have to be released. See: Alexander, The New Jim Crow.  
32 In September of 1988, the City Council of Minneapolis voted unanimously to bolster the city’s police 
force with 72 new officers by the end of 1990, boosting its size by nearly 10 percent to 794 officers and 




much as it generated a number of complaints by people of color of police brutality.33 
However, if the goal was to bring stability to inner-city neighborhoods as many 
                                                                                                                                            
Department, City Council Member Walter Dziedzic, who represented the predominantly-white and wealthy 
First Ward of the city, told the Star Tribune: “I was born in this town. I’ve lived in this town all my life. I 
was educated here, and I expect to die here. I’ll be damned if I’m going to surrender this town to the 
rapists, muggers and robbers without a fight.” White injury framed the expansion of the city’s policing and 
surveillance mechanisms. For instance, the City Council of Minneapolis demanded more police officers in 
downtown Minneapolis as a result of a series of supposed bias-related crimes. In late October of 1989, four 
white men were allegedly assaulted in downtown Minneapolis by a group of black youth in what police 
were treating as racially-motivated attacks. Several of the victims were reportedly hospitalized with face 
and head injuries after the attacks which included racial slurs such as “honky” and “white trash.” According 
to a study conducted by the Crime Control Institute on police calls in Minneapolis, the shopping and 
entertainment district known as City Center in downtown had logged 529 calls for police assistance in the 
first nine months of 1989. Seven percent of those calls were for assaults while 62 percent were for thefts. 
Through September, the department had logged 52 bias crime reports, with 70 percent of reports indicating 
alleged racially motivated crime committed by black men against white men. That a vast majority of bias 
crime reports were documented against white men is reflective of the perception of white injury permeating 
the cultural fabric of Minneapolis at the time. As a result of these so-called hate crimes against white men, 
the number of police officers walking downtown beats doubled. Although crime in the city was actually 
down, white injury was enough to warrant the expansion of the police force. Police Chief Bouza discounted 
the need for more police officers since crime had decreased. He insisted that serious crime in the city 
peaked in 1981 with a dramatic decline from 1982 to 1984, only to rise from December 1984 to December 
1987. However, as Bouza told the Star Tribune, the city’s crime rate declined during the first seven months 
of the year. This is not to suggest that Bouza was immune to the hoopla for more “law and order.” Bouza’s 
strategy to fight crime consisting of making more arrests. He boasted that in 1987, for the first time in the 
city’s history, Minneapolis police had made over 8,000 arrests from street crimes including rape, murder, 
assault, burglary, and auto theft. (Central to the expansion of the criminal punishment system were 
enhanced sentencing procedures for repeat crime offenders. Another component of increased policing 
consisted of incorporating marginalized communities in their own policing including the recruitment and 
retaining of minority officers.) Rob Hotakainen, “Council approves 72 new police officers,” Star Tribune, 
Sep. 3, 1988.; Mark Brunswick, “A new rash of beatings reported downtown,” Star Tribune, Oct. 26, 
1989.; “7th Ward Candidates Spotlight DT Safety,” Skyway News, Nov. 2, 1989.; Jim Parsons, “Downtown 
patrol increased but not as much as businesses asked,” Star Tribune, Jul. 1, 1989.; Bruce Rubenstein, 
“Farewell to Arms,” City Pages, Nov. 16, 1988.; Dennis J. McGrath, “Seven top issues for Police 
Department in next three years,” Star Tribune, Aug. 22, 1988.; Mark Brunswick and Dennis J. McGrath, 
“New Minneapolis police strategy is to involve citizens,” Star Tribune, Aug. 22, 1989. 
33 By May of 1988, the police internal affairs unit of Minneapolis had received 105 complaints. The year 
before, that many complaints had been filed until August. In 1989, the Internal Affairs Unit had received 
259 complaints containing 484 allegations of misconduct. The IAU had been plagued by charges of bias for 
years. The unit had sustained a remarkably low number of the complaints it received. Of nearly 300 
excessive force complaints lodged between 1984 and 1986, only one was ever sustained. Relations between 
the Minneapolis Police Department and the African-American community reached a boiling point in the 
winter of 1989 after several incidents triggered an avalanche of complaints and protests over racism and 
police brutality. One case involved the death of an elderly black couple trapped in a fire during a botched 
crack raid in north Minneapolis. The fire was ignited by police after a stun grenade designed to temporarily 
disorient subjects started a fire. The other event that triggered a community demand for police reform 
involved an altercation between police and a group of black partygoers at a downtown Minneapolis hotel in 
which the latter group reported they were harassed and beaten by police. At several community meetings 
hosted in the wake of these events, black residents voiced their anger, frustration, and fear over what they 
deemed was a racist, brutal police force. Black residents reported being harassed at all hours of the day, of 




policymakers purported, then the war on drugs was a failure of epic proportions. As 
Alexander proposes, mass incarceration increases—not decreases—the likelihood of 
violence in inner-city neighborhoods because it creates a new “racial undercaste.” 
Because the war on drugs is designed to target small-time street level drug dealers and 
offenders, the majority of those swept into the nation’s new undercaste are black and 
Latinx men and women. Once those arrested for drug possession are incarcerated, they 
are further punished through a series of civil penalties that dwindle their chances of 
transitioning back to “normalcy.”34 As a result of these post-conviction penalties, many 
of these Americans revert back to the informal economy, perpetuating the same cycle of 
poverty, crime, and drug abuse that policymakers so adamantly insisted the war on drugs 
would remedy. For this reason, urban sociologist Loic Wacquant argues that the mass 
incarceration of African-Americans reflects one of the four “peculiar institutions” that 
                                                                                                                                            
grassroots community activism, the City Council of Minneapolis implemented a civilian review board to 
investigate complaints against police officers, including charges of excessive force, harassment, 
discrimination, inappropriate language, and failure to provide adequate or timely police protection. The 
Minneapolis Police Department rejected the civilian review board, insisting that charges of racism were 
exaggerated. Police officers argued that any form of increased scrutiny would render it more difficult to 
perform their duties by undermining police confidence, especially in the wake of street gangs, crime, and 
crack cocaine. During the vote for the Civilian Review Board by the City Council, about 150 uniformed 
police officers jammed the council chambers in City Hall, wearing pins that read: “Cops or Crack: Your 
Choice.” Mark Brunswick, “Minneapolis police may not be attracting best qualified recruits,” Star Tribune, 
May 21, 1989.; Meleah Maynard, “Civilian Review: Now the Bad News,” City Pages, Jan. 31, 1990.; Eben 
Shapiro, “With Bouza gone, is brutality back?” Twin Cities Reader, Mar. 08-14, 1989.; Wendy S. Tai, 
“Black community galvanized in its anger at police,” Star Tribune, Feb. 12, 1989. Kevin Diaz and Rosalind 
Bentley, “Civilian review of police is urged,” Star Tribune, Sep. 14, 1989.; “Police review plan is a good 
one,” Star Tribune, Jan. 20, 1990.  
34 As part of the war on drugs, Americans with felony convictions are subject to employment and voting 
bars. They also experience a ban on the receipt of cash assistance and food stamps, denial of federal 
financial aid for postsecondary education, and public housing assistance. These Americans are also 
prohibited from serving as foster or adoptive parents—a significant exclusion for those wishing to be act as 
legal guardians for the children of family relatives. Due to these post-conviction penalties, those who return 
to their communities of origin after prison often confront social and economic destitution. In particular, 
Native American and African American women and Latinas are extremely susceptible to poverty before 
and after prison. In 1997, 65 percent of white men, 48 percent of African American men, and 57 percent of 
Latinos were employed full-time in the month prior to their arrests compared to 47 percent of white 
women, 36 percent of African American women, and 30 percent of Latinas. Patricia Allard, “Crime, 
Punishment, and Economic Violence,” in Color of Violence: The INCITE! Anthology, ed. INCITE! 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2016).  
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have confined blacks over the course of American history, the other peculiar institutions 
being slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and the fabrication of urban ghettoes.35  According 
to Wacquant’s logic then, the War on Drugs does not signal a discrete “moral panic” as 
much as it confirms a continuation of the hyper marginalization inflicted upon a group of 
people whose race, class, gender, and sexuality are held as symbols of their deviance.  
 The war on drugs epitomizes the ways policymakers envisioned remedying the 
gender and sexual non-normativity of the racial underclass. On the one hand, new jails 
and prisons, police task forces, and new policies that linked drug use with the denial of 
social services were necessary. On the other hand, since the breakdown of the African-
American family unit was cited as the primary culprit in shaping the black social 
experience, the restoration of heteronormative relations through domestic and private 
housing arrangements was conceived as a viable option. With this in mind, a number of 
policies and campaigns orchestrated to “Americanize” black men, women, and children 
into racialized norms of sexual hygiene proliferated. All these campaigns and programs 
shared in common the notion that both the origins of urban blight and, by extension, its 
solution lay in norms of gender, sexuality, and domestic space as enacted by single 
mothers of color. Ameliorating the phenomenon of crack babies among the racialized 
poor demanded comprehensive urban reform, an approach many in positions of power 
were unwilling to take. Americanization programs, since they focused on modifying 
individual behavior, were less threatening to the economic and racial status quo.  
 The few social service programs that existed in the 1980s in north Minneapolis 
for poor, families of color imposed upon their participants a white, middle-class 
                                                
35 Loic Wacquant, “The new ‘peculiar institution’: On the prison as surrogate ghetto,” Theoretical 
Criminology 4, no. 3 (2000): 377-89.  
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approximation of gender and sexuality. Social reformers understood the material 
conditions of the racialized poor as a product of their perceived personal shortcomings 
and maladaptive cultural structures. According to this logic, fatherless black children 
enlisted in street gangs as a refuge from their “broken homes” while young black girls 
birthed many babies by the lure of a welfare check. Americanization programs of the 
1980s, disguised under the banner of “social services,” did little, if anything, to unravel 
social structures that preserved material inequality. Instead, they focused on modifying 
the gender and sexual identities and practices of the racialized poor by promoting an 
ethos of “personal responsibility.”36 As George Sánchez argues in his discussion of 
public health in Los Angeles at the turn of the twentieth century, Americanization 
programs, in promoting diet, health, and sexual hygiene, were envisioned with the 
objective that “the influence of the home would extend to the public sphere.”37 By 
                                                
36 One of the earliest of these programs was a 1986 program conceived by the Minneapolis Housing 
Authority that converted four apartments in the Sumner-Olson housing project into a center that provided 
education and health programs, child care and other services designed to help participants achieve “self-
sufficiency.” The Family Learning Center, as the program was called, was designed to bring services, 
including prenatal care, to the neighborhood instead of having a resident travel to another neighborhood. 
According to the president of the Sumner-Olson resident council, Louise James, “We need that kind of 
service out here in this area. We have a lot of young mothers out here who don’t have GEDs, who need 
jobs, who don’t know how to take care of their children.” Among the free services available included an 
Early Childhood and Family education program, a GED program for adults to earn high school certificates, 
an English as a Second Language program for more than 150 Southeast Asian families living in the area, 
employment assistance and health care, including a prenatal program. According to Jon Gutzman, public 
housing director, “These are the kinds of programs that would enable tenants to improve their own lives, to 
make progress toward becoming self-sufficient.” Dennis J. McGrath, “City plans to open self-help center,” 
Star Tribune, Jan. 16, 1986.   
37 In Becoming Mexican American, historian George Sánchez examines the myriad of Americanization 
programs implemented by social reformers at the turn of the twentieth century in California to assimilate 
Mexican immigrants into American norms of industry, health, and hygiene. Social reformers centered their 
efforts on the private home of Mexicans since they believed that Mexican women possessed significant 
clout over their children and husbands. Reformers hoped “the influence of the home would extend to the 
public sphere.” But, as Sánchez notes, these programs were not necessarily designed to ameliorate the 
unequal distribution of resources. Quite the opposite, by teaching Mexican immigrants to be dependable 
and obedient workers as part of the agricultural and industrial economy of the U.S. Southwest, these 
programs were intended to transform Mexican immigrants and their children into second-class American 
citizens. George Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los 
Angeles, 1900-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 59.  
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focusing on gender and sexuality, these programs actually justified the further 
retrenchment of the state in the dispersal of welfare. Inasmuch as these programs buoyed 
discourses of personal responsibility, they abstracted the role of neoliberalism in the 
production of material inequality. This abstraction, in turn, rendered it possible to center 
gender deviance and sexual non-normativity as the agents of urban blight. And yet, under 
the pretense of protecting children from the supposed harms associated with single-parent 
households, these Americanization programs warranted greater state intervention into the 
lives of black women, undermining the notion of individual agency. Although these 
programs further devalued black motherhood—they cast black mothers as responsible for 
the problems afflicting black families—these Americanizing efforts simultaneously 
valorized them as the solutions to largely structural problems.  
 The biggest of these programs in the Twin Cities materialized in 1989 by then-
mayor of Minneapolis, Don Fraser. In his state of the city address, Fraser called for a 
stepped-up war against drugs and crime in the city, saying that “crack,” random violence, 
and more “openly defying gang activity” had all contributed significantly to a growing 
sense of fear in the city. He promised that drug dealers had “no place in our city. We will 
search out and meet them wherever they do their evil business. We will wring our city 
dry of their influence” (emphasis added). There would be “no higher priority for the city 
than strengthening our crime and drug strategy.”38  Although Fraser exclaimed that 
attacking drug-related crime was of the utmost importance to restore a moral order, he 
offered solutions that only indirectly addressed “law and order.” More precisely, Fraser 
promoted approaches that focused on imposing heteronormativity—with an emphasis on 
                                                
38 Rob Hotakainen, “Fraser’s speech urges city to step up battle against drugs, crime,” Star Tribune, Jan. 
31, 1990.  
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diet, health, and sexual hygiene—on poor, black families. In that same state of the city 
address, Fraser recounted that 31 percent of children in public schools came from 
“welfare-dependent families.” He further substantiated his position by lamenting that 36 
percent of all live births in the city were to single women—a 94 percent increase in out-
of-wedlock births since 1970. He then connected these out-of-wedlock births to the 
doubling of the welfare caseload in some inner-city tracts between 1982 and 1986.39 Not 
only would this growing number of single-mothers and ill-health children breed crime, he 
suggested it would also negatively impact the city’s ability to have enough skilled, 
productive employees. Fraser framed black families as parasitic for allegedly living off 
taxpayers’ hard work. Due to the economic threat that such gender deviance and sexual 
non-normativity posed for the city’s interests, Fraser partnered with private corporations 
to determine the best course of action for pacifying the racial underclass.  
 To address the long-term effects of the racial underclass in the Twin Cities, Fraser 
teamed up with the Committee for Economic Development (CED), an organization 
composed of 225 of the nation’s top corporate executives and college presidents. A major 
focus of the CED was determining the associated costs of the racial underclass on the 
American economy. The CED had conducted a national study, “Children in Need: 
Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disadvantaged.” The study concluded that 
the United States was creating a permanent underclass of young people—who could not 
hold jobs because they were illiterate and lacked work habits— for whom poverty and 
                                                
39 Fraser also disclosed that the city’s health department had estimated that out the 6,500 children born in 
Minneapolis every year, 30 percent were “at risk” of school failure due to low birth weight, others because 
they were born to teenage mothers, and still others because their homes were dominated by drugs. In 1986, 
because only 43 percent of pregnant women form such low-income areas in the city had adequate prenatal 
care, the percentage of newborns under 5.5 pounds rose from 6.8 percent to 8 percent; for black families, 




despair were a given. The study reported that youth could not attain the living standard of 
most (white) Americans because they were “trapped in a web of dependency and failure.” 
The CED’s study warned that each year’s class of high school dropouts would cost the 
nation more than $240 billion in lost earnings and foregone taxes with millions more 
going to crime control, welfare, health care, and other social services.40 
 To prevent such an economic and social drain on the state of Minnesota, the Chief 
Executive Officer of CED, Jim Reiner, who was also the chairman of Honeywell 
Corporation and a white resident of the state, helped establish the program, Success 6. A 
committee of community members from hospitals, corporate boards, the Minnesota 
Legislature, unions, management, and nonprofit organizations assisted Reiner. Together, 
they designed Success 6 as a program that offered poor, families of color with the 
resources necessary to ensure that every child by age six would have health, skills, and 
“confidence” necessary to compete in school. During the design process, committee 
members visited the infamous Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago to gather ideas of how 
city officials there were managing their poor.41 Reiner expressed shock to the Star 
Tribune that “the average age of the renter there was 18, and many already had three 
kids-single-parent families and 30,000 people living there in six high-rises. Unbelievable! 
And you think that can't happen [in the Twin Cities]? You betcha it can happen here—if 
                                                
40 The CED report concluded with ominous warnings: “If present trends continue without corrective 
actions, American business will confront a severe employment crisis. This scarcity of well-educated and 
well-qualified people in the work force will seriously damage this country's competitive position in an 
increasingly challenging global marketplace. Current projections point to a serious labor shortage in only a 
few years. By 1990, the impact of new technologies is expected to drive total private-sector demand for 
employment to 156.6 million jobs, nearly twice that in 1978. If these estimates are only close to the mark, 
there will be a shortage of over 23 million Americans willing and able to work." Ibid.  
41 In describing the Robert Taylor Homes, the Star Tribune stated, “Windows of the blighted red-brick 
towers were covered with bars and accordion-type grates. Stairwells were dirty and smelled of urine. 
Unemployed men were scattered outside amid the broken glass.” Ibid.  
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it’s not addressed!” The committee, “sickened by the extreme deprivation in the Chicago 
housing projects,” returned to the Twin Cities determined to “attack poverty here at its 
roots” before it reached those “levels of desperation.”42  
 Reiner and Fraser looked closely at one of the programs offered to tenants of the 
Robert Taylor Homes. The Beethoven Project taught mothers parenting skills and the 
importance of a basic education for themselves and their children.43 The program served 
free lunchtime meals during which parents learned about nutrition and which foods were 
“appropriate” for their children’s ages. Inspired by the Beethoven Project, Reiner and 
Fraser implemented their own early-childhood development intervention program, Way 
to Grow. Like the Beethoven Project, the Way to Grow program offered home visits to 
pregnant mothers. The program was originated to help would-be mothers secure early-
childhood development services for their children so that they would be well prepared for 
school. The program sought to screen children as early as possible, treating neurological 
or psychological “damage” by helping parents provide “cognitively stimulating home 
environments.” Although the program’s goals were laudable, the program proceeded 
from a developmental narrative that cast poor, families of color as being simply not 
“civilized” enough to care for their children. Fraser conveyed this sentiment when he 
explained the rational for such a program to the press: “Let us resolve to intervene early 
enough to make a difference.”44 Reiner defended early intervention out of a belief that by 
the time children were three-years-old and, thus, eligible for any sort of early childhood 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Housed in one of the high-rises of the Robert Taylor Homes, the Beethoven Project had “clean and 
white” walls. “Floors are covered with colorful carpeting. Pictures of children and informational posters 
decorate the walls. If you can read, you can learn something here.” Ibid.  
44 In a report outlining the program’s rationale, the authors compared, “In most European countries, home 
visits are a routine service provided to all families of newborns. There is some evidence that initiating 
home visits before birth for high-risk families can be even more effective.” Ibid.  
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development, much of their intellect, trust levels, and expectations for life had already 
been established. Way to Grow, and other similar Americanization programs, 
characterized poor, families of color, in general, and single mothers of color, in particular 
as posing a negative influence in the development of their own children.  
 Way to Grow and the Beethoven Project targeted black single mothers because 
they were premised as being the parties responsible for the transmission of values in the 
home. In short, women of color were both the cause and solution to social ills and 
pathology. Americanization programs, therefore, sought to transform familial habits in 
hopes of guiding black children away from a purported life of crime. Under such efforts, 
social reformers visited private homes to educate women and their children in matters 
relating to early childhood development, diet, and hygiene. Reformers believed that 
proper homemaking could lead to moral regeneration. In disseminating the message that 
a healthy diet and hygienic living conditions could deter black children from adult lives 
of crime, these campaigns interpreted black criminality as a culturally inherent formation. 
Home visits, cleanliness talks, and dietary regimens, thus, operated in the service of 
neoliberalism by evading state accountability for improving overall living conditions. 
Moreover, since corporate interests figured largely in these Americanization programs, 
training black single mothers in proper American homemaking skills was also contrived 
to nurture a living environment conducive to the production of docile workers in the 
neoliberal service-oriented economy of Minneapolis. As historian Natalia Molina writes 
in her discussion of Americanization programs targeting Mexican immigrants in 
California in the early twentieth century, “Disciplining bodies through health programs 
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was the first step to creating a strong workforce.”45 The neoliberal revamping of 
Minneapolis expanded the service sector, creating a demand for cheap, exploitative labor.  
 Discourses of unfit black motherhood that demanded punitive measures did not 
only emanate from those in positions of power. Black community leaders also 
internalized these tropes and called for practices of “personal responsibility,” as well as 
the restoration of racialized norms of sexual hygiene. Geraldine Carter, an African-
American woman from north Minneapolis who worked her way through a PhD, founded 
the Survival Skills Institute as a non-profit organization that provided a wide range of 
educational and support programs for “high-risk” black children and their families in 
north Minneapolis, many of whom were characterized as living in crack houses. Known 
as the “Joan Arc of the Ghetto,” Carter had worked in the educational system before 
establishing the Institute in a run-down house near the Sumner Field public housing 
project. In the midst of massive budget cuts to social services, the Institute provided a 
desperately needed social safety net for poor, black families.46 However, many of the 
Institute’s programs were designed to convince single mothers of color of the virtues of 
domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and respectability.  
 One of the more noteworthy programs offered at the Institute to empower and 
strengthen poor, black families was ACTION, which stressed “independent” living, 
parenting skills, and employability for single mothers of color. Like the Beethoven 
Project and Way to Grow, some of the program’s lesson plans consisted of teaching 
mothers how to make low-cost meals in less than an hour with government food 
                                                
45 Natalia Molina, Fit to be Citizens: Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2006), 78. 
46 Between 1980 and 1987, the Institute had served 1,806 families in north Minneapolis. 
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commodities. Other programs that the Institute hosted to address the growing problems 
associated with a racial underclass included a teenage mothers program, a youth 
leadership development-readiness program for junior high school youth, and a child 
abuse-neglect intervention program for crack-addicted mothers.47 The Institute was so 
prominent in community affairs that the Minneapolis Housing Authority even contracted 
it to develop a course for public housing tenants whose housekeeping was so “poor” that 
they risked being evicted from their units.  
 A major limiting factor of the services offered through the Survival Skills Institute 
is that they all centered on the rescue of poor, black children through the regulation and 
punishment of their culturally “unfit” mothers.48 The Institute reinforced dominant 
notions of who was and was not “fit” to be a parent. Carter was adamantly explicit that 
the message of all these programs was “positive reinforcement,” albeit through a 
narrative of personal responsibility. For Carter, drug abuse and welfare dependency 
presented a real threat to an agenda of racial uplift since these practices were destructive 
                                                
47 The child abuse-neglect intervention program was closely linked to efforts by the institute to wean 
mothers off crack. Carter described crack as an unprecedented phenomenon that removed “the maternal 
instinct from a mother than the children don’t matter.” Carter described how these “children from crack 
houses” came in as “angry little children who grab and choke another child until their victim becomes 
limp.” She detailed how these children manipulated toy airplanes into makeshift guns. These children could 
not cooperate with one another, did not feel guilty, and could not express remorse. Similar to police 
officers, she predicted a crisis of epic proportions once these “little ones with learning disabilities and 
psychological damage hit the public schools.” Carter compared the plight of these children to that 
experienced by children removed from their homes in times of slavery. She explained, “These black 
children are victims as if they were living in the days of slavery when families were ripped apart. With 
slavery, another slaves would pick up the child if the blood mother was sold away. There is no extended 
family stepping in to raise and love that child as if it was their own.” Carter had no qualms about 
demanding greater punishment against crack-addicted parents. She declared, “We must have these parents 
facing consequences and we’re not getting that from the courts. If there is crack, there is neglect.” Paul 
McEnroe, “Violence, despair tarnish hope for new generation,” Star Tribune, Feb. 11, 1990.  
48 Speaking to the Star Tribune, a worker at the Survival Skills Institute described Carter as taking “mothers 
with children who really don’t fit, who have had children and dropped out of school. She not only helps 
them continue their education, but helps them deal with parenting issues. Without that kind of help, the 
children are going to be raised not knowing anything…If those young ladies don’t continue their education, 
we know that the mother and her offspring are going to end up on poverty row, dire poverty.” Ibid.   
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to family cohesion. Speaking in regards to her motivations, Carter told the Star Tribune, 
“What I really feel and have felt all along is I have something to offer young people, 
particularly young, black females: Your life is not over just because you have a baby.” 
Her goal of saving black children placed the onus of responsibility on individual mothers 
by attacking what Carter insisted were the underlying causes of child abuse and neglect: 
dysfunctional families, teenage pregnancy, illiteracy, “histories of failure,” lack of 
employment skills, low self-esteem, and overall despair.49 With these factors in mind, the 
Institute offered free care to teenage mothers on the premise that they be enrolled in 
school and that they participate in parenting and sexuality classes that actively 
emphasized the use of birth control. Acknowledging that the Institute encouraged women 
not to have children, Carter told the Tribune, “We do encourage them to wait to become 
pregnant. And a lot of our girls do not. But that does not mean their life has ended 
because they have one child. And we particularly are trying to focus them in on waiting 
before they have any more.” Carter assumed that black women’s fertility alone accounted 
for the social ills associated with urban blight.  
 Carter explained to the Star Tribune that these “angry young women” who are 
“no longer interacting with the father of the child” had babies for a number of trivial 
reasons ranging from “I want somebody to love” to “I got mad at my momma.” As a 
community leader with clout, Carter’s beliefs were the more problematic because she 
used these narratives of unfit black mothers to vouch for the denial of welfare benefits on 
the grounds that welfare bred a culture of dependency. She recognized that although the 
                                                
49 The Star Tribune described mother participants of the program as not knowing “how to touch their 
children in loving ways, simply because they have not experienced that as a child.” Kay Miller, “Surviving 
as mothers,” Star Tribune, Oct. 11, 1987: 12SM.  
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“welfare system will ensure that there’s food, clothing, and shelter for the babies,” 
mothers were not using it as a “stepping stone.” Instead, they were allegedly abusing the 
system. To substantiate her claims, Carter provided anecdotal evidence of witnessing 
five- and six-year-old children “out by themselves, poorly dressed” while their mothers 
rested at home. She compared these scenes to “street kids” in the Global South where 
apparently, parents did not monitor their children either. A reflective Carter asked the 
Tribune where the money was going: “We’re giving you money to stay home and take 
care of these kids, and they’re not being taken care of.”50  
 Community leaders like Carter heralded the private home as the most 
fundamental site for assimilation and racial uplift. However, Carter, like other community 
leaders, fretted that teenage pregnancy threatened black social membership. She hoped 
that in encouraging limited reproduction—by freeing women from the constraints of 
continuous childrearing—black women would experience new opportunities outside the 
home. But, because these efforts largely focused on modifying individual behavior at the 
expense of enacting large-scale structural change, the new possibilities afforded to black 
women outside the home were likely relegated to low-end, service-sector employment. In 
none of her speeches or campaigns did Carter or other community leaders offer critiques 
of the political economy of citizenship. Instead, Carter and others petitioned the state for 
the social membership of some of their constituents through the reification of gender, 
sexual, and domestic space norms. In so doing, they conflated citizenship and capital 
productivity with American standards of diet, health, and sexual hygiene. 
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 The Way to Grow program and the Survival Skills Institute focused their efforts 
on single mothers of color, as both the source of and solution to urban blight. 
Policymakers believed that single mothers of color subscribed to gender, sexual, and 
domestic space practices that deprived their children of adequate parenting, which in turn 
led these children into drug-fueled street gangs. To offset the threat of unwanted births 
and alleged bad parenting, policymakers demanded Americanization programs to tutor 
single mothers of color into racialized norms of sexual hygiene, similar to the ones 
imposed upon white gay men through the anti-bathhouse and the anti-cruising ordinance. 
The targeting of women of color for the perceived cultural deficiencies of the racialized 
poor has a long and troubled history in the United States.  
In Fit to be Citizens, historian Natalia Molina discusses the role that Mexican 
women played in efforts to curtail the perceived cultural and health threat posed by 
immigration to Los Angeles in the early 1900s. Molina shows that although Mexican 
women were considered “socially peripheral,” they were “symbolically central” to 
campaigns to Americanize Mexican immigrants.51 In perceiving Mexican culture as 
backwards, health authorities concluded that Mexican cultural practices were antithetical 
to making Los Angeles into a modern city of pristine health. That is why, health 
authorities enacted Americanization programs—prenatal, birthing, and well-baby 
programs—in hopes that such assimilation would minimize the wider dangers Mexicans 
allegedly posed for economic and social progress. Health authorities purposefully 
directed their efforts on Mexican mothers since they were allegedly more malleable and 
influential within their families. Molina’s analysis helps us understand that 
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Americanization programs have historically targeted single mothers of color because they 
are seen as allegedly exerting a significant influence within their families. And, by 
extension, women of color hold the key to making or breaking the economic and social 
success of cities as modern and progressive.  
Scapegoating women of color as responsible for urban blight essentially displaces 
any focus on structural issues. The crowded and unsanitary living conditions of poor, 
families of color in north Minneapolis were the result of systemic failures exacerbated by 
shifts in the political economy of central cities spurred by neoliberalism, not ingrained 
cultural habits. The rationalization that the crowded and unsanitary environments of the 
racialized poor bred crime, drug abuse, and gang-related violence, contributed to a 
housing policy of deconcentration that essentially argued that the reform of housing 
conditions would improve the lot of poor, people of color in central cities throughout the 
United States. The Hollman Consent Decree and HOPE-VI program sought to redress a 
history of racial discrimination in housing policy not by distributing resources in a more 
equal fashion. Quite the opposite, the key to remedying material inequality for 
policymakers lay within the institutionalization of a framework that castigated poor, 
families of color for their perceived gender and sexual non-normativity, and that imposed 
upon them a discourse and practice of personal responsibility via racialized norms of 
sexual hygiene.    
The Hollman Consent Decree. 
 The reality that a number of domestic arrangements and households thrived in the 
public housing projects of Sumner Field in north Minneapolis was evidence enough by 
health and housing authorities to confirm that poor, families of color upset the nuclear 
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family ideal and rendered obsolete the architectural layout of such structures. The varied 
roles of caretaking and parenting undertaken by extended family and kin networks made 
it difficult for housing authorities to demarcate familial arrangements. To make the 
racialized poor more legible for social control, housing authorities sought to assimilate 
poor, families of color into heteronormative community structures by imposing upon 
them a neoliberal reform of their housing conditions. Under this restructuring, housing 
authorities pitched single-family homes. A single-family home, with its multiple rooms 
and spaces for explicit purposes, created opportunities for conviviality.52 At the same 
time, this design layout applied distinctions of private and public onto the built 
environment, in the process transforming the relationships and social dynamics of the 
racialized poor into a more readable script for dominant white society. This process 
confirms that housing is a crucial way of socializing the racialized poor into the norms 
and values of American citizenship. As the history of public housing evinces, with the 
proper architectural arrangement, racialized norms of sexual hygiene can be cultivated. 
We can, thus, treat the privatization of public housing in the 1990s as an attempt to render 
legible, readable, and, by extension, manageable the racialized poor for economic and 
political control under neoliberalism. Forasmuch as it focused on modifying the private 
home to exert a positive outcome in the public sphere, the privatization of public housing 
in the 1990s amounts to a large-scale social engineering Americanization program. 
Housing reformers surmised that inculcating in women of color the tenets of white 
heteronormativity would better their families lot in life. It did not. In diverting the 
structural causes of racialized poverty onto gender and sexual practices, the privatization 
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of public housing immunized the state from scrutiny for minimizing the life opportunities 
afforded to the racialized poor.   
 By the early 1990s, the north side of Minneapolis was socially isolated from the 
rest of the Twin Cities metro region. It was one of the most economically depressed areas 
in the entire state of Minnesota. Despite the postindustrial economy of Minneapolis 
expanding between the 1980s and 1990s, the gains of economic prosperity did not 
equally apply to everyone. From 1980 to 1990, the poverty rate in Minneapolis exploded 
by 46 percent, striking African-Americans particularly hard. The City of Minneapolis 
even admitted that at 27 percent the Twin Cities region in 1992 experienced the highest 
rate of African-American unemployment of any metropolitan area in the country.53  
 A large portion of that unemployment was concentrated to the city’s north side 
where on a 73-acre parcel of land sat four public housing developments: Glenwood, 
Lyndale, Olson, and Sumner Field.54 Built in the 1930s as part of a government effort to 
clear slums, address a housing shortage, and create construction jobs during the Great 
Depression, the early residents of these four developments were predominantly Jewish. 
By the 1990s, these developments had become largely black.55 While the City of 
Minneapolis was 78 percent white, African-Americans and Hmong refugees comprised 
96 percent of the population in these public housing developments.56 The population was 
                                                
53 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, “Housing in the Heartland: An Examination of the Hollman v. Cisneros Consent 
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55 Sumner Field’s most famous residents included the musician Prince Rodgers Nelson. “Sumner Field 
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also relatively young compared to earlier inhabitants. More than 1,900 children, most of 
them hailing from low-income families headed by single mothers, called one of the four 
public housing developments home.57 The four public housing developments were also 
witness to an acute concentration of poverty. The median household income on-site was 
one-third that of the city as a whole and more than 70 percent of households lived well 
below the federal poverty line.58 All these factors contributed to the Star Tribune in 
characterizing the public housing developments as breeding grounds for cultural 
pathology.59 
 Admittedly, the housing developments were in blighted conditions, but not 
because of the perceived cultural pathology of residents. The blighted conditions emerged 
as a result of the systemic neglect of federal and local housing agencies and officials. 
Residents described the developments as experiencing a number of problems. The 
buildings themselves were crumbling and shifting since they were constructed atop 
boggy soil. Hidden within the walls of the buildings lured a number of other problems not 
visible to the public eye. Residents complained of units with malfunctioning smoke 
detectors, peeling paint, growing mold on ceilings, sagging porches, roaming mice and 
roaches, and rusty water spewing from corroded faucets.60 The blighted conditions of 
these four public housing developments confirmed for much of the general public that 
poor, families of color—particularly black single-mother households—were incapable of 
taking care of their living environments.  
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 The deterioration of these four public housing developments, and others across 
the United States, must be understood in relation to the neoliberalization of urban policy. 
The withdrawal of social welfare provisions by the state was clearly encapsulated in the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981. This act consisted of two major options. First, it 
granted cities greater autonomy over urban redevelopment through the unrestricted use of 
“block grants.” The other motion of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act prescribed the 
reduction of government spending on social programs. Whereas the government was 
once committed to the dispersal of social services, it was now the responsibility of the 
“free market” to disperse such social welfare. These alleged cost-cutting measures set in 
motion an array of dire consequences for the economically disenfranchised. After 35 
years of steady increase, the number of Americans able to purchase a home decreased by 
1.6 million between 1980 and 1987, a trend that was particularly noticeable among young 
families and first-time homebuyers. The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
was specially hit hard by these neoliberal shifts in federal policy. By 1987, the nation’s 
public housing budget was obliterated by 87 percent.61 
 The combined effects of unemployment and abject poverty produced an 
overwhelming demand for affordable housing for low-income populations across central 
                                                
61 Administration officials contended that the federal housing program was merely more streamlined and 
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cities. By 1988, according to the National Housing Institute, there were about 800,000 
families on waiting lists for 1.3 million federal public housing units already occupied.62 
In Chicago, despite the less than desirable physical conditions of high-rise public housing 
developments, the waiting list for public housing stretched far beyond the physical 
infrastructure owned and operated by the Chicago Housing Authority. In 1980, the 
waiting list for a subsidized apartment consisted of 13,323 people. By 1984, that number 
had skyrocketed to 24,000 people.63 In Minneapolis, housing subsidies dropped from a 
peak of 4,000 to 5,000 units a year in the late 1970s to just 500 in 1983, despite a demand 
for 10,000 units.64 The odds that poor Minnesotans would be able to secure decent, low-
income housing decreased substantially with the beginning of the decade.65  
In the face of this housing shortage, there was a growing demand for affordable 
housing in Minneapolis, particularly among renters.66 While two out of three American 
households owned their own homes, families and individuals locked out of the housing 
market were forced into the rental market, where they drove prices up and decreased 
availability. Between 1980 and 1986, rents in the metropolitan area of Minneapolis 
increased by 66 percent so much so that a third of renters were spending more than 30 
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percent of their income on rent. As more poor people, with less money, sought fewer 
available apartments, apartment quality declined while rents rose sharply. In addition to a 
crisis in affordable housing, a pattern of stagnation and decline in the quality of the 
housing stock emerged throughout urban centers, confining 10 million families to 
inadequate or overcrowded dwellings and 24 million families to units that the federal 
government classified as having “a housing problem.”67 The concerted divestment of 
inner-city neighborhoods, through the denial of repairs and cutbacks in subsidized 
housing assistance, created a context in which slum landlords could increase rent, make a 
profit, and not have to maintain properties. All these factors would lead to a dramatic 
wave of gentrification in the 1990s. 
 In part, due to the state withdrawal in social services and the housing crisis of the 
1980s, the homeless population in the United States increased dramatically. From 1981 to 
1989, the rate of homelessness increased from 5 to 15 percent in the 142 largest cities of 
the country.68 In Minnesota, according to the Department of Jobs and Training, on an 
August night in 1985, there were 1,165 Minnesotans in homeless shelters. In August of 
1987, that number had more than doubled to 2,425, with families becoming a large part 
of that homeless population.69 The removal of a social safety net and the limited stock of 
affordable housing made homelessness a reality for many disenfranchised Americans. 
The state’s continued abstraction throughout these neoliberal shifts in public policy 
facilitated the proliferation of cultural explanations rooted that, in turn, justified such 
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cutbacks. This narrative interpreted homelessness not as a consequence of housing policy 
but as a result of personal choice.  
 This same narrative explained away the failure of public housing developments as 
a product of cultural pathology—manifested in the gender and sexual non-normativity of 
public housing tenants, in particular single-parent households. The Chicago Tribune 
reported that housing analysts projected that the housing crisis would be further 
aggravated in the 1990s by several key population factors including the number of low-
income, single-parent, female-headed households which was expected to rise. In 
Minneapolis, the Metropolitan Council, the regional governmental agency assigned with 
urban planning, warned to the Star Tribune that the number of single-parent families was 
growing at a rate faster than married-couple households and predicted a plethora of social 
problems not the least of which involved a housing shortage. In spite of the stigma 
unleashed on single-parent households, they were not the primary beneficiaries of public 
housing in Minneapolis. Single-parent households accounted for 65 percent of the area’s 
non-elderly, low-income housing needs, yet they only accounted for 17 percent of the 
39,890 Twin Cities area family housing subsidies. This discrepancy illustrates that 
although single-parent households were in greater need of housing assistance, they were 
less likely to receive it. Despite not being the primary beneficiaries, single-parent 
households, especially those headed by single mothers of color, were often treated as the 
culprits for the failure of public housing, in particular, and urban blight, in general.70  
 To address the various structural problems plaguing Sumner Field, attorneys for 
the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis chapter of the NAACP, on 
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behalf of 14 local residents of public housing, filed a lawsuit against the City of 
Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority, the Minneapolis Community 
Development Agency, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in 
1992. The suit, Hollman v. Cisneros, accused the defendants of racial discrimination for 
creating and perpetuating patterns of residential segregation by confining subsidized 
housing to the north side of Minneapolis. 
 In 1995, the parties agreed to settle the claims in the lawsuit by signing a consent 
decree. The settlement became known as the Hollman Consent Decree after Lucy Mae 
Hollman, the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit. Hollman, an African-American woman who 
lived in the Sumner Field public housing development, requested a transfer after 
witnessing a shooting. The settlement was intended to end the racial and economic 
isolation of family public housing in north Minneapolis in three major ways. First, it 
called for the redevelopment of the north side neighborhood, by demolishing the 770 
units of family public housing and relocating all of the 440 families living in those units 
to the suburbs in single-family homes and mixed-income apartments. Second, it required 
that HUD contribute to 900 housing vouchers for the creation of a Special Mobility 
Program (SMP) for other low-income households on the MPHA waiting list to be used in 
non-concentrated neighborhoods.71 Third, the settlement mandated a one-for-one 
replacement of the 770 public housing units to be demolished. The replacement units, 
which were to have been built in non-concentrated neighborhoods throughout the 
                                                
71 The consent decree defined non-concentrated neighborhoods in terms of both race and class. Any census 
tract with more than 29% people of color was minority-concentrated. Any central city census tract with 




metropolitan area, were to have been completed within 6 years of HUD’s approval of the 
demolition.72 
 Not everyone was pleased with the provisions outlined by the consent decree. 
Many questioned the policy’s proposed demolition of the few available affordable 
housing in the region given the affordable housing crisis that afflicted the region. In 1995, 
the City of Minneapolis witnessed a shortage of 14,776 housing units for extremely low-
income households. By 1998, according to a study by HUD, the apartment vacancy rate 
for Minneapolis was 1.1 percent. The patterns of homelessness and a lack affordable 
housing that had already intensified in the 1980s, thus, persisted well into the following 
decade. With a greater demand than actual supply, waiting lists for housing assistance 
skyrocketed to at least 4,160 households in Minneapolis in 1988. Due to the lack of 
affordable housing, the number of homeless families in Minneapolis also increased. In 
1995, according to the city’s own estimates, 1,600 families experienced homelessness. In 
fact, several of the 14 original named plaintiffs in the Hollman v. Cisneros lawsuit were 
homeless in 1999.73 Even though the Hollman Consent Decree attempted to remedy the 
concentration of racialized poverty through a multi-prong policy of demolition, 
relocation, and redevelopment, its provisions wreaked greater economic turmoil in the 
lives of poor, families of color. 
 To bring this contradiction to light, in the summer of 1999, prominent north side 
African-American community leaders interrupted the demolition process. The group of 
fourteen protesters, which included eight African-American ministers, were jailed for 
standing between bulldozers and the remaining public housing units. The Hollman 14, as 
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the group became known, demanded that in a middle of an affordable housing crisis, it 
would make greater sense to rehabilitate than to demolish housing. In an editorial 
appearing in the Star Tribune, the group claimed, “City policies send a consistent 
message to its low-income citizens particularly those of color: ‘We don’t want you 
here—get out of town.’” 74 The Hollman 14 linked the city’s perceived disregard for 
affordable housing to long-simmering tensions against urban migrants of color to 
Minneapolis.  
However, in the midst of mounting opposition to a policy of deconcentration, the 
leadership of the Minneapolis branch of the NAACP changed. Rickie Campbell, who had 
referred to the Hollman Consent Decree as a “mistake,” replaced Matthew Little who had 
openly supported the original lawsuit. Once it became apparent that deconcentration 
would literally destroy entire black communities in north Minneapolis, the NAACP 
recanted its earlier position. The Star Tribune quoted Bill English, a NAACP member, 
questioning “why de-concentrating poverty means moving poor people. Why not bring 
economic development to poor people instead?” 75 Although members of the NAACP 
worked in collaboration with community activists to slow down or stop the destruction of 
the “heart and soul” of the African-American community, the NAACP’s newfound 
position clashed with that of the mayor’s. As the city’s first African-American and female 
mayor, Sharon Sayles Belton was also a member of the NAACP. Having been a party to 
the original lawsuit and a signatory to the Hollman Consent Decree, Belton vehemently 
endorsed deconcentration. She explained to the press, “I’m on the side that says we must 
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de-concentrate poverty and build strong neighborhoods.”76 Unlike the Hollman 14 and 
the NAACP, who insisted that economic development and opportunity were crucial in 
reducing poverty, Belton stressed that neighborhood environment was by far more critical 
in determining upward mobility for public housing families. Belton’s position lend itself 
more easily to the notion that deconcentration and subsequent mixed-income and multi-
racial integration would benefit poor, families of color because it enable them to model 
their behaviors after their middle- to upper-class white neighbors. This was a central tenet 
of the Hollman Consent Decree.  
Then-secretary of HUD, former San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros, welcomed 
the settlement process in Hollman v. Cisneros if only because it provided the agency with 
another opportunity to test out its newfound neoliberal vision of subsidized housing. 
During the first term of President Bill Clinton’s administration, HUD channeled its 
resources to altering its policies towards the spatial deconcentration of subsidized 
housing. This campaign was spearheaded by Cisneros who decried poverty as “urban 
America’s toughest challenge.” On April 6, 1995, Cisneros testified before a Republican-
led Congress that the “social engineering experiment” of large-scale, high-rise public 
housing had proven a mass failure.77 But Cisneros did not highlight the role of the state in 
this failure, doing so would have required him to acknowledge HUD’s policy of malign 
neglect. Neither did Cisneros link past federal housing policies (i.e., redlining, 
blockbusting, zoning) to contemporary patterns of residential segregation. Instead, 
Cisneros took the government’s failure in managing public housing as an opportunity to 
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vouch for the benefits of the market in the operation of subsidized housing. Cisneros’ 
thinking stressed that where the government had failed, the market would surely succeed.   
At the hearing before Congress, Cisneros optimistically proclaimed that the 
reinvention of the agency hinged upon the “power of market discipline and individual 
choice.” This approach, Cisneros argued, would provide housing families with a greater 
range of housing choices while ensuring that families be immersed in racially-integrated, 
mixed-income neighborhoods.78 Cisneros’ reinvention of HUD in the mid-1990s 
conveyed a new vision of urban space, one that was shaped by neoliberal ways of 
thinking and was designed to attract private investment. As the architect of the “new” 
HUD in the 1990s, Cisneros understood that racially concentrated and impoverished 
neighborhoods bred cultural pathology: drug abuse, school dropouts, teenage 
pregnancies, and intergenerational welfare dependency. In making the case for a policy of 
deconcentration, Cisneros told Congress: “We have ample evidence that shows that when 
people are given the opportunity to live near jobs, and near schools, quality schools, that 
we see dramatic changes in their life circumstances.”79 Cisneros, and other housing 
officials, used a theory environmentalism—the belief that changes to the built 
environment could generate changes to people’s behavior—to restructure HUD as an 
anti-racist apparatus that assimilated the racialized poor into the cultural dictates of 
neoliberalism: heteronormativity, personal responsibility, and self-entrepreneurialism. A 
central limitation to this approach is that it mistakenly attributed poverty to the choices 
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and personalities of individuals while failing to recognize the economic, legal, and 
political structures that produce racially unequal outcomes on a daily basis. Though 
Cisneros accentuated the mid-1990s reinvention of HUD as a new frontier in housing, the 
incursion of a market rationale into federal housing policy has a longer, ongoing history, 
most notably in the state’s self-abstraction in postwar white suburban homeownership.80   
The new spatial strategy outlined in the Hollman Consent Decree was greatly 
influenced by the theories and policies of neoliberalism. The consent decree owed its 
emergence to the hallmark of neoliberal urban policy, HOPE-VI (Housing Opportunities 
for People Everywhere). HOPE-VI consisted of a campaign of rehabilitation or 
demolishment and redevelopment of severely distressed high-rise public housing 
infrastructure in the United States into mixed-income housing. It provided funds to 
rehabilitate or demolish and rebuild the 86,000 public housing units throughout the 
country labeled the most “severely distressed.”81 The program began in 1992 and was 
codified into law in 1998.82 The legislation outlining HOPE-VI emerged out of the 
National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing established by Congress in 
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1989 to survey the matter of run-down public housing. 83 The first HOPE-VI pilot grant 
was awarded to the Atlanta Housing Authority in 1993.84 Over the course of 15 years, 
HOPE-VI grants were used to demolish 96,200 public housing units and generate 
107,800 new or renovated housing units, of which 56,800 were to be affordable for the 
lowest-income households.85 The new and renovated housing units were designed to be 
mixed-income, less dense, and more fully integrated into local neighborhoods. The 
program’s philosophy drew primarily from New Urbanism and the concept of “defensible 
space.” 
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
adopted the principles of New Urbanism in its multibillion-dollar program of HOPE-VI 
to rebuild public housing projects nationwide. As the architectural ethos of neoliberalism, 
New Urbanism is an urban design movement, arising in the United States in the early 
1980s, defined by a focus on creating high-density, mixed-income, multi-use, and 
walkable neighborhoods. As the antithesis to the automobile-centered practice of urban 
sprawl, New Urbanism, through pedestrian-friendly spaces and design codes, seeks to 
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men, women and children—living in approximately 86,000 units of severely depressed public housing to 
reside in physical, emotional, social, and economic distress.” The 16-member commission, co-chaired by 
the chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority and U.S. Rep Bill Green of New York, visited public 
housing developments in more than 25 cities, held 20 public hearings and spoke extensively with residents 
of some of the best and worst facilities. The reports revealed disheartening figures for Chicago. One of the 
chairs of the study proclaimed that Chicago had the worst public housing in America with 50 percent 
seriously distressed. Especially troublesome, he said, was that only 10 percent of Chicago public housing 
residents were described as working. Otto A. Silha, “U.S. cities still starving for attention,” Chicago 
Tribune, Sep. 30, 1992: 15.; Linda Couch, “Public Housing: Choice Neighborhoods Initiative and HOPE 
VI,” National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2001. Retrieved August 5, 2016. 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Sec4.05_Public-Housing-Choice-Neighborhoods_2015.pdf  
84 Bruce Katz, “The Origins of HOPE VI.” In From Despair to Hope: HOPE VI and the New Promise of 
Public Housing in America’s Cities, ed. Henry G. Cisneros and Lora Engdahl, 15-29. Brookings Institution 
Press, 2009. 
85 “FY2010 Budget.” United States Department of Housing & Urban Development. Jun. 20, 2010.  
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forge a sense of community by facilitating interaction and neighborliness.86 New 
Urbanism works to bring the neighborly feel of the suburbs to the urban core while 
maintaining the hustle and bustle of city life. Although New Urbanism is concerned with 
promoting neighborliness, it could very well contribute to increased policing especially if 
newly implanted inhabitants feel threatened by perceived racial outsiders who may very 
well have lived in the neighborhood for generations.  
 In the case of public housing, the New Urbanist’s architectural template 
abandoned the modernist’s model of large-scale housing in favor of neatly fenced-off 
rows of townhomes that were believed to more directly interact with the street. Under 
HOPE-VI, rehabilitated or rebuilt public housing units were constructed with the goal of 
low-level, high-density, mixed-income, and mixed-use communities. In fact, the 
Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU), the organizing body for New Urbanism founded 
in 1993, was instrumental in providing design guidelines and training for HUD in its 
implementation of the program.87 In addition to HOPE-VI, the ethos of New Urbanism 
was explicitly encapsulated in a number of other housing policies and practices including 
Chicago’s Plan for Transformation.88 Chicago’s Plan for Transformation, along with 
HOPE-VI, did not require a “one-for-one” replacement of the old housing units, meaning 
                                                
86 Jones and Popke, “Re-invisioning the city,” 123.  
87 Center for New Urbanism. “HUD HOPE VI.” Last modified 2015. https://www.cnu.org/our-
projects/hud-hope-vi 
88 On January 06, 2000, Chicago Housing Authority officials held a press conference to announce Plan for 
Transformation, a detailed course of action outlining housing policy for the City of Chicago in the 
upcoming decade. It called for the demolition of 18,000 units, including all 51 of the high-rise public 
housing developments in the city, including the famed Cabrini-Green projects adjacent to the city’s Gold 
Coast neighborhood. The plan cost $1.5 billion and required the relocation of 6,000 families. The CHA 
predicted that by 2010 it would manage 25,000 units, some newly built and some renovated, all of which 
would be located in mixed-income and racially-integrated neighborhoods, with a guarantee that 30 percent 




that new developments did not have to house the same number of tenants, thus, resulting 
in a net loss of affordable housing for the poor.89  
 Housing officials did not consider institutional neglect to be the cause for public 
housing’s failure. Instead, they insisted that previous housing policies had proven 
unsuccessful because these policies had spatially and socially concentrated low-income 
populations. This isolation coupled with the alleged cultural pathology of tenants had 
contributed to a housing climate inimical to the neoliberal vision of HUD. For these 
reasons, housing officials hailed deconcentration as the appropriate course of action. By 
combining market-rate units with assisted units, the visionaries behind HOPE-VI 
postulated that interaction with middle- to upper-class neighbors would instill a more 
efficient work ethic among the poor and working-class tenants of public housing. Per this 
logic, to climb up the social, the racialized poor needed constant behavioral motivators in 
the form of more successful neighbors. To assist in this process of subjection, housing 
officials also ensured that they promoted single-family homes that would, in turn, train 
the racialized poor on the proper spatial delineation of private and public. Neoliberal 
urban policy, in the form of HOPE-VI, did not so much as seek to equalize the 
distribution of resources, as much as it labored to instill a discourse and practice of 
personal responsibility. In other words, neoliberal urban policy did not only manage 
public space, it also regulated private citizens in accordance to racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene.  
                                                
89 In 1998, Congress repealed the one-for-one replacement policy, apart from HUD’s implementation of 
HOPE-VI. According to the Urban Institute, the number of units receiving a federal subsidy and that are 
available specifically for the extremely poor in which to live has been slashed in half in developments 
emerging out of HOPE-VI. Rachel Peterson, “HOPE VI in San Francisco.” San Francisco Planning and 




 With HOPE-VI and its sibling programs, housing officials coerced displays of 
proper American self-improvement. They harnessed the architectural fabric of housing 
units in the service of instilling upon tenants an ethics of self-discipline and personal 
responsibility. The visionaries behind HOPE-VI drew their ideological inspiration largely 
from the concept of “defensible space.” Developed in the early 1970s by architect and 
city planner Oscar Newman, the theory of defensible space addresses ideas about crime 
prevention and neighborhood safety. In his 1972 book, Defensible Space, Newman 
observed that high-rise apartment buildings had a higher crime rate than lower-level 
housing projects. Newman theorized that high-rise apartment buildings witnessed more 
crime and vandalism because residents did not feel a sense of control or personal 
responsibility for an area occupied by such a large crowd of people. Newman, thus, 
reasoned that in order for a neighborhood to feel safer and remain physically well-kept, 
its residents had to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for a particular parcel of 
land within that community. A housing development, however, could only be defensible 
if its physical features evoked territorialism among tenants.  
The public housing buildings that emerged out of the theory of defensible space 
were low-rise ones, with high-quality materials—to develop pride in the space and 
maintain an interest in keeping the property in fair condition—closely integrated into the 
street, and designed with an eye for visibility—so that tenants could look outdoors at all 
times of the day and would-be criminals could be deterred by looking indoors—a kind of 
domestic Panopticon.90 In the mixed-income row of townhomes that sprung up in 
Chicago’s Cabrini Green neighborhood and in north Minneapolis’s post-demolition 
                                                
90 Oscar Newman. Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing, 1973).  
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community of Heritage Park, all homes purposefully included private entrances and 
gardens to foster respect for and maintenance of private property among tenants who 
were presumed to be careless.  
From the Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini Green in Chicago to Sumner Field in 
north Minneapolis, the goal of state-subsidized housing has always been the molding of 
tenants into a specific ideal that upholds the economic, political, and social status quo. 
One of the most prominent examples of this set of circumstances is that of the Pruitt-Igoe 
public housing complex in St. Louis, Missouri. A bold experiment in public housing, 
Pruitt-Igoe was completed near downtown St. Louis in 1954 in response to the crowded 
and unhygienic living conditions of the city’s slums. Built according to the ideas of Swiss 
architect Charles Edward Jeanneret le Corbusier, the complex consisted of 33 eleven-
story, high-rise buildings that occupied a 59-acre site. Pruitt-Igoe, like postwar public 
housing, was informed by a modernist approach to architecture: a design ethos that 
valued a rational, scientific approach to construction wherein only the necessary, 
functional parts of structures remained. In regards to aesthetic, modernism was conveyed 
by beauty in geometric purity, concrete slab construction, and a fondness for sleek 
surfaces. The idealist rationality that underwrote the modernist vision of architecture 
professed that people’s lives could be shaped by architecture. 91 To that extent, the layout 
                                                
91 The buildings were designed to incorporate Le Corbusier’s three essential joys of urbanism: sun, space, 
and greenery. Elizabeth Birmingham, “Reframing the Ruins: Pruitt-Igoe, Structural Racism, and African-




of Pruitt-Igoe was not without intended purpose. The public housing development was an 
attempt to solve the problems of poverty and urban blight through architectural means.92  
Planners designed the layout of Pruitt-Igoe in such a way that it provided for the 
materialization of racialized norms of sexual hygiene: domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and 
respectability. As urban scholar Elizabeth Birmingham notes, the design aesthetic of 
Pruitt-Igoe closely resembled that of a hospital, “a safe, hygienic, and healthful 
environment.”93 Planners sought to instill the virtues of a clean, democratic, and safe 
living environment on residents by encoding particular design features onto the built 
environment. For instance, architects installed elevators that stopped at only every third 
floor, forcing residents to travel up and down the stairs to reach their desired destination. 
Architects hoped this design would provide opportunities for residents to play and 
interact with one another. Also, in keeping with Corbusier’s notion of the “City in a 
Garden,” a ring of greenspace, intended to serve as an aesthetic and recreation area, 
separated the buildings from the remainder of the city. These outdoor open spaces were 
devised to link the project to the larger neighborhood and to foster a sense of community 
among residents. In reality, these design features merely provided opportunities for crime 
as they economically isolated the residents from the resources of the city. In confining the 
city’s poor, black residents to their own urban island, they were denied access to the basic 
amenities and opportunities for social mobility. By the end of the first decade, the 
buildings began to decline. And, just twenty years after their opening, the buildings were 
                                                
92 The first project, Pruitt, was intended for African-Americans and the second, Igoe, was intended for 
whites. However, with the Supreme Court invalidating residential segregation, both projects eventually 
become black. Of the over 10,000 residents of Pruitt-Igoe, 98 percent were black. And they were also 
extremely poor, with an estimated annual median family income of $2,454 with an average family 
consisted of a single mother and 4.28 children. Ibid.  
93 Ibid.  
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demolished. Their failure was blamed on the architects, the government, the city, but 
mostly on the residents themselves.94  
The built environment of the Pruitt-Igoe housing complex, like that of Sumner 
Field and its post-demolition neoliberal iteration of Heritage Park, rested on an ideology 
of cultural pathology. Modern and post-modern architecture (i.e., mixed-income public 
housing) did not fail public housing residents. What failed them and continues to do so 
are the deeper structural failures of racism and poverty. The underlying problems of 
racial and class-based inequality were carried over from the era of high-rise public 
housing projects to that of multi-racial, mixed-income town-homes. HUD’s new 
neoliberal vision of urban space proceeded from an environmentalist assumption that a 
reconfiguration in the built environment would likewise alter people’s behaviors. 
Although the visionaries behind HOPE-VI utilized the principles of defensible space to 
nurture a sense of control of public spaces among residents that was once denied to them 
living in high-rise public housing, their mission wrongfully assumed that high-rise public 
housing buildings became dilapidated as a result of crime, vandalism, and an overall 
cultural unwillingness on the part of tenants to care for their surroundings. For that 
reason, housing officials believed that racial integration, mixed-income housing—that is, 
gentrification—would “fix” public housing tenants by instilling upon them new 
neoliberal subjectivities.  
We can connect the notion of greenspace and defensible space to the ideological 
presumptions around allotment in the United States. The idea of allotment is that the 
                                                
94 Timothy J. Fox, “The World’s Fair, Pruitt-Igoe, and the Myths of Modernism,” The Confluence (2014): 
44-52.; Joseph Heathcott, “Pruitt-Igoe and the Critique of Public Housing,” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 78, no. 4 (2012): 450-51.; Katherine Bristol, “The Pruitt-Igoe Myth,” Journal of 
Architectural Education, (1991): 163-71. 
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government will grant a certain amount of space to residents in order to foster personal 
responsibility. In the late 1800s, after the American West had been conquered, the 
American government embarked on a policy of “civilizing” the Lakota and other western 
Indian peoples. For colonial administrators, all the Lakota looked alike; they had no 
individual identities. Prior to the emergence of industrial capitalism in the late 19th 
century, the primary sociopolitical units of the Lakota were kinship-based, and leader-
centered. The state, thus, encountered a problem with this arrangement. This type of 
subject could not be recuperated under the government’s administrative and juridical 
agenda, or the market economy under which labor and land were traded as goods. As a 
result, agents for the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) implemented a series of 
administrative techniques that forced the Lakota to conform to a minimum definition of 
modern individuality. Examining the process of “subjection” on the Pine Ridge and 
Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota from the 1880s to the 1930s, historian Thomas 
Biolsi argues that the Lakota were molded into private individuals with predictable and 
recordable identities and self-interests.95 According to Michel Foucault, subjection is the 
constitution of subjects, the way in which individuals establish their relation to power and 
recognize themselves as being obligated to abide by that power. In short, it is the way in 
which people are invited to recognize their obligations to power. Because subjection was 
linked to both positive and negative power, the Lakota came to view their self-interests 
through this matrix of subjectivity. They also learned to shape their actions and thoughts 
under these terms.  
                                                
95 Thomas Biolsi, “The Birth of the Reservation: Making the Modern Individual Among the Lakota,” 
American Ethnologist 22, no. 1 (1995): 28-53. See: Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983), 208-26.  
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Modes of subjection, in determining the channels through which the Lakota 
would be known by the state and allowed to operate as individuals, facilitated the 
penetration of the subjectivities of the Lakota by the state and by capitalism. One of the 
modes of subjection operating in the internal pacification of the Lakota was 
“empropertiment,” in particular the allotment of Indian lands by the OIA. Administrators 
believed that the allotment system created individuality, responsibility, and a desire to 
accumulate capital among the Lakota. The allotment system also helped to create a new 
sovereignty on the reservations. As empropertied individuals, the Lakota depended upon 
the state apparatus for the protection of their property. This social contract between 
property owners and the state bolstered the role of the state as a sovereign entity that 
represented the interests of property owners. As Biolsi explains, “The significance of 
property ownership as a form of modern subjectivity lies in its implications for political 
sovereignty, specifically for the state: privatization of the means of 
production/subsistence creates fundamentally new subjects with radically new interests 
and social and political relations to each other.”96 Biolsi’s point here is that private 
property ownership reconfigured social relations while giving rise to a subject whose 
interests rested within the protection of that property.  
Like the allotment of Indian lands, as a “civilizing” strategy, one of the most 
important elements of housing policy under neoliberalism has been the allotment of 
single-family homes, whether in multi-racial, mixed-income urban neighborhoods or in 
the suburbs, with their use of defensible space and greenspace. The use of greenspace and 
defensible space in both modernist and neoliberal iterations of public housing is 
                                                
96 Ibid., 33.  
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indicative of attempts to demarcate the boundaries between the public sphere and the 
private domain of the home. Under HOPE-VI and the Hollman Consent Decree, single-
family homes in mixed-income neighborhoods, with their separate entrances, multi-
purpose rooms, and plant-filled front-porch gardens, were meant to impose upon the 
racialized poor a spatial sense of the boundaries between public and private. And, in so 
doing, planners hoped to elicit heteronormative community structures out of the 
racialized poor that marked their relationships and social dynamics as legible and 
readable for dominant white society. The discussion of Indian land allotment suggests 
that the state recycled a number of the approaches used in the construction of reservations 
for Native Americans as it did for blacks in the construction of public housing 
developments (i.e., racial segregation, economic isolation, and architectural design codes 
of defensible space). Given these similarities, it would be of benefit for us to study the 
creation of American Indian reservations in relation to the postwar development of inner-
city ghettos as “urban reservations” for blacks and Latinx. These were urban reservations 
to the extent that they also contained and segregated people of color, the poorest and most 
vulnerable, from the rest of the city and the resources allocated to whites. By spiraling 
into prison-like encampments of crime and policing once federal and local monies dried 
up, these desolate and isolating institutional structures fortified the foundations of racial 
hierarchies and the pervasiveness of hopelessness.  
If housing policy in the United States operates as a mode of subjection, then we 
can treat the privatization of public housing as an attempt to reconstitute the political 
subjectivities of the racialized poor in accordance to neoliberalism. In the 1990s, housing 
officials believed they could socially engineer heteronormativity out of the racialized 
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poor by applying architectural design codes that promoted—coerced—domesticity, 
intimacy, privacy, and respectability. Given its intended goal of behavioral modifications, 
neoliberal urban policy, as manifest in HOPE-VI and the Hollman Consent Decree, 
operates as a neoliberal spatial fix that seeks to remedy social disparities by merely 
altering the ways in which people occupy space, not by addressing the root causes behind 
those material inequalities. The failure of local housing authorities and HUD to maintain 
its infrastructure—the result of Reagan’s massive budget cuts— is what resulted in the 
physical deterioration of these structures across the country. The blighting of the 
buildings in conjunction with the mass exodus of economic activity from the surrounding 
neighborhoods all contributed to a wave of mass desperation and human suffering. 
False Hope. 
 Mainstream perceptions of gender and sexual non-normativity stoke cultural 
anger from those in positions of power that, in turn, fuels a number of punitive and 
“benevolent” mechanisms designed to “fix” such populations. Proceeding from a 
reservoir of popular images of poor, families of color as deviant, in particular of women 
of color as “unfit” mothers, these neoliberal urban policies and programs served as 
powerful mechanisms of moral and sexual regulation. Forasmuch as morality and 
sexuality were upheld as the both the cause and solution to racialized material inequality, 
the Hollman Consent Decree and HOPE-VI program elided any acknowledgement of the 
economic policy decisions and social processes that conspired to perpetuate racialized 
poverty. Policymakers insisted that deconcentration would benefit public housing 
families by placing them in close contact to job growth centers in developing suburbs and 
help them develop a more efficient work ethic by providing them with opportunities to 
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emulate their white, middle-class neighbors. In practice, deconcentration did not achieve 
these end goals. 
 While some community activists explicitly expressed their opposition to the 
Hollman approach through news media, displaced families implicitly expressed their 
opinion on the matter through their relocation patterns. In August of 1995, three months 
after the signing of the Hollman Consent Decree, displaced families began moving from 
the north side neighborhood. Housing officials provided relocation assistance to the 440 
impacted families including helping them locate potential units, assisting them in visiting 
units, and filling out rental applications. Although the primary goal of the settlement 
process was the relocation of public housing families into non-concentrated areas, 
specifically suburban, most of the displaced families chose to relocate very close to their 
original address. The 440 families displaced from the north side neighborhood were not 
restricted to non-concentrated areas. That is, they could have used relocation assistance to 
move to any neighborhood in the city. However, according to a study of the relocation 
patterns of displaced families conducted by urban geographer Edward Goetz, only 49.6 
percent moved to non-concentrated census tracts, 4.9 percent moved to census tracts that 
were poverty-concentrated, 12.9 percent moved to minority-concentrated neighborhoods, 
and 32.6 percent moved to neighborhoods that were both poverty- and minority-
concentrated. More than half of the 440 displaced families moved to neighborhoods that 
were concentrated in one way or another. To place the relocation patterns in different 
terms, 27 percent of families stayed within a one-mile radius of the center of the original 
public housing development, 39 percent moved within a two-mile radius, and 58 percent 
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moved within three miles. Overall, only 10 percent of families relocated to first-ring 
suburbs, and that was immediately to the north and west of Minneapolis.97 
 The minimal rate of success suggests that housing officials, in their policy of 
deconcentration, did not consider how material conditions would constrain the mobility 
choices of public housing families. Suburban living posed a number of challenges for 
displaced families, many of whom rightfully feared discrimination in their housing 
searches and harassment in their new living environments given the vicious history of 
residential segregation. Other families were reluctant to relocate to suburban areas 
located many miles away from north Minneapolis and, by extension, the informal support 
networks upon which they relied for survival. In addition, the lack of public 
transportation in the outer suburbs contributed to the less than ideal nature of these 
locations.98 In spite of these obvious constraints, bureaucratic parties to the Hollman 
Consent Decree failed to contemplate how these difficulties could dissuade families from 
abandoning the central city in favor of suburbia. The fact that these obvious constraints 
were so easily overlooked suggests that the true purpose of the Hollman Consent Decree 
was not to reduce racialized poverty. Had this been the case, housing officials from HUD 
and the Minneapolis Public Housing Authority would have channeled some of the 
millions of dollars allocated to public housing in Minneapolis to education, job training 
and placement, and childcare. Instead, because it merely deconcentrated poverty without 
addressing its root causes, the Hollman Consent Decree served to implement HUD’s 
newfound neoliberal urban policy towards subsidized housing in the United States.  
                                                




 Not all public housing families equally benefitted from this policy of 
deconcentration. Those who were unable or unwilling to adhere to the cultural dictates of 
neoliberalism—in particular, those who were characterized as mono-cultural, sexually 
deviant, inflexible, and criminal—were symbolically devalued and made vulnerable to 
the state’s disciplining regimes. Spurred by media images of women of color as unfit 
mothers and men of color as criminals, welfare reform and post-conviction penalties of 
the mid-1990s illustrate how those who defied racialized norms of sexual hygiene were 
subjected to heightened surveillance and harassment. Much like public housing, welfare 
reform in the mid-1990s was redesigned as a tool of social control and punishment, a 
means of modifying the behavior of the racialized poor.99 Since many policymakers 
attributed “fatherlessness” as the leading cause of some of the most pressing problems in 
American society—crime, drug abuse, and poverty—welfare reform in the 1990s focused 
on preserving the American family. Welfare reform further disenfranchised poor, people 
of color by denying those with drug convictions access to anti-poverty instruments 
including housing and financial assistance, and education supports.100 
                                                
99 On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The new law authorized states with increased power to run 
AFDC as it dramatically cut welfare funding. It also established a lifetime ban of five years for payments to 
any family and required that heads of household secure employment within two years. Under Clinton, 
welfare was no longer treated as philanthropy; it was reframed as a mode of re-adjusting poor people’s 
behavior, in particular the sexual pathologies associated with black and Latino families. As part of the 
system’s overhaul, family cap provisions were also written into law. Premised on the assumption that the 
promise of benefits compels women to have additional children, family cap provisions deny any increase to 
the total payment a family receives after the birth of a new baby. In addition to family cap provisions, the 
PRWORA placed a priority on family preservation by offering monetary incentives to establish the 
parentage of children born out of wedlock and improve fathers’ access to visit children. See: Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Vintage, 
1999).   
100 The PRWORA also established a lifetime welfare ban on people convicted of felony drug offenses, 
further solidifying racial and class boundaries. As Allard shows, the ineligibility for cash assistance and 
food stamps results in limited access or outright denial of education and employment training programs, 




 In 1996, the same year that welfare reform was passed, the federal government 
implemented the “One Strike and You’re Out” policy authorizing local housing 
authorities to deny admission or evict tenants from subsidized housing based on a felony 
or misdemeanor conviction, including those based on drug-related offenses. Under the 
provision, even suspicion of illegal activity suffices to meet eviction or inadmissibility 
from public housing, Section 8 voucher programs, and project-based Section 8 housing. 
The policy also authorizes local housing authorities to conduct criminal background 
checks on adult applicants before approving their applications. If one member, or even a 
guest, is suspected of having engaged in criminal activity, regardless whether that person 
has been arrested or convicted of any such illegal activity, housing authorities are 
permitted to evict entire families. According to the Human Rights Watch, the “One 
Strike” policy renders ineligible for public housing at least 3.5 million men and women. 
Employment requirements for housing vouchers and HOPE-VI housing, furthermore, 
penalize tenants unable to secure or unwilling to accept low-wage labor.101 Through these 
complex web of post-conviction penalties and welfare bans, poor, families of color are 
expected to observe compliance, strive for normativity, embrace responsibility, and 
practice docility or else face eviction and potential homelessness. The legislation of these 
penalties and bans also allows the state to slash entitlement program spending, such as 
                                                                                                                                            
that the disproportionately impact women. Between 1996 and 1999, over 96,000 women, 48 percent who 
were African American or Latina, were subjected to the ban, impacting the well-being of 250,000 children. 
Meanwhile, a 1998 amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965 suspended eligibility, under some 
circumstances for life, for post-secondary financial aid—grants, loans, and work assistance—for anyone 
convicted of a drug-related misdemeanor or felony offense while attending a post-secondary institution. 
Affecting more than 175, 000 students, the law prescribed that anyone convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance would face a one-year suspension of federal aid following the first offense, a two-year 
suspension for the second offense, and a lifetime ban for the third offense. Allard, “Crime, Punishment, and 




public housing, and redirect those funds elsewhere, all the while forwarding explanations 
that attribute the failure of public housing to people’s unwillingness to abide by the rules 
of the market.  
 Despite the racialized violence generated by welfare reform and housing reform, 
attorneys for Legal Aid and members of the NAACP, who were invested in a liberal 
ethos of multiculturalism, were unable to successfully articulate a materialist critique of 
the neoliberal restructuring of public housing. They were unable to muster an antiracist 
critique of such policies precisely because neoliberal policymakers coded 
deconcentration-policy as an official antiracism that would successfully open up 
suburban living to poor, people of color and would, by extension, redress a history of 
residential segregation in the United States. A discourse and practice of neoliberal 
multiculturalism rendered it difficult, if not impossible, for housing activists and 
community leaders to successfully mount an antiracist critique of HOPE-VI and the 
Hollman Consent Decree. As the latest incarnation of official state-sanctioned antiracism, 
neoliberal multiculturalism normalized the shifting urban policies of spatial governance. 
Literary critic Jodi Melamed writes that “neoliberal multiculturalism portrays an ethic of 
multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism and posits neoliberal restructuring 
across the globe to be the key to a postracist world of freedom and opportunity.”102 The 
model of neoliberal multiculturalism deputizes the market as the mediator of racial, class, 
gender, and sexual disparities. By conflating economic rights—the freedom of consumer 
choice—as the most important form of civil rights, neoliberal multiculturalism justifies 
                                                
102 Jodi Melamed, “Reading Tehran in Lolita: Making Racialized and Gendered Difference Work for 
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deregulation and privatization to guarantee freedom to previously marginalized racialized 
populations. Nonetheless, by portraying the free market as the greatest purveyor of racial 
equality, neoliberal multiculturalism abstracts the racialized social and economic 
structures that bolster neoliberalism.  
 The hegemony of neoliberal multiculturalism hinges on the incorporation of 
newly valued racialized subjects. In our discussion, it would be those poor, families of 
color who as a result of the Hollman Consent Decree and HOPE-VI were provided with 
the opportunity to move into multi-racial, mixed-income neighborhoods. Their 
incorporation confirms how newly privileged subjects have emerged to the extent that 
traditional racial identities can occupy both sides of the privilege/stigma divide. The 
racial identity of “person of color” can now occupy both sides of the valued and devalued 
equation and reap benefits or experience violence accordingly. This dialectic is key to 
sustaining neoliberal urban policy: gentrification and banishment without the explicit 
accusation of racism. Precisely because some people of color are included within the fold 
of the state, acts of violence by the state against devalued racial subjects are not 
interpreted as racist. By transplanting onto the neoliberal subject of color some of the 
privileges and benefits associated with whiteness, neoliberal multiculturalism obscures 
the racist intent behind mass incarceration, welfare reform, post-conviction penalties, 
homelessness, and displacement ignited by gentrification. 
Conclusion. 
 A policy of deconcentration, because it abstracted the state’s role in fostering the 
concentration of racialized poverty, ensured that discourses and practices of cultural 
pathology—via gender deviance and sexual non-normativity—could be mobilized to 
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explain urban blight and, in turn, justify gentrification as a solution to sexually-
conjugated racial pathos. As a tool of social control, public housing policy in the 1990s 
became a way of “improving” the sexual behavior of poor, families of color. Since 
housing authorities understood the regulation of the gender and sexual identities and 
practices of the racialized poor as a solution to material inequality, one of the major goals 
of public housing policy was to inscribe domesticity and privacy into the living 
arrangements of these families via the architectural design of New Urbanism and the 
behavioral codes of defensible space. Racial norms of sexual hygiene were, thus, etched 
into the bricks and mortar of public housing policies and programs in the United States. 
In so doing, public housing policy shared features of eugenic thinking by striving to 
improve the race of people of color, primarily black men, women, and children. Precisely 
because it promulgated residential integration, the anti-racist rhetoric of housing policy in 
the 1990s reduced the channels available for poor, families of color and community 
activists to articulate a critique against the state’s sexual and spatial privatizing 
imperatives. By stoking anxieties associated with white injury, the mainstream media 
played a crucial role in garnering public support for these policies.  
 In the midst of changing racial demographics in the Twin Cities, elected leaders, 
officials in the criminal punishment system, and the media aroused fears around the issue 
of crime and emphasized its connections to race. By underscoring their non-normative 
gender and sexual identities and practices, those in positions of power bolstered the 
notion that urban migrants of color were culturally predisposed to crime. Through the 
dissemination of images of fatherless violent gang members and lazy single mothers on 
crack and welfare, the mainstream media became an important site for the state in 
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fabricating public consent and support for the policies associated with the war on drugs, 
welfare reform, and the privatization of public housing. The media reframed gang-related 
violence and drug abuse, not as economic crimes or public health matters, but rather as 
pressing risks to the moral fabric of the nation requiring punishment and regulation.  
The white injury that powered the war on drugs transformed the criminal 
punishment system into a technology of mass incarceration that exacerbated the 
marginalization and misery of an entire segment of the American population caught at the 
nexus of economic disenfranchisement and political subordination. On the other hand, 
Americanization programs, the few ones that survived neoliberal gutting, targeted single 
mothers of color in an attempt to assimilate poor, families of color into heteronormative 
community structures by imposing upon them a reform of their housing conditions. 
Housing, thus, became a way to socially engineer racialized norms of sexual hygiene out 
of the racialized poor. The problem with these approaches to urban blight—the punitive 
and the benevolent—is that they both failed to acknowledge how crime, drug abuse, and 
poverty operated within a context of economic disenfranchisement, police brutality, and 
structural racism. By ignoring these stark racial disparities, policymakers, the police, and 
the media failed to provide context or nuance. Instead, they solidified the perceived 
connection between race, crime, and deviations from gender, sexual, and domestic space 
norms. And, they did this while bolstering neoliberalism as the true guarantor of civil 
rights.  
It is important, though, to note that the lives of the racialized poor—gang 
members and crack addicted mothers—do not operate in a historical vacuum. We must 
place their experiences within the context of neoliberal shifts in the political economy of 
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American central cities in the latter half of the 20th century. This material re-centering 
allows us to better understand the individual lived experiences of social structures of 
oppression. Writing in regards to Puerto Rican crack cocaine dealers in New York City in 
the late-1980s, cultural anthropologist Phillipe Bourgois notes that “the self-destructive 
daily life of those who are surviving on the street needs to be contextualized in the 
particular history of the hostile race relations and structural economic dislocation they 
have faced.” By narrating the experience of residential segregation and 
deindustrialization, I have contextualized that particular history of “hostile race relations 
and structural economic dislocations” navigated by urban migrants of color to 
Minneapolis in the 1980s. If we fail to relate individual experience to political economy, 
we also forego an opportunity to decode “the relationship between social structural 
constraints and individual failure.”103 To that extent, I have reframed public housing in 
the United States not as a symbol of the progressive ethos of the state. On the contrary, I 
have emphasized that public housing marks the state’s failure to meet the basic housing 
needs of its population—a reminder of the state’s overtly racist federal housing policies 
and programs that economically and physically constrained communities of color into 
encampments of misery and squalor: “urban reservations.” Given the outcome of public 
housing in the United States, we would do well from treating public housing not just as a 
physical structure but as a metaphor of structural racism in the United States. We can 
observe structural racism not only in the economic, legal, and social structures of 
American society, but also in the “discreet infrastructures and structures of our 
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community.”104 As metaphors of structural racism, public housing projects reinforced the 
physical barriers confronted by the racialized poor in accessing the opportunities afforded 
to whites in American society. Considering that my analysis confirms that everyday 
racism and heteronormativity are produced, structured, and sustained in diverse spatial 
practices, we must attend to the processes under which structural constraints become 
reflected in spatial impediments.  
Despite HUD’s efforts to deconcentrate poverty via the dispersal of subsidized 
housing, the result of these policies and practices were mixed. Indeed, the Hollman 
Consent Decree did successfully deconcentrate Minneapolis’s largest concentration of 
poverty. However, it minimally accomplished the dispersal of these families into middle-
class neighborhoods. Most of the displaced families merely moved to nearby central city 
neighborhoods that were already concentrated in terms of class, race, or both. Other 
displaced families experienced homelessness. The larger majority of families, unable to 
rely on their informal social support networks, experienced new challenges when 
adopting to their living environment. In sum, these public housing policies and programs 
of deconcentration led to the very same conditions housing authorities were purported to 
eradicate. The state produced the very same non-normativity that it had tasked itself with 
remedying.  
Both the modernist and neoliberal vision of public housing in the United States 
failed because of a complex web of causes. These include larger economic and social 
forces of deindustrialization, fiscal mismanagement, and the broader—still 
unacknowledged—social circumstances that necessitated public housing, in the first 
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place: racism, classism, and economic divestment. These crosscutting economic, 
political, and social dynamics—which carried over from the modernist to the neoliberal 
vision of public housing—are responsible for turning public housing into a symbol of 
decay, hopelessness, and violence.105  
Focusing on cultural factors—gender and sexual non-normativity—to explain the 
failure of public housing is delimiting. But, it does achieve an important ideological 
function. According to Molina, “The formulation of racialized groups as non-normative 
and therefore needing to be controlled…excuses inequality by attributing it to the non-
normative behavior of racialized groups” and “legitimizes intrusive measures of social 
control under the guise of civilizing projects.”106 Molina’s point is that a focus on the 
cultural attitudes and practices of marginalized communities sidesteps an important 
conversation on how institutional policies actually trigger non-normativity. Furthermore, 
it bolsters the state’s neoliberal infrastructure of policing and surveillance. And, I would 
add, it reifies the viability of racialized norms of sexual hygiene as the criteria through 
which marginalized communities petition the state for social membership.  
The assumption that domesticity and privacy should be the lenses through which 
we solve material inequality is conservative and unrealistic given current social 
formations. Likewise, the promotion of family obscures an interrogation of the state and 
excuses it from providing such basic necessities as housing to its populace. Queer theorist 
David L. Eng observes, “The privatization of family underwrites the withdrawal of state 
funding and resources, as the promotion of ‘traditional’ marriage is meant to replace state 
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dependency and employer support.”107 Here, Eng explains that in the wake of cutbacks to 
social welfare programs used by the racialized poor, family becomes the privatized 
institution that assumes the state’s public and institutional obligations. The private sphere 
of the home and family is not “private” so much as it is a key site in the global 
restructuring of capital and labor. We are, thus, witness to the contradictions of capital. 
One the one hand, the state demonizes the racialized poor for failing to adhere to 
conventional structures of family and kinship. And yet, on the other hand, the state 
conditions this very same gender and sexual non-normativity by denying the racialized 
poor access to economic mobility.  
In the long run, a policy of infrastructural decay proved economically viable in 
central cities across the United States. What the deconcentration approach to poverty did 
successfully achieve was gentrification. The replacement of large-scale family public 
housing complexes in the 1990s with mixed-income, high-density, low-level townhouses 
intensified a process of gentrification, albeit one that was already under way across in 
central cities. By increasing property values, the mixed-income model of the Hollman 
Consent Decree and HOPE-VI conditioned the surrounding neighborhoods for urban 
revitalization. This came at a time when wages stagnated or decreased altogether further 
pushing people into more precarious living conditions, including homelessness for some. 
This process of state-assisted gentrification is exemplified with the redevelopment of the 
145-acre vacant site in north Minneapolis that formerly housed the Sumner Field, 
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Glenwood, Lyndale, and Olson public housing developments into Heritage Park, a 
“stable, affordable, and sustainable urban neighborhood.”108 
 In March of 2000, the Minneapolis City Council approved the Master Plan for 
Heritage Park. The plan doubly called for the construction of new homes and of new 
parks and tree-lined streets to connect the area to the surrounding community and the 
larger city. Opening in 2005, the 900-housing-unit development included both rental and 
ownership single-family homes, duplexes, garden apartments, townhouses and carriage 
houses with “modern floor plans, ample backyards, front porches, and elegant design 
details” in “European Romantic, Classic, Victorian, and Craftsman” architectural 
design.109 The new homes were built according to the templates of defensible space and 
New Urbanism. Housing officials harnessed architectural design to press upon poor, 
families of color a particular set of attitudes and behaviors—domesticity, neighborliness, 
privacy, and responsibility—all of which were meant to render these tenants non-
threatening to the professional and elite classes that were the real targets of this mixed-
income housing complex.  
 The City of Minneapolis boasted that Heritage Park would result in a “mixed-
income, mixed-density, culturally diverse and amenity-rich neighborhood.” The project, 
which cost approximately $225 million ($75 million in public infrastructure costs and 
$150 million for housing development), was the result of a public-private partnership 
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between the city, county, state, and federal government, and a private developer.110 Of 
significance is how city officials and real estate agents sought to recuperate north 
Minneapolis as an intrinsic part of the city. Most city-sponsored and real estate websites 
listing Heritage Park highlighted the close approximation of the housing development to 
downtown Minneapolis— “located just six blocks west” and “on the western doorstep of 
Minneapolis’ downtown area”— a fact that was actively concealed in most press and city 
accounts of the public housing developments in the 1980s. At that time, if the media or 
city officials did acknowledge the housing development’s close proximity to downtown 
Minneapolis, it was usually to justify greater policing.  
 Given the multicultural justification of the neoliberalization of public housing, the 
case of north Minneapolis alerts us to the importance of mobilizing critiques that are anti-
racist, intersectional, and materialist in nature, while also non-identitarian. Women of 
color feminism and queer of color critique encourage the re-reading of the spatial text of 
urban blight by providing us with a lens that enables us to critique structural racism and 
the ways in which architectural systems reinforce it. Such an approach will enable us to 
make sense of the ways through which race and class shape the experiences of gender 
and sexuality via spatial processes. We must question the notion that racialized norms of 
sexual hygiene, designed into the very fabric of housing policy in the United States, are 
anything more than state-sanctioned performative iterations intended to uphold 
capitalism, patriarchy, and white supremacy. Doing so will grant us the opportunity to 
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repudiate the compulsion to measure the social value of the racialized poor according to 
that arbitrary standard. For as long as neoliberal calculations intrude on the design and 
operation of government approaches and practices, we will continue to witness racialized 




Towards a Transformative Coalitional Politics: Re-Reading the Spatial Text of Urban 
Blight with Women of Color Feminism and Queer of Color Critique   
Michael Johnson, the “Tiger Mandingo.”  
 Today, taking antiretroviral drugs and pre-exposure prophylaxes—such as 
Truvada—has been proven to reduce the risk of transmitting HIV by more than 90 
percent.1 As pharmaceutical companies introduce new treatments, laws criminalizing 
HIV transmission, however, have also proliferated. Although prosecutors defend such 
laws as providing just punishment for behavior that could transmit the virus, some 
epidemiologists and AIDS advocates contend that these laws are outdated, harsh, and no 
longer appropriate given the medical advances in HIV care. In fact, they warn that HIV 
criminalization may actually backfire and fuel the spread of the virus by making people 
hesitant to be tested and treated. Under most of these laws, people who do not know they 
have HIV are less culpable than those who do know. Even though a wide swath of the 
medical establishment has rightfully pointed out that prosecuting people for not 
disclosing their HIV status could harm public health, their critiques have largely 
overlooked the racially charged nature of such laws. The majority of those charged and 
convicted for such offenses are poor, from marginalized groups. They often suffer from 
complex behavioral, medical, and social problems that the criminal punishment system is 
unable to adequately address.2 AIDS activist Sean Strub likens the disproportionate 
prosecution and punishment of potential HIV exposure or transmission to the 
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disproportionate prosecution and sentencing of those convicted of possession of crack 
cocaine versus those charged with powder cocaine.3 One of those convicted under these 
laws is former college wrestler, Michael Johnson. 
  In 2013, two years before the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 
ruled that the right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Johnson, a semi-literate, poor, black, and gay twenty-three-year-old was 
arrested in a predominantly white suburb of St. Louis, Missouri, for infecting two men 
with HIV and for “recklessly” exposing four others to it. News of Johnson’s arrest blew 
up across local broadcasts and spurred international headlines, with most stories openly 
framing him as a predatory monster. That there was an underlying racial component to 
Johnson’s case is not surprising given the media frenzy. Many of Johnson’s sex partners, 
including the men he was charged with exposing to HIV, were white. 
 News accounts exploited racial anxieties by featuring photos of Johnson’s dark-
skinned, muscular, and shirtless torso and by pointing out that his online screenname was 
“Tiger Mandingo.” The word “mandingo” entered the American lexicon in the mid-1970s 
with the release of the eponymous Blaxploitation film about an ethnically West African 
Mandingo slave who is blackmailed by the mistress of the plantation into sex. Upon 
learning of their sexual indiscretions, the master kills the mistress, the Mandingo slave, 
and their newborn child. According to journalist Steven Thrasher, the film’s plot 
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illustrates how black male sexuality, especially in regards to interracial sex, has 
historically been criminal and always been suspect in America.4 In the thousands of 
recorded lynchings of black men documented by the Tuskegee Institute, about one in four 
were triggered by the alleged sexual assault of a white woman.5 During Jim Crow 
segregation, any and all sexual relations between black men and white women were 
illegal, socially repugnant, and within the definition of rape.6 Until the Supreme Court 
struck them down in 1967, anti-miscegenation laws outlawing marriage or sexual 
relations between different races were heavily enforced. It was only in 2000, when the 
last anti-miscegenation law was struck down and that was in spite of more than 40 
percent of Alabama voters casting their ballots to keep the law in the state constitution.7 
 I cite Johnson’s case because it alerts us to how racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene continue to shape and determine access to social membership. At the same time, 
I am interested in listening to the silences echoed throughout this case in order to hone in 
on what those silences tell us about race, homonormativity, and citizenship in the United 
States. With the exception of journalist Steven Thrasher, there were no Larry Kramers or 
Dan Savages who rallied behind Johnson. The responses on the part of the Human Rights 
Campaign and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force to Johnson’s case, in particular, 
and HIV criminalization, in general, paled in comparison to their mobilization behind 
same-sex marriage, hate crime legislation, and open military service. Sure, we can 
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explain this response—or lack thereof—as another instance of white gay racism. 
However, that would be an oversimplification that masks the political utility that the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has played in the homonormalization of white gay men in the West. 
When we understand the relationship between HIV/AIDS and homonormativity, we are 
better equipped to make sense of the institutionalized apathy towards HIV criminalization 
from white gay leaders and mainstream gay rights organizations.  
 In this dissertation, From Vice to Nice: Race, Sex, and the Gentrification of AIDS, 
I have shown that white gay leaders, beginning in the mid-1980s, used the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic as the basis of white normative recovery. By this I mean that the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic witnessed the emergence of a white gay male identity and visibility through the 
development of a political movement for rights and recognitions. The HIV/AIDS 
epidemic provided gay community activists with an ideological platform—rooted in 
domestic consumerism, moral cleanliness, private property, and reproductive futurism—
on which they could petition the state for citizen rights, benefits, and protections. 
Coinciding with the period in which market fundamentalism and policies tied to 
neoliberal ideology were on the rise, the HIV/AIDS epidemic provided for the 
anesthetization and co-optation of gay radical politics and, in turn, gave form to 
“homonormativity,” the normalization of white, middle-class gay and lesbian politics of 
sexual respectability. And yet, as my analysis of single mothers of color and sex workers 
of color at the height of the AIDS crisis makes clear, homonormativity was contingent on 
making poor, people of color the center of the panic around the virus. Since matters of 
sexual hygiene comprised a significant portion of the discourse on respectability, white 
gay leaders vouched for the worthiness of white gay men infected with the virus by 
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emphasizing their difference from the racialized poor, both heterosexual and homosexual. 
Under neoliberalism, citizenship and whiteness provided gay men and lesbians with a 
unifying platform against the racialized poor. The moral panic associated with 
HIV/AIDS, thus, served racial and political interests, employing the threat of non-white 
transmission to cultivate technologies of social control, including HIV criminalization, 
that, in turn, provided for the gentrification of central cities.  
 To illustrate this process of relational valuing—between white homonormativity 
and racialized sexual deviance—I looked at several cases of alleged sex workers of color, 
including Fabian Bridges. Like Johnson, Bridges was accused of recklessly exposing 
innocent others to HIV. Given the tremendous discursive weight that media-generated 
AIDS commentary and some portions of the political establishment placed upon the 
notion of promiscuity, gay community activists agonized that the general public and the 
political establishment would interpret Bridges’ “deviant” behaviors as representative of 
all gay men and, by extension, would risk the hard-won access, mobility, and 
respectability of community elites through the passage of sexually restrictive legislation, 
cuts in AIDS funding, and heightened anti-gay hate violence. To circumvent being 
lumped together with individuals like Bridges, white gay leaders implemented strategies 
of secondary marginalization.  
 On the one hand, gay community activists distanced individuals like Bridges from 
the larger community of gay men by agreeing with public health officials and law 
enforcement authorities that Bridges was, in fact, an abomination. On the other hand, 
white gay leaders conveyed alternate images of gay men that openly embraced a culture 
and politics of homonormativity vis-à-vis racialized norms of sexual hygiene. These 
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homonormalized images invalidated stigmatized representations of gay men as 
promiscuous, immoral, and deviant that were being disseminated throughout dominant 
channels. Accordingly, we must understand right-wing state ideologies and practices 
under the banner of family values and moral cleanliness as providing the historical 
conditions of possibility for homonormativity to materialize. Those in positions of power 
within the gay community insisted that “proper” and “respectable” behavior confirmed 
for dominant state agents and institutions that gay men were worthy of equal civil rights 
and social membership, something they believed could not be argued if gay men were 
regarded as promiscuous. Regardless of its specific manifestation, this practice of 
secondary marginalization enabled these leaders—in conjunction with the medical 
establishment, the mainstream media, and law enforcement authorities—to use moral 
panic discourses that were racialized to make poor, people of color the center of the panic 
around HIV/AIDS. Vis-à-vis the alleged non-normative gender and sexuality of the 
racialized poor, gay community activists were, thus, able to authenticate their civic 
competence and moral suitability for the heteronormative nuclear family and the rights, 
benefits, and protections associated with citizenship.  
 These moral panic discourses and racialized norms of sexual hygiene that the 
heads of the mainstream gay rights movement mobilized were reflective of deeper 
anxieties engendered by shifts in the political economy brought about by neoliberalism. 
The media-orchestrated HIV criminalization of poor, people of color with AIDS served a 
powerful symbol that unified “injured” white Americans as a group in the wake of 
neoliberalism’s ascendancy. For that reason, Bridges, and others like him, were 
meaningful to the extent that they served as a focal point around which white gay leaders 
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mobilized to fulfill the interests and investments of a homonationalism that petitioned the 
state for access into the cultural, political, and economic social order of white 
heteropatriarchy. They held Bridges as an instructive moral lesson for other gay men: not 
to engage in sex work; not to frequent bathhouses; in essence, not to be poor and black. 
The moral panic of HIV/AIDS was, thus, both a sexual and racial project and the basis of 
white normative recovery, all thinly disguised within the parameters of public health in 
an ostensibly colorblind society. As a repressive apparatus of the state, public health is 
designed to contain the mobility of the racialized poor. We can, hence, frame AIDS 
moral panic as the nucleus for producing respectability among white gay leaders and their 
constituents, a respectability politics that worked to criminalize the racialized poor and 
helped extend the law and the media’s neoliberal advances. 
 In alerting us to the centrality of white injury in shaping public health and law 
responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Bridges’ case helps us contextualize the lack of 
action on the part of mainstream gay rights advocates and organizations in response to 
Johnson’s arrest and conviction. In May of 2015, two hours after closing arguments, 
jurors found Johnson guilty of infecting and/or exposing his white gay sex partners. For 
this, Johnson was sentenced to 30 years in prison, a sentence far longer than the average 
sentence doled out for almost every other crime in the state, including second-degree 
murder at 25.2 years.8 Johnson’s conviction is the more troubling since it comes at a time 
when the epidemic’s racialized and classed dynamics become increasingly difficult to 
ignore. Black gay men, bisexual men and transgender women are in a state of emergency 
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when it comes to HIV/AIDS. According to the Centers for Disease and Control, more 
than one in four black gay and bisexual men and one in two black transgender women 
test positive for HIV, compared to .06 percent of the general population.9 This 
discrepancy in HIV infection rates is enabled by discrimination and socio-economic 
factors linked to race which engender additional challenges to obtaining quality health 
care, housing, and education necessary for HIV treatment and care. The real crime here is 
that despite thirty years into this epidemic, the virus is still allowed to proliferate 
unabated in communities denied access to the basic tools of prevention, a reality that will 
likely widen in scope with President Donald Trump’s administration toying with 
defunding the Ryan White Care Act.10  
 At the same time, these AIDS moral panic discourses that criminalized Bridges 
and that made a re-appearance in the prosecution of Johnson paved the way for the 
neoliberal restructuring of urban public spaces both through increased policing and the 
subsequent gentrification of those urban spaces. Moral panics, in particular those 
revolving around race and sexuality, were and remain central to the spatial 
implementation of neoliberal policies and practices.  
Gay Marriage Travel. 
 These racialized norms of sexual hygiene at the heart of gay rights-based claims 
for political enfranchisement and social membership provided for a shrunken public 
sphere and laid the foundation for the infrastructure of homonormative domestic privacy 
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in line with the neoliberal restructuring of central cities. Public health constructions of 
normative gender, sexuality, and domestic space—so central to manifestations of 
gentrification—became effectively bound up with private development so that public 
health as an institution worked in the service of promulgating the economically 
prosperous potential of post-industrial inner-cities as centers of business, culture, and 
tourism. Initially, white gay men were perceived as being antithetical to the vision of the 
Twin Cities as a booming, modern, post-industrial metropolis.  
Homonormativity, based in racialized norms of sexual hygiene, came to operate in the 
service of consolidating “whiteness as property” for a new batch of citizen-consumers. 
These dynamics are present in recent efforts by cities and municipalities, such as 
Minneapolis, to market themselves as “gay friendly.”  
 On September 3, 2013, then-Minneapolis Mayor R.T. Rybak held a press 
conference at the Center on Halsted in Chicago’s gay neighborhood of Boystown. Rybak 
urged gay couples in Illinois to tie the knot in Minneapolis under Minnesota’s then-new 
gay marriage law. One month earlier, Minnesota had become the 13th state in the nation 
to legalize same-sex marriage. That day, Rybak officiated the marriages of 46 same-sex 
couples, including a number who flew in from out-of-state. Because Minnesota and Iowa 
were the only two states in the Midwest that allowed same-sex marriage, Rybak saw this 
as a lucrative business opportunity. In partnership with Minneapolis’s convention and 
visitors’ association, Meet Minneapolis, Rybak launched the campaign, “Marry Me in 
Minneapolis.” Meet Minneapolis had even resorted to offering free wedding planning 
services for those who came. As part of the campaign, Rybak roamed throughout the 
Midwest, inviting same-sex couples in areas without legal same-sex marriage, including 
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 Rybak’s campaign illuminates the processes through which same-sex marriage 
has come to operate as a marketplace activity through the sale of hotel rooms, flowers, 
and so forth; as a marketing strategy through the discursive production of “gay 
friendliness;” and as a homonormative set of behaviors through the performance of law-
abiding, neoliberal citizenship. Although Minneapolis prides itself for being a liberal 
town with tolerant people—via a discourse and practice of Minnesota Nice—the region is 
also home to some of the nation’s largest racial and socio-economic gaps. The narrative 
of tolerance at the helm of Rybak’s campaign is, thus, predicated on the repression of 
those racial and property hierarchies. The discursive production of “gay friendliness” as 
an urban marketing strategy relies upon a logic of colorblindness that gives the neoliberal 
city free reign to apply a revanchist set of policies and practices against the racialized 
poor. Gay marriage travel as a manifestation of that homonormativity elevates a region’s 
sexual tolerance at the same time that it shields the neoliberal city from anti-racist and 
anti-capitalist critiques. In Minneapolis, we are able to witness the simultaneity of state-
sanctioned gay marriage travel while the racialized poor are systematically criminalized, 
incarcerated, and banished.  
 As I discuss in the introduction to this dissertation, the incursion of a post-
industrial market logic into local urban governing structures has morphed cities into 
quasi-corporations that must then sell themselves to a professional-managerial class with 
global tastes. In order to differentiate themselves from other municipalities, cities re-
create themselves as bastions of culture and consumption that fulfill the desires of a 
professional-managerial class of citizen-consumers. In a high-tech, financial and service-
oriented economy, this class of executive and white-collar professionals asserts its social 
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status, in part, through consumption patterns. As a result, cities, in an effort to attract such 
residents, tourists, and capital, mobilize an ethos of cosmopolitanism in the form of racial 
diversity and sexual tolerance. These competitive strategies are reflective of Richard 
Florida’s highly-debated creative class model, which explains that regional and local 
structures must reach out to the creative class should they seek to attract economic 
growth. The economic benefits made possible by the creative class—which includes 
gays, youth, bohemians, professors, scientists, artists, entrepreneurs, and the like—
include outcomes in new ideas, new technology, and new creative content which, in turn, 
encourage regional growth. But, for a city to attract these highly-lauded members of the 
creative class, it must first personify the three main prerequisites of creative cities, what 
Florida calls “the three ‘T’s”: Talent, Technology, and Tolerance. Here, Florida proposes 
the “Gay Index”—based on the proportion of same-sex households in a region—as a 
measure of that city’s diversity, openness, and, overall, tolerance.12 Rybak subscribed to 
Florida’s creative class theories when he set out to travel throughout the Midwest in 
search of same-sex couples willing to tie the knot.  
 During this travels throughout the Midwest, Rybak made a feverish pitch for 
would-be newlywed same-sex couples to settle down in Minneapolis, a place he 
described as treating all people as “equals.” Speaking at the Center on Halsted, Rybak 
tried to reasoned with the crowd of professional white gay men and lesbians: “Ask 
yourself a question: If you were in a same-sex relationship and you wanted to start a 
business, would you rather start it in Chicago, where you are on your own, or come to 
Minneapolis where you can get married and that will give you rights to be on your 
                                                
12 Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class (New York: Routledge, 2005).  
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partner’s health insurance; so you can put that money into starting your business?”13 In 
selling Minneapolis to these same-sex couples, Rybak appealed to their class interests. 
Although Rybak prided himself for being a passionate defender of “marriage equality,” 
he was frank about wanting to capitalize on a lucrative new market of consumers. Rybak 
did not shy away from conceding his desire to take in millions for Minneapolis’s 
hospitality and tax coffers. Expressing his enthusiasm before reporters in Chicago, Rybak 
marveled: “Even 20 weddings would be tens of thousands of dollars, maybe hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.”14 He was right. A study conducted by the Williams Institute, a 
think tank at the University of California School of Law, predicted a $42 million boost to 
Minnesota’s economy in the first three years of the new law, including $28 million in 
new wedding spending and $14 million through tourism from out-of-town guests.15 
Rybak conceded that the longer other Midwestern states (or the country as a whole) went 
without legalizing same-sex marriage, the more their loss would prove Minneapolis’s 
economic gain. 
 Rybak’s concessions make clear the political stakes of gay marriage travel. In her 
study of the impact of gay marriage on the gay travel market, historian Nan Alamilla 
Boyd argues that same-sex marriage as an urban marketing strategy hinges on patterns of 
conspicuous consumption that further the logics of neoliberalism.16 Rather than being a 
mere act of municipal sexual tolerance or consumer sovereignty, gay tourism functions as 
                                                
13 Cheryl V. Jackson, “Chicago first stop as Minneapolis mayor drums up gay marriage business,” Chicago 
Tribune, Sep. 3, 2013.  
14 Don Babwin, “Mayor Invites Gay Illinois Couples to Wed in Minn,” Herald Times, Sep. 4, 2013.  
15 Angeliki Kastanis and M.V. Lee Badgett, “Estimating the Economic Boost of Marriage Equality in 
Minnesota,” The Williams Institute UCLA School of Law, last modified April 2013. 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/economic-impact-reports/estimating-the-economic-boost-of-
marriage-equality-in-minnesota/.  
16 Nan Alamilla Boyd, “Sex and Tourism: The Economic Implications of the Gay Marriage Movement,” 
Radical History Review 100 (2008): 222-35. 
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a neoliberal enterprise that molds white gay travelers into global citizens whose 
consumption practices sustain dominant patterns of consumption, production, and 
service. Boyd’s point is that gay tourism conspires to produce a global gay citizen 
defined by an erotic affinity that subsumes material inequalities.  
We can apply Boyd’s conceptualization of gay tourism to underscore how gay marriage 
travel in Minneapolis also downplays widespread racial inequality.  
 Even though a city’s perceived gay friendliness is designated to elevate that city’s 
desirability, policymakers must ensure that the diversity they are promoting is one that 
sustains key tenets of neoliberalism, including a culture of entrepreneurship that heralds 
capitalist development and, by extension, consumer sovereignty as markers of human 
freedom. Neoliberalism seeks a cultural predisposition of its citizen-consumers that does 
not question its neoliberal discourses and policies of free markets and personal 
responsibility. To this extent, cities often celebrate the safest and most fundable forms of 
minority social difference. In terms of sexuality, this difference is often rooted in a 
culture and politics of homonormativity, a set of ideologies and practices constituting the 
gay and lesbian liberal platform that asserts citizenship rights for gay men and lesbians 
via neoliberal practices of conspicuous consumption, heteronormativity, and white 
supremacy. Homonormativity indexes the ways through which conspicuous consumption 
has come to be a stand-in for political enfranchisement. In her analysis of the 
mainstreaming of the gay and lesbian rights movement in the United States, Alexandra 
Chasin traces how marketers in the 1990s discovered the bountiful economic rewards of 
catering to the needs of this untapped gay market. Chasin argues that by transforming this 
overlooked population of consumers into a niche opportunity, the free market defined 
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mainstream gay subjectivity as it simultaneously delimited both the heterogeneity of 
queer consumers and of same-sex desires. Thus, Chasin declares that the market, by 
linking spending with social membership, pacifies identity-based social justice 
movements of their radical potentialities.17  
 Given that citizenship under neoliberalism is increasingly achieved through a 
mode of conspicuous consumption that does not challenge neoliberal logics, 
policymakers benefit from treating same-sex marriage as an economic transaction on the 
road towards political enfranchisement. When lobbying same-sex couples throughout the 
Midwest, Rybak’s strongest selling point was the array of tax benefits that were to follow 
after the U.S. Treasury Department’s decision that married same-sex couples would be 
treated as “married” under the federal tax code in all 50 states, even if the state where 
they lived did not recognize their union. Speaking in Chicago, Rybak told the crowd: 
“Commit to marriage. That will give you more than 1,100 federal rights immediately. 
You can hop on a plane this afternoon, go to Minneapolis and get married, and come 
home tonight and be eligible for veterans benefits, for all those other benefits, as well.”18 
By equating spending with civil rights, Rybak framed same-sex marriage as a commodity 
necessary for participation in civil society. The commodification of gay marriage via 
marketplace activity, thus, produces a new kind of gay citizen, one who participates in 
civil life via the social rituals of marriage and the commercial rituals of conspicuous 
consumption. As a tourist attraction, an export commodity, and a marketplace activity, 
homonormativity is the lens through which policymakers interpellate white gay men and, 
                                                
17 Alexandra Chasin, Selling Out: The Gay and Lesbian Movement Goes to Market (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000).  
18 Greg Henderson, “Mayor to Gay Couples: ‘I Want To Marry You In Minneapolis’,” NPR, Sep. 5, 2013.  
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to a lesser extent, lesbians as neoliberal model minority citizens in the creative class 
economy. 
 One of the most significant limitations to using homonormativity as an urban 
marketing strategy in a participatory democracy is that it renders possible the application 
of revanchist policies against the racialized poor. On account of its reliance on 
conventional forms of family and kinship, homonormativity is performed in 
contradistinction to the racialized subject whose gender and sexuality are construed as 
deviant. By celebrating particular manifestations of minority social difference, ones that 
forward a neoliberal rationality, the neoliberal revanchist city is, hence, afforded an 
opportunity to crack down on those other instances of difference that do threaten the 
city’s reputation as a liberal, modern, and pristine city. According to this logic, a city’s 
policymakers cannot possibly be intolerant of minority social difference if they eagerly 
set out the welcome mat for same-sex couples. This set of contradictions was clearly 
articulated in journalist Derek Thompson’s controversial March 2015 article for The 
Atlantic titled, “The Miracle of Minneapolis,” in which he celebrated Minneapolis as one 
of the best places in the nation to live. 
 Thompson argued that tolerance and talent were of two of the overarching factors 
that rendered this Upper Midwest city an ideal place to live. Thompson marveled that 
Minneapolis’s recent college graduates faced little difficulty finding work. He also 
pointed out that the Twin Cities was home to more corporate headquarters per capita than 
anywhere in the nation. These included Target, Best Buy, and General Mills. And, 
Thompson gawked that housing was more affordable than in other municipalities. He 
failed, however, to note that this was true so long as one earned more than the minimum 
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wage. Thompson attributed Minneapolis’s success to the generous swath of educated 
middle-class workers and to the city’s isolation that discouraged people from moving 
elsewhere. On top of these two advantages, he credited two policies that distributed the 
rewards and responsibilities of growth. In 1971, municipalities in the Twin Cities metro 
area agreed to share a portion of their commercial property tax revenue to a fund that 
would be invested directly back into the community.  Also, in 1976, state legislators 
passed a law requiring that every neighborhood in the metro region build affordable 
housing.19  
 Nevertheless, these policies, which were designed to keep the poorest areas from 
falling behind in Minneapolis, were implemented at a time when the population in 
Minnesota looked markedly different from what it looks like today. As historian Jessica 
Nickrand points out, these equitable growth policies were designed to largely benefit 
white people. In the 1970s, the Minneapolis area was 94 percent white and 2 percent 
black. Few people lived in segregated areas because there were few people of color. Not 
surprisingly, it was easier to implement these redistributive tax agreements when 
residents saw people who looked like them as beneficiaries of these programs. Today, 
just as these policies have been significantly curtailed, the non-white population in the 
Twin Cities has grown to 20 percent.20 
 Despite the tolerance and talent lauded by Rybak and Thompson, Minneapolis is 
home to a number of deep-seated racial disparities. A recent study by WalletHub, a 
personal finance site, after analyzing census indicators such as household income, 
                                                
19 Derek Thompson, “The Miracle of Minneapolis,” The Atlantic, Mar. 20015 issue.  




homeownership, and educational attainment, found that Minnesota had the largest racial 
poverty gap in the country. In fact, black residents in the Twin Cities live below the 
poverty line at a rate three times greater than that of white residents. Banks in the Twin 
Cities have also been found to be nearly four times more likely to give high-income black 
residents subprime loans than their poor white counterparts, a national lending practice 
that contributed to the housing crash of 2008. Defaulting on subprime loans has, in turn, 
fueled the gentrification of predominantly black neighborhoods, such as north 
Minneapolis which has become an appealing destination for white, same-sex households. 
Although Minnesota consistently earns national rankings for its students’ reading, math, 
and college-entrance exam scores, it is one of the worst states in the country for its non-
white students. And, the Twin Cities, which is home to most of Minnesota’s non-white 
population, also possesses the country’s highest rates of racial employment discrepancy.21 
 In terms of housing, the affordable housing that Thompson praised is largely 
unavailable to the cadre of low-income renters who are in most need of stable living 
arrangements. Private developers have spatially concentrated the little affordable housing 
that is being built on the peripheries of downtown Minneapolis, further clustering the 
racialized poor. Making matters worse, a recent boom in the luxury apartment market has 
been instrumental in reducing affordable housing for the city’s low-income renters. In 
2013, 3,100 new apartments opened in Minneapolis, more than any other year. But, the 
significant majority of these high-end units were priced at the upper end of the market 
with most renting $2 a square foot or $24,000 a year for 1,000 square feet.22 With an 
average rent across the Twin Cities of $1,007 per month, Minneapolis is now home to the 
                                                
21 Ibid.  
22 Burl Gilyard, “What’s driving the Twin Cities’ apartment mania?” Twin Cities Business, Sep. 20, 2013.  
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10th most expensive real estate market in the nation.23 Despite high rents, demand has not 
lessened. On the contrary, the pace of rentals exceeds the volume of units created, in part 
by the influx of newly-descending young, urban professionals. At the end of the third 
quarter in 2014, Minneapolis had an apartment vacancy rate of 2.1 percent, compared 
with 4.2 percent nationally.24 Given low vacancy rates in an apartment market saturated 
with high rents, more and more residents find themselves in precarious housing 
situations. In 2015, on any given night in Hennepin County, more than 3,000 people 
experienced homelessness.25 Although just 5 percent of the overall Minnesota population, 
African-Americans represent about 39 percent of homeless adults statewide. American 
Indians represent about 8 percent of homeless adult statewide but just one percent of the 
overall adult Minnesota population.26  
 Policymakers in Minneapolis are, thus, faced with having to manage surplus 
populations, or the physical detritus of neoliberal capitalism, while at the same time 
highlighting the city’s economic, political and social benefits of and for same-sex 
couples. We can locate this task within the arsenal of the neoliberal revanchist city. As 
Neil Smith defines it, revanchist anti-urbanism is “a reaction against the supposed ‘theft’ 
of the city [by people of color], a desperate defense of a phalanx of privileges, cloaked in 
the populist language of civic morality, family values, and neighborhood security.”27 
                                                
23 Jim Buchta, “As apartment building surges in the Twin Cities, so does demand,” Star Tribune, Nov. 4, 
2014.    
24 Burl Gilyard, “Metro Apartment Vacancy Remains Low,” Twin Cities Business, Oct. 28, 2014.  
25 Steve Brandt, “Homelessness increase despite decade-long push to end it in Minneapolis, Hennepin 
County,” Star Tribune, Feb. 28, 2016.  
26 “Homelessness in Minnesota: Findings from the 2015 Minnesota Homeless Study,” Wilder Research, 
accessed December 15, 2016, http://mnhomeless.org/minnesota-homeless-study/homelessness-in-
minnesota.php#.  




Revanchist anti-urbanism is perhaps most clearly illustrated in measures passed to 
address minor “quality of life” violations. Quality of life provisions criminalize behaviors 
previously understood as noncriminal and are often selectively enforced. These laws are 
mobilized to increase enforcement of such practices as juvenile curfews, and to prohibit 
activities such as graffiti, loitering, panhandling, public sleeping, and street vending. 
Because they largely target those living on the streets or using public spaces, these laws 
disproportionately impact homeless people and precariously-housed people including 
low-income women of color and youth who have limited access to private spaces. 
Moreover, these laws beg the question of quality of life for the betterment of whose life?  
 Although a revanchist anti-urbanist logic would have us assume that the arrival of 
same-sex couples would similarly ignite a firestorm of opposition from residents, 
Rybak’s unraveling of the proverbial welcome mat to same-sex couples underscores the 
political implications that a discourse of “gay friendliness” entails for a city’s economy. 
American cities continue to market themselves as cosmopolitan in terms of the flow of 
capital and culture, commodities and information. Nevertheless, the promotion of same-
sex marriage—an institution that does not challenge neoliberal discourses and practices—
as a tourist draw erases the economic plight of the racialized poor. In the case of 
Minneapolis, the promotion of gay marriage travel elides a critical focus on the city’s 
widespread racial disparities; it does not question a lack of affordable housing, 
unemployment, homelessness, or abject poverty. Instead, queer liberalism, as articulated 
by gay marriage travel, disavows race in the name of freedom, progress, and capital 
accumulation. But, as Chicana feminist scholar Cherríe Moraga reminds us, progress 
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does not always entail progressive politics.28 The real miracle of Minneapolis is one that 
sanitizes these material realities and repackages them as the just desserts of cultural 
deficiencies and individual shortcomings. For that reason, we can treat gay marriage 
travel as registering the symbolic banishment of those populations unable to conform to 
racialized norms of sexual hygiene and, by extension, unable to sustain the racial and 
economic social order of the city.29  
Queer Liberalism and Neoliberal Multiculturalism. 
 My dissertation has explored how the extension of liberal rights to privacy and 
family for white, middle-class same-sex households relates to the economic 
dispossession, political disenfranchisement, and social marginalization of the racialized 
poor via spatial biopolitics. Gay gentrification in Minneapolis is quite different than that 
witnessed in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and San Francisco. The difference is 
rooted in the local history of white liberalism in Minnesota. As I have shown throughout 
this dissertation, a discourse and practice of Minnesota Nice underpinned the 
domestication of unruly white gay men into model minority citizens, and contributed to 
the gentrification of Minneapolis’ red-light and vice districts. Through Minnesota Nice, 
white liberalism reproduces patterns of inequality under a seemingly anti-racist, gay-
friendly guise. As a neoliberal racial project, Minnesota Nice denies race in order to 
                                                
28 Cherríe L. Moraga, A Xicana Codex of Changing Consciousness: Writings, 2000-2010 (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011).  
29 According to Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert, banishment functioning as a form of urban social 
control through the spatial exclusion of idle, vagrant and socially threatening bodies from urban public 
spaces has made a reappearance amid the proliferation of neoliberal policy and its attendant physical 
manifestation of gentrification. The modern incarnation of banishment conflates criminal law with civil 
legal authority conferring police the liberty to regulate, criminalize and incarcerate subjects for behaviors 
otherwise deemed misdemeanors. At the same time, the novel legal articulation of banishment withdraws 
rights from those same targeted bodies delimiting their venues for legal recourse. See: Katherine Beckett 
and Steve Herbert, Banished: The New Social Control in Urban America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010).  
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inaugurate a racial politics of color-blindness that is conducive to capital accumulation. 
Rybak’s gay marriage campaign makes explicit that city officials in Minneapolis used 
white homonormativity to assess and advertise the economic and moral health of the 
region. As such, I argue that the incorporation of white, middle-class same-sex 
households obscures the state’s deployment of violent regulatory mechanisms against 
racially devalued subjects.  
Under neoliberalism, the state reconstitutes its power through discourses of family 
values and through mandates of multicultural inclusion. In our post-civil rights juncture 
of “colorblindness,” dominant white society employs racial frames that downplay racial 
difference, all in the name of so-called equality, freedom, and progress. Dominant white 
society contends that since discrimination based on biological factors is no longer de jure, 
disparate racial outcomes can be explained away as mere instances of cultural 
deficiencies or individual shortcomings, not institutional policies or structural processes. 
And yet, those groups that were once subordinated under biological conceptualizations of 
race continue to be disenfranchised and dispossessed under the new colorblind racial 
order; if anything, the venues of critique are merely lessened. This economic 
disenfranchisement persists because race continues to determine and structure both the 
public and private spheres in ways that shape our material realities. 
 In The Feeling of Kinship, queer theorist David L. Eng traces the historical 
emergence of what he calls “queer liberalism” on the conventional structures of family 
and kinship in the United States. Eng explains that queer liberalism “articulates a 
contemporary confluence of the political and economic spheres that forms the basis for 
the liberal inclusion of particular gay and lesbian U.S. citizen-subjects petitioning for 
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rights and recognition before the law.”30 Queer liberalism presents the joining of a 
particular set of economic and political circumstances that spearhead the liberal inclusion, 
rights, and recognitions of gay and lesbian U.S. citizen-subjects free and willing to abide 
by the normative decrees of the U.S. nation-state, including racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene. Queer liberalism is marked by the merging of a mass-mediated, visible gay 
consumer lifestyle with juridical protections for gay and lesbian rights to intimacy and 
privacy. No longer excluded from the conventional structures of family and kinship, gay 
men and lesbians are inhabiting these structures in growing numbers and in increasingly 
public and visible ways. Nonetheless, what has been excised in the process, Eng laments, 
is the effort to abolish state oppression through a concomitant radical critique of family 
and kinship.  
 In mapping out the historical conditions of possibility for queer liberalism, Eng 
argues that colorblindness renders possible the emergence of homonormativity, or gay 
freedom. The occlusion of race within the private domain of family and kinship 
structures—what Eng calls the “racialization of intimacy”—consolidates queer liberalism 
as the latest incarnation of liberal freedom and progress. Through its promulgation of an 
abstract equality—one articulated through the rhetoric of colorblindness and divorced 
from materiality—queer liberalism sublimates the rhetoric of race into the area of 
intimacy and privacy. Due to its active management and systematic disassociation of race 
                                                
30 As I see it, the similarities between Eng’s concept of queer liberalism and Duggan’s concept of 
homonormativity is that both attend to the shift by the mainstream gay rights movement towards rights-
based claims on the state for citizenship via domesticity, intimacy, privacy, and responsibility. However, 
Eng builds upon that shift by elaborating how the homonormalization of white, middle-class same-sex 
households has been achieved through the repudiation of race as a “completed” project in U.S. liberalism. 
David L. Eng, The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), 3.  
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from sexuality, queer liberalism, therefore, denies intersectionality.31 Anchored within a 
logic of colorblindness, queer liberalism facilitates the forgetting of race and, by 
extension, enforces the racially disparate material redistribution of resources. Instead, 
queer liberalism interprets socio-economic disparities as the product of people’s 
unwillingness to play by the rules of the neoliberal market. From this perspective, queer 
liberalism operates in the service of the state and capital by allowing these entities to 
continue inflicting racial violence without critique. Not having to attend to racial 
genealogies of materiality, queer liberalism simply assumes that intimacy and privacy 
exist outside capitalist relations of domination and exploitation. But, as I indicate in my 
discussion of the privatization of public housing in north Minneapolis, these domains are 
anything but free of racialized labor.  
 As the latest incarnation of whiteness as property, queer liberalism not only 
signals the homonormalization of gay and lesbian sexuality, it also marks the differential 
distribution of that intimacy as what Eng describes a “racialized property right.” In his 
reading of the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court ruling of Lawrence v. Texas, Eng writes that the 
decision extended “a long Enlightenment liberal tradition of privacy, a political right to 
be protected,” to a subset of “domesticated” gay men and lesbians “willing (and able) to 
accept a heteronormative version of bourgeois family, domesticity, and marriage,” or 
those that subscribed to racialized norms of sexual hygiene.32 In reversing Bowers, the 
Supreme Court honed in on “intimate sexual conduct” as a fundamental right to privacy 
and intimacy, “an integral part of human freedom” between couples; it did not so much as 
                                                
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid., 16-17.  
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focus on same-sex sodomy.33 By uprooting gay men and lesbians from the public sphere, 
Lawrence domesticated these subjects as it concomitantly repudiated one of the central 
tenets of gay liberation: the right to homosexual difference and expression in public. 
When it struck sodomy down among same-sex couples, Lawrence, therefore, reinscribed 
the traditional divide between the public and the private for a new cohort of possessive 
individuals.  
The homonormalization of gay and lesbian sexuality, nonetheless, has demanded 
treating intimate sexual conduct as a “racialized property right” that inducts the long legal 
legacy of property and racial privilege in U.S. law—whiteness as property—into the 
contemporary moment of colorblindness. Intimacy as a racialized property right is born 
out of a long history of racial subordination that denied people of color access to the 
conventional structures of family and kinship, and to the concerted legal defense of white 
entitlement to space, in general, and private property, in particular. Although Eng 
attributes intimacy as a “racialized property right” emerging with Lawrence, the linkage 
between intimacy and private property, I argue, came to fruition as a result of the 
racialized norms of sexual hygiene standardized by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. What Eng 
calls queer liberalism, Duggan homonormativity, and Puar homonationalism, thus, has a 
longer history we can trace to the 1980s. Even so, if queer liberalism marks the 
inauguration of gay men and lesbians into that racial project of whiteness as property, 
then we can begin to understand how gay freedom is inextricably intertwined with shifts 
in the political economy of central cities in late capitalism, most notably gentrification. 
Advanced gentrification, like queer liberalism, extracts its legitimacy from colorblind 
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rhetoric of consumer choice. By virtue of the shared investment in colorblind rhetoric, the 
confluence of queer liberalism with gentrification has so readily benefitted neoliberal 
capital.  
 Because queer liberalism necessitates a forgetting of race, it is through 
homonormativity that genealogies of racial domination and spatial segregation are 
methodically expunged from the record of U.S. liberalism. For this reason, the 
permutations of the public and private spheres under neoliberalism—gentrification 
included—have largely depended on the active management of race vis-à-vis sexuality. 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, neoliberalism secures its legal, moral, and 
social claims through the configuration of normative gay and lesbian U.S. citizen-
subjects as the new model minority in the creative age. As an ideological apparatus of 
neoliberalism, queer liberalism—through the mobilization of racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene—exploits racial difference to expand idealized notions of family and kinship to 
be inclusive of white, middle-class same-sex households. In as much as the state—under 
neoliberalism—recalibrates its dominance through discourses of family values (i.e., 
domestic consumerism, moral cleanliness, private property, reproductive futurism) and 
through its mandates of multicultural inclusion, we can treat queer liberalism as the latest 
iteration of neoliberal multiculturalism in our current colorblind juncture.  
 Through each successive racial era, U.S. law has readjusted whiteness as 
property, instead of merely nullifying whiteness—a pattern I illustrate in my discussion 
of the racial reconsolidation of whiteness under HIV/AIDS. According to literary critic, 
Jodi Melamed, neoliberal multiculturalism is the most recent incarnation of that 
readjustment of whiteness. This ethos renews U.S. global ascendancy by administering 
 
 538 
the contradictions of race and capitalism. It accomplishes such a feat by masking the 
centrality of race to the enactment of capitalist domination and exploitation—both here 
and abroad. At the same time, however, neoliberal multiculturalism does not make way 
with race. Rather, it posits the market as the purveyor of solutions to racial and class 
disparities. In deputizing the market as the arbiter of equality, neoliberal multiculturalism 
conflates economic rights as the most pressing form of civil rights. Melamed explains 
that under neoliberal multiculturalism, neoliberalism is celebrated as the conduit to a 
multicultural, post-racist world order of freedom and opportunity.34 In other words, 
neoliberal multiculturalism justifies key tenets of neoliberalism—deregulation and 
privatization—in order to confer “freedom” upon previously marginalized racialized 
populations.  
 Neoliberal multiculturalism creates new racial subjects by differentiating between 
newly valued collectivities and continuously demonized groups. As the latest incarnation 
of official state-sanctioned anti-racism, neoliberal multiculturalism offers the state with 
the vocabulary to ascribe value to subjects depending on their ability to advance key 
tenets of neoliberalism, including self-entrepreneurship. Considering that neoliberal 
multiculturalism provides for the inscription of newly valued subjects, older conventional 
ideas of race, class, gender, and sexuality are unevenly sutured onto new iterations of 
privilege and stigma, in ways that transgress the conventional color line. Although 
ascriptions of value and valuelessness are unevenly detached from overt references to 
race, their mobilization still occasions significant racial violence in that it erases the 
differentials of power, value, and social death between and within marginalized 
                                                
34 Jodi Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism 
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communities. This development is paramount to sustaining some of neoliberalism’s most 
egregious practices without the explicit accusation of racism. Precisely because some 
people of color and some queers are now included under the fold of the state, acts of 
violence sanctioned by the state do not register as racist, but rather as necessary steps 
taken to ensure safety and security, to maintain freedom. Thus, by portraying the equality 
of the free market as the most important purveyor of racial justice, neoliberal 
multiculturalism masquerades the racialized social and economic structures of 
neoliberalism and, in the process, renders it more facile to explain away systemic failures 
in economic and social transactions as the product of personal characteristics and 
decisions. 
 Under neoliberalism, citizenship has shifted to coincide with the state promotion 
of self-entrepreneurship. In extending rights and benefits, citizenship bestows social 
membership within the home of the nation. However, it never remains static. Instead, it 
undergoes mutations to cohere around socio-economic developments. It is this ability to 
be “flexible” that makes citizenship such a vital instrument in the regulation of subjects. 
Cultural anthropologist, Aihwa Ong, argues that citizenship under neoliberalism and, in 
turn, social membership are no longer dispersed on the basis of birthright or 
naturalization within a nation-state. Instead, Ong claims that citizens who are deemed 
“too complacent or lacking in neoliberal potential may be treated as less-worthy 
subjects.” She concludes, “We are beginning to see a detachment of entitlements from 
political membership and national territory as certain rights and benefits are distributed to 
bearers of marketable talents and denied to those who are judged to lack such capacity or 
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potential.”35 Ong’s point is that the infiltration of market logic into modes of governance 
has impacted the dissemination of rights and benefits so that those subjects with 
entrepreneurial value are more likely to reap the privileges of citizenship. This 
differential citizenship enables valued subjects to exercise citizenship-like entitlements 
beyond national borders, while devalued subjects lose elements of citizenship both at 
home and abroad. Even though overt racism appears to be dwindling, or so popular lore 
would have it, neoliberalism continues to exert inequality in allegedly non-racist ways.  
 Melamed and Ong’s analysis elucidates that a neoliberal ethics of 
multiculturalism bestows privilege or stigma upon those subjects who exemplify 
neoliberal subjectivity by adhering to a moral calculus of feminist, law-abiding, 
multicultural, and reasonable. I would expand that moral calculus to include racialized 
norms of sexual hygiene. According to this line of thinking, if newly valued subjects 
include those law-abiding and rational citizens who do not engage in public sex, then 
those devalued subjects who do engage in public sex comprise the opposite of such 
criteria. The racialized poor, including single mothers of color and sex workers of color, 
for not advancing certain traits of neoliberalism are divested of their citizenship. Their 
marginalization underscores how social value needs negativity for its existence. Or, as 
Lisa Cacho aptly puts it, value is made intelligible relationally and, by extension, 
violently.36 What neoliberal multiculturalism also makes clear is that new forms of 
displacement occur alongside new forms of ascension and mobility. This is clear in a 
study conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2011 that found Americans were more 
                                                
35 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 16.  
36 Lisa Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the Unprotected (New 
York City: New York University Press, 2012).  
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accepting of gay and lesbian parents than they were of single mothers.37 If neoliberalism 
displays the racialized devaluation of human life—a process that is inherently gendered 
and sexual in nature—then we desperately need an approach that re-centers race and 
materiality, one that attends to the interconnections between such formations with gender 
and sexuality. 
Women of Color Feminism and Queer of Color Critique.   
 Seeing that neoliberal multiculturalism and queer liberalism register the state’s 
co-optation of single-issue identity politics and minority social difference, we are in need 
of politically mobilizing along axes other than identity. Given the ascendancy of 
neoliberal practices and policies, we need a more robust politics of intersectionality, one 
that impedes the colorblind impulse to detach race and sexuality from materiality. This 
need is made abundantly clear in attempts to defeat HIV criminalization. It is 
inappropriate to speak of AIDS in disadvantaged communities without also widening our 
scope of analysis to engage matters of social justice, including unemployment and mass 
incarceration. Otherwise we run the risk of being unable to articulate how the life choices 
of those most vulnerable, such as Bridges and Johnson, are systematically constrained by 
structural racism and material inequality. In short, we jeopardize “privatizing” their AIDS 
diagnoses as the result of supposed irresponsible decisions and pathological desires. What 
                                                
37 According to a nationally representative report of 2,691 Americans conducted by the Pew Research 
Center in 2011, respondents were more accepting of gay and lesbian parents than single mothers. 
Researchers found that a third of respondents (dubbed “Acceptors”) were comfortable with a wide variety 
of family arrangements. Another third (“Rejecters”) considered non-traditional situations to be detrimental 
to the social fabric of the nation. The final third of respondents (“Skeptics”) were varied in their positions 
with some accepting of some arrangements, but not others. The vast majority of Acceptors and Skeptics 
approved of gay and lesbian families. Some even argued that these specific non-traditional arrangements 
entailed benefits to society. However, the vast majority of respondents, 99 percent of Skeptics and 98 
percent of Rejecters disagreed with women raising their children alone. Linda Carroll, “Gay families more 




the cases of Bridges and Johnson confirm is that any attempt to combat HIV 
criminalization must be made in earnest collaboration with efforts to fight racism, 
homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, and economic and political disenfranchisement. 
As Cathy Cohen reminds us, we can unearth a cure for the virus someday, but if we do 
not pay heed to the institutional contexts and wider patterns under which HIV/AIDS 
materialize, we will not politically emancipate those communities made most at risk from 
their marginalized position in American society.38   
 Rights-based movements, such as the mainstream gay rights movement in the 
1980s, are useful, but limited in large part because they rely on single-issue platforms that 
fail to take into account the violent nature of relational valuing. My dissertation confirms 
the limitations integral to identity-based and nationalist forms of collectivity, especially 
in regards to neoliberalism. Moreover, if neoliberalism produces new racial formations as 
Melamed and Ong theorize, we must also develop new comparative technologies in the 
study of race. Whatever form these reading practices take, they must be equipped with 
the infrastructure to make sense of the gendered and sexual nature of racialized 
devaluation. Furthermore, because racial formation does not occur as a discreet 
phenomenon, these comparative models must highlight the significance of relational 
valuing in the consolidation of racial hierarchies. As Roderick A. Ferguson and Grace K. 
Hong argue, women of color feminism and queer of color critique, in registering 
sexuality as constitutive of race, provide a critical aperture from which we can cultivate 
                                                
38 Cathy J. Cohen, “Black Sexuality, Indigenous Moral Panics, and Respectability,” in Moral Panics, Sex 
Panics: Fear the Fight over Sexual Rights, ed. Gilbert Herdt, (New York: New York University Press, 
2009), 104-129.  
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reading practices that allow us to process the complexity of cultural belonging and social 
membership in our current neoliberal juncture.39  
 Women of color feminism and queer of color critique question identitarian and 
nationalist modes of political organization by forging alternative understandings of 
collectivity, power, and subjectivity that lie outside the dictates of neoliberalism.40 Their 
method names the material conditions of racialized violence, which Western 
epistemologies all too easily dislodge onto narratives of cultural deficiency and 
individual shortcomings. To that extent, women of color feminism and queer of color 
critique organize around difference, not sameness.41 For that reason, these reading 
                                                
39 Roderick A. Ferguson and Grace K. Hong, ed., “Introduction,” in Strange Affinities: The Gender and 
Sexual Politics of Comparative Racialization (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).  
40 Arising out of the global neoliberal restructuring of capital in the 1970s and early 1980s, women of color 
feminism arose to make sense of the heteropatriarchal investments of cultural and revolutionary 
nationalisms, and the racially normative criteria of second-wave feminism and gay liberation politics. This 
new political order of neoliberalism was one informed by a service-oriented economy of finance, insurance, 
and law. This shift towards service economies relied on the gendered labor of women of color as its 
propelling force. However, under a single-issue lens of gendered oppression employed by second-wave 
feminists, the lived experiences of women of color were rendered illegible. As a result, women of color 
feminists called into question the racialized interpretations of womanhood by providing alternative 
epistemologies for engaging gender, feminism, and political organizing. They promoted intersectional 
analysis as central to the expression of the material conditions and the lived experiences of multiply 
positioned social actors, such as women of color. Women of color feminism, nonetheless, operates as more 
than a mere political formation. It is also a comparative methodology, or reading practice, that explicates 
the means through which differently produced subjectivities are formed in relation to one another according 
to the demands and contradictions of capital. Because it adheres to an intersectional analysis, women of 
color feminism employs difference as an analytical category and it stresses the importance of multiple-issue 
coalitional politics for multiply positioned social actors. In undermining the naturally-assumed relationship 
between attributes, actions, and desires in identity politics, women of color feminism disorganizes the very 
notion of a fixed identity. See: Grace K. Hong, The Ruptures of American Capital: Women of Color 
Feminism and the Culture of Immigrant Labor (Minneapolis: MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).  
41 Queer of color critique provides us with an analytic to make sense of the contradictions of capital and the 
demands of nation-state formations which queer theory, with its dismissal of race and materiality, is unable 
to successfully achieve. Roderick A. Ferguson defines queer of color critique as an analytic that 
“interrogates social formations as the intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and class, with particular 
interest in how those formations correspond with and diverge from nationalist ideals and practices.” 
Extending the critical endeavors of women of color feminist practice, queer of color critique employs 
materialist analysis and queer critique to “contradict the idea of the liberal nation-state and capital as sites 
of resolution, perfection, progress, and confirmation.” In challenging the assumptions of discrete, stable 
and fixed identitarian formations, queer of color critique takes up the limitations of queer critique by 
centering political economy, racial formation and an intersectional analytical framework.  An intersectional 




practices make possible what was once considered unthinkable—a language to describe 
coalitional movements outside normative criteria of discreteness and sameness. 
 Women of color feminism and queer of color critique situate culture as the 
medium for the production of alternative modes of affiliation and comparison. The 
melding of culture and citizenship—cultural citizenship—theorizes home not as an 
affective component that endorses a politics of privatization. Instead, cultural citizenship, 
as developed by cultural anthropologist Renato Rosaldo, denotes everyday practices of 
belonging in a participatory democracy despite differences of race, class, gender, or 
sexuality.42 Diaspora studies scholar Lok Siu elaborates upon Rosaldo’s definition by 
adding that cultural citizenship encompasses the “behaviors, discourses, and practices 
that give meaning to citizenship as lived experience” amid “an uneven and complex field 
of structural inequalities and webs of power relations.”43 Because citizenship has been 
primarily based on civic, economic, and political terms, cultural anthropologist Sunaina 
Marr Maira argues that this traditional model of citizenship is unable to render intelligible 
the cultural practices of membership in the nation-state.44 In addition to being 
incompetent at ensuring the legal protection of the racialized poor, legal citizenship is 
unable to attend to the neoliberalization of citizenship as discussed by Melamed and Ong. 
Without equal protection under the law, we must therefore devise new strategies that 
vouch for the rightful belonging of the racialized poor in public urban spaces. What I am 
                                                                                                                                            
produce specific material conditions and lived experiences. Roderick A. Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: 
Toward A Queer of Color Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 149, 3.  
42 Renato Rosaldo, “Cultural Citizenship and Educational Democracy,” Cultural Anthropology 9, no. 3 
(1994): 402-11. 
43 Lok Siu, “Diasporic Cultural Citizenship: Chineseness and Belonging in Central America and Panama,” 
Social Text 19, no. 4 (2001): 9.  
44  Sunaina Marr Maira, Missing: Youth, Citizenship, and Empire After 9/11 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2009).  
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calling a “spatial disidentification” can help us make sense of the quotidian practices of 
inclusion performed by marginalized subjects in a neoliberal landscape of central cities.  
 As an example of cultural citizenship, spatial disidentification describes the 
strategies enacted by the racialized poor to contest their devaluation within commodified 
spaces of the neoliberal city.45 For instance, homeless queer and trans youth of color in 
Chicago’s Boystown mobilize such spatial disidentificatory strategies to navigate through 
the racist, classist, homophobic, and transphobic social milieu of that gay neighborhood. 
The youth do not shop in the exclusive boutiques because they do not have the economic 
means to do so. They also do not frequent the posh nightclubs that such a neighborhood 
offers since most of this youth are underage. But, even so, this youth rejects the 
mainstream gay rights impulse towards spatialized homonormativity of domesticity, 
private property, and respectability as the preferred means for conveying social 
membership. Traditional community stakeholders of Boystown, like community activists, 
residents, business owners, and policymakers, market the neighborhood as a safe space, 
complete with sanitized doses of sexual difference. That representation of Boystown, 
however, requires that stakeholders uphold a type of cultural performance that does not 
drive capital away. Unable to abide by this cultural ethic, homeless queer and trans youth 
of color are portrayed as idle, recalcitrant, and vulgar. Still, in spite of not having 
property ties to the neighborhood, the youth lay claim to Boystown. The youth socialize 
                                                
45 Queer studies scholar José Esteban Muñoz defines a disidentification “to be descriptive of the survival 
strategies the minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that 
continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of normative 
citizenship.” As a simultaneous disavowal and negotiation, disidentification operates as “a third mode of 
dealing with dominant ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within such a structure nor strictly 
opposes it...a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology.” José Esteban Muñoz, 
Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics (Minneapolis: University of 




with one another at the wee hours of the morning; they “vogue” in public; or they engage 
in illicit practices such as sex work or drug use. Truth be told, I am not trying to 
romanticize the plight of homeless queer and trans youth of color. Their material realities 
circumscribe their life choices in very violent ways. I am, nonetheless, citing their lived 
experiences to shed light on alternative ways of belonging that resist the neoliberal logics 
all too frequently invoked by the mainstream gay rights movement in the West.  
 As my dissertation outlines, the gay rights movement may have rejected 
institutionalized homophobia, but it did not challenge capitalism, patriarchy, or white 
supremacy as normative systems of oppression. In the process, it reproduced the state’s 
methods for valuing and devaluing populations along the axes of race and sexuality. In 
his critique of the gay rights movement’s investment in hate crime laws, legal scholar 
Dean Spade reveals that advocates of trans equality have primarily pursued two law 
reform interventions. On the one hand, advocates seek anti-discrimination laws that list 
gender identity and/or expression as a category of nondiscrimination. On the other hand, 
advocates lobby on behalf of hate crime laws to include crimes motivated by the gender 
identity and/or expression of the victim.46 Advocates of such “trans rights” insist that the 
passage of anti-discrimination laws is beneficial as it creates a basis for legal claims 
against discriminating employers, housing providers, restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. 
Spade disputes such claims that these laws provide certain remedies to injured trans 
people. Having the experiences of discrimination and violence named in the law, he 
argues, only gives the illusion of trans equality. These punishment systems and economic 
                                                
46 Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics and the Limits of Law 
(Brooklyn, NY: South End Press, 2011).  
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arrangements are made nominally inclusive as they continue to commit violent deeds 
against other marginalized populations.  
 Moreover, hate crime laws do not actually improve the life chances of those these 
laws are designed to protect. For one, anti-discrimination reforms do not eliminate bias, 
exclusion, or marginalization. Strictly speaking, they do not have a deterrent effect; they 
merely administer punishment. According to critical race theorist Alan Freeman, 
discrimination law misunderstands the operation of discrimination. For Freeman, 
discrimination law addresses the harm of racism, or any other oppressive system, through 
a binary of perpetrator and victim. The perpetrator perspective interprets racism as an 
individual act committed by an irrationally-minded person who discriminates based on 
race. Because it individualizes racism and, by extension, obscures the structural nature of 
racism, the perpetrator perspective is largely ineffective at eradicating racism.47 By its 
very nature, discrimination law is only equipped to address the personal consequences of 
discrimination, not the structural conditions which engender racism, in the first place. 
 Inasmuch as hate crime laws frame violence in terms of individual wrongdoers, 
these laws legitimate the criminal punishment system as the arbiter of solutions to that 
discrimination. As I discuss in chapter three of my dissertation, the collaboration between 
the gay rights movement and the criminal punishment system in the legislation of hate 
crime laws is problematic. The criminal punishment system inflects an inordinate amount 
of violence on the very same people those laws are supposed to protect, homeless queer 
and trans youth of color being one particular group. Accordingly, we must remain 
hesitant to increase the punishment capabilities and resources of the criminal punishment 
                                                
47 Alan D. Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,” Minnesota Law Review 62 (1978): 1049-1119.   
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system. While the expansion of such punitive systems may not actually improve the life 
chances of the most resource-poor and vulnerable, the inclusion of previously 
marginalized populations within such systems—white gay men—may actually empower 
those systems in ways that continue to target those most at risk for individual and 
structural violence. 
 Because discrimination laws only change what the law says about a group of 
people without addressing the actual impact of that discrimination, we need approaches 
to violence that do not rely on the state as the guarantor of rights, benefits, and 
protections. In her critique of the anti-violence movement’s reliance on the criminal 
punishment system, Native scholar and feminist activist Andrea Smith compares the 
home of the United States—the greatest purveyor of racialized-gender violence for 
people of color and sexual minorities—to the private sphere of the home, statistically-
speaking the most dangerous place for women and children. Smith urges us to think 
beyond the state as the answer to domestic and sexual violence. A separatist approach, 
nevertheless, can lead to a reluctance to engage with other social justice movements. As 
such, we are faced with the challenge of developing and organizing models that take 
power and make power. Sista II Sista, a young women’s community organization in 
Brooklyn, utilizes a model of social justice which applies the dual strategies of “taking 
power” and “making power.” Smith describes this model in detail:  
  On the one hand, it is necessary to engage in oppositional politics to corporate 
and state power by taking power. Yet if we only engage in the politics of taking 
power, we will have a tendency to replicate the hierarchical structures in our 
movements. So it is also important to “make power” by creating those structures 
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within our organizations, movements, and communities that model the world we 
are trying to create. Many groups in the U.S. often try to create separatist 
communities based on egalitarian ideals. If we “make power” without also trying 
to “take power,” we ultimately support the political status quo by failing to 
dismantle structures of oppression that will undermine us.48 
Making claims on the state for citizen rights, benefits, and protections proves necessary. 
But this is not a completely effective approach if we hope to avoid the replication of the 
same racist, classist, sexist, and homophobic logics of the state. On the other hand, if we 
merely employ a utopian framework to separate ourselves from the ills of society, we fail 
to challenge the systems which occasioned our separatist stance in the first place and that 
continue to inflect violence on others. In light of that contradiction, it is of paramount 
importance that we engage the state, by demanding the redistribution of resources, as we 
simultaneously disengage from the state, by creating our own collectives for social 
justice. For if we only look to the state for our well-being, we will be at the mercy of its 
disciplinary regimes and we will become duplicitous in the brutality inflected against 
others.  
 The dual strategies of “taking power” and “making power,” along with the 
technique of spatial disidentification, are part and parcel of the political project and 
reading practices of women of color feminism and queer of color critique. In the seminal 
piece, “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens,” Cathy J. Cohen proposes a 
transformative coalitional politics under which we could situate the tactics of taking 
power/making power, and spatial disidentification. Cohen critiques queer studies and the 
                                                
48 Andrea Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: South End 
Press, 2005), 187.  
 
 550 
mainstream gay rights movement for failing to subscribe to an intersectional framework. 
This failure, Cohen argues, leads to the reproduction of new dichotomous logics between 
“heterosexuals” and “queers,” which ascribe entitlement onto all heterosexuals and assign 
marginalization onto all gay men and lesbians. Owing to the fact that this binary 
conception of sexuality does not recognize the multiple subject positions of individuals, it 
is unable to attend to the material conditions of working-class heterosexuals of color, and 
elite managerial white gay men and lesbians, factors which complicate the division of 
heterosexual power outlined in the model.49  
 As a result, Cohen proposes a transformative coalitional politics that attends to 
racial formation, the intersecting nature of identity, and the interlocking nature of systems 
of oppression. This politics is defined, not by discrete categories of identity, but by one’s 
position to power. Under this politics, Cohen explains that “one’s relation to power, and 
not some homogenized identity, is privileged in determining one’s political comrades.”50 
Cohen’s conceptualization of politics prescribes that one’s relation to power determine 
the creation of practices and spaces distanced from normativity (i.e., white supremacy, 
heteronormativity, homonormativity, neoliberal multiculturalism) to enable coalitional 
work across and through difference. My dissertation corroborates the immediacy for such 
a spatial approach to social justice. Racial, class, gender, and sexual particularities mold 
and dictate people’s metaphorical and material proximity to normativity and power. 
Given the spatial implications of capitalism and power, mobility—or lack thereof—is 
                                                
49 For instance, a heterosexual man of color may reap benefits from being heterosexual, yet he can still be 
“queered” from normative masculinity. Racialized masculinities do not emerge from the same relationships 
to citizenship, property, and self-will that constitutes white hegemonic masculinities. If anything, white gay 
men may be in closer alignment to the power vested in those white hegemonic masculinities. Cathy J. 
Cohen, “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?” GLQ: A 
Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 3, no. 4 (1997): 437-65.  
50 Ibid., 438.  
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shaped by people’s living environments. Therefore, to truly subvert dominant systems of 
knowledge and power, we must attend to the ways in which racialized norms of sexual 
hygiene confine people to distinct spatial locations. In narrating a transformative 
coalitional politics in such a spatialized way, we are able to expand existing social justice 
frameworks to critique gentrification by signaling the geographic shift away from the 
long liberal Western tradition of whiteness as property. And, in so doing, we privilege 
those living on the margins to theorize the social production of space and its relationship 
to the consolidation of categories and locations of social difference.  
As a central location for the creation of counter-hegemonic discourses, the 
margins offer the possibility of radical perspective to envision alternative, more just, 
worlds. According to feminist scholar bell hooks, marginality is “much more than a site 
of deprivation.” It is also the “site of radical possibility, a space of resistance.”51 As a site 
of transgression where marginalized groups are able to produce political alternatives to 
uniquely challenge the meaning of that marginalization, in the margins we do not need to 
assimilate to racialized norms of sexual hygiene to confirm our social value or to verify 
our aptitude for social membership. A social movement that attends to this fact, such as 
Black Lives Matter, is able to generate revolutionary meanings of social value that, in 
turn, inspire alternative meditations on the nature of power in late neoliberal capitalism.  
Women of color feminism and queer of color critique provide us with the tools to 
map the politics of lived experience in the United States and abroad, to recognize that 
space is continuously evolving because so is capital, identity, and power. These 
experiential feminist and queer theories of geography—taking power/making power, 
                                                




spatial disidentification, transformative coalitional politics—remind us that our inclusion 
within the rights, benefits, and protections associated with citizenship can be both 
emancipating yet inequitable, so that we do not rely wholeheartedly on the state’s 
approval to appraise our own social worth. Instead, we must nurture the multiple 
geographical knowledges that emerge from our lived experiences on the margins. Only 
then can we collectively cultivate new diverse spaces of resistance where the likes of 
Fabian Bridges and Michael Johnson, single mothers of color, sex workers of color, and 
the more than 70 million people infected with HIV since the beginning of the epidemic 
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